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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS, STATE OF UTAH 
BEAR RIVER MUTUAL INSURANCE ) 
COMPANY, ) 
Plaintiff/Appellant ) 
) Case No. 960362-CA 
) 940905590CN 
vs. ) 
JOHN WALL AND ) 
NANCY WALL, his wife, ) 
) Priority No. 15 
Defendants/Appellees ) 
JURSIDICITON 
This appeal is brought by the Plaintiff/Appellant Bear River Mutual 
Insurance Company, of Utah pursuant to Rule 3 and Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure which provides that an appeal may be taken from a 
District Court to the Appellate Court from all Orders and Final Judgment. 
The Order and Final Judgment of Judge Glenn Iwasaki was entered by 
the District Court of the Third District, for Salt Lake County, Sate of Utah on 
March 8, 1996. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
(Not required by Appellee) 
l 
DETERMINATION STATUTES OF RULES 
The Appellee believes that the determinative statues necessary to resolve 
this case are as follows: 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended 31A-22-306 
Utah Code Annotated, ? 953, as amended 3JA-22-307 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended 31A-22-308 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended 31A-22-309 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended 31-41-11 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 60b 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 54b 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case: 
This action was initiated by Plaintiff Bear River Mutual Insurance, of Utah, 
(hereinafter known as "Plaintiff Bear River") on September 2, 1994, in the District 
Court of the Third Judicial District in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah. A 
Complaint for Declaratory Judgment was brought before Judge Glen Iwasaki's 
Court, Civil number 940905590CN alleging a need for a court of law to 
determine the contractual obligations and rights of Plaintiff Bear River to John 
W. Wall and Nancy V. Wall, his wife, (hereinafter known as Defendant). On or 
about said time, it was the decision of Plaintiff Bear River to terminate nny rind 
all further PIP benefits for the Defendant, until a binding decision of said 
obligations and rights could be determined by a Court of Law. Said PIP benefits 
were terminated twenty-four (24) months ago, leaving the injured Defendant 
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with no medical coverage for her injuries and with medical bills still unpaid. 
Said action and alleged need for a "Declaratory Judgment" arose from 
an accident involving the Defendant, in Cortez, Colorado, on or about August 
6, 1992. At said time, Defendant was insured by Plaintiff Bear River under Policy 
Number CI45077, a Utah no-fault Auto Insurance policy. Defendant was in no 
way found to be at fault. 
Plaintiff Bear River began paying PIP benefits to Defendant's medical 
providers. Said payments exceeded the $3,000.00 Utah threshold, as well as the 
$5,000.00 Colorado threshold, thereby allowing for an action grounded in tort 
against the tort-feasor and her insurer, Hawkeye Security Insurance Company, 
of Colorado, for the Personal Liability of the tort-feasor. On or about March 4, 
1994, Defendants signed a release of Personal Liability for the tort-feasor Lana D. 
Waters and received a tort settlement. [ROA pgs. 11,52, 70,103, etc.] 
Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff Bear River terminated all of Defendant's PIP 
benefits and drafted a letter to Defendant explaining that Plaintiff Bear River 
was going to initiate a Court action - a "Complaint for Declaratory Judgment" 
to determine both Plaintiff Bear River's rights and those of the Defendant. 
b. Essential course of proceedings 
1. September 2, 1994, Plaintiff Bear River filed a "Complaint for 
Declaratory Judgment" before Judge Iwasaki's Court, in the District Court, 
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of the Third District, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, Civil 
Number 940905590CN. [ROA pgs. 1 -34] 
2. October 28, 1994, Defendant received a Summons and Complaint, 
at 11:10 a.m. from Plaintiff Bear River. [ROA pgs. 1 -34] 
3. November 17, 1994, Defendant filed an Answer and Counter Claim 
denying the allegations of Plaintiff Bear River's Complaint, pursuant to the 
Utah Supreme Court Decision, Allstate Insurance Company vs. Ivie, 
alleging that: 
a. Plaintiff Bear River was not released from their contractual 
obligations to Defendant for PIP benefits. 
b. That Plaintiff Bear River could only receive their 
reimbursement of PIP expenses in Binding Mandatory Arbitration 
with the tort-feasor insurer; not by an "equitable lien" upon 
Defendant's tort-settlement. 
c. That Defendants no-fault Auto Insurance Policy required that 
Defendant's PIP benefits must equal those of Colorado. 
[ROA pgs. 41-56] 
4. November 23, 1994, Plaintiff Bear River filed an Answer to said 
Counterclaim denying all allegations of said Counterclaim or was 
"without sufficient information to admit the same". [ROA pgs. 57-58] 
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5. December 13, 1994, Defendant filed a motion for Summary 
Judgment. [ROA pgs. 75-79] 
6. December 16, 1994, Plaintiff Bear River filed a Motion for Judgment 
On The Pleadings Or In Lieu Thereof Motion for Summary Judgment. 
[ROA pgs. 82-83] 
7. December 16, 1994, Plaintiff Bear River filed a Memorandum In 
Support Of Plaintiff's Motion For Judgment On The Pleadings Or In Lieu 
Thereof Motion For Summary Judgment And Memorandum In Opposition 
To Defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment, alleging that Defendant 
was attempting double recovery. That because Plaintiff Bear River was a 
Utah Company, their auto insurance policy complied with Utah Code 
31A-22-308 providing that, because said accident occurred in Colorado, 
Defendant had no cause of action and was "barred bv statute in any 
event" from making a claim. Said quote is completely and deliberately 
misquoted. 31A-22-308 states: 
The following may receive benefits under personal injury protection 
coverage: (1) The named insured, when injured in an accident 
involving any motor vehicle, regardless of whether the accident 
occurs in this state, the United States, its territories or possessions, or 
Canada, except where the injury is the result of the use or 
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operation of the named insured's own motor vehicle not actually 
insured under the policy. [ROA pgs. 84-103] 
8. December 28. 1994 Defendant filed their Memorandum In Support 
Of Defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment. [ROA pgs. 106-110] 
9. No notice to submit for decision was filed by either Plaintiff Bear 
River or Defendant. 
10. June 19. 1995. Defendant filed a Motion and Memorandum to 
Amend Defendant's Counter Claim pursuant to Rule 15 URCP Amended 
and Supplemental Pleadings, to include: 
a. A complaint for Breach of Insurance Contract and of Breach 
of good faith and fair dealings. 
b. Consequential damages. 
c. Reservation of Defendant's right to bring a future action in 
tort for "Communication Fraud" against Plaintiff Bear River. 
[ROA pgs. 266-339] 
11. July 17, 1995. Defendant filed a Notice To Submit For Decision 
concerning [ROA pgs. 266-339]. [ROA pgs. 340-341 ] 
12. July 18, 1995. Plaintiff Bear River filed a Motion for Rule 16 Motion for 
Scheduling Management Conference. [ROA pgs. 342-344] 
13. July 18, 1995. Plaintiff Bear River wrote a personal letter to Judge 
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Iwasaki. [ROA pgs. 357-358] 
14. July 21, 1995, Judge Iwasaki's Court ordered a scheduling 
conference. [ROA pgs. 359, 360] 
15. July 25, 1995, Defendant filed a second copy of said Amended 
Counter Claim. [ROA pgs. 365-402] 
16. August 1, 1995, Judge Iwasaki's Court filed a Notice of Scheduled 
Hearing for August 24, 1995. [ROA pgs. 403-404] 
17. August 24, 1995, Judge Iwasaki's Court heard oral arguments from 
both Plaintiff Bear River and Defendant. Plaintiff Bear River's motions on 
the pleadings were denied. Defendant's motions on the pleadings were 
granted: [ROA pg.534] 
a. Plaintiff Bear River was ordered to continue to pay 
Defendant's PIP benefits per the terms of their insurance contract 
with Defendant. 
b. On the Court's own motion. Defendant's Counterclaim was 
dismissed because Defendant had intermixed civil matters with 
criminal matters. 
c. Defendant's Amended Counter Claim was neither 
acknowledged nor dismissed. 
d. Plaintiff Bear River's attorney was directed to prepare the 
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order. [ROA pg. 406] (Exhibit "A") 
18. September 20, 1995, Defendant filed a Motion and Memorandum 
for Reconsideration of Judge Iwasaki's non-final Judgment, pursuant to 
Rule 54b of the URCP as provided for in Timm vs. Dewsnup 851 P.2d 1178 
at 1185 (Utah 1993), where the Utah Supreme Court states "We have 
previously held that Rule 54b permits reconsideration of non-final 
judgments 'Since it facilitates a just and speedy resolution of disputes in 
the trial court.'" And furthermore, the Utah Supreme Court in Bennion vs. 
Hansen 699 P.2d 757 at 760 (Utah 1985) says, "Until a court files its findings 
of fact, no decision has been rendered or final ruling made. Any Judge is 
free to change his or her mind on the out come of a case until a decision 
is formally rendered." 
Defendant ask the court to reconsider it's findings based upon 
(Exhibit "B") a memorandum filed eighteen (18) months prior to said 
"Complaint for Declaratory Judgment" by Plaintiff Bear River and 
authored authored by Attorney Thomas A. Duffin. Said memorandum 
completely contradicts all of Plaintiff Bear River's allegations in said 
"Complaint for Declaratory Judgment." Said memorandum concurs 
exactly with the findings of law made by Judge Iwasaki. 
[ROA pgs. 408-419] [ROA pgs. 420-453] (Exhibit "B") 
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19. October 6, 1995, Defendant filed a Notice to Submit For Decision 
concerning [ROA pgs. 408-409] [ROA pgs. 420-453]. [ROA pgs. 468-469] 
20. October 24, 1995, Defendant's Motion For Reconsideration was 
denied. [ROA pgs.470-471] 
21. November 20, 1995, Defendant again motioned the Court to 
reconsider said non-final Judgment [ROA pgs. 472-473]. [ROA pgs. 474-
486] 
22. December 12,1995, Defendant filed a Notice To Submit For Decision 
concerning [ROA pgs. 472-486]. [ROA pgs. 518-519] 
23. December 29, 1995, minute entry Defendant's Motion To 
Reconsider was again denied. [ROA pgs. 520-521 ] 
24. March 8. 1995, Plaintiff Bear River filed the Order And Final 
Judgment in which Defendant's motion to file a Amended Counter Claim 
was finally acknowledged by dismissing it without merit. [ROA pg. 534] 
25. April 3, 1996, Plaintiff Bear River filed Notice Of Appeal before Utah 
Supreme Court. [ROA pgs. 536-544] 
26. May 30, 1996, Plaintiff Bear River's appeal was pourover to the 
Court at Appeals for disposition. 
c. Disposition by the Court 
The proceeding statement of the course of the proceedings outlines all of 
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the material procedures and judicial facts in this case. However, Plaintiff Bear 
River's version differs substantially from that of the Defendant's and should be 
duly noted bv this court. Judge Iwasaki's Court entered it's Order And Final 
Judgment on March 8,1996, as follows: [ROA pg. 534] 
1. That the Defendants, John and Nancy Wall's Motion For Summary 
Judgment is granted and Plaintiff is required to pay John and Nancy Wall, 
pursuant to the provisions of its policy. Part B, Personal Injury Protection, 
those benefits since the time of the release signed by Defendants on 
March 4,1994, pursuant to the terms and conditions of the policy. 
2. That Plaintiff's Motion For Judgment on the Pleadings Or Summary 
Judgment is denied. 
3. That the Counter Claim filed by Defendants, John Wall and Nancy 
Wall, is hereby dismissed, and the Defendant's request to file and 
Amended Counter Claim is denied. 
The Defendant did not file a cross appeal on this issue, as pointed out by 
Plaintiff Bear River, concerning the dismissal of their Request To Amend their 
Counter Claim, but has instead filed an Independent Action, "Amended 
Complaint For Fraud" before the District Court of the Third District, in and for Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, Civil Number 96094641CV, on July 3, 1996, before 
Judge Sandra Pauler. Said independent action was filed pursuant to the 
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provisions of Rule 60b of the URCP providing for the power of the Court to 
entertain an independent common law action to set aside a judgment or 
decree for fraud, as well as the Utah Supreme Court in St. Pierre vs. Edmonds 645 
P2d 615 at 618 (Utah 1982) in which said Court states, the three month limitation 
period does "... not limit the power of a court to entertain an independent 
common law action to set aside a judgment or decree for fraud or duress after 
the three month period has expired." 
d. Statement of Relevant facts: 
1. The Plaintiff, Bear River Mutual Insurance Company of Utah, 
(hereinafter known as "Plaintiff Bear River") is an insurance corporation 
engaged in the insurance business in the State of Utah, having its principle 
place of business at 778 E. Winchester, Murray, Utah 84107. 
2. The Defendant, John W. Wall and Nancy V. Wall, his wife, are 
residents of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, and receive all mail at P. O. 
Box 540118, North Salt Lake, Utah 84054, and have so resided for the past 
five (5) years consecutively. [ROA pg. 41] 
3. Defendant was properly insured by Plaintiff Bear River under Policy 
Number CI45077, a Utah no-fault Auto Insurance Policy, governed by the 
laws and codes of the State of Utah, at the time of said accident. 
[ROA pg. 2] 
n 
On or about August 6,1992, Plaintiff Bear River's Insured Defendant Nancy 
V. Wall, was involved in an automobile accident in Cortez, Colorado. 
Defendant was in no way found to be at fault. 
Plaintiff Bear River began paying PIP benefits to Defendant's medical 
providers. Said payments exceeded the $3,000.00 Utah threshold, thereby 
allowing for an action grounded in tort against the tort-feasor and her Insurer, 
Hawkeye Security Insurance Company, of Colorado, for Personal Liability. On or 
about March 4, 1994, Defendant signed a release of Personal Liability in favor 
of, the tort-feasor, Lana D. Water and received a tort settlement. 
[ROA pg. 11,52,70, 103, etc.] 
On or about August 26,1994, Plaintiff Bear River notified Defendant of their 
intentions to file an action in the Third District Court, Salt Lake County, for a 
Declaratory Judgment. In addition to, on or about said time, Plaintiff Bear River 
terminated any and all further PIP benefits for Defendant. Said action left the 
injured Defendant without any medical coverage for her injuries and with 
medical bills still unpaid. 
On August 24, 1995, one year later, in Summary Judgment, Judge Glenn 
K. Iwasaki ordered Plaintiff Bear River to continue making said PIP payments, for 
Defendant, as per the terms of their no-fault Auto Insurance Contract, with 
Plaintiff Bear River. [ROA pg. 534] 
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In spite of said order, as of the date of this brief. Plaintiff Bear River has still 
refused to honor their Insurance Contract with Defendant and pay said PIP 
benefits. Instead, Plaintiff Bear River has claimed that Judge Iwasaki's decision 
was "unwarranted" and filed an appeal with the Utah Supreme Court. Said 
appeal was "poured over" to the Utah Court of Appeals. For the past (24) 
twenty-four months, Plaintiff Bear River has refused to pay any and all PIP claims 
or medical payments to Defendants medical providers because of various legal 
maneuvers. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Plaintiff Bear River, has asserted three points of alleged error before this 
Court in said appeal of Judge Iwasaki's decision. They are as follows: 
Point No. 1: That Judge Iwasaki's Court errored by determining that 
Defendant's release of the tort-feasor did not also release Plaintiff Bear River 
from any further obligations to Defendant for PIP benefits. 
Point No. 2: That Judge Iwasaki's Court errored by determining that Defendant 
did not waive or extinguish Plaintiff Bear River's rights in Arbitration Proceedings 
for reimbursement of PIP expenses paid to Defendant's medical providers. 
Point No. 3: That Judge Iwasaki's Court errored by determining that Defendant 
did not contractually waive or extinguish their right for future PIP benefits by 
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executing their general release of the tort feasor. 
All (3) three of Plaintiff Bear River's allegations of error by Judge Iwasaki's 
Court can be simply and completely eliminated by understanding that Judge 
Iwasaki ruled that the PIP benefits covered by Plaintiff Bear River's Auto 
Insurance Contract with Defendant and Defendant's tort settlement with 
attending release are separate and distinct. Plaintiff Bear River was never 
released from their contractual obligations and responsibilities for PIP benefits to 
Defendant, at all. Said release applies only to the Personal Liability of the tort 
feasor, to Defendant. (Exhibit "A") 
Much like a man who has a first mortgage on his home and also a 
second mortgage on the same property; payment of the first mortgage does 
not release or extinguish the liability of the second mortgage. The mortgages 
are separate and distinct, unless otherwise agreed. 
ARGUMENT 
Judge Iwasaki determined said separate and distinct nature based upon 
two Utah Supreme Court Decisions: The first, is Allstate Insurance Company vs. 
Ivie 606 P.2d 1197 at 1203 (Utah 1980); The second is, Allstate Insurance 
Company vs. Anderson 608 P.2d 235 at 236 (Utah 1980). 
[ROA pg. 75, 76, 80, 107, 133, 174, 175, 200, 270, etc.] 
14 
In Allstate vs. Ivie, at 1203: The Utah Supreme Court states, " . . . the tort-
feasor's liability insurer in fulfilling its duty to respond to the claim of the injured 
party to the limits of its policy, stands in the shoes of its insured and pays on the 
basis of the insured's personal liability to the tort victim; this personal liability 
does not include PIP payments. Thus the tort victim's recovery cannot be 
reduced by the PIP payments." 
[ROA pg. 75 ,76, 80,107,133,174,175, 200, 270, etc.] (Emphasis Added) 
In Allstate vs. Anderson, at 236: Twenty-four days later, on March 3, 1980, 
the Utah Supreme Court further clarified their decision in Allstate vs. Ivie, in 
Allstate Insurance Company vs. Anderson stating, "I concur on the basis that the 
recently decided case of Allstate Insurance Company vs. Ivie is now to be 
recognized as the law of this state. However, inasmuch as that case made a 
change in our law, I think it appropriate to make some further observations. In 
cases such as this, it is important to keep in mind the distinction between the 
two classes of claims: First, the personal injury protection (PIP) benefits, which are 
to be paid to the claimant (the person who suffers the injuries) by his own insurer, 
regardless of fault. Second, there is the possible tort claim against the alleged 
wrongdoer, back up by his insurer. If it appears that the wrongdoer is or would 
be legally liable to the claimant, then the wrongdoer's insurer must reimburse 
the claimant's insurer for PIP payments it has made, this is to be done under the 
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procedure provided in section 31-41-11 UCA 1953; and this PIP payment is not to 
be considered as part of any settlement between the claimant and the 
wrongdoer or his insurer, (unless the parties clearly understand and agree 
otherwise.)" 
[ROA pg. 75, 76,80,107,133,174,175, 200, 270, etc.] (emphasis added) 
Again in 1980, the Utah Supreme Court reaffirmed the decision of Ivie, in 
Guaranty National Insurance Company vs. Morris, 611 P.2d 725 at 727 (Utah 
1980) stating, " . . . the no fault insurer who has paid PIP benefits to its insured is 
not entitled, by way of subrogation to reimbursement of those funds from 
subsequent recovery by its insurer against the third party tort-feasor or his insurer. 
Rather as was explained in that case, any reimbursement claimed by the PIP 
insurer is to be sought in arbitration proceedings between the insurance 
companies of the respective parties, as provided in Section 31-41-11 UCA 1953. 
The gist of the decision was that PIP payment would not be considered as part 
of any settlement between the insured party and the third-party tort-feasor or 
his insurer." (emphasis added) 
Without a doubt, it can be clearly seen that PIP benefits and the Personal 
Liability of the tort-feasor are separate and distinct. Plaintiff Bear River was 
never released from their contractual obligations to Defendant for PIP benefits. 
PIP benefits are not, in anyway, to be considered as any part of the Personal 
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Liability of the tort-feasor. 
As the Utah Supreme Court stated in Allstate vs. Anderson, the first liability 
is personal injury protection (PIP) benefits, to be paid to the injured by the 
injured's insurer regardless of fault. The second liability, is the possible tort claim 
against the alleged wrongdoer backed up by his insurer. These liabilities are 
separate and distinct and PIP payments are not to be considered as any part of 
the tort-feasor's Personal Liability, paid in the tort settlement. 
The release of liability Defendants signed, released only the tort-feasor of 
her Personal Liability to Defendants, (the second liability). Defendants cannot 
release the tort-feasor insurer's liability to the no-fault insurer for PIP 
reimbursement. As the Utah Supreme Court stated in Jaramillo vs. Farmers 
Insurance Group 669 P.2d 1231 at 1235 (Utah 1980) "Bv what leaal right can a 
stranger compromise another's legal liability? Under the Utah No Fault Act and 
Ivie and its proaencv the obligation to reimburse the no-fault insurer is solely that 
of the liability insurer and the injured person can not compromise that right." 
Furthermore: In Ivie, at 1203: The Utah Supreme Court states, "The No-fault 
insurer by being subrogated to the rights of the insured as provided by 31-41-11 
has a right to collect directly from the tort-feasor's insurer (whether or not the 
insured party has filed a tort claim) by way of arbitration pursuant to 31-41-11. If 
the insured party files an action against the third party tort-feasor which results in 
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a judgment for the insured, the judgment would be given dispositive effect on 
the issue of fault and the relative liabilities of the insurance companies in the 
arbitration proceedings, for it is in the arbitration proceedings that the no-fault 
insurer is subrogated to the rights of the insured." 
Consequently, Defendant's tort-settlement can and will only aid Plaintiff 
Bear River's case in arbitration with the tort-feasor insurer. 
Therefore, the release of the tort-feasor's Personal Liability has no affect 
on relationship to the contractual obligations of Plaintiff Bear River to 
Defendant, for PIP benefits. 
Wherefore: 
1. Plaintiff Bear River was never released from their Contractual 
Obligations to Defendant and consequently was not released from their 
obligation to Defendant for Personal Injury Protection or PIP benefits. 
2. Defendant cannot and did not "waive or extinguish" the liability 
owed Plaintiff Bear River by the tort-feasor insurer Hawkeye Security Insurance 
Company for reimbursement of PIP expenses, to be recovered in the arbitration 
proceedings. 
3. Plaintiff Bear River was never released from their Contractual 
obligations to Defendant and therefore Plaintiff Bear River is still contractually 
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liable to Defendant for future Personal Injury Protection benefits, as per the 
terms of said Auto Insurance Contract. 
Plaintiff Bear River further alleges that Defendants "are now attempting to 
. . . seek double recover." The Utah Supreme Court has addressed Plaintiff's 
allegations of "double recovery" many times in the following decisions: 
a. Allstate Insurance Company vs. Ivie 606 P.2d 1197 at 1203 and 1204 
(Utah 1980). 
b. Allstate Insurance Company vs. Anderson 608 P.2d 235 at 236 (Utah 
1980). 
c. Street vs. Farmers Insurance Exchange 609 P.2d 1343 at 1346 (Utah 
1980). 
d. Transamerica Insurance Company vs. Barnes 505 P.2d 783 at 787 
(Utah 1972). 
In Ivie, at 1203:".. . the result reached by a majority of the Court will not 
result in double recovery to an injured person. It will on the other hand, result in 
greater efficiency, accuracy and fairness in determining the relative rights of the 
interested parties." (emphasis added) 
In Anderson, at 236: "It is important that parties involved in such situations 
be aware of those rights and obligations, as now adjudicated under the No-
19 
fault Act. This is to prevent double recovery and double payment for the same 
loss and incidently to avoid increased costs of insurance coverage, in frustration 
of the very purpose of the act." 
In Street, at 1346: "The right of subrogation, as explained in Ivie, is a right to 
be exercised in an arbitration proceeding between Insurance Companies of the 
respective parties so that double recovery can be avoided, unnecessary 
litigation made less likely and the inherent conflict between the insured and the 
insurer avoided." 
In Transamerica, at 1204: Should double recovery be suspected by an 
insurer, it is a matter which said insurer must" . . . present proof which establishes 
that the damages covered by defendant's settlement were the same or 
covered those for which defendant has already received indemnity from 
(insurer); otherwise the receipt of payment from the tort-feasor does not entitle 
(insurer) to return of payment made by it." 
It is true, as Plaintiff Bear River has pointed out time and time again that 
"double recovery", "double payment", "open end medical funds", "windfall 
profits", etc., etc., etc., etc., are prohibited. But NOT ONCE HAS PLAINTIFF Bear 
River COMPILED WITH THE UTAH SUPREME COURT REQUIREMENTS WHEREBY SAID 
ACCUSATIONS ARE CLEARLY DEMONSTRATED. Plaintiff Bear River has only "dirtied 
the water" by slinging about irrelevant, pre Ivie, Utah Supreme Court decisions 
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and arguments. Plaintiff Bear River is desperately attempting to infer that 
Defendant is a "bad guy" attempting to rip off the system, via double recovery. 
As the cornerstone or "nutshell" of Plaintiff Bear River's argument. Plaintiff 
has presented the Utah Supreme Court decision, Jones vs. Transamerica 
Insurance Company 592 P.2d 609 (Utah 1979) as identical to the issue at bar. 
Said comparison is completely and totally false. Defendant's did receive 
a tort-settlement from the tort-feasor insurer. Defendants did release the tort-
feasor from any further Personal Liability to Defendant (the second liability). 
However, Defendant was only paid PIP benefits (the first liability) by their no-fault 
insurer. Plaintiff Bear River. Defendant did not release Plaintiff Bear River from 
their liability for PIP benefits, because Plaintiff Bear River has not fulfilled their 
contractual obligations to Defendant for PIP benefits. The distinction between 
the issue at bar and the "Jones" case is simply — the tort-feasor insurer, 
Hawkeye Security Insurance Company has paid absolutely no PIP benefits to 
Defendant, what-so-ever. PIP benefits are not the responsibility of the tort-
feasor insurer, they are the contractual responsibility of the no-fault Auto Insurer, 
Plaintiff Bear River, as provided in Allstate vs. Ivie and Allstate vs. Anderson. 
[ROA pg. 75, 76, 80, 107, 133, 174, 175, 200, 270, etc.] 
In "Jones" the injured received all PIP benefits directly from the tort-feasor 
insurer rather than his own insurer. The injured then attempted to collect 
additional PIP benefits, from his own insurer, but was refused. Said issue went 
before the Utah Supreme Court in Jones vs. Transamerica Insurance Company, 
where said injured was again denied. Said Court determined that the injured 
had chosen his course of recovery, through and by the tort-feasor insurer, rather 
than his own insurer. That the injured had settled with the tort-feasor insurer for 
said Personal Injury or PIP benefits. That the injured had thereby extinguished his 
insurer's right of subrogation. 
In 1980, one year after the 1979 "Jones" case, the Utah Supreme Court 
"changed the law" in and by Allstate vs. Ivie and Allstate vs. Anderson, 
concerning PIP benefits and the Personal Liability of the tort-feasor. Said Court 
determined that PIP benefits and the Personal Liability of the tort feasor, are 
separate and distinct. That PIP benefits are to be paid bv the injured's no-fault 
Auto Insurer. That if and when damages exceed a $3,000.00 threshold, the 
nonliable or not at fault injured, can pursue a claim against the tort-feasor for 
the Personal Liability. That when said Personal Liability or tort settlement is paid, 
the injured can release the tort-feasor, separately and distinctly, from all 
Personal Liability to the injured. That when the Contractual Liability, of the no 
fault insurer, for PIP benefits to their injured has been fulfilled, said no-fault Insurer 
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can, at that time, pursue their reimbursement of PIP expenses from the tort-
feasor insurer, in Binding Mandatory Arbitration. 
On page (15) fifteen of Plaintiff Bear River brief before the Utah Court of 
Appeals, Plaintiff Bear River states, "Bear River Mutual is not attempting to 
recover or claim any interest in the Wall's settlement with Lana D. Waters and 
her insurance carrier and their settlement. [ROA pg. 33] The settlement was 
within the insurance policy limits of the Water's Insurance Policy. [ROA pg. 
533]". "These are not issues in this appeal, neither were they issues in the trial 
court." 
By said statements. Plaintiff Bear River has acknowledged that there were 
no funds inappropriately paid to Defendant that should have been paid to 
Plaintiff Bear River for reimbursement of PIP expenses. Nor has Plaintiff Bear River 
demonstrated that the tort-feasor insurer has inappropriately included PIP 
benefits within said tort settlement, thereby paying the obligations of the no-
fault insurer, Plaintiff Bear River for PIP benefits, (the first liability). Therefore, as 
the Utah Supreme Court has determined in Allstate vs. Ivie and in Allstate vs. 
Anderson - said PIP payments are not and were not any part of the tort 
settlement received by Defendant. 
If Plaintiff Bear River should suspect that Defendant did collect PIP 
benefits from the tort-feasor insurer, then Plaintiff Bear River must prove those 
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allegations. Again, the Utah Supreme Court, in Transamerica Insurance 
Company vs. Barnes, 505 P.2d 783 at 787 (Utah 1972) as well as Allstate 
Insurance Company vs. Ivie at 1204 (Utah 1980), states that said insurer"... must 
present proof which establishes that the damages covered by defendant's 
settlement were the same or covered those for which defendant has already 
received indemnity from (insurer)..." 
Plaintiff Bear River has never once attempted to prove said allegations 
but has only inferred double payments would result if Plaintiff Bear River were to 
fulfill the terms of their insurance contract with Defendant. 
Plaintiff Bear River stated that they filed their "Complaint for Declaratory 
Judgment" on October 28, 1994, under authority of the Utah Supreme Court 
decision Western Casualty and Surety Co. vs. Marchant 615 P.2d 423 at 427 
(Utah 1980), in which said Court states, "It would not comport with our ideas of 
either law or justice to prevent any party who entertains bona fide questions 
about his legal obligations from seeking adjudication thereon in the courts." 
[ROA pg. 422] (emphasis added) 
On April 14, 1993, (18) eighteen months prior to initiating said Complaint 
for Declaratory Judgment, Plaintiff Bear River, filed a memorandum in Judge 
Medley's Court, in the Third District, for Salt Lake County, State of Utah. Said 
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Memorandum was entitled "Amended Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's 
Motion to File An Amended Complaint" Civil Number 920905486PD. 
[ROA pg. 424-433] 
In said Memorandum, Mr. Thomas A. Duffin, representing Plaintiff Bear 
River and addressing an Insurance Company's obligations in the State of Utah, 
for PIP payments and the recovery of their costs, stated the following: 
a. "The Ivie case makes it unequivocally clear that the personal injury 
protection benefits do not become part of the Plaintiff's (claimant's) 
negligence against the tort-feasor. They are distinct and separate and 
they have nothing to do with the tort-feasor or claimant's cause of 
action." (emphasis added) 
b. ". . . the insured contractually has a claim against his insurance 
company for payment of these benefits. Then the reimbursement is 
covered by statute pursuant to arbitration." 
c. Mr. Duffin then quotes Utah Code annotated 1953, as amended 
31 A-22-309(5) indicating the contractual nature of PIP benefits. 
d. Finally, Mr. Duffin concludes that PIP benefits and the recovery of 
their costs is "contractual and statutory". 
Beyond any doubt. Plaintiff Bear River has clearly and convincing 
demonstrated their knowledge and understanding of the Codes, Laws and 
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Utah Supreme Court decisions governing PIP benefits and the recovery of their 
costs in the State of Utah. 
Yet, in spite of this clear and convincing knowledge, Plaintiff Bear River, 
on October 28, 1994, filed said Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, Civil 
Number 940905590CN alleging the following: [ROA pgs. 1-34] 
a. that the release of tort-liability Defendant signed in favor of the tort-
feasor also released Plaintiff Bear River of all obligations for any further PIP 
benefits to Defendant's Medical Providers. 
b. that the only remedy Plaintiff Bear River had for the recovery of 
their Contractual PIP expenses was for the Court to order that Plaintiff 
Bear River was entitled to an "equitable lien upon the proceeds of 
Defendant's tort settlement". [ROA pg. 8] 
Plaintiff Bear River's said Memorandum directly and completely 
contradicts Plaintiff's Complaint for Declaratory Judgment. Plaintiff Bear River's 
said Memorandum concurs exactly with the findings of law made bv 
Judae Iwasaki's Court, as follows: (Exhibit "A) 
o. that Defendant's tort settlement and Defendants Insurance 
Contract with Plaintiff are separate and distinct. 
b. that the recovery of PIP expenses by Plaintiff Bear River was to be 
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pursued in Arbitration with the tort-feasor insurer. 
c. that the Utah Supreme Court decision in Allstate Insurance 
Company vs. Ivie and its progeny govern said issue. 
d. that Defendant contractually has a claim against their Insurance 
Company, Plaintiff Bear River for payment of PIP benefits per the 
terms of said contract. 
Now Plaintiff Bear River has appealed the decision of Judge Iwasaki's 
Court, in spite of the fact, said Court ruled exactly as Plaintiff Bear River has 
explained in their Memorandum. 
Clearly, Plaintiff Bear River had no "bonafide" questions of law and 
therefore had no need to initiate said Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, at 
all. [ROA pg. 424-433] 
Because Plaintiff Bear River had no "bonafide" need for said Complaint 
for Declaratory Judgment there was absolutely no need to terminate all of 
Defendants legitimate, contractual PIP benefits pending a decision from Judge 
Iwasaki's Court - then a decision from that the Utah Supreme Court - and now a 
decision from the Utah Court of appeals. [ROA pgs. 421, 422,423] 
Defendant submits that clearly Plaintiff Bear River's actions constitute 
fraud. Fraud upon our system of Justice and fraud upon Defendant. 
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The Utah Supreme Court, in Crookston vs. Fire Insurance 817 P.2d 789, 
(Utah 1991) at 800, states that for fraud to be proven, such an action must 
clearly and convincingly demonstrate the following: 
a. "That a representation was made . . . " 
Plaintiff Bear River represented to the Court that because 
Defendant had entered into a settlement with the tort-feasor, Defendant 
had knowingly and willingly terminated any obligation Plaintiff Bear River 
had to continue further PIP benefits for Defendant. 
Plaintiff Bear River further represented to said Court, that the 
"release" Defendant signed in favor of the tort-feasor had destroyed 
Plaintiff Bear River's right of subrogation in the matter and consequently 
Plaintiff Bear River was entitled to an "equitable lien" upon the proceeds 
of Defendant's tort-settlement. 
b. "concerning a presently existing material fac t . . . " 
There are two existing Utah Supreme Court decisions governing this 
very issue. They are specifically, Allstate Insurance Company vs. Ivie, 606 
P.2d 1197 (Utah 1980) and Allstate Insurance Company vs. Anderson 608 
P.2d 235 (Utah 1980). 
[ROA pg. 75, 76, 80, 107, 133, 174, 175, 200, 270, etc.] 
There are at least four more Utah Supreme Court decisions 
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discussing and reaffirming said Utah Supreme Court findings. They are 
specifically: 
• Street vs. Farmers Insurance Exchange 609 P.2d 1343 (Utah 
1980) 
• Guaranty National Insurance Company vs. Morris 611 P.2d 
725 (Utah 1980) 
• Laub vs. South Central Utah Telephone Association 657 P.2d 
1304 (Utah 1982) 
• Jaramillo vs. Farmers Insurance Group 669 P.2d 1231 (Utah 
1983) 
All of the aforementioned Utah Supreme Court cases decide and 
reaffirm the following: 
". . . the no-fault insurer who has paid PIP benefits to its 
insured is not entitled, by way of subrogation, to 
reimbursement of those funds from subsequent recovery by 
its insured against the third-party tort-feasor or his insurer. 
Rather, as was explained in that case, any reimbursement 
claimed by the PIP insurer is to be sought in an arbitration 
proceeding between the insurance companies of the 
respective parties, as provided in section 31-41-11, U.C.A.1953. 
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The gist of the decision was that the PIP payment would not 
be considered as part of any settlement between the injured 
party and the third-party tort-feasor or his insurer." Guaranty 
National Insurance Company vs. Morris 611 P.2d 725 (Utah 
1980) at 727. (emphasis added) 
c. "which was false . . . " 
It can therefore be clearly seen, that the representations made in 
said Complaint for Declaratory Judgment by Plaintiff Bear River are false. 
Tort-settlements and PIP benefits are separate and distinct. A release of 
the tort-feasor has no effect or relationship to the contractual obligations 
of the PIP insurer. Plaintiff Bear River. And subrogation of tort-settlements is 
not allowed unless damages are "proven on a record with evidence". 
d. "which the representor either (a) knew to be false, or (b) made 
recklessly, knowing that he for shel had insufficient knowledge upon 
which to base such representation . . . " 
Plaintiff Bear River's aforementioned Memorandum, in Civil Case 
Number 920905486PD, clearly and convincingly demonstrates that 
Plaintiff Bear River, knew beyond any doubt, (18) eighteen months prior to 
initiating said Complaint, the Laws, Codes and Utah Supreme Court 
Decisions governing this issue. Yet, in spite of this knowledge. Plaintiff Bear 
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River and their attorney Mr. Thomas A. Duffin have deliberately 
misrepresented their knowledge of those facts to the Court, thereby 
blocking the payment of PIP benefits for Defendant. 
e. "for the purpose of inducing the other party to act upon i t . . . " 
Without any doubt, it can be seen, that Plaintiff Bear River brought 
said "Complaint for Declaratory Judgment" before the Court solely for 
the purpose of inducing said Court to act upon their arguments. Thereby, 
allowing Plaintiff Bear River to deny any further PIP benefits to Defendant 
and to obtain their reimbursement of PIP costs directly and illegally from 
Defendant's tort-settlement. 
f. "that the other party acting reasonably and in ignorance of its 
falsity..." 
g. "did rely upon i t . . . " 
h. "and was thereby induced to ac t . . . " 
Said Court accepted Plaintiff Bear River's Complaint as legitimate 
and ruled that their Declaratory Action was justified, even though Plaintiff 
Bear River was clearly and convincingly aware of the Laws, Codes, and 
Utah Supreme Court decisions, at the very least, (18) eighteen months 
prior to initiating said Complaint. Plaintiff Bear River did not need or 
require said Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, at all. 
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In Pepper vs. Zions First National Bank N.A., 801 P.2d 144 at 148 (Utah 1990), 
the Utah Supreme Court states, ". . . that the fraud alleged need only affect 
that the basic fairness of the adjudication." 
Through Judge Iwasaki's Court ruled against Plaintiff Bear River on every 
single issue in Summary Judgment, except one, it is that issue which has 
destroyed the total fairness of said adjudication. 
Said Court ruled that Plaintiff Bear River's action for Declaratory Judgment 
was "fairly debatable and needed to be handled in a declaratory manner." 
By said ruling, Judge Iwasaki's Court absolved Plaintiff Bear River of all 
allegations of breach of Insurance Contract. Yet, breach of Insurance Contract 
is exactly what Plaintiff Bear River has accomplished by said manipulation of our 
system of justice. In Beck vs. Farmers Insurance Exchange 701 P.2d 795 at 798 
and 801 (Utah 1985) the Utah Supreme Court upheld an Insurer's duty "to 
perform a first party insurance Contract in good faith." Failure to do so, is to be 
considered a breach of contract. Furthermore, the Utah Supreme Court 
maintained that the duty of good faith requires an insurer "to refrain from 
actions that will injure the insured's ability to obtain benefits of contract." 
Plaintiff Bear River's Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and 
consequential denial of Defendant's PIP benefits have without a doubt injured 
Defendants "ability to obtain benefits of contract." Plaintiff Bear River for the 
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past (24) twenty-four months has totally eliminated Defendant's PIP benefits, for 
no "bonafide" reason, what-so-ever. 
Plaintiff Bear River has stated that Defendants, Pro Se, have clouded this 
issue, displaying their ignorance with a "donnybrook" of pleadings. In an effort 
to correct said "donneybrook" of pleadings, on June 19, 1995 Defendants filed 
a "Motion to Amend Defendant's Counter Claim Pursuant to Rule 15 URCP 
Amended and Supplemental Pleadings, along with supporting Memorandum. 
On July 17,1995, Defendant filed a "Notice to Submit for Decision." 
[ROA pgs. 266-268] [ROA pgs. 269-339] [ROA pgs. 340-341] 
No pre-trial conference had been scheduled nor had a trial date been 
set. Defendant's Motion, Memorandum and Notice to Submit for Decision were 
totally and completely ignored for (8) eight months by Judge Iwasaki's Court, 
until said Court dismissed them, without Merit, in Plaintiff's version of the Final 
Order and Judgment. [ROA pgs. 533-534] 
Judge Iwasaki's (Bench Ruling) never once mentioned Defendant's 
motion to their Amended Counter Claim. However, said Amended Counter 
Claim was thereby deliberately included within the "Final Order and Judgment 
by Plaintiff Bear River and dismissed without merit. 
(Exhibit "A") 
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As further demonstration of Plaintiff Bear River's intent, motives, and 
method Defendant asks this Court to review the following: 
[ROA oa. 84-103]. On December 16, 1994, Plaintiff Bear River filed a 
"Memorandum In Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings or 
In Lieu Thereof, Motion for Summary Judgment and Memorandum in Opposition 
to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
No notice to submit for decision was ever filed on any issue allegedly 
brought before this Court by, Plaintiff Bear River. 
[ROA pas. 93-941. In said Memorandum Plaintiff. "Bear River deliberately 
rewords Utah State Code 31 A-22-308 stating under Point II, Bear River's Policy for 
PIP was issued to comply with the Utah Code. Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as 
amended 31 A-22-308 provides that PIP benefits are payable to covered persons 
injured in an automobile accident occurring in the State of Utah. The accident 
in this case occurred in Colorado. Therefore, the claim made by Defendants 
does not provide for a cause of action unless it occurs in Utah and is, therefore, 
barred by statute in any event." 
When in fact, Utah Code 31 A-22-308, Persons covered by personal injury 
protection states exactly the opposite, as follows: "The following may receive 
benefits under personal injury protection coverage: [ROA pgs. 134,135] 
(1) the named insured, when injured in an accident involving any 
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motor vehicle, regardless of whether the accident occurs in this 
state, the United States, its territories or possessions, or Canada, 
except where the injury is the result of the use or operation of the 
named insured's own motor vehicle not actually insured under the 
policy:" 
fROA pq. 91, 92, 95, 96, 97]. Plaintiff Bear River references the following 
cases as current and viable and justification for Plaintiff Bear Rivers actions 
against Defendant. 
Jamison vs. Utah Home Fire Insurance Company 559 P.2d 958 (Utah 1977). 
Jones vs. Transamerica Insurance Company 592 P.2d 609 (Utah 1979). 
State Farm Mutual vs. Farmers Insurance Exchange 450 P.2d 458 (Utah 
1969). 
Geetz vs. State Farm Fire and Casualty 451 P.2d 860 (Oregon 1969). 
Catmull vs. Medical Integrated Systems Inc. 517 P.2d 1003 (Utah 1974). 
All of the a fore-mentioned cases are totally irrelevant and out-dated. 
The procedures discussed and indicated were superceeded by those of Allstate 
Insurance Company vs. Ivie 606 P.2d 1197 (Utah 1980) and Allstate Insurance 
Company vs. Anderson 608 P.2d 235 (Utah 1980). [ROA pg. 75, 76, 80, 107, 133, 
174, 175, 200,270, etc.] 
[ROA pg. 9, 82, 83]. Plaintiff Bear River claims that Defendant has 
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destroyed Plaintiff Bear River's right to subrogation and recovery of their PIP 
expenses. Yet on [ROA pg. 88, 89] Plaintiff Bear River acknowledges that after 
all. Plaintiff can settle using ". . . Mandatory Arbitration with the tort-feasor 
insurance company, Hawkeye Security Insurance Company." 
fROA pa. 1221. Plaintiff Bear River states, "In Colorado there is no right of 
reimbursement between insurance companies regardless of the fault of their 
insured." When in fact, Colorado State Code, Section 10-4-717, Inter Company 
Arbitration, pages 336-337 states that reimbursement between insurers shall be 
accomplished via mandatory binding arbitration. (Exhibit "D") 
[ROA pg. 144, 183, 210, 2821. Plaintiff Bear River in a letter to the tort-feasor 
insurer, dated July 8, 1993, claims to have paid $5,000.00 for collision coverage. 
No such payment was ever made to or received by Defendant. 
On September 20, 1995, six (6) months before Judge Iwasaki's decision 
became final, Defendant attempted to present Plaintiff Bear River's said 
Memorandum to the Court for consideration. Defendant filed a "Motion for 
Reconsideration and Assessment of New Evidence" with supporting 
memorandum. Said Motion for Reconsideration is allowed by the Utah 
Supreme Court in Timm vs. Dewsnup 857 P.2d 1178 at 1184 and 1885 (Utah 1993). 
Said Court states that should new material facts come ". . . to light between 
entry of summary judgment and the subsequent motion to reconsider,..." Rule 
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54(b) permits reconsideration of a non-final judgment "since it facilitates the just 
and speedy resolution of disputes in the trial court." [ROA pg. 472-473] 
And again the Utah Supreme Court, provides for the re-evaluation of non-
final decisions in Bennion vs. Hansen 699 P.2d 757 at 760 (Utah 1985) the Utah 
Supreme Court states "Until a court files its findings of fact, no decision has been 
rendered or final ruling made. Any judge is free to change his or her mind on 
the outcome of a case until a decision is formally rendered." [ROA pg. 474-486] 
However, in spite of the Utah Supreme Courts provisions for 
reconsideration, Defendant's motions were dismissed without merit. 
[ROA pgs. 534] 
CONCLUSION 
There are no excuses for the actions of Plaintiff Bear River. There are no 
debatable issues of law in this action. There are no "bonafide" questions in 
need of answers by a Court of Law. The only debate that exists, is that which 
Plaintiff Bear River has attempted to create - to justify their denial of 
Defendants' legitimate, contractual, PIP benefits and their attempt to 
subrogate Defendant's tort-settlements with an "equitable lien". Without a 
doubt. Plaintiff Bear River knew and understood their obligations as no-fault 
Auto Insurance providers, in the State of Utah, affhe very least (18) eighteen 
37 
months prior to initiating said Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, as clearly 
and convincingly demonstrated by said Memorandum. (Exhibit "B") 
The Laws, Codes, and Utah Supreme Court decisions involved in this issue 
are now (16) sixteen years old. The process of arbitration is a process in which 
Plaintiff Bear River has undoubtedly participated in many, many times to 
receive their reimbursement of PIP expenses, from other insurer's, of liable tort-
feasors. Said arbitration is a practice which provides Plaintiff Bear River with 
much of its financial income. 
Defendant submits that Plaintiff Bear River has and is fraudulently 
manipulating this issue to justify and to avoid paying Defendant's PIP benefits, as 
well as to very possibly set a precedent for future denial of legitimate PIP benefits 
to other injured policy holders. 
The Utah Supreme Court, in McBride vs. Jones 615 P.2d 431 at 433 (Utah 
1980) admonishes,"... that the courts should not forsake the interests of justice; 
and when it appears that an egregious deception or oppression may have 
been practiced, it should neither be condoned nor rewarded. Particularly, that 
this should not be done by allowing one to seek refuge in niceties of legal 
terminology." ". . . where the contentions make it appear that there is 
substantial likelihood that the proof may show that a party was so cheated, 
imposed upon or unfairly dealt with that it would shock the conscience of the 
38 
court to allow it to stand, the court should resolve doubts in favor of permitting 
the parties to present their evidence and have the issues determined." 
This issue is now (2) two years old. The costs to Defendants have been 
enormous, specifically: 
a. Defendant has many unpaid medical bills as result of Plaintiff Bear 
River's denial of said PIP benefits. 
b. Defendant has been unable to receive Doctor prescribed physical 
therapy because Defendant cannot afford said treatments without 
insurance reimbursement. 
c. Defendant's credit is slowly being destroyed as a result of this issue. 
d. Defendant has lost their construction loan, on their new home, 
because of this issue. 
e. Defendant cannot live in their partially finished new home, 
because of this issue. 
f. Defendant's son was expelled from the school district, in which said 
home was being constructed, because of unmet residency requirements, 
resulting from this issue. 
g. Defendant's new marriage has suffered greatly because of 
disharmony and frustration as a result of this fraudulent action. 
In a case very similar to the issues at bar, the Utah Supreme Court in 
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Crookston vs. Fire Insurance 817 P.2d 789 at 816 (Utah 1991) states, "One may 
never know how many of the thousands of claims handled in Utah and 
elsewhere by the defendant(plaintiff) have been subject to the same kind of 
fraudulent manipulation as occurred in this case, with devastating losses to 
those who contracted in good faith. A $4,000,000.00 punitive damage award 
can certainly have a salubrious effect in inducing the defendant(plaintiff) to 
bring its practices into harmony with common moral conduct and accepted 
business ethics to say nothing of the requirements of the law." 
Wherefore: Defendant asks this Court to determine: 
1. That the findings of Judge Iwasaki's Court were correct, with one 
exception. 
2. That said exception is specifically that there exists no "bonafide" 
questions of law in this issue, no debatable points of law justifying Plaintiff 
Bear River's "Complaint for Declaratory Judgment" what-so-ever. 
3. That said Complaint was only obstructive and served no other 
useful purpose as were the legal maneuvers pursued by Plaintiff Bear 
River. 
4. That said Complaint and consequential denial of PIP benefits was 
absolutely unnecessary. 
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5. That said Complaint and denial of Defendants PIP benefits, without 
any doubt constitutes fraud upon Defendant. 
6. That Plaintiff Bear River's Memorandum, dated April 14, 1993, Civil 
Number 920905486PD demonstrates clearly and convincingly Plaintiff's 
prior knowledge and understanding of this issue and therefore required 
NO explanation or clarification by any Court. (Exhibit "B") 
7. That Plaintiff Bear River knew at the very least (18) eighteen 
months prior to initiating said Complaint, Plaintiff's rights and obligations as 
well as those of Defendant. 
8. That this issue should have never been brought before this Court or 
any other Court, at all. Said issues are well settled, now over (16) sixteen 
years old. They have been tried, retired and reaffirmed by the Utah 
Supreme Court many, many times. 
9. That this issue should be remanded to the Third District Court, Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, to be adjudicated by Judge Sandra Peuler in 
Civil Number 960904641 CV, Amended Complaint for Fraud, pursuant to 
the opinions of this Court. 
9. All costs to Plaintiff Bear River. 
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Dated this 30 day of September 1996. 
John W. Wall and Nancy V. Wall, his wife 
il. UJiUyC— 
in W. Wall 
)efendant/ Appellee Pro se 
f/2dA 
/
^ r ^ £ 
Nancy V. Wall 
Defendant/ Appellee Pro se 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BEAR RIVER MUTUAL INSURANCE ] 
COMPANY, a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JOHN WALL and 
NANCY WALL, his wife, 
Defendants. 
COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY 
JUDGMENT 
< Civil No. 940905590CN 
i Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki 
Comes now the Plaintiff and for a cause of action alleges as follows: 
NATURE OF THE ACTION 
1 . The Plaintiff, Bear River Mutual Insurance Company, (hereinafter 
"Bear River") is an insurance corporation engaged in the insurance business in the 
state of Utah, is a non-profit corporation and is owned entirely by its policyholders for 
the use and benefit of the policyholders, having its principal place of business at 545 
East Third South, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
2. Defendants, John Wall and Nancy Wall, his wife, are residents of 
Davis County, State of Utah, and reside at 802 Montague, Bountiful, Utah 84010. 
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3. This action is brought pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as 
amended §78-33-1, et.seq. seeking by determination the rights of the parties hereto 
under a policy issued by Plaintiff, Policy No. C145077. 
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS 
4. On or about June 5, 1992, and continuing through June 5, 1993, 
Plaintiff had issued its standard automobile Policy No. C145077, to John Wall and 
Nancy Wall, his wife. A copy of the policy is attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and a 
copy of the declaration page is attached hereto as Exhibit "B." 
5. That the auto policy, Exhibit wA,n issued to Defendants, provides 
under PART B - PERSONAL INJURY PROTECTION COVERAGE, Insuring Agreement, 
as follows: 
"The Company will pay personal injury protection benefits that are reasonable 
and necessary to or on behalf of each eligible injured person for: 
(a) medical expenses 
(b) work loss 
(c) funeral expenses 
(d) survivor loss and 
(e) special damages 
with respect to bodily injury sustained by an eligible insured person caused by 
an accident involving the use of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle. 
Medical Payments: 
The maximum amount payable for medical expenses shall not exceed 
$3,000.00; unless additional medical protection or payments are provided for 
on the Declaration page, they must be incurred within three years of the date 
of the accident to be payable. 
Policy Period, Territory, Other Limits of Liability and Special Provisions 
This coverage applies only to accidents which occur during the policy period 
in the United States and Canada, except if an auto accident to which this 
policy applies occurs outside of Utah, (but is within the United States and 
Canada), our limits of liability under your policy for that accident are as follows: Q Q 
+ i* +u^ «»-•-»•<* fmrKMrte ni NtaM nr Canada, has: I ^ 
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a. a personal injury protection or similar law specifying limits higher 
than that in the declarations, your policy will provide the higher 
specified limit; 
Special Conditions if Law is Declared Invalid 
The premium for the policy is based on rates which have been established in 
reliance upon the limitations on the right to recover for damages imposed by 
the provisions of the Utah Automobile No-Fault insurance Act. In the event a 
court of competent jurisdiction declares or enters a judgment, the effect of 
which is to render the provisions of such act invalid or unenforceable in whole 
or in part, the Company shall have the right to recompute the premium payable 
for the policy and the provisions of this endorsement shall be voidable or 
subject to amendment at the option of the Company. 
Non-Duplication of Benefits, Limits of Liability and Conditions of Other 
Insurance Under our Personal Injury Protection 
1. No eligible injured person shall recover or receive duplicate benefits for the 
same elements of loss under this or any similar insurance/ 
6. Under PART G - GENERAL PROVISIONS, APPLYING TO ALL 
COVERAGES, Subrogation, it provides: 
"In the event of any payment to any person under all coverages: 
1 • The Company is subrogated to the rights of the person to whom or for 
whose benefit such payments were made, to the extent of such 
payments, and such person must execute and deliver instruments and 
papers and do whatever else is necessary to secure such rights. Such 
person shall do nothing after loss to prejudice such rights. 
a. If the Insured proceeds or commences an action against a legally 
responsible third party, the Company shall be entitled to the 
extent of such payment to the proceeds of any settlement or 
judgment that may result from the exercise of any rights of 
recovery of such person against any person or organization legally 
responsible for the bodily injury or property damage because of 
which such payment is made and the Company shall have a lien 
to the extent of such payment, notice of which may be given to 
the person or organization causing such bodily injury, his agent, 
his insurer or a court having jurisdiction in the matter; such 
person shall hold in trust for the benefit of the Company all rights 
of recovery which he shall have against such other person or 
organization because of such bodily injury." 
7. Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended §31A-22-308 provides: 
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"The following may receive benefits under personal injury protection 
coverage: 
(1) the named insured, when injured in an accident involving any 
motor vehicle, regardless of whether the accident occurs in this state, 
the United States, its territories or possessions, or Canada, except 
where the injury is the result of the use or operation of the named 
insured's own motor vehicle not actually insured under the policy;" 
8. Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended §31A-22-309(6) 
provides: 
"(6) Every policy providing personal injury protection coverage is 
subject to the following: 
(a) that where the insured under the policy is or would be held 
legally liable for the personal injuries sustained by any person to whom 
benefits required under personal injury protection have been paid by 
another insurer, including the Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah, 
the insurer of the person who would be held legally liable shall 
reimburse the other insurer for the payment, but not in excess of the 
amount of damages recoverable;0 
9. On or about August 6, 1992, the Plaintiff's insured, Nancy Wail, 
was driving her vehicle carefully and prudently on Colorado State Highway 666 at 
Cortez, Colorado, at its intersection with County Road 5, when Lana D. Waters failed 
to yield the right-of-way at a stop sign and ran her vehicle into the vehicle being driven 
by Nancy Wall. As a direct, proximate result of the collision, the Plaintiff's insured 
suffered personal injuries which required medical attention and medical services, 
10. On September 23, 1992, Bear River Mutual's agent, George 
Sergakis, drafted a letter to Anthony Thurber, attorney for John & Nancy Wall, with 
the provision that he was on notice as to Bear River Mutual's subrogation rights and 
with the language: nl am looking forward to working with you.n 
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11. On July 8, 1993, Plaintiff's attorney sent to Defendant a copy of 
the letter notifying him of the subrogation rights of Bear River Mutual Insurance 
Company for the payment of medical benefits pursuant to the Utah Personal Injury 
Protection statute as herein set forth, placing them on notice as to Bear River Mutual's 
subrogatable interest. 
12. On November 2,1993, Anthony Thurber drafted a letter to George 
Sergakis and Bear River Mutual Insurance Company indicating that they were fully 
apprised. 
13. On or about March 4,1994, John Wall and Nancy Wall executed 
a release of nany and all actions, claims, and demands whatsoever which claimants 
now have or may have, whether known or unknown, developed, or undeveloped, on 
account of or arising out of the accident, casualty or event which happened on or 
about the 7th day of August, 1992." A copy of the release is attached as Exhibit C. 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
(As to the Obligation of Bear River Mutual to pay 
PIP benefits to Defendants) 
14. The Defendants, on March 4, 1994, Exhibit C, executed a full 
release as to the tortfeasor, Lana Waters, providing a release of n any and all actions, 
claims, and demands whatsoever which claimants now have or may have, whether 
known or unknown, developed, or undeveloped, on account of or arising out of the 
accident, casualty or event which happened on or about the 7th day of August, 
1992." 
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15. Bear River Mutual's policy provides under PART B - Non-
Duplication of Benefits, Limits of Liability and Conditions of Other Insurance Under our 
Personal Injury Protection: 
" 1 . No eligible injured person shall recover or receive duplicate 
benefits for the same elements of loss under this or any similar 
insurance." 
16. That the Defendants have accepted $16,000-00 from the tort 
feasor as additional recovery in lieu of further insurance benefits, to which they may 
have been entitled. The agreement expressly releases the tort feasors from all known 
or unknown personal injuries, as well as for property damage arising out of the 
accident. The Defendants have discharged the tort feasor from all liability related to 
no-fault benefits. By doing so the Walls have chosen their recovery and cannot now 
successfully assert a claim against their insurer. 
17. That the said release, Exhibit C, is clear, concise and unambiguous. 
18. Plaintiff has no adeauate remedy at law or appropriate means, 
other than an action for declaratory judgment, to determine its rights and obligations, 
if any, as to the Defendants for future personal injury protection benefits. 
19. If it is proved that the release does not release personal injury 
benefits, then the Plaintiff would be liable to pay those and liable for the expenses and 
attorney fees as provided for in Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended §31A-22-
309. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
(As to Subrogation of the Plaintiff to the Settlement of Defendants) 
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20. Plaintiff adopts and by this reference incorporates herein 
paragraphs 1 through 13 of the Identification of parties, Jurisdiction and Genera! 
Allegations, and paragraphs 14 through 19 of the First Cause of Action as though the 
allegations contained therein were fully and completely set forth herein. 
21 . That on or about the 4th day of March, 1994, the Defendants 
executed a full release as to the tort feasor, Lana Waters, providing a release of "any 
and all actions, claims, and demands whatsoever which claimants now have or may 
have, whether known or unknown, developed, or undeveloped, on account of or 
arising out of the accident, casualty or event which happened on or about the 7th day 
of August, 199Z" 
22. Bear River Mutual Insurance Company's insurance contract 
provides under PART B - Non-Duplication of Benefits, Limits of Liability and Conditions 
of Other Insurance Under our Personal Injury Protection as follows: 
" 1 . No eligible injured person shall recover or receive duplicate 
benefits for the same elements of loss under this or any similar 
insurance." 
23. That the said action on the part of the Defendants has deprived 
this Plaintiff of its right to reimbursement from Hawkeye Security Insurance Co. of the 
expenses paid to its insureds, as more fully set forth in Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
as amended §31A-22-308, which provides as follows: 
"The following may receive benefits under personal injury protection 
coverage: 
(1) the named insured, when injured in an accident involving any 
motor vehicle, regardless of whether the accident occurs in this state, 
the United States, its territories or possessions, or Canada, except 
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where the injury is the result of the use or operation of the named 
insured's own motor vehicle not actually insured under the policy;" 
and Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended §31A-22-309(6) which states: 
n(6) Every policy providing personal injury protection coverage is 
subject to the following: 
(a) that where the insured under the policy is or would be held 
legally liable for the personal injuries sustained by any person to whom 
benefits required under personal injury protection have been paid by 
another insurer, including the Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah, the 
insurer of the person who would be held legally liable shall reimburse the 
other insurer for the payment, but not in excess of the amount of 
damages recoverable; 
(b) that the issue of liability for that reimbursement and its amount 
shall be decided by mandatory, binding arbitration between the 
insurers." 
24. The Plaintiff has no adequate remedy at law or appropriate means, 
other than an action for declaratory judgment, to determine its rights and obligations, 
if any, as to the Defendants for future personal injury protection benefits and requests 
that the above-entitled Court determine whether the release by John & Nancy Wall of 
March 4, 1994, has destroyed Bear River Mutual Insurance Company's right of 
subrogation in the matter and whether Bear River Mutual Insurance Company is 
entitled to an equitable lien upon the proceeds of the funds received by the 
Defendants. 
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WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment against the Defendants as 
follows: 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
(As to the Obligation of Bear River Mutual to pay 
PIP benefits to Defendants) 
1. For an order determining the rights and obligations of the parties 
under insurance Policy No. C145077. 
2. For an order determining that the Release, Exhibit Cf given by the 
Defendants to Lana D. Waters and Hawkeye Security Insurance Co. was a full and 
complete release of all claims, demands and causes of action for any obligation of Bear 
River Mutual Insurance Company to pay personal injury protection benefits to the 
Defendants from the date of the release of March 4, 1994. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
(As to Subrogation of the Plaintiff to the Settlement of Defendants) 
3. For an order determining that the Release, Exhibit A, given by the 
Defendants to Lana D. Waters and Hawkeye Security Insurance Co. release by John 
& Nancy Wall of March 4, 1994, has destroyed Bear River Mutual Insurance 
Company's right of subrogation in the matter and whether Bear River Mutual Insurance 
Company is entitled to an equitable lien upon the proceeds of the funds received by 
the Defendants. 
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Dated this day of August, 1994. 
JENSEN, DUFFIN, CARMAN, DIBB & JACKSON 
Jn&yyr^LSsd J5^V> 
•Thomas A. Duffin 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Plaintiff's Address: 
Bear River Mutual Insurance Company 
545 East Third South 
P. 0 . Box 11869 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147 
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BEAR RIVER MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY 
Non-Assessable Motor Vehicle and Auto Policy 
UTAH 
Bear River Mutual Insurance Company is the oldest, non-profit mutual insurance company incorporated in die State of Utah. 
Please read your policy to make certain you understand the coverage diat it provides. You may call die company to help and 
assist you in any questions that you have. 
Bear River Mutual Insurance Company 
545 East Third South 
P.O. Box 11869 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147 
The contractual obligations of this policy are assumed by insured and by Bear River Mutual Insurance Company named in die 
Declarations and Policy. 
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J!ST>EX OF POLICY P R O V I S I O I 
DECLARATION PAGE- Your Personal coverage 
page is attached to the policy with your 
name, address, your auto or trailer, policy 
period, coverages and the amount of insurance 
based upon the premium paid, and your statements 
representations and declarations. 
Warranties and Declarations 1 
Agreement 1 
Definitions 1 
PART A - LIABILITY COVERAGE 
Insuring Agreement 3 
Supplementary Payments 3 
Exclusions 3 
Limit of Liability 4 
Other Limits of Liability 5 
Out of State Coverage 5 
Financial Responsibility Required 5 
Other Insurance 5 
PART B - PERSONAL INJURY PROTECTION 
COVERAGE 
Insuring Agreement 6 
Exclusions 6 
Definitions 6 
Personal Injury Payments and Limits of Liability . . . 7 
Policy Period, Territory, Other Limits of 
Liability, and Special Provisions 7 
Special Conditions if Law is Declared 
Invalid 8 
Non-Duplication of Benefits; Other Insurance 8 
PART CI - UNINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE 
Insuring Agreement 8 
Definitions 9 
Exclusions 9 
Limits of Liability 9 
Non-Duplication of Benefits; Other Insurance 10 
Medical Reports; Proof of Claim 10 
Arbitration 10 
Additional Duties for Uninsured Motorists 
Coverage 10 
PART C2 - UNDERINSURED 
MOTORISTS COVERAGE 
Insuring Agreement 11 
Definitions 11 
Exclusions 11 
Limits of Liability 11 
Non-Duplication of Benefits, Limits 
of Liability, Other Insurance 12 
Fault, Amount and Arbitration 12 
PART D - COVERAGE FOR DAMAGE 
TO YOUR VEHICLE 
Insuring Agreement 13 
Dl. Collision Coverage 13 
D2. Comprehensive Coverage 13 
D3. Towing and Emergency Road Service 13 
D4. Expense for Car Rental 13 
Duplication of Benefits 14 
Exclusions 14 
Limit of Liability under Collision and 
Comprehensive Coverages 15 
Payment of Loss under Collision and 
Comprehensive Coverages 15 
No Benefit to Bailee 15 
Non-Duplication of Benefits, Limits of Liability, 
and Conditions of Other Insurance 15 
Appraisal and Arbitration 15 
Additional Duties for Coverage for Damage 
to Your Covered Vehicle 16 
PART E - SPECIAL CONDITIONS 
APPLYING TO ALL 
Section I General Conditions 16 
Section II Prohibited Use of Alcohol 
and Drugs for All Coverages 16 
Section HI Special Conditions 
Applying to All Coverages, Except 
A, Arbitration 17 
PART F - DUTIES AFTER AN ACCIDENT 
OR LOSS FOR ALL COVERAGES 
General Duties 17 
PART G - GENERAL PROVISIONS APPLYING 
TO ALL COVERAGES 
Bankruptcy 18 
Fraud 18 
All Agreements Between You and Us 18 
Legal Action Against Us 18 
Subrogation 18 
Policy Period and Territory 19 
Termination, Cancellation, Non-renewal 
by You and Us 19 
Transfer of Your Interest in this Policy 20 
Terms of Policy Cannot be Waived 
Except by Endrosement 20 
Punitive and Exemplary- Damages 20 
Policyholders' Vooting Rights and 
Contingent Liability 20 
Notice of Annual Meeting 20 
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WARRANTIES AND DECLARATIONS 
BEAR RIVER MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY agrees 
to insure you according to the terms of this policy based: 
1. on your payment of premium for the coverages you 
chose; and 
2. in reliance on your statements in these declarations. 
You agree and further warrant, by acceptance of this policy 
that: 
1. the statements in these declarations are your 
statements and are true; and 
2. we insure you on the basis your statements are true; 
and 
3. this policy contains all of the agreements between you 
and us or any of our agents; and 
4. that this is a non-alcohol drinkers' policy; and 
5. that this policy is for those who do not use illegal 
drugs. 
Unless otherwise stated in the exceptions space on the 
declarations page, your statements are: 
The following words and phrases are defined throughout the 
policy as follows: 
1. Auto Business, means a business or job where the 
purpose is to sell, lease, repair, service, transport store 
or park land motor vehicles or trailers. 
2. Bodily Injury: means bodily injury and/or death to 
a person which occurs during die policy period as a 
result of the injury. 
3. Business: means one engaged in any commercial 
activity for gain or livelihood including employees of 
their employer, executives and traveling salespersons. 
4. Declarations: means the Declaration Page. 
5. Family Member means a person related to you by 
blood, marriage, guardianship or adoption who is a 
resident of your household. This includes a ward, a 
foster child, or an unmarried son or daughter while 
away at schooL 
6. Insured: means the person, persons or organization 
defined as insured in the specific coverage, including 
you, the named insured shown in the Declarations. 
1. Ownership. You are the sole owner of your car. 
2. Insurance and License History. Neither you nor 
any member of your household in the past 3 years has 
had: 
a. vehicle Insurance canceled by an insurer, unless 
it is revealed and appears in the application for 
insurance; or 
b. a license to drive or vehicle registration 
suspended, revoked or refused. 
3. Alcohol and Drugs. That neither you, nor any 
member of your household, within the past three 
years, has used or consumed any alcohol or alcoholic 
beverages or has used or consumed any illegal drugs 
or has used or consumed any illegal substances. 
4. Application. That the statements in your application, 
declarations or renewal for insurance are true. 
7. Motor Vehicle Auto or Can means a private 
passenger auto, or a pickup truck, panel truck or van 
which is a land motor vehicle with four or more 
wheels, which is designed for use mainly on public 
roads. It does not include: 
a. any auto or motor vehicle while being used other 
than on a temporary basis as a residence; 
b. a truck-tractor designed to pull a trailer or 
semitrailer, or 
c. an auto or vehicle used in any business to haul 
materials to or from job sites, deliver goods or 
merchandise or for use in construction, or 
manufacturing and during any continuous and 
regular business use; 
& any motor vehicle used to carry persons for 
compensation; 
e. any vehicle or auto used in the auto business; 
f. any recreational vehicle, motorcycle, all-terrain 
vehicle, motor home or similar vehicle whether it 
has four wheels or not, which is not described on 
the declaration page of the policy. 
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AGREEMENT 
In return for payment of the premium and subjea to all die terms of this policy, we agree with you as follows: 
DEFINITIONS 
DEFINITIONS cont'd. 
8. Non-Owned Vehicle: means a vehicle not: 
a. owned by; 
b. registered in the name of, or 
c. furnished or available for frequent use of: you or 
a person living in your household or any family 
members; 
d. used for the business purposes. 
The use has to be within the scope of consent of the 
owner or person in lawful possession of it. 
9. Occupying: means being in or on a motor vehicle as 
a passenger or operator, or being engaged in the 
immediate acts of entering, boarding, or alighting 
from a motor vehicle. 
10. Owned if Leased: for purposes of this policy, a 
private passenger type vehicle shall be deemed to be 
owned by a person if leased: 
a. under a written agreement to that person; and 
b. for a continuous period of at least 6 months. 
11. Person: means human being. 
12. Private Passenger Auto: means an auto: 
a. wiii four wheels that simultaneously touch the 
ground; and 
b. of die private passenger or station wagon type; 
and 
c. designed solely to carry persons and their 
luggage. 
13. Reasonable: the word "reasonable" when used in 
connection with costs, services, rentals and towing, 
means that they are usual and customary charges and 
when used in connection with repairs, it means thai 
they are necessary, usual and customary charges due 
to die loss. 
14. Spouse: means your husband or wife while living 
with you. 
15. Temporary Substitute Auto: means an auto not 
owned by you or your spouse, if it replaces your auto 
for a short time. Its use has to be with the consent of 
the owner. Your auto has to be out of use due to its 
breakdown, repair, servicing, damage or loss. A 
temporary, substitute auto is not considered a non-
owned anto. 
16. Trailer: means a vehicle designed to be pulled by a: 
a. private passenger auto; or 
b. pickup truck, panel truck, or van. 
It also means a farm wagon or farm implement while 
towed by a vehicle listed in a. or b. above. 
17. Utility Vehicle: means a motor vehicle with: 
a. a pickup truck, panel or van body; and 
b. a Gross Vehicle Weight of 10,000 pounds or less 
plus its maximum load capacity. 
18. Van: means a four-wheeled land motor vehicle with 
a load capacity of not more than 2,000 pounds or 
Gross Vehicle Weight of not more than 10,000 
pounds. Gross Vehicle Weight is the weight of the 
vehicle plus its maximum load capacity. 
19. "We", "Us" and "Our" or "Company" refer to 
Bear River Mutual Insurance Company. 
20. •Tou" or "Your'* means the named insured shown 
on the declaration page. 
21. Your Covered Vehicle: means: 
a. any motor vehicle shown in the Declarations for 
which a specific premium has been paid for 
coverage; 
b. any newly acquired motor vehicle that you 
acquire during die policy period provided it is a 
private passenger vehicle and we insure all other 
private motor vehicles owned by you on the date 
of delivery to you or your spouse. This coverage 
ends 30 days after you acquire the vehicle, unless 
within the 30 days you ask us and we agree to 
insure it and you pay any additional premium that 
may be due: 
(1) If the newly acquired motor vehicle replaces 
one shown in die declarations, it will have 
the same coverage as the vehicle it replaces; 
(2) If the newly acquired motor vehicle is an 
additional vehicle, it will have the broadest 
coverage we now provide for any motor, 
vehicle shown in the declarations. If you 
have more than one auto policy with us, you 
must tell us which one applies; 
c. any trailer you own as to liability and no-fault 
coverage, but only those trailers shown on the 
Declarations Page for which a specific premium 
has been paid for Coverage for Damage to Your 
Auto; 
d. any auto or trailer you do not own while used as 
a temporary substitute for any other auto or 
vehicle described in this definition which is out 
of normal use because of its: 
(1) breakdown; 
(2) repair, 
(3> servicing; 
(4) loss; or 
(5) destruction 
P9S5 
e. your Covered Vehicle doe. .M include a motor 
vehicle that has been sold or is subject to a 
contract to sell oral or written, to a non-family 
member or other business entity, provided that 
the purchtww-r is in possession of the motor 
vehicle. This exclusion applies whether title has 
been transferred or the purchase price has been 
paid by the purchaser. 
PART A - LIABILITY COVERAGE 
Insuring Agreement 
We will pay damages for bodily injury or property damage for 
which any covered person becomes legally responsible 
because of an auto accident We will settle or defend, as we 
consider appropriate, any claim or suit asking for these 
damages. We have no duty to defend any suit or settle any 
claim for "bodily injury" or "property damage" not covered 
under this policy. 
In addition to our limits of liability, we pay for all defense 
costs for attorneys retained and paid by us. Our duty to defend 
in any litigation ends when the applicable limits of liability 
have been paid as provided for in the policy for the accident 
which is the basis of the lawsuit 
COVERED PERSON as used in this part means: 
1. You or any family member for the ownership, 
maintenance or use of any covered motor vehicle or 
trailer, 
2. Any other person using your covered motor vehicle 
if the use is within the scope of consent of you or 
your spouse. 
3. For your covered motor vehicle, any person or 
organization but only with respect to legal 
responsibility for acts or omissions of a person for 
whom coverage is afforded under this part; 
4. For any motor vehicle or trailer, otiier than your 
covered motor vehicle, any person or organization 
but only with respect to legal responsibility for acts or 
omissions of you or any family member for whom 
coverage is afforded under this part This provision 
applies only if the person or organization does not 
own or hire the auto or trailer. 
Supplementary Payments 
In addition to our limit of liability, we will pay on behalf of a 
covered person: 
1. Up to $250.00 for the cost of bail bonds required 
because of an accident, however, we do not pay for 
traffic tickets, violations or citations. The accident 
must result in bodily injury or property damage 
covered under this policy. 
2. Premiums on appeal bonds and bonds to release 
attachments in any suit we defend. 
3. Interest accruing after a judgment is entered in any 
suit we defend. Our duty to pay interest ends when 
we tender into court to pay that part of the judgment 
which does not exceed our limit of liability for this 
coverage. 
4. Up to $35.00 a day for loss of earnings, but not other 
income, because of attendance at hearings or trials at 
our request 
Exclusions to Part A 
Insuring Agreement 
Liability Coverage, 
WE DO NOT PROVIDE LIABILITY COVERAGE FOR 
ANY PERSON: 
1. For property damage and bodily injury which may be 
reasonably expected to result from the intentional or 
criminal acts of the insured or which, in fact, is 
intended by the insured person; 
2. For damage to any property owned by, rented to, in 
charge of or transported by an insured; but coverage 
applies to a rented residence or private rented garage 
damaged by a car we insure. 
3. For any BODILY INJURY to: 
a. A fellow employee, while on the job and arising 
from the maintenance or use of a vehicle by 
another employee- in the employer's business. 
You and your spouse are covered for such injury 
to a fellow employee. 
b. Any employee of a COVERED PERSON 
ARISING OUT OF HIS OR HER 
EMPLOYMENT, This does not apply to a 
household employee who is not covered or 
required to be covered under any Worker's 
Compensation Insurance. 
c. ANY COVERED PERSON or any member of 
a covered person's family residing in the covered 
person's household in excess of the Utah Motor 
Vehicle Liability Policy Minimum Limits as more 
fully set forth in Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
§31A-22-304; providing for minimum limits for 
motor vehicle liability coverage. 
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4. For any damages ror wnictl u i e United States, or its 
employees or any of it$ agencies, including their 
employees, might be liable for the COVERED 
PERSON'S use of any vehicle. 
5. For any obligation of a COVERED PERSON or his 
or her insurer, under any type of worker's 
compensation or disability or similar law. 
6. For liability assumed by the covered person under any 
contract or agreement. 
7. For liability arising out of the ownership or operation 
of a vehicle while it is be}ng used to carry persons or 
" property for any fee or a Charge. This exclusion does 
not apply to a share-the-^Xpense car pool. 
8. While employed or odienvise engaged in the business 
or occupation of: 
a. selling, 
b. repairing, 
c. servicing, 
d. storing, 
e. parking 
vehicles designed for use mainly on public highways. 
This includes road testing and delivery. This 
exclusion does not ^pply to the ownership, 
maintenance or use of VOUR COVERED AUTO 
by: 
a. you; 
b. any family member,
 0r 
c. any partner, agent or employee of you or any 
family member. 
9. Maintaining or using any vehicle while that person is 
employed or otherwise Engaged in any business or 
occupation not describe in Exclusion 8. This 
exclusion does not apply to the maintenance or use 
of. 
a. a private passenger ^uto; 
b. a pickup truck, pane} truck or van that you own; 
or 
c. a trailer used with a vehicle described in a. or b. 
above. 
10. Using a vehicle: 
a. without the consent <^ f you or your spouse; 
b. with permission but Consent or the permission or 
its use is beyond the scope and consent of you or 
your spouse. 
11. For bodily injury or proi>erty damage for which that 
person: 
a. is an insured under
 a nuclear energy liability 
policy; or 
b. would be an insur&d under a nuclear energy 
liability policy but for its termination upon 
exhaustion of its limit of liability. 
A nuclear energy liability policy is a policy issued by 
any of the loiiov.-mg or their successors: 
a. Nuclear Energy Liability Insurance Association; 
b. Mutual Atomic Eneig) Liability Underwriters; or 
c. Nuclear Insurance Association of Canada. 
12. Maintaining or using any non-owned or rented vehicle 
by an insured in his employment, occupation, 
profession, or in any commercial activity engaged in 
for gain or livelihood, including employees of their 
employer, executives and traveling salespersons who 
rent or use vehicles in connection with their work or 
livelihood. 
13. WE DO NOT PROVIDE LIABILITY COVERAGE 
FOR THE OWNERSHIP, maintenance or use of: 
a. Any motorized vehicle having less than four 
wheels; 
b. Any vehicle, other than your covered vehicle, 
which is: 
1. owned by you; or 
2. furnished or available for your regular or 
frequent use; 
c. Any vehicle, other than your covered auto, 
which is: 
1. owned by any family member, or 
2. furnished or available for the regular or 
frequent use of any family member, 
however, this exclusion does not apply to your 
maintenance or use of any vehicle which is: 
1. owned by a family member; or 
2. furnished for or available for the regular use 
of a family member, 
i To a motor vehicle that has been sold or is 
subject to a contract to sell, oral or written, to a 
non-family member or other business entity, 
provided that the purchaser is in possession of the 
motor vehicle. This exclusion applies whether 
title has been transferred or the purchase price 
has been paid by purchaser. 
Limit of Liability 
The limit of liability shown in the Declarations for "each 
person"' for Bodily Injury Liability is our maximum limit of 
liability for all damages for bodily injury sustained by any one 
person in any one auto accident Subject to this limit for "each 
person", the limit of liability shown in the Declarations for 
"each accident" for Bodily Injury Liability is our maximum 
limit of liability for all damages for bodily injury resulting 
from any one auto accident The limit of liability shown in the 
Declarations for "each accident" for Property Damage Liability 
is our maximum limit of liability for all damages to all 
property resulting from any one auto accident This is the 
most we will pay for any auto accident regardless of the 
number of: 
1. covered persons; 
2. claims made; 
3. vehicles or premiums shown in the Declarations; or 
4. vehicles involved in the auto accident. 
We will apply the limit of liability to provide any separate 
limits required by law for bodily injury and property damage 
liability. However, this provision will not change our total 
limit of liability. A motor vehicle and trailer are considered 
one unit for the limit of liability 
Other Limits of Liability 
We do not provide motor vehicle liability coverage for. 
1. bodily injury caused by an insured for any person 
using your covered vehicle who is not a family 
member to the extent or in excess of die limits of 
liability which this coverage exceeds die minimum 
liability required by the Utah Motor Vehicle Financial 
Responsibility Law. (Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
§31A-22-304 Motor Vehicle Liability Policy 
Minimum Limits). 
2. For bodily injury to any person who is a family 
member or related to an Insured by blood, mairiage 
or adoption for whom claim is made to the extent of 
any limits of liability of this coverage which exceed 
the limits of liability required by the Utah Motor 
Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law, (Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, §31A-22-304 Motor Vehicle 
Liability Policy Minimum limits). 
Out of State Coverage 
If an auto accident to which this policy applies occurs in any 
state or Canada other than the one in which your covered 
vehicle is principally garaged, we will interpret your policy for 
that accident as follows: 
If the state or Canada has: 
1. a financial responsibility or similar law specifying 
limits of liability for bodily injury or property damage 
higher than die limit shown in the Declarations, your 
policy will provide the higher specified limit; 
2- a compulsory insurance or similar law requiring a 
nonresident to maintain insurance whenever the 
nonresident uses a vehicle in that state or Canada, 
your policy will provide at least the required 
minimum amounts and types of coverage. 
No one will be entitled to a duplication of payments for the 
same elements of loss. 
Financial Responsibility Required 
When certified under any law as proof of future financial 
responsibility, and while required during the policy period, this 
policy shall comply with such law to the extent required. 
Other Insurance 
If there is other applicable liability insurance we will pay only 
our share of the loss. Our share under this policy is the 
amount computed under the applicable paragraph below. 
However, any insurance we provide for a vehicle you do not 
own shall be excess over other collectible insurance. 
IF THERE IS OTHER LIABILITY COVERAGE: 
1. Policies issued by us to you: 
If two or more vehicle liability policies 
issued by us to you apply to the same accident, 
the total limits of liability under all such policies 
shall not exceed that of the policy with the 
highest limit of liability. 
2. Other overage Available from Other Sources: 
If other liability coverage applies, we are liable 
only for our share of the damages. Our share is the 
percent that the limit of liability of this policy bears 
to the total of all liability coverage applicable to die 
accident. 
3. Temporary Substitute Auto, Non-Owned Auto, 
Trailer or Rental Auto: 
If a temporary substitute auto, a non-owned 
auto or trailer or rental auto designed for use with 
a private passenger auto or utility vehicle has other 
liability coverage which applies in whole or in part as 
primary, excess or contingent coverage, then tins 
coverage is excess over other liability coverage. We 
do not contribute under this policy to any loss where: 
a. the motor vehicle or trailer is owned by any 
person or organization in the auto business; and 
b. a non-owned or rental vehicle maintained or used 
in any business or business pursuits or business 
activity, including salesman, employees who are 
using or who have rented a car in connection 
with their livelihood. 
4. Newly-Acquired Vehicle: 
This coverage does not apply if there is other 
vehicle liability coverage on a .newly-acquired 
vehicle. 
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PART B - PERSONAL INJURY PROTECTION COVERAGE 
Insuring Agreement 
The Company will pay personal injury protection benefits 
that are reasonable and necessary to or on behalf of each 
eligible injured person for. 
(a) medical expenses 
(b) work loss 
(c) funeral expenses 
(d) survivor loss and 
(e) special damages 
with respect to bodily injury sustained by an eligible 
insured person caused by an accident involving the use of 
a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle. 
Exclusions 
This coverage does not apply: 
1. for any injury sustained by the Insured while 
occupying another motor vehicle owned by the 
Insured and not insured under the policy; 
2. for any injury sustained by any person while 
opera ting the insured motor vehicle without the 
express or implied consent of the insured or while not 
in lawful possession of the insured motor vehicle; or 
3. to any injured person, if the person's conduct 
contributed to his injury: 
(a) by intentionally causing injury to himself; or 
(b) while committing a felony; 
4. for any injury sustained by any person arising out of 
the use of any motor vehicle while located for use as 
a residence or premises; 
5. for any injury due to war, whether or not declared, 
civil war, insurrection, rebellion or revolution, or to 
any act or condition incident to any of the foregoing; 
or 
6. for any injury resulting from the radioactive, toxic, 
explosive, or other hazardous properties of nuclear 
materials. 
Definitions 
When used in reference to this coverage: 
1. Bodily Injury: means bodily injury to a person and/or 
death which occurs during the policy period as a 
result of the injury. 
2. Covered and Insured Persons entitled to Personal 
Injury Protection: 
a. the named insured and persons related to the 
insured by blood, mamage, adoption, or 
guardianship who are residents of the insured's 
household, including those who usually make 
their home in the same household but temporarily 
live elsewhere, when injured in an accident 
involving any motor vehicle; and 
b. any other natural person whose injuries arise out 
of an automobde accident occurring while the 
person occupies a motor vehicle described in the 
policy with the express or implied consent of the 
named insured or while a pedestrian if he is 
injured in an accident involving the described 
motor vehicle. 
3. Funeral Expenses: means funeral, burial or cremation 
expenses incurred; 
4. Insured Motor Vehicle: a motor vehicle with respect 
to which: 
a. the bodily injury liability insurance of the policy 
applies and for which a specific premium is 
charged; and 
b. the named insured is required to maintain security 
under the provisions of the Utah Automobile No-
Fault Insurance Act; Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
Tide 41, Chapter 12a, Financial responsibility of 
Motor Vehicle Owners and Operators Act. 
5. Medical Expenses: the reasonable value of all 
expenses for necessary medical, surgical, x-ray, 
dental, rehabilitation (which includes prosthetic 
devices), ambulance, hospital and nursing services; 
6. Motor Vehicle: means every self-propelled vehicle 
which is designed for use upon a highway, including 
trailers and semitrailers designed for use with such 
vehicles, except traction engines, road rollers, farm-
tractors, tractor cranes, power shovels, and well 
drillers, and every vehicle which is propelled by 
electric power obtained from overhead wires but not 
operated upon rails and excluding motorcycles; 
7. Named Insured: the person or organization in die 
declarations; 
8. Occupying: being in or on a motor vehicle as a 
passenger or operator or engaged in the immediate act 
of entering, boarding or alighting from a motor 
vehicle; 
9. Pedestrian: means any person not occupying or 
riding upon a "motor vehicle. "Any person riding, 
occupying or upon a motorcycle is not a pedestrian; 
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10. Survivor Loss: compensation on account of the death 
of the eligible injured person; 
11. Work Loss: any loss of gross income and loss of 
earning capacity per person from inability to work, 
for a maximum of 52 consecutive weeks after the 
loss, except that this benefit need not be paid for the 
first three days of disability, unless the disability 
continues for longer than two consecutive weeks after 
the date of injury; 
12. Special Damage: an allowance for a maximum of 
365 days, for services actually rendered or expenses 
reasonably incurred for services that, but for the 
injury, the injured person would have performed for 
his household, except that this benefit need not be 
paid for the first three days after the date of injury 
unless the person's inability to perform these services 
continues for more than two consecutive weeks. 
Personal Injury Payments and Limits of Liability 
Regardless of the number of persons insured, policies or bonds 
applicable, claims made, or insured motor vehicles to which 
this coverage applies, the Company's liability for personal 
injury protection benefits with respect to bodily injury 
sustained by any one eligible injured person in any one motor 
vehicle accident, is limited except or unless additional 
protection is purchased or provided for by statute as follows: 
Medical Payments: 
The maximum amount payable for medical expenses shall 
not exceed $3,000.00; unless additional medical protection 
or payments are provided for on the Declaration page, 
they must be incurred within three years of the date of the 
accident to be payable; 
Work Loss: 
The maximum amount payable for work loss is eighty-five 
percent of any loss of gross income and earning capacity, 
not to exceed the total of $250.00 per week; 
Special Damage: 
A special damage allowance not exceeding $20.00 per day 
for inability to perform services for his household; 
Funeral Expenses: 
The maximum amount payable for funeral expenses shall 
not exceed $1,500.00; 
Survivor Loss: 
The amount payable for survivor loss is $3,000.00 and is 
payable only to natural persons who are the eligible 
injured person's heirs. 
Policy Period, Territory, Other Limits of 
Liability and Special Provisions 
This coverage applies only to accidents which occur during the 
policy period in the United States and Canada, except if an 
auto accident to which this policy applies occurs outside of 
Utah, (but is within the United States and Canada), our limits 
of liability under your policy for that accident are as follows: 
1. If the state, (outside of Utah) or Canada, has: 
a. a personal injury protection or similar law 
specifying limits higher than that in the 
declarations, your policy will provide the higher 
specified limit; 
b. compulsory personal injury protection insurance 
or similar law requiring a non-resident to 
maintain personal injury protection insurance, 
whenever the non-resident uses a vehicle in that 
state or Canada, your policy will provide at least 
the required minimum amounts and types of 
coverage; 
c. no compulsory personal injury protection 
insurance or similar law requiring a non-resident 
to maintain insurance, whenever the insured uses 
a vehicle in that state or 0"v"fat your policy 
does not provide for any benefits under Part B, 
Personal Injury Coverage, to non-residents of the 
State of Utah, except for medical expenses under 
this section, not to exceed S3,000.00; 
d. no compulsory personal injury protection 
insurance or similar law requiring a non-resident 
to maintain insurance in that state or Canada, 
your policy does not provide benefits under this 
section to residents of the State of Utah who are 
not family members in any amount in excess of 
the minimum limits as provided for this type of 
coverage in the State of Utah, 
2. Any amount payable by the Company under the terms 
of this coverage shall be reduced by the amount paid, 
payable, or required to be provided on account of 
such bodily injury: 
a. under any worker's compensation plan or any 
similar statutory plan; 
b. which that person receives or is entitled to 
receive from the United States or any of its 
agencies because he is on active duty in the 
military service. 
3. That where a Covered Person under this policy is or 
would be held legally liable for the personal injuries 
sustained by any person to whom benefits required 
under personal injury protection provisions of this 
poiicy have been paid by the injured party's insurance 
carrier, including the Workers' Compensation Fund of 
Utah, the Company if it would be legally held liable 
shall reimburse the insurance company of theother 
party for the payments as provided herein, but not in 
excess of the amount of damages recoverable; that the 
issue of liability for that reimbursement in its amount 
shall be mandatory binding arbitration between the 
two insurance companies providing for insurance 
coverage as herein set forth. 
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4. If the Covered Person incu.. .nedical expenses which 
are unreasonable or unnecessary, we may refuse to 
pay for those medical expenses and contest them. 
Unreasonable medical expenses are fees for medical 
services which are higher than the usual and 
customary charges for those services; unnecessary 
medical expenses are fees for medical services which 
are noc usually and customarily performed for 
treatment of the injury, including fees for an 
excessive number, amount, or duration of medical 
services. 
5. If the Covered Person is sued by a medical services 
provider because we refuse to pay contested medical 
expenses, we will pay all defense costs and any 
resulting judgment against the Covered Person. We 
have the right to choose the counseL The Covered 
Person must cooperate with us in the defense of any 
claim, demand or lawsuit If the Covered Person is 
required to attend any trials or hearings and wages or 
salaries are lost as a result, we will pay up to $35.00 
per day. 
Special Conditions if Law is Declared Invalid 
The premium for the policy is based on rates which have 
been established in reliance upon the limitations on the 
right to recover for damages imposed by the provisions of 
the Utah Automobile No-Fault Insurance Act In the 
event a court of competent jurisdiction declares or enters 
a judgment, the effect of which is to render the provisions 
of such act invalid or unenforceable in whole or in part, 
the Company shall have the right to recompute the 
premium payable for the policy and the provisions of this 
endorsement shall be voidable or subject to amendment at 
the option of the Company. 
Non-Duplication of Benefits, Limits of Liability 
and Conditions of Other Insurance Under our 
Personal Injury Protection 
this or an> _.milar insurance. 
2. If the Insured sustains bodily injury while occupying 
a vehicle not owned by you, your spouse or any 
family member, this coverage applies: 
a. as cxctss to any personal injury protection 
coverage which applies to the use of the vehicle 
as primary coverage, but only in an amount 
which it exceeds the primary coverage. 
If coverage under more than one policy applies as 
excess: 
a. the total m^xir"»m recovery, liability or benefit 
payable shall not exceed die difference between 
the limit of liability that applies as primary 
insurance, and die maximum recovery, liability or 
benefit that applies from any one of the 
coverages that apply as excess; and 
b. we are liable only for our share of the loss or 
damage. Our share is the proportion of damages, 
loss, or benefits that the limits of this bear to the 
total applicable to all personal injury protection 
coverage as excess to die accident We will pay 
our share of the loss, damages or benefits. 
3. Except as provided for in the preceding paragraphs, 1 
and 2, if the Insured sustains bodily injury as a 
pedestrian or sustains bodily injury while occupying 
your covered vehicle, and if two or more insurers are 
liable to pay no-fault or personal injury coverage 
benefits or provide similar coverage involving the use 
of an automobile: 
a. the total limits of liability or benefits under all 
such coverages shall not exceed die coverage or 
benefits of die policy with the highest limit of 
liability; and 
b. we are liable only for our share of the loss or 
damage. Our share is that percent of the 
damages that the limit of liability of this coverage 
bears to the total of all personal injury benefits 
coverage applicable to the accident 
1. No eligible injured person shall recover or receive 
duplicate benefits for the same elements of loss under 
PART Cl - UNINSURED MOTORISTS COVERAGE 
Insuring Agreement 
We will pay for bodily injury for damages which a covered 
person, as defined in this section are legally entided to recover 
from the owner or operator of a motor vehicle: 
1. sustained by you and your covered vehicle; and 
2. caused by an accident 
the owner's or operator's liability for these damages must arise 
out of the ownership, maintenance or use of the uninsured 
motor vehicle. 
Any judgment for damages arising out of a suit brought 
without our written consent is not binding on us. 
"Uninsured Motor Vehicle" Means a Land Motor Vehicle 
or Trailer of any Type: 
1. To which no bodily injury liability bond or policy 
applies at the time of the accident 
2. To which a bodily injury liability bond or policy 
applies at die time of die accident In diis case its 
limit for bodily injury liability must be less than the 
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minimum limit for bodily injury liability specified by 
the financial responsibility law of the state in which 
your covered vehicle is principally garaged 
3. Which is a hit and run vehicle whose operator or 
owner cannot be identified and which hits: 
a. you or any family member, 
b. a vehicle which you or any family member are 
occupying; or 
c. your covered vehicle. 
4. In accordance widi Utah Code Annotated, §31A-22-
305, the policy is expanded so that uninsured motorist 
also includes any motor vehicle whose operator or 
owner cannot be identified which causes an accident, 
but does not make physical contact with your covered 
vehicle. The existence of this vehicle and motorist 
must be demonstrated by clear and convincing 
evidence odier than the testimony of the covered 
person or persons. 
5. To which a bodily injury liability bond or policy 
applies at the time of the accident but the bonding or 
insuring company: 
a. denies coverage; or 
b. is or becomes insolvent 
However, "Uninsured Motor Vehicle" Does Not Include 
Any Vehicle or Equipment 
1. Owned by or furnished or available for the regular 
use of you or any family member; 
2. Owned or operated by a self-insurer under any 
applicable motor vehicle law; 
3. Owned by any governmental unit or agency; 
4. Operated on rails or crawler treads; 
5. Designed mainly for use off public roads while not on 
public roads; 
6. While located for use as a residence or premises. 
Definitions 
The following phrase and words are defined in this Section as 
follows: 
L As used in this section "covered persons" includes: 
a. the named insured; 
b. persons related to the named insured by blood, 
marriage, adoption, or guardianship, who are 
residents of the named insured's household, 
including those who usually make their home in 
the same household, but temporarily live 
elsewhere; 
c. any person occupying a covered motor vehicle 
referred to in the policy; 
All other definitions apply. 
Exclusions 
A. We do not provide Uninsured Motorists Coverage for 
bodily injury sustained by any person: 
1. While occupying, or when struck by, any motor 
vehicle owned by you or any family member which 
is not insured for this coverage under this policy. 
This includes a trailer of any type used with that 
vehicle. 
2. For any Covered Person who, without written consent 
from the Company, settles with any person or 
organization who may be liable for bodily injury. 
3. While occupying your covered vehicle when it is 
being used to carry persons or property for a fee. 
This exclusion does not apply to a share-the-expense 
carpooL 
4. Using a vehicle without permission or a reasonable 
belief that the person is entided to do so or its use is 
beyond the consent of you or your spouse. 
B. This coverage shall not apply directly or indirectly to 
benefit any insurer or self-insurer under any of the 
following or similar law: 
1. workers' compensation law 
2. disability benefits law 
3. any government body or agency, including political 
subdivisions 
Limits of Liability 
The limit of liability shown in the Declarations for "each 
person" for Uninsured Motorists Coverage is our maximum, 
Hmit of liability for all damages for bodily injury sustained by 
any one person in any one accident Subject to this limit for 
"each person", the limit of liability shown in the Declarations 
for "each accident" for Uninsured Motorists Coverage is our 
TTiflTimmn limit of liability for all damages for bodily injury 
resulting from any one accident 'This is the most we will pay 
regardless of the number of: 
a. covered persons 
b. claims made 
a. vehicles or premiums shown in the Declarations 
d. vehicles involved in the accident 
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Any amounts otherwise payable iv~ damages under this 
coverage shall be reduced fay all sums paid or payable because 
of the bodily injury under any of the following or similar law: 
a. workers* compensation law; or 
b. disabilirv benefits law. 
Non-Duplication of Benefits, Limits of Liability 
and Conditions of Other Insurance Under Our 
Uninsured Motorist Coverage 
1. If the Insured sustains bodily injury while occupying 
a vehicle not owned by you, your spouse or any 
family member, this coverage applies: 
a. as excess to any uninsured motor vehicle 
coverage which applies to the vehicle as primary 
coverage and only in an amount by which it 
exceeds the primary coverage. 
If coverage under more than one policy applies as 
excess: 
a. the total maximum recovery, liability or benefit 
payable shall not exceed the difference between 
the limit of liability that applies as primary 
insurance, and the max^mim recovery, liability or 
benefit that applies from any of the coverages 
that apply as excess; and 
b. we are liable for our share of the loss or damage. 
Our share is the proportion of damages that the 
limit of liability of this coverage bears to the total 
applicable uninsured motorist coverage as excess 
to the accident 
2. Except as provided for in the previous paragraph 1, if 
the Insured sustains bodily injury as a pedestrian or 
sustains bodily injury while occupying your covered 
vehicle, and if two or more insurers are liable to pay 
uninsured motorist protection as provided by this 
coverage: 
a. the total limits of liability under all such 
coverages shall not exceed that of the coverage 
with the highest limit of liability; and 
b. we are liable only for our share. Our share is 
that percent of the damages that the limit of 
liability of this coverage bears to the total of all 
uninsured motor vehicle coverage applicable to 
the accident. 
3. Notwithstanding paragraphs 1 and 2 under this part, 
Non-duplication of Benefits, Limits of Liability and 
Conditions of Other Insurance Under Our Uninsured 
Motorist Coverage, if uninsured motorist coverage is 
available to a covered; injured person, under more 
than one insurance policy, the covered injured person 
may elect the policy under which he desires to collect 
the uninsured motorist benefits. 
However, in no event will the limit of liability for 
uninsured ni^onst coverage for two or more motor 
vehicles be added together or stacked to determine the 
limit of coverage available to a covered injured 
person for any one accident. 
No Insured person can recover duplicate benefits from 
the same elements of loss under this, or other similar 
insurance. 
Medical Reports; Proof of Claim 
As soon as practicable the eligible covered person or someone 
on his behalf shall give to the Company written proof of 
claim, under oath if required, including full particulars of the 
nature and extent of the injuries and treatment received and 
contemplated, and such other information as may assist the 
Company in determining the amount due and payable. The 
eligible covered person shall submit to physical and mental 
examinations by physicians selected by die Company when and 
as often as the Company may reasonably require. 
Arbitration 
If we and a covered person do not agree: 
1. whether that person is legally entitled to recover 
damages under this part; or 
2. as to the amount of damages; 
either party may make a written demand for the matters to be 
settled by arbitration. Any matter in dispute between you and 
us will be made pursuant to arbitration as provided for in the 
arbitration rales of the Arbitration Forums, Inc., a copy of 
which is available on request from the Company, which shall 
be binding on both you and the Company. The arbitration 
award may include attorney's fees if allowed by state law and 
may be entered as a judgment in any court of proper 
jurisdiction. Such arbitration shall be in compliance with the 
"Utah Arbitration Act" (Title 78, Chapter 31a, Utah Code 
Annotated) or the applicable arbitration provisions in force and 
effect in Utah at the time. 
Additional Duties for Uninsured Motorists 
Coverage 
A person seeking Uninsured Motorists Coverage must also: 
1. promptly notify the police if a hit and run driver is 
involved; 
2. promptly send us copies of the legal papers if a suit 
is brought. 
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PART C2 - UNDERINSURED MOTORISTS COVERAGE 
Insuring Agreement 
We will pay for bodily injury for damages which a covered 
person, as defined in this part is legally entitied to recover 
from the owner or operator of an underinsured motor vehicle 
because of bodily injury, sickness, disease or death: 
L sustained by you and your covered vehicle; and 
2. caused by an accident. 
The owner's or operator's liability for these damages must 
arise out of the ownership, maintenance or use of the 
underinsured motor vehicle. 
Any judgment for damages arising out of a suit brought 
without our written consent is not binding on us. 
"Underinsured Motor Vehicle" means a Land Motor 
Vehicle or Trailer of any Type: 
1. The ownership, maintenance or use of which is 
insured or bonded for bodily injury liability at the 
time of the accident; but 
a. whose limits of liability for bodily injury liability 
are insufficient to compensate fully the insured 
for all special and general damages; 
b. have been reduced by payments to persons other 
than die insured to less than the amount of the 
insured's damages. 
However, "Underinsured Motor Vehicle" Does Not Include 
any Vehicle or Equipment 
1. Owned by, furnished or available for die regular use 
of the insured, a resident spouse or resident relative of 
the insured, unless die motor vehicle is described in 
the Declarations and for which a specific premium 
has been paid, or if the motor vehicle is a newly 
acquired or replacement vehicle covered under the 
terms of the policy; 
2. Owned or operated by a self-insurer under any 
applicable motor vehicle law; 
3. Owned by any governmental unit, political 
subdivision or agency; 
4. Operated on rails or crawler treads; 
5. Designed mainly for use off public roads while not on 
public roads; 
6. While located for use as a residence or premises; 
7. Defined as more fully set forth in Part CI, Uninsured 
Motorist Coverage in your policy; 
8. To which a bodily, injury liability bond or policy 
applies at die time of the accident but its limit for 
bodily injury liability is less than the minimum limit 
for bodily injury liability specified by die Utah Safety 
Responsibility Act; 
9. To which a bodily injury liability bond or policy 
applies at the time of the accident but the bonding or 
insuring company: 
a. denies coverage: or 
b. is or becomes insolvent. 
Definitions 
As used in this section "covered persons" includes: 
a. the named insured; 
b. persons related to the named insured by blood, 
marriage, adoption, or guardianship, who are residents 
of the named insured's household, including those 
who usually make their home in the same household 
but temporarily live elsewhere; 
c. any person occupying a covered motor vehicle 
referred to in the policy, 
All other definitions apply. 
Exclusions 
A. We do not provide Underinsured Motorists Coverage for 
bodily injury sustained by any person: 
1. While occupying, or when struck by, any motor 
vehicle owned by you or any family member which 
is not insured for this coverage under this policy. 
This includes a trailer of any type used widi that 
vehicle. 
2. For any Covered Person who, without written consent 
from the Company, settles with any person or 
organization who may be liable for bodfly injury. 
3. While occupying your covered vehicle when it is 
being used to cany persons or property for a fee. 
This exclusion does not apply to a share-the-expense 
car pool 
4. Use of a vehicle widiout permission, or the use with 
permission is beyond the consent of you or your 
pouse. 
B. There is no coverage until die limits of liability of all 
bodily injury liability bonds and policies tiiat apply have 
been used up by payment of judgments or setdements to 
other persons. 
Limits of Liability 
The limit of liability shown in the Declarations for "each 
person" for Underinsured Motorists Coverage is our maximum 
limit of liability for all damages for bodily injury sustained by 
any one person in any one accident Subject to this limit for 
"each person", the limit of liability shown in the Declarations 
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for "each accident" for Underinsureu *sts Coverage is our 
maximum limit of liability for all damages for bodily injury 
resulting from any one accident, This is the most we will pay 
regardless of the number of: 
a. covered Persons 
b. claims made 
c. vehicles or premiums shown on the Declarations 
d. vehicles involved in the accident. 
Any amounts otherwise payable for damages under this 
coverage shall be reduced by all sums paid or payable because 
of the bodily injury under any of the following or similar law: 
a. workers' compensation law; or 
b. disability benefits law. 
Non-Duplication of Benefits, Limits of Liability 
and Conditions of Other Insurance Under Our 
Underinsured Motorist Coverage 
payabv $' jy one vehicle under the polil%y with 
the highest possible dollar limit; 
b. subject to paragraph a, above, any insurance we 
provide with respect to a vehicle you do not own 
shall be txctss over any other collectible 
insurance; 
c. we will pay our share of the loss. Our share is 
the proportion of damages that the limit of 
liability of this coverage bears to the total 
applicable underinsured motorist limits. 
4. No eligible injured person shall recover duplicate 
benefits for the same elements of loss under this or 
any similar insurance. 
Fault, Amount and Arbitration 
The following two questions for the coverage under 
underinsured motorist protection must be decided by agreement 
pursuant to the provisions of the policy as follows: 
1. is the insured legally entitled to collect for bodily 
injury for damages from the owner or driver of an 
underinsured motor vehicle; and 
2. if so, in what amount? 
If we and a covered person do not agree: 
1. whether that person is legally entitled to recover 
damages under this part; or 
2. as to the amount of damages; 
either party may make a written demand for the matters to be 
settled by arbitration. Any matter in dispute between you and 
us will be made pursuant to arbitration as provided for in the 
arbitration rales of the Arbitration Forums, Inc., a copy of 
which is available on request from the Company, which shall 
be binding on both you and the Company. The arbitration 
award may include attorney's fees if allowed by state law and 
may be entered as a judgment in any court of proper 
jurisdiction. Such arbitration shall be in compliance with the. 
"Utah Arbitration Act" (Title 78, Chapter 31a, Utah Code 
Annotated) or the applicable arbitration provisions in force and 
effect in Utah at the time. 
1. A covered person injured in a vehicle described in an 
insurance policy that includes underinsured motorist 
benefits may not elect to collect underinsured motorist 
coverage benefits from any other motor vehicle 
insurance policy under which he is a named insured 
except: 
a. if a named insured is injured as a pedestrian or 
while occupying a vehicle not described in this 
part, (C2, Underinsured Motorist Coverage) and 
is covered by more than one policy including 
underinsured motorist coverage, the injured 
person may elect the policy under which he 
collects underinsured motorist benefits. 
Z The limits of liability for underinsured motorist 
coverage for two or more motor vehicles may not be 
added together, combined, or stacked to determine the 
limit of insurance coverage available to an injured 
person for any one accident. 
3. If there is other applicable or similar insurance under 
more than one insurance policy or provision of 
coverage: 
a. die mflxiTmiTn recovery under all policies 
combined will not exceed the maximum amount 
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PART D - COVERAGE FOR DAMAGE TO YOUR VEHICLE 
Insuring Agreement 
We will pay as follows: 
1. for any direct and accidental loss or damage to your 
covered vehicle, 
a. for which a premium is charged for each 
coverage, including its equipment, 
b. provided it is common to your vehicle, 
minus any deductible[s] and subject to the limits of 
liability or as set forth on the Declaration page under 
Dl and D2; 
2. for the perils and coverage under D3 and D4 for 
which a premium is charged for each coverage, minus 
any deductible[s], subject to the limits of liability as 
set forth on die Declaration page under D3 and D4 
because of a loss; 
DL COLLISION COVERAGE: 
"Collision" means the upset, or collision with another 
object by your covered or non-owned vehicle. However, 
loss caused by the following arc not considered 
"collision": 
1. Missiles or falling objects; 
2. Fire; 
3. Theft or larceny; 
4. Explosion or earthquake; 
5. Windstorm; 
6. Hail, water or flood; 
7. Malicious mischief or vandalism; 
8. Riot or civil commotion; 
9. Contact with bird or animal; or 
10. Breakage of glass, except if part of a collision. 
The amounts payable under Dl are subject to the 
deductible and limits of liability as set forth on the 
Declaration page. 
D2. COMPREHENSIVE COVERAGE: 
"Comprehensive" means loss arising from any cause other 
than collision, including die breakage of glass, or loss 
caused by missiles, falling objects, fire, theft, larceny, 
explosion, earthquake, windstorm, hail, water, flood, 
malicious mischief, or vandalism, riot or civil commotion, 
and contact with a bird or an animal is payable under this 
coverage. 
If your covered vehicle is stolen, we will pay your 
incurred transportation costs at the rate of up to $14.00 per 
day, with a maximum amount of $420.00 for each loss. 
This coverage begins 48 hours after you notify the police 
and us of the theft and ends when: 
a. your covered vehicle is returned to you if it is 
driveable or in a repaired condition; or 
b. we offer to pay you the actual cash value of the 
vehicle. 
The amounts payable under D2 are subject to the 
deductible and limits of liability as set forth in the 
Declaration page. 
D3. TOWING AND EMERGENCY ROAD SERVICE: 
We will pay the reasonable costs you incur for your 
covered vehicle due to loss: 
1. For a mechanic and the reasonable cost for his 
services at the place of breakdown, not to exceed- one 
hour. 
2. The reasonable cost of towing your vehicle to a 
necessary place where repairs can be made if the 
vehicle will not run. 
3. The reasonable cost of towing your covered vehicle if 
it is stuck. 
4. The reasonable cost of delivery for gas, oil or a 
battery and change of a tire, but we do not pay for 
the cost of these items. 
The amounts payable under D3 are subject to the 
deductible[s] and limits of liability as set forth in the 
Declaration page. 
D4. EXPENSE FOR CAR RENTAL: 
We will pay you, not to exceed, $14.00 per day for rental 
expenses incurred for a covered loss: 
1. if you rent a vehicle from a car rental agency or 
garage because your covered vehicle will not run due 
to a loss; 
2. when your covered vehicle runs and when you leave 
it at a repair establishment for agreed and necessary 
repairs pursuant to a written contract or agreement for 
repairs; 
Ending when 
1. the repairs have been made or completed; 
2. when we offer to pay for the loss; or 
3. the repair costs exceed die fair market value of the 
vehicle and we offer to pay for the loss; or 
4. the rental time has exceeded 30 days, 
whichever comes first 
Any rent payable under coverage D4 is reduced by any 
amount payable under the comprehensive. 
We will not pay rental time: 
1. while your covered vehicle is being repaired, 
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serviced, or Deing used b, i^y person wane that 
person is working in any car business; 
2. while used in any other business or occupation. This 
does not apply to a private passenger car driven or 
occupied by the insured, his spouse or family 
member, 
3. for any covered vehicle while subject to any lien, 
rental or sales agreement not shown in the 
Declarations. 
The amounts payable under D4 are subject to the 
deductible and limits of liability as set forth in the 
Declaration page. 
iplication of Benefits 
ere is no duplication of benefits under Dl, D2, D3 and D4 
the same elements of loss under this, or any similar 
urance. 
elusions 
will not pay for. 
1. Loss to your covered vehicle or non-owned vehicle 
which occurs while it is used to carry persons or 
property for a fee. This exclusion does not apply to 
a share-the-expense car pooL 
2. Damage due and confined to: 
a. wear and tear; 
b. freezing; 
c. mechanical or electrical breakdown or failure; or 
d. road damage to tires. 
This exclusion does not apply if the damage results 
from the total theft of your covered vehicle. 
Loss due to or as a consequence of: 
a. radioactive contamination; 
b. discharge of any nuclear weapon (even if 
accidental); 
c. war, declared or undeclared, civil war, 
insurrection, rebellion or revolution; 
d. taking by any governmental authority or political 
subdivision; 
e. embezzlement, conversion, repossession by any 
person who has the vehicie.due to any lien, rental 
or sales agreement. 
Loss to equipment designed for the reproduction of 
sound, including, but not limited to loss to any of the 
following or their accessories: 
a. citizens band radio; 
b. two-way mobile radio; 
c. telephone; 
d. scanning monitor receiver; 
e. radar < ctors; 
f. compact disc players; 
g. stereos; or 
h. televisions. 
This exclusion does not apply if the equipment is 
permanently installed in the opening normally used by 
the auto manufacturer for the installation of this 
equipment, however, we do not pay in excess of 
S500.00 unless an extra premium has been charged 
for each item. 
5. Loss to tapes, records or other devices for use with 
equipment designed for the reproduction of sound. 
6. Loss to a camper body or trailer not shown in the 
Declarations. This exclusion does not apply to a 
camper body or trailer that you: 
a. acquire during die policy period; and 
b. ask us to insure within 30 days after you become 
die owner. 
7. Loss to: 
a. TV antennas; 
b. awnings or cabanas; or 
c. equipment designed to create additional living 
facilities. 
8. Loss to any custom furnishings or equipment in or 
upon any motor vehicle. Custom furnishings or 
equipment include but are not limited to: 
a. special carpeting and insulation, furniture, bars or 
television receivers; 
b. facilities for cooking and sleeping; 
c. height-extending roofs; 
d. custom murals, paintings or other decals or 
graphics; 
e. radar and telephones. 
9- We do not pay for loss to motor homes, campers, 
trailers and recreational vehicles owned or non-owned 
for which coverage is not purchased; 
10. Separate coverage may be purchased waiving 
paragraph 4 for accessories and customized 
furnishings, paragraph 8, if a separate premium is 
paid, but said waiver of customized furnishings shall 
not include custom murals, paintings or other decals 
or graphics. 
11. We do not pay for any loss or damage to your 
covered or non-owned . vehicle because* of 
embezzlement, conversion or repossession by any 
person who has taken possession of the vehicle due to 
anv lien, rental or sales agreement. 
12. We do not pay for any loss or damage on a covered 
vehicle if it is newly acquired and there is similar 
coverage on your newly acquired vehicle. ?3 70 
13. We do not pay for any loss or damage on a covered 
or non-owned vehicle for tires unless they are 
damaged by fire, vandalism or they are stolen, unless 
they are covered by other provisions of this section. 
Limit of Liability under Collision and 
Comprehensive Coverages 
Our limit of liability for loss will be the lesser of the: 
1. actual cash value of the stolen or damaged property; 
or 
2. amount necessary to repair or replace the property. 
Cash value of damaged or stolen property is the fair market 
value of the property, taking into consideration its age, 
condition as of the date of the loss. Fair market value does 
not include any value for antique or sentimental value. The 
deductible will then be subtracted from the amount of die 
determined loss. 
Payment of Loss under Collision and 
Comprehensive Coverages 
We have the option to pay you for a loss of the property in 
one of the following manners: 
1. we may pay you for the fair market value of the 
property in money; or 
2. we may repair or replace the damaged or stolen 
property; if die repair or replacement results in an 
improvement to the condition, kind or quality, you 
must pay for the amount of the improvement. 
3. we may, at our expense, return any stolen property to: 
a. you; or 
b. the address shown in this policy 
but you cannot abandon the property to us. 
4. if we return stolen property, we will pay for any 
damage resulting from the theft; or we may keep all 
or part of the property at an agreed or appraised 
value. 
No Benefit to Bailee 
This insurance shall not directly or indirectly benefit any 
carrier or other bailee for hire. 
Non-Duplication of Benefits, Limits of Liability 
and Conditions of Other Insurance 
If there is other applicable liability we will pay only our share 
of the loss. Our share under this policy is the amount 
computed under the applicable paragraph below. 
However, any insurance we provide for a vehicle you do not 
own shall be excess over other collectible insurance. 
IF THERE IS OTHER LIABILITY COVERAGE: 
1. Policies Issued by Us to You: 
If two or more vehicle liability policies issued by us 
to you apply to the same accident, the total limits of 
liability under all such policies shall not exceed that of the 
policy with the highest limit of liability. 
2. Other Liability Coverage Available from Other 
Sources: 
If other liability coverage applies, we are liable only 
for our share of the damages. Our share is the percent 
that the limit of liability of this policy bears to the total of 
all liability coverage applicable to the accident. 
3. Temporary Substitute Auto, Non-Owned Auto, Trailer 
or Rental Auto: 
If a temporary substitute auto, a non-owned auto 
or trailer or rental auto designed for use with a private 
passenger auto or utility vehicle has other liability 
coverage which applies in whole or in part as primary, 
excess or contingent coverage, then our coverage is excess 
over other liability coverage. We do not contribute under 
this policy to any loss where: 
a. the motor vehicle or trailer is owned by any person or 
organization in the auto business; and 
b. a non-owned or rental vehicle maintained or used in 
any business or business pursuits or business activity, 
including salespersons, employees who are using or 
who have rented a car in connection with their 
livelihood; 
4. Newly-Acquired Vehicle: 
Our coverage does not apply if there is other vehicle 
liability coverage on a newly-acquired vehicle. 
Appraisal and Arbitration 
If we and a covered person do not agree: 
1. whether that person is legally entided to recover 
damages under this part; or 
2. as to the amount of damages; 
the parties may agree in writing to have the loss 
determined by competent appraisals, as set forth in 
paragraph A. 
If you or we do not desire to proceed with the appraisal 
process, as set forth in paragraph A, either party may 
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demand arbitration, as set forth i** ^dragraph B. 
A. APPRAISAL: If we and you do not agree on the 
amount of the loss, in this event each party will select 
a competent appraiser. The two appraisers will select 
an umpire. The appraisers will state separately the 
actual cash value and the amount of loss. If they fail 
to agree, they will submit their differences to the 
umpire. A decision agreed to by any two will be 
binding. Each party will: 
1. pay its chosen appraiser, and 
2. bear the expenses of the appraisal and umpire 
equally. 
We do not waive any of our rights under this policy 
by agreeing to an appraisal 
B. ARBITRATION: If we and the covered person do 
not agree to settle the matter by appraisal, or in the 
event that you do not desire to proceed by selecting 
competent appraisers, either party may make a written 
demand for arbitration. Any matter in dispute 
between you and us will be made pursuant to 
arbitration as provided for in the arbitration rules of 
PART E - SPECIAL CONDITIONS 
Section I - General Conditions 
jL Action Against Company. No action shall lie 
against the Company unless as a condition precedent 
thereto, there shall have been full compliance with all 
die terms of this coverage. 
B. Notice. In the event of an accident, notice containing 
particulars sufficient to identify the eligible covered 
person, and also reasonably obtainable information 
respecting the time, place and circumstances of die 
accident shall be given by or on behalf of each 
eligible covered person to die Company at the home 
office as soon as practicable. If any eligible covered 
person, his legal representative or his survivors shall 
institute legal action to recover damages for bodily 
injury against a person or organization who is or may 
be liable in tort therefor, a copy of the summons and 
complaint or other process served in connection with 
such legal action shall be forwarded as soon as 
practicable to the Company by such eligible person, 
his legal representative, or his survivors. 
Section II - Prohibited Use of Alcohol and Drags 
for All Coverages 
You understand and agree as follows: 
die Arbitral.. Forums, Inc., a copy of which -is 
available on request from the Company, which shall 
be binding on both you and the Company. The 
arbitration award may include attorney's fees if 
allowed by state law and may be entered as a 
judgment in any court of proper jurisdiction. Such 
arbitration shall be in compliance with the "Utah 
Arbitration Act" (Tide 78, Chapter 31a, Utah Code 
Annotated) or the applicable arbitration provisions in 
force and effect in Utah at the time. 
Additional Duties for Coverage for Damage to 
Your Covered Vehicle 
A person seeking Coverage for Damage to Your Covered 
Vehicle must also: 
1. Take reasonable steps after loss to protect your 
covered vehicle and its equipment from further loss. 
We will pay reasonable expenses incurred to do this. 
2. Prompdy notify the police if your covered vehicle is 
stolen or damaged. 
3. Permit us to inspect and appraise the damaged 
property before its repair or disposal. 
APPLYING TO ALL COVERAGES 
A. That we do not issue policies to persons who 
consume any alcohol or alcoholic beverages or who 
use or consume any illegal drugs or who use or 
consume illegal substances, or who will operate any 
motor vehicle after having consumed alcoholic 
beverages of any kind or in any amount whatsoever 
or who allow the insured vehicle to be operated by 
anyone who consumes any alcohol or alcoholic 
beverages or who uses or consumes any illegal drugs 
or illegal substances or who operate the insured 
vehicle after consuming alcohol or alcoholic 
beverages of any kind or in any amount, or after 
using or consuming any illegal drugs or illegal 
substances. 
B. The named insured further understands that the 
premiums charged for coverage under this policy 
reflect the reduced risk present with insured who do 
not consume any alcohol, or alcoholic beverages, or 
who do not use or consume any illegal drugs or 
illegal substances, or operate a motor vehicle after 
having consumed alcohol or alcoholic beverages of 
any kind or in any amount, or who have used or 
consumed any illegal drugs or illegal substances, and 
who do not allow the insured motor vehicles to be 
operated by anyone who consumes alcohol or 
alcoholic beverages or has consumed an alcoholic 
beverage of any kind or in any amount, or who has 
used or consumed any illegal drugs or illegal 
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substances, and that the company would not issue a 
policy to the named insured except upon this 
representation and agreement. 
For any loss incurred under this policy when the 
insured motor vehicle is being operated by someone 
who has consumed any alcohol or alcoholic beverages 
of any kind or in any amount whatsoever, or who has 
used or consumed any illegal drugs or illegal 
substances of any kind or in any amount whatsoever 
then the coverage under Part A, Part B, Pan CI, Part 
C2 and Pan D of this policy shall apply only for the 
minimum limits of motor vehicle liability coverage as 
provided for in Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as 
amended, including §3lA-22-304, §3lA-22-30S and 
§31A-22-307 providing for bodily injury and property 
damage, personal injury protection, uninsured motorist 
coverage and underinsured motorist coverage and 
damage to your vehicle because of injury or 
destruction of property not the amounts set forth in 
the Declaration, if greater. If the motor vehicle is 
being operated by an Insured as applied in this 
section, outside of the state of Utah, then this policy 
only provides the minimum limits of bodily injury 
and property damage, personal injury protection, 
uninsured motorist coverage and underinsured 
motorist coverage and damage to your 
vehicle, if any, applicable in the state in which the 
vehicle is being operated and not the amount stated in 
the declarations if greater. 
D. This provision providing for minimum limits of motor 
vehicle liability coverage for bodily injury and 
property damage as applied in this section applies to 
all motor vehicles, whether owned or non-owned and 
_ to all coverages. 
Section m - Special Conditions Applying to All 
Coverages, Except A, Arbitration 
The Company and any Insured or Covered Person agree that 
on any matter in dispute between the Insured or Covered 
Person and the Company, that any of the above have die right 
to make a written demand for all marten to be settled by 
arbitration. Any matter in dispute between You and Us will be 
tnade pursuant to arbitration as provided for in the arbitration 
rules of the Arbitration Forums, Inc., a copy of which is 
available on request from the Company, which shall be binding 
on both You and the Company. The arbitration award may 
include attorney's fees if allowed by state law and may b$ 
entered as a judgment in any court of proper jurisdiction. Such 
arbitration shall be in compliance with the "Utah Arbitration 
Act" (Title 78, Chapter 31a, Utah Code Annotated) or th$ 
applicable arbitration provisions in force and effect in Utah at 
the time. 
PART F - DUTIES AFTER AN ACCIDENT OR LOSS FOR ALL 
COVERAGES 
General Duties 
We must be notified promptly of how, when and where the 
accident or loss happened. Notice should also include the 
names and addresses of any injured persons and of any 
witnesses. 
A covered person seeking any coverage must 
1- Cooperate with us in the investigation, settlement or 
defense of any claim or suit 
2. Promptly send us copies of any notices or legal 
papers received in connection with the accident or 
loss. 
3. Submit, as often as we reasonably require, to physical 
exams by physicians we select. We will pay for these 
exams. 
4. Authorize us to obtain: 
a. medical reports; and 
b. other pertinent records. 
5. Furnish us with a proof of claim in particularity as to 
any damages or loss under oath and properly verified 
if requested by us for damage to your covered or non-
owned vehicle, medical expenses, medical treatment, 
and all losses and damages in any form which you 
clshn you are entitled to under the policy and such 
other and further information that may assist thfc 
company in determining the amount due because of 
the loss. 
6. Submit to examinations under oath as reasonably 
required by us. 
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PART G - GENERAL PROVISIONS, APPLYING TO ALL COVERAGES 
Bankruptcy 
Bankruptcy or insolvency of the covered person shall not 
relieve us of any obligations under this policy. 
Fraud 
We do not provide coverage for any "Insured" who has made 
fraudulent statements or engaged in fraudulent conduct in 
connection with any accident or loss for which coverage is 
sought under this policy. 
All Agreements Between You and Us 
This policy contains all the agreements between you and us. 
Its terms may not be changed or waived except by 
endorsement issued by us. If a change requires a premium 
adjustment, we win adjust the premium as of the effective date 
of change. 
We may revise this policy form to provide more coverage 
without additional premium charge. If we do this your policy 
will automatically provide the additional coverage as of the 
date the revision is effective in Utah. 
Legal Action Against Us 
No legal action may be brought against us until there has been 
full compliance with all the terms of this policy. In addition, 
under Part A» no legal action may be brought against us until; 
1. we agree in writing that the covered person has an 
obligation to pay, or 
2- the amount of that obligation has been determined by 
arbitration or judgment after a trial, as applicable 
under die various coverages of this policy. 
No person or organization has any right under this policy to 
bring us into any action to detennine the liability of a covered 
person. 
Subrogation 
In the event of any payment to any person under all coverages: 
1. The Company is subrogated to the rights of the 
person to whom or for whose benefit such payments 
were made, to the extent of such payments, and such 
person must execute and deliver instruments and 
papers and do whatever else is necessary to secure 
such rights. Such person shall do nothing 
after loss to prejudice such rights. 
a. If the Insured proceeds or commences an 
action against a legally responsible third party, 
the Company shall be entitled to the extent of 
such payment to the proceeds of any settlement 
or judgment that may result from the exercise of 
any rights of recovery of such person against any 
person or organization legally responsible for the 
bodily injury or property damage because of 
which such payment is made and the Company 
shall have a lien to the extent of such payment, 
notice of which may be given to the person or 
organization causing such bodily injury, his agent, 
his insurer or a court having jurisdiction in the 
matter; such person shall hold in trust for the 
benefit of the Company all rights of recovery 
which he shall have against such other person or 
organization because of such bodily injury. 
b. If the Company proceeds or commences an 
action against a legally responsible third party, 
the Company may, at its option, and has the right 
to proceed or commence against any third party, 
which may be liable for damages to the Insured 
for bodily injury, medical expenses, property 
damages or other payments. The Insured agrees 
in consideration of the payments made under this 
policy to subrogate the said Company to all rights 
and causes of action the Insured has against any 
persons or corporations whomsoever, arising out 
of or incident to the bodily injury, medical 
expenses or property damage or other payments, 
authorizes the Company to sue and commence an 
action in the name of the Insured, but at the 
expense of the Company against any third party 
pledging full cooperation in the action for his 
deductible. The Insured assigns his deductible, if 
any, to the Company and authorizes the Company 
to sue in the name of the Insured as part of the 
overall cause of action. In the event of any 
reimbursement, collection or payment by a third 
party, from the payment or proceeds the 
Company will be paid and reimbursed first for 
any costs of litigation and reasonable attorney 
fees necessarily incurred. The remaining 
payments or proceeds will be distributed in direct 
proportion to each interest (the amount of the 
Insured's deductible) in proportion to- the 
Company's payments pursuant to the provisions 
of this policy for which it has a suhrogatable 
interest 
The benefits and provisions of subrogation, as herein provided, 
are subject to the provisions of Utah Code 
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Annotated, 1953. §31A-22-3U, _Amits, Exclusions and 
Conditions to Personal Injury Protection and providing for 
mandatory binding arbitration between insurers; and the 
provision for that reimbursement and the amount decided by 
mandatory binding arbitration between the insurers is not part 
of the subrogation rights as provided herein. 
Policy Period and Territory 
1. This policy applies only to accidents and losses which 
occur during the policy period as shown in the 
Declarations and within the policy territory. The 
policy territory is the United States of America, its 
territories or possessions, Puerto Rico or Canada. 
This policy also applies to loss to, or accidents 
involving, your covered vehicle while being 
transported between their ports. 
2. The policy term is shown on die Declaration page and 
is for successive periods of time if renewed for which 
you pay a renewal premium. 
3. The policy begins and ends at 12:01 a.m. standard 
time at the address shown on the Declaration page. 
Termination 
and Us 
Cancellation, Non-renewal by You 
A- Cancellation by You. 
You may cancel this policy during any policy period 
by returning it to us or by letting us know in writing 
of the date cancellation is to take effect, but the date 
of cancellation must be prospectively after the date 
that you let us know you intend to cancel. 
B. Cancellation by Us. 
We may cancel this policy only for the reasons stated 
below by letting you know in writing of the date 
cancellation takes effect in the following manner 
1. When you have not paid the premium, we may 
cancel at any time by letting you know at least 10 
days before the date cancellation takes effect 
2. When this policy has been in effect for less than 
60 days and is nor a renewal with us, we may 
cancel for any reason by letting you know at least 
10 days before the date of the cancellation. If the 
notice of cancellation is by mail, it will be sent 
first class, postage prepaid and die 10 days takes 
effect three days after the date of mailing. 
3. When this policy has been in effect for 60 days 
or more, or at any time if it is a renewal with us, 
we may cancel: 
a. if mere has been material misrepresentation 
of fact which if known to us would have 
caused us not to issue the policy; or 
b. if the risk has changed substantially since the 
policy was issued; 
c. if there have been substantial breaches of 
contractual duties, conditions and warranties; 
d. if there has been a revocation or suspension 
of the driver's license of the named insured, 
or any other person who customarily drives 
the car. 
This can be done by letting you know at least 30 
days before the date cancellation takes effect 
4. When this policy is written for a period of more 
than one year, we may cancel for any reason at 
anniversary by letting you know at least 30 days 
before die date cancellation takes effect: 
a. when this policy is canceled, the premium 
for the period from the date of cancellation 
to the expiration date will be refunded pro 
rata; 
b. if the return premium is not refunded with 
the notice of cancellation or when this policy 
is returned to us, we will refund it within a 
reasonable time after the date cancellation 
takes effect 
5. If your policy is canceled or not renewed you 
have the right by First Class Mail to request the 
reasons for the cancellation and non-renewal of 
your policy. This will be sent to you within ten 
working days after written request 
6. Any cancellation, termination or non-renewal 
notices as required herein, under the provisions of 
this paragraph and the provisions of Part G, 
Termination - Cancellation, Non-renewal by Us, 
paragraphs 1 through 5, may be delivered to you 
or mailed to you at your mailing address shown 
in the declarations and proof of mailing will be 
sufficient proof of notice. 
C. Automatic Termination. 
If we offer to renew or continue your policy and you 
or your representative do not accept, this policy will 
automatically terminate at the end of the current 
policy period. Failure to pay the required renewal or 
continuation premium when due shall mean that you 
have not accepted our offer. 
If you obtain other insurance on your covered vehicle, 
any similar insurance provided by this policy will 
terminate as to the covered date on the effective date 
of the other insurance. 
PfTf 
D. Other Termination Prov^n/ns. 
1. If the Jaw in effect in Utah at the time of this 
policy is issued, renewed or continued: 
a. requires a longer notice period; or 
b. requires a special form of, or procedure for, 
giving notice; or 
c. modifies any of the stated termination 
reasons; 
we will comply with those requirements. 
2. We may deliver any notice instead of mailing it. 
Proof of mailing of any notice shall be sufficient 
proof of notice. 
3. If this policy is canceled, you may be entitled to 
a premium refund. If so, we will send you the 
refund. The premium refund, if any, will be 
computed according to our manuals. However, 
making or offering to make the refund is not a 
condition of cancellation. 
4. The effective date of cancellation stated in die 
notice shall Become the end of die policy period. 
Transfer of Your Interest in This Policy 
Your rights and duties under this policy may not be assigned 
without our written consent. However, if a named insured 
shown in die Declarations dies, coverage will be provided for. 
1. The surviving spouse if resident in the same 
household at the time of death. Coverage applies to 
die spouse as if a named insured shown in the 
Declararions; or 
2. The legal representative of the deceased person as if 
a named insured shown in the Declarations. This 
applies only with respect to the representative's legal 
responsibility to maintain or use your covered vehicle. 
Coverage will only be provided until the end of the policy 
period. 
Punitive and Exemplary Damages 
We do not pay for punitive or exemplary damages for bodily 
injury or property damage for which any covered person 
becomes legally responsible because of an automobile accident, 
including costs and attorney fees. 
POLICYHOLDERS5 VOTING RIGHTS AND 
CONTINGENT LIABILITY 
1. While this policy is in force and effect, die named 
insured, by purchasing this policy is a member of 
Bear River Mutual Insurance Company, a non-profit 
corporation, governed by and subject to the Articles 
of Incorporation and Bylaws and is entided to vote at 
all meetings of the members. 
2. No Contingent Liability. This policy is non-
assessable. 
NOTICE OF ANNUAL MEETING 
THE INSURED IS FURTHER NOTIFIED THAT BY 
VIRTUE OF THE POLICY AS A MEMBER OF BEAR 
RIVER MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, A NON-
PROFIT CORPORATION, THAT THE ANNUAL MEETING 
IS HELD IN THE HOME OFFICE IN SALT LAKE CTTY, 
UTAli, ON THE FIRST SATURDAY IN MARCH EACH 
YEAR AT 11:00 AM. FOR THE PURPOSE OF 
TRANSACTING THE GENERAL BUSINESS OF THE 
COMPANY AND FOR THE ELECTION OF DIRECTORS. 
AS A POLICYHOLDER YOU ARE ENTITLED TO VOTE 
IN PERSON AT THE MEETING OR BY PROXY. THIS 
NOTICE SHALL BE DEEMED FULL NOTICE OF THE 
ANNUAL MEETING. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the Company has caused this policy 
to be signed by its president and secretary, but this policy shall 
not be valid unless completed by the attachment hereto of the 
Declaration Page. 
Terms of Policy Cannot be Waived Except by 
Endorsement 
Notice to any agent or knowledge possessed by any agent or 
by any other person shall not effect a waiver or a change in 
any part of this policy or estop the company from asserting 
any right under the terms of this policy; nor shall the terms of 
this policy be waived or changed, except by endorsement 
issued to form a part of this policy, signed by a duly 
authorized representative of the company. 
Secretary 
Resident v / Pr i  
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JBE IT REMEMBERED That John Wal l and Nancv Wall 
Address 1269 West C a l i f o r n i a , S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84104 
(hereinafter referred to as the Claimant s J for and in consideration of the sum of S i x t e e n Thousand and no/lOOs 
Dollars(S 1 6 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 ) 
the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, do we hereby REMISE, RELEASE AND FOREVER DISCHARGE 
David W a t e r s d / b / a D & L C o n s t r u c t i o n and Lana W a t e r s 
(ImfX « n n ruti H*mm at *rux\u Corporation* or P«nnifWiot To dm ft«m<c) 
*«efn5 and wy—its and *il «**•«• persors. firms, and corporations yhcmsceyer of md fron: cr.y 2nd 2il scscns. Thie ir (His, ««r, Tn«ic, its) 
daims, and demands whatsoever which da.imzrrz s now have or may have, whether known or unknown, developed or un« 
(H4&, H4¥«J 
developed, on account* of or arising out of the accident, casualty or event which happened on or about the 7 t h day of 
As a further consideration for said Sum Claimant s warrant tnat no promise or agreement not nerein expressed has 
been made to Claimant s ; that in executing this Release Claimant s a r e not relying upon any statement or representation 
(U, Art ) 
made by the party or parties hereby released or said party's or parries' agents, servants or physicians concerning the nature. 
extent, or duration of the injuries and/or damages, or concerning any other thing or matter, but a r e relying solely upon 
rUTAnti 
t h e i r own judgment; that the above mentioned sum Is received by Claimants^ 
(mtk. m«t, Tft«4r. its) "™ 
in full settlement and satisfaction 
of all the aforesaid daims and demands whatsoever: that Claimants ?ro legally competent to execute this Release; and that be-
(IU Aral 
fore signing and sealing this Release, Claimant
 c V> 3 V A fully informed rha^c oWoc of its contents and meaning 
(Htt, navt) (Himsott, H«rs«rt, Tn«ms*tv«s) 
*** h a v e executed it with full knowledge thereof. It is further undersiood and agreed that the payment of said amount is 
not to be construed as an admission of liability, but is a compromise of a disputed claim. 
HAVE BEAD THE FOREGQ1N& RELEASE AND FQUTHNDESSTAHD-IX^^ 
Signed, sealed and delivered this Lj Tr/ day of '~7Yl (XJCJLJ^C 
at >r^6 ^&*~s' ^J^^tA^ <rf 
i»2£. 
ln the presence of 
Witness: 
Witness: 
Witness: 
n^Cb^=Ja^ I IjJf 
(/NOTARY PUBUC 
MAIIHEWU. WHITE 
2*7 Hawthorne Or. 
Layton.UT 840*1 
Mi' Cowwm<i«in Cwgirn pCf JJ Seal) 
THOMAS A. DUFFIN (0927) 
DANIEL O. DUFFIN (6530) 
JENSEN, DUFFIN, CARMAN, DIBB & JACKSON 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
311 South State, Suite 380 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 531-6600 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BEAR RIVER MUTUAL INSURANCE 
COMPANY, a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JOHN WALL and 
NANCY WALL, his wife, 
Defendants. 
I ORDER AND FINAL JUDGMENT 
) Civil No. 940905590CN 
i Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki 
The above-entitled matter having come on regularly for hearing before the 
above-entitled Court on the 24th day of August, 1995, at the hour of 9:00 a.m., the 
Honorable Glenn K. Iwasaki presiding, Thomas A. Duffin appearing for and on behalf 
of Plaintiff, Bear River Mutual Insurance Company, and John and Nancy Wall 
appearing per se, whereupon the Court heard the respective argument of the parties, 
pursuant to Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings or in lieu thereof, Motion 
for Summary Judgment, and Defendants' counter Motion for Summary Judgment, and 
pursuant to the pleadings, the fol lowing facts are not in dispute: 
1 . The Plaintiff, Bear River Mutual Insurance Company, (hereinafter 
"Bear River") is an insurance corporation engaged in the insurance business in the 
r.;x 
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state of Utah, is a non-profit corporation and is owned entirely by its policyholders for 
the use and benefit of the policyholders, having its principal place of business at 778 
Winchester, Murray, Utah. Bear River Mutual only issues insurance policies in the 
state of Utah. 
2. Defendants, John Wal! and Nancy Wall, his wife, are residents of 
Davis County, State of Utah, and reside at 802 Montague, Bountiful, Utah 84010. 
3. This action is brought pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as 
amended §78-33-1, et.seq. seeking by determination the rights of the parties hereto 
under a policy issued by Plaintiff, Policy No. C145077. 
4 . On or about June 5, 1992, and continuing through June 5, 1993, 
Plaintiff had issued its standard automobile Policy No. C145077, to John Wall and 
Nancy Wall , his wi fe. A copy of the policy is attached as Exhibit "A" and a copy of 
the declaration page is attached as Exhibit "B" to Plaintiff's Complaint. 
5. That the auto policy issued to Defendants, provides under PART 
B - PERSONAL INJURY PROTECTION COVERAGE, Insuring Agreement, as fol lows: 
"The Company will pay personal injury protection benefits that are reasonable 
and necessary to or on behalf of each eligible injured person for: 
(a) medical expenses 
(b) work loss 
(c) funeral expenses 
(d) survivor loss and 
(e) special damages 
with respect to bodily injury sustained by an eligible insured person caused by 
an accident involving the use of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle. 
Medical Payments: 
The maximum amount payable for medical expenses shall not exceed 
$3,000.00; unless additional medical protection or payments are provided for 
p9 i°i 
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on the Declaration page, they must be incurred within three years of the date 
of the accident to be payable. 
Policy Period, Territory, Other Limits of Liability and Special Provisions 
This coverage applies only to accidents which occur during the policy period in 
the United States and Canada, except if an auto accident to which this policy 
applies occurs outside of Utah, (but is within the United States and Canada), 
our limits of liability under your policy for that accident are as fol lows: 
1 . If the state, (outside of Utah) CJ Canada, has: 
a. a personal injury protection or similar law specifying limits higher 
than that in the declarations, your policy wil l provide the higher 
specified limit; 
Special Conditions if Law is Declared Invalid 
The premium for the policy is based on rates which have been established in 
reliance upon the limitations on the right to recover for damages imposed by the 
provisions of the Utah Automobile No-Fault Insurance Act . In the event a court 
of competent jurisdiction declares or enters a judgment, the effect of which is 
to render the provisions of such act invalid or unenforceable in whole or in part, 
the Company shall have the right to recompute the premium payable for the 
policy and the provisions of this endorsement shall be voidable or subject to 
amendment at the option of the Company. 
Non-Duplication of Benefits, Limits of Liability and Conditions of Other 
Insurance Under our Personal Injury Protection 
1 . No eligible injured person shall recover or receive duplicate benefits for the 
same elements of loss under this or any similar insurance." 
6 . Under PART G - GENERAL PROVISIONS, APPLYING TO ALL 
COVERAGES, Sub roga t i on , i t p rov ides : 
"In the event of any payment to any person under all coverages: 
1 . The Company is subrogated to the rights of the person to whom or for 
whose benefit such payments were made, to the extent of such 
payments, and such person must execute and deliver instruments and 
papers and do whatever else is necessary to secure such rights. Such 
person shall do nothing after loss to prejudice such rights. 
a. If the Insured proceeds or commences an action against a legally 
responsible third party, the Company shall be entitled to the 
extent of such payment to the proceeds of any settlement or 
judgment that may result from the exercise of any rights of 
recovery of such person against any person or organization 
-4-
legally responsible for the bodily injury or property damage 
because of which such payment is made and the Company shall 
have a lien to the extent of such payment, notice of which may 
be given to the person or organization causing such bodily injury, 
his agent, his insurer or a court having jurisdiction in the matter; 
such person shall hold in trust for the benefit of the Company all 
rights of recovery which he shall have against such other person 
or organization because of such bodily injury." 
7. Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended §31A-22-308 provides: 
"The fol lowing may receive benefits under personal injury protection 
coverage: 
(1) the named insured, when injured in an accident involving any 
motor vehicle, regardless of whether the accident occurs in this state, 
the United States, its territories or possessions, or Canada, except 
where the injury is the result of the use or operation of the named 
insured's own motor vehicle not actually insured under the policy;" 
8. Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended §31 A-22-309(6) 
provides: 
"(6) Every policy providing personal injury protection coverage is 
subject to the fol lowing: 
(a) that where the insured under the policy is or would be held 
legally liable for the personal injuries sustained by any person to whom 
benefits required under personal injury protection have been paid by 
another insurer, including the Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah, 
the insurer of the person who would be held legally liable shall 
reimburse the other insurer for the payment, but not in excess of the 
amount of damages recoverable;" 
9. On or about August 6, 1992, the Plaintiff's insured, Nancy Wall, 
while a resident of Utah, was involved in an automobile accident on Colorado State 
Highway 666 at Cortez, Colorado. 
10. That on or about March 4, 1994, John Wall and Nancy Wall 
executed a release of "any and all actions, claims, and demands whatsoever which 
claimants now have or may have, whether known or unknown, developed, or 
PS */ 
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undevelopedf on account of or arising out of the accident, casualty or event which 
happened on or about the 7th day of August 1992." A copy of the release to the tort 
feasors, David & Lana Waters, is attached as Exhibit C to Plaintiff's Complaint, and 
the release was less than the insurance limits of the tort feasors. 
1 1 . Plaintiff's Complaint for Declaratory Judgment for the interpretation 
of its policy provisions and whether Plaintiff is under an obligation pursuant to Utah 
law to make further personal injury protection benefit payments as provided for in Part 
B of its policy providing for personal injury protection benefits to Defendants was filed 
promptly and commenced in good faith by Plaintiff after receiving knowledge of the 
general release of the tort feasors by Defendants, jointly and severally. There were 
legal, debatable, questions of law and there exists a reasonable question as to the 
issues of law for denial of the claim of Defendants by Plaintiff. 
12. The Court examined the briefs of the Plaintiff and Defendants and 
the cases and authorities cited by both, and finds that that the Plaintiff's Motion for 
Judgment on the Pleadings or for summary judgment, should be denied, and that 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment should be granted and that Plaintiff should 
be required to pay further personal injury protection claims to Defendants, John Wall 
and Nancy Wall, pursuant to Part B of its policy under the personal injury protection 
benefits. 
13. The Court hereby dismisses the Counterclaim of the Defendants 
on the basis that it attempts to include a criminal action wi th a civil action and, 
therefore, is an improper counterclaim; the Court further denies the Defendants' 
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Motion to amend their Counterclaim based upon the settlement of the issues herein 
set for th. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND 
DECREED: 
1 . That the Defendants, John and Nancy Wall's Motion for Summary 
Judgment is granted and Plaintiff is required to pay to John and Nancy Wall, pursuant 
to the provisions of its policy, Part B, Personal Injury Protection, those benefits since 
the time of the release signed by Defendants on March 4, 1994, pursuant to the terms 
and conditions of the policy. 
2. That Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings or for 
Summary Judgment is denied. 
3. That the counterclaim filed by Defendants, John Wall and Nancy 
Wall, is hereby dismissed, and the Defendants' request to file an amended 
counterclaim is denied. ^-£)/. 
Dated this %/ day of March, 1996. 
P<? R3 
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Mailing Certificate 
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing Judgment to 
the following parties by placing a true copy thereof in an envelope addressed to: 
John Wall and 
Nancy Wall 
P.O. Box 540118 
No. Salt Lake, Utah 84054 
postage prepaid, this ;>> day of March, 1996. 
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(DEFENDANT'S 
Jensen at this time is willing to plead 
guilty to the probation violation with the 
understanding, and because of the situa-
tion that has been presented to us, that 
he still denies that he ever made the 
unauthorized calls to A and M Mowers. 
He is without a defense because we can-
not get a hold of Douglas Russell, but he 
has violated the rules and regulations of 
the Halfway House as indicated by that 
representative in the matters that he in-
dicated he would have just let go unno-
ticed if it had not been for the phone 
calls, and that's the only way we can 
handle it, your honor, because of him 
being incarcerated, so that's how we have 
to handle it. 
THE COURT: Mr. Jensen, does that 
conform to what your opinion is, and has 
your attorney stated your position accu-
rately? 
MR. JENSEN: Yeah. 
The defendant should be permitted to 
withdraw his plea of guilty because, I be-
lieve, in no way could it be deemed to be a 
free, voluntary, understanding, and intelli-
gent plea. 
MAUGHAN, J., concurs in the views ex-
pressed in the dissenting opinion of WIL-
KINS, J. 
ALLS* J INS. CO. v. ANDERSON Jtah 2 3 5 
Cite as, Utah, 608 P.2d 235 
COUNSEL): Mr. paid to its insured following a settlement 
between insured and insurance carrier of 
third-party tort-feasor. The First District 
Court, Cache County, Ted S. Perry, J. pro 
tern., entered judgment in favor of insured, 
and insurer appealed. The Supreme Court, 
Stewart, J., held that insurer was not enti-
tled to recover no-fault payments made to 
its insured out of proceeds of a settlement 
with third-party tort-feasor. 
ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, a 
corporation, Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Richard Bruce ANDERSON, Defendant 
and Respondent. 
No. 16411. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
March 3, 1980. 
Automobile liability insurer brought ac-
tion to recover no-fault insurance benefits 
Judgment affirmed. 
Crockett, C. J., filed concurring opinion 
in which Hall, J., concurred. 
Insurance <£=> 601.25 
Automobile liability insurer was not en-
titled to recover no-fault payments made to 
its insured out of proceeds of settlement 
with third-party tort-feasor. U.C.A.1953, 
31-41-11. 
L. E. Midgley, Salt Lake City, for plain-
tiff and appellant. 
N. George Daines of Daines & Daines, 
Logan, for defendant and respondent. 
STEWART, Justice: 
Plaintiff, Allstate Insurance Company, 
brought this action to recover no-fault in-
surance benefits paid to its insured, the 
defendant, following a settlement between 
the defendant and the insurance carrier of 
a third-party tortfeasor. 
In January 1976 defendant, a passenger 
in a vehicle insured by Allstate, was injured 
in an automobile accident. Pursuant to his 
claim, Allstate paid defendant $2,000 in no-
fault medical benefits. Subsequently, de-
fendant filed suit against the tortfeasor, 
who was insured by State Farm Mutual 
Insurance Company. Defendant entered 
into a settlement agreement with State 
Farm. On settlement of that suit defend-
ant executed a release, and State Farm 
agreed to pay a settlement amount of $10,-
000. Two thousand dollars of this amount 
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was made payable jointly to defendant and 
Allstate. Defendant refused to deliver the 
draft, and Allstate initiated this action. 
The issue is whether Allstate is entitled, 
because of a right of subrogation, to recov-
er the no-fault payments made to its in-
sured out of proceeds of a settlement with a 
third-party tortfeasor. 
We hold that Allstate Insurance Co. v. 
Ivie, Utah, 606 P.2d 1197 (1980), is disposi-
tive of this case. 
The judgment in favor of defendant is 
affirmed. Costs to Respondent 
MAUGHAN and WILKINS, JJ., concur. 
CROCKETT, Chief Justice (concurring 
with comments): 
I concur on the basis that the recently 
decided case of Allstate Ins. Co. v. Ivie1 is 
now to be recognized as the law of this 
state. However, inasmuch as that case 
made a change in our law,21 think it appro-
priate to make some further observations. 
In cases such as this, it is important to 
keep in mind the distinction between the 
two classes of claims: first, the personal 
injury protection (PIP) benefits, which are 
paid to the claimant (the person who suf-
fers injuries) by his own insurer, regardless 
of fault. Second, there is the possible tort 
claim against the alleged wrongdoer, 
backed up by his insurer. If it appears that 
the wrongdoer "is or would be legally lia-
ble" to the claimant, then the wrongdoer's 
insurer must reimburse the claimant's in-
surer for its PIP payments it has made, this 
to be done under the procedure provided in 
Section 31-41-11, U.C.A.1953; and this PIP 
payment is not to be considered as part of 
any settlement between the claimant and 
the wrongdoer or his insurer. (Unless the 
parties clearly understand and agree other-
wise.) 
It is important that parties involved in 
such situations be aware of these rights and 
obligations, as now adjudicated, under the 
No-Fault Insurance Act. This, in order to 
1. Utah. 606 P.2d 1197 (1980). 
prevent double recovery, and double pay-
ment for the same loss, and incidentally, to 
avoid increased costs of insurance coverage, 
in frustration of the very purpose of that 
act. 
HALL, J., concurs in the views expressed 
in the concurring opinion of CROCKETT, C. 
J. 
J. Elmer WISCOMBE and Naomi B. 
Wiscombe, his wife, Plaintiffs and 
Respondents, 
v. 
The LOCKHART CO., Defendant 
and Appellant 
The LOCKHART CO., Third-Party 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
Neil J. BEARDALL et a!., Third-Party 
Defendants. 
No. 16304. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
March 3, 1980. 
Assignee of uniform real estate con-
tract appealed from judgment of the 
Fourth District Court, Utah County, Allen 
B. Sorensen, J., quieting title to certain real 
property in vendors as ^gainst assignee. 
The Supreme Court, Wilkins, J., held that 
contract between vendor and purchaser was 
properly foreclosed by vendor in accordance 
with terms of contract after purchaser de-
faulted by missing one installment pay-
ment; title to property thereafter remained 
in vendor no longer subject to contract, and 
contract assignee's tender of payment, 
2. See dissenting opinions in Allstate Ins. Co. v. 
Ivie. supra, note 1. 
P9 U 
of the institution to carrv onj ts operations 
in secret. Accordingly, e. dgment that 
the plaintiff and other members of the pub-
lic are entitled to it is affirmed.12 No costs 
awarded. 
MAUGHAN and HALL, JJ., concur. 
WILKINS and STEWART, JJ., concur in 
result. 
ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
Louise IVIE and Travelers Insurance 
Companies, Defendant and 
Appellant. 
No. 15983. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Feb. 7, 1980. 
Passenger who sustained severe person-
al injuries in motor vehicle accident appeal-
ed decision of the Third District Court, Salt 
Lake County, David K. Winder, J., granting 
summary judgment in favor of no-fault in-
surance carrier for car in which passenger 
was riding in the amount of personal injury 
protection benefits paid by it to passenger. 
The Supreme Court, Maughan, J., held that 
No-Fault Insurance Act does not confer on 
no-fault insurer right of subrogation to 
funds received by its insured for personal 
injuries in subsequent legal action, but 
rather grants the no-fault insurer a limited, 
equitable right to seek reimbursement in 
arbitration proceeding against the liability 
insurer. 
12. We so decide this case on the record as 
presented to the district court, and on the basis 
of our statutory law We have taken judicial 
notice of the subsequently enacted Chap. 113. 
S.L.U.1979, Sec. 5 of which provides that per-
Cause remandpH 
Stewart, J., . ,<SG concurring opinion. 
Hall, J., filed dissenting opinion, in 
which Crockett, C. J., concurred. 
Crockett, C. J., filed dissenting opinion 
in which Hall, J., concurred. 
1. Automobiles <$=> 251.11 
No-Fault Insurance Act confers two 
privileges on party who has either insurance 
or other accrued security: first, he is grant-
ed partial tort immunity, and second, he is 
not personally liable for no-fault insurance 
benefits paid by insurer; he does, however, 
remain liable for customary tort claims not 
compensated by such benefits. U.C.A.1953, 
31^1-5 , 31-^1-6. 
2. Automobiles <$=>251.11 
Where tort-feasor has complied with 
security provisions of No-Fault Insurance 
Act, injured party, if entitled to maintain 
claim for personal injuries, should plead 
only for those damages for which he has not 
received reparation under his first-party in-
surance benefits. U.C.A.1953, 31-41-5, 3 1 -
41-6, 31-41-9(1). 
3. Automobiles <*=> 251.11 
Under No-Fault Insurance Act, tort-
feasor has partial immunity for general 
damages until threshold provisions of in-
jured party's damages are met and no per-
sonal liability for payment of the benefits 
provided by no-fault insurance company, if 
he has complied with security requirements 
of the Act. U.C.A.1953, 31-41-6, 31-41-
9(2). 
4. Insurance <s=»601.25 
No-Fault Insurance Act does not confer 
on no-fault insurer right of subrogation to 
funds received by its insured for personal 
injuries in subsequent legal action, but 
rather grants no-fault insurer*a limited, 
equitable right to seek reimbursement in 
sonally identifiable salary data of employees of 
institutions of higher education is "private in-
formation" and subject to disclosure only to 
the extent provided by the Utah Information 
Practices Act 
P? ?7 
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arbitration proceeding against the liability 
insurer. 
5, Subrogation <§=*1 
Subrogation is creature of equity, pur-
pose of which is to work out equitable ad-
justment between parties by securing ulti-
mate discharge of debt by person who, in 
equity and in good conscience, ought to pay 
it. 
6. Insurance ^512.1(1) 
In action for damages against tort-fea-
sor brought by claimant who has collected 
benefits from its no-fault insurer, tort-fea-
sor's liability insurer, in fulfilling its duty to 
respond to claims of the injured party to 
limits of its policy, stands in shoes of its 
insured and pays on the basis of its in-
sured's personal liability to injured party, 
and such personal liability does not include 
personal injury protection benefits paid un-
der no fault insurance; therefore, tort vic-
tim's recovery from the liability insurer 
cannot be reduced by personal injury pro-
tection benefits. U.C.A.1953, 31-41-6, 3 1 -
41-9(1, 2). 
L. Rich Humpherys of Christensen, Gard-
iner, Jensen & Evans, Salt Lake City, for 
defendant and appellant. 
L. E. Midgley, Salt Lake City, for plain-
tiff and respondent. 
MAUGHAN, Justice: 
Before us is a matter involving our "no-
fault" insurance act. It was resolved, by 
summary judgment, in favor of plaintiff 
Allstate Insurance Company. We reverse 
and remand. Costs awarded to defendant 
Ivie. 
Defendant, hereinafter "Ivie," sustained 
severe personal injuries in a motor vehicle 
accident. Allstate Insurance Company, the 
plaintiff herein, was the "no-fault" insur-
ance carrier for the vehicle in which Ivie 
was a passenger. In compliance with the 
Utah Automobile No-Fault Insurance Act, 
Section 41, Title 31, U.C.A.1953, as enacted 
1973, Allstate paid Ivie PIP (personal injury 
protection) benefits amounting to the sum 
of $7,394.00. Thereafter, Ivie filed an ac-
tion for damages against James Salisbury, 
the driver of the other motor vehicle in-
volved in the accident. Salisbury's liability 
insurer was Travelers Insurance Company. 
Allstate declined to join in or participate in 
the lawsuit, although it asserted it had sub-
rogation rights to the extent of the PIP 
benefits it had paid. 
The trial of the negligence action was set 
for April 11, 1978. In March 1978, Travel-
ers offered to settle for $44,000. Travelers' 
liability was limited to $50,000 under the 
policy. Ivie's counsel was employed under a 
contingency fee arrangement, viz., twenty-
five percent prior to actual trial preparation 
and one third if the case were settled imme-
diately before or during the trial, or went 
to judgment. Additionally, Ivie was re-
sponsible for all costs and expenses incurred 
in the prosecution of her claim. After re-
viewing the deposition of tort-feasor Salis-
bury, and further investigation, Ivie deter-
mined there would be a limited opportunity 
to collect a judgment in excess of the liabili-
ty policy limit of $50,000, although Ivie 
claimed $150,000 in damages. Under these 
circumstances, Ivie accepted a settlement of 
$44,000; thus she limited her attorney's 
fees to twenty-five percent. Travelers is-
sued two drafts: one was made payable 
jointly to Allstate and Ivie in the sum of 
$7,394.00; the other was for the balance of 
the $44,000 settlement. Ivie refused to de-
liver the check for $7,394.00 to Allstate, and 
the present action was filed. 
In its complaint, Allstate pleaded in the 
alternative that it was entitled to subroga-
tion under the contractual terms of the 
policy issued on the vehicle in which Ivie 
was a passenger to the extent it had paid 
the PIP benefits, or it was entitled to reim-
bursement under Section 31-41-11, U.C.A. 
1953, enacted in 1973. Allstate further 
pleaded for a declaration of its rights in 
regard to Ivie's recovery as a result of the 
settlement of her tort action. Allstate 
moved for summary judgment. 
Ivie opposed the summary judgment on 
the ground there were triable issuesof fact. 
Ivie urged equitable principles applp-Wysu^ 
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rotation, and the insured i a ed to be 
made whole before the insurer is entitled to 
any portion of the recovery from the tort-
feasor. Ivie argued she sustained severe 
injuries and was compelled to settle for a 
sum totally inadequate to compensate her 
for the total damages sustained. According 
to her argument, to prevail Allstate must 
prove it has a greater equity than Ivie, 
which, in effect, would require proof Ivie 
had received double payment for her medi-
cal expenses.1 
Ivie further urged, if Allstate were enti-
tled to its subrogation claim, it should con-
tribute to the costs and attorney's fees in-
curred by Ivie in collecting the claim. Ivie 
cites the principle that in the absence of an 
agreement to the contrary as set forth by 
the terms in a policy of insurance, the in-
sured, who is successful in the recovery of 
funds which include money payable by the 
insured to an insurance company, is entitled 
to deduct attorney fees and other expenses 
reasonably and necessarily incurred in mak-
ing such a recovery from the amount pay-
able to the insurance company.2 
The trial court granted Allstate's motion 
for summary judgment. Specifically, the 
court granted Allstate judgment against 
Ivie and Travelers jointly and severally in 
the sum of $7,394.00. The court declared 
Travelers was bound by the provisions of 
Section 31-41-11, and Ivie was not entitled 
to an attorney's fee from Allstate. 
To resolve the issues between the parties, 
it is essential to construe Section 31-41-11; 
however, this section cannot be construed in 
isolation, but must be correlated with other 
pertinent provisions in Chapter 41 of Title 
31, Utah Automobile No-Fault Insurance 
Act. As an aid to the proper construction 
of this act, reference to an article by Robert 
E. Keeton in the 1973 Utah Law Review is 
beneficial, Compensation Systems and 
Utah's No-Fault Statute, 1973 ULR 383. 
Therein, it is explained that twenty-one 
states have enacted "no-fault" legislation. 
1. Transamehca Insurance Company v. Barnes, 
29 Utah 2d 101, 505 P.2d 783 (1972); Lyon v. 
Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company, 25 
Utah 2d 311, 480 P.2d 739 (1971). 
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These laws are of pes: first, the 
add-on statutes; and second, the partial 
tort exemption statutes. The add-on stat-
utes merely add to the negligence system of 
reparations with some kind of no-fault ben-
efits to an injured person, without regard to 
fault. All tort claims are preserved under 
these statutes, although some provide for 
subrogation or offset to avoid jkuikle recov-
ery for an jtem of loss. These add-on laws 
are not regarded as true "no-fault" legisla-
tion. 
The true "no-fault" insurance is a type of 
compensation system which couples the 
payment of benefits on a no-fault basis 
with the partial elimination of fault-based 
tort actions for both economic losses and 
pain and suffering. This system generally 
continues to permit fault-based claims for 
pain and suffering in the more serious cases 
and for economic losses above no-fault ben-
efits. A system which has no tort exemp-
tion at all is not a "no-fault" insurance. 
The Utah no-fault statute is a compulsory, 
partial tort exemption law coupling no-
fault insurance benefits, Section 6, with a 
partial elimination bf tort claims for bodily 
injury. 
Section 2 of the act provides: 
The purpose of this act is to require the 
payment of certain prescribed benefits in 
respect to motor vehicle accidents 
through either insurance or other ap-
proved security, but on the basis of no 
fault, preserving, however, the right of 
an injured person to pursue the custom-
ary tort claims where the most serious 
type of injuries occur 
(1) No person for whom direct bene-
fit coverage is provided for in this act 
shall be allowed to maintain a cause of 
action for general damages arising out 
of personal injuries alleged to have 
been caused by an automobile accident 
except where there has been caused by 
this accident any one or more of the 
following: 
2. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance 
Company v. Clinton, 267 Or. 653, 518 P.2d 645 
(1974). 
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(a) Death; 
(b) Dismemberment or fracture; 
(c) Permanent disability; 
(d) Permanent disfigurement; or 
(e) Medical expenses to a person in ex-
cess of $500. 
(2) The owner of a motor vehicle 
with respect to which security is re-
quired by this act who fails to have 
such security in effect at the time of an 
accident shall have no immunity from 
tort liability and shall be personally 
liable for the payment of the benefits 
provided for under Section 31-^1-6. 
[Emphasis supplied]. 
[1] Under this statutory plan, first par-
ty PIP benefits up to the amoun* - provided 
in Section 6 are paid to an inju ^d person 
without regard to fault. Furthermore, the 
injured party is precluded from maintaining 
an action to recover general damages (all 
damages other than those awarded for eco-
nomic losses),3 except where the threshold 
requirements of Section 9(1) are met. Un-
der Section 9(2), there are two consequences 
to the owner of a motor vehicle who fails to 
have the security required by Section 5: 
first, he has no immunity from tort liabili-
ty; second, he is personally liable for the 
benefits provided under Section 6. The 
only logical inference is that if a party has 
the security required under Section 5, the 
no-fault insurance act confers two privileg-
es: first, he is granted partial tort immuni-
ty; second, he is not personally liable for 
the benefits provided under Section 6. He 
does, however, remain liable for customary 
tort claims, viz., general damages and eco-
nomic losses not compensated by the bene-
fits paid under Section 6, where the thresh-
old provisions of Section 9(1) are met. 
[2] There is no provision in the statuto-
ry scheme to indicate the tort-feasor who 
ha.s complied with the security provisions of 
the act, becomes personally liable for the 
PIP benefits provided in Section 6, when 
the injured party is entitled under the 
threshold pro\isions of Section 9(1) to main-
tain a claim for personal injuries. In such a 
3. 1973 ULR 
situation, the injured party should plead 
only for those damages for *hich he has not 
received reparation under his first party 
insurance benefits. In order to present a 
completely factual picture to the jury, the 
injured party may wish to present evidence 
of all his medical bills or other economic 
losses. The court, by an appropriate in-
struction, could explain to the jury that 
these economic losses have not been includ-
ed in the prayer for damages, because the 
injured party has previously received repa-
ration under his own no-fault insurance 
coverage. 
The foregoing interpretation is the only 
one consistent with the provisions in Section 
9(2). The obvious legislative intent was to 
encourage compliance with the security pro-
visions of the act. The design to compel 
compliance included not only partial tort 
exemption, but immunity from personal lia-
bility for payment of the benefits provided 
for under Section 6, 
When Section 9(2) is construed in con-
junction with Section 9(1), the legislative 
intent emerges. 
No person for whom direct benefit cov-
erage is provided for in this act shall be 
allowed to maintain a cause of action for 
general damages . . . except wThere 
Until the threshold requirements are met, 
the injured party is limited to his direct 
benefit coverage. If his injuries meet the 
threshold requirements, then he may main-
tain a claim for general damages. The 
term "general damages" is explained as fol-
lows: 
Another interesting feature of the 
Utah law is its distinctive phrasing of the 
tort exemption provision, which declares: 
"No person for whom direct benefit cov-
erage is provided for in this act shall be 
allowed to maintain a cause of action for 
general damages unless one of the thresh-
old requirements is met." The term 
"general damages" is not defined in the 
statute. The tort exemption pro\isions 
of other statutes, rather than referring to 
383, 392. 
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"general damages" have used phrases 
such as "pain and suffering" or "pain, 
suffering, mental anguish, and inconven-
ience," or have used especially defined 
term such as noneconomic detriment. 
The term "general damages" was often 
used, in public discussion of no-fault pro-
posals, as a comprehensive term for ele-
ments of tort damages other than eco-
nomic losses, which were often referred 
to as "specials." In view of that usage, it 
would seem that "general damages" as 
used in the Utah statute includes dam-
ages for pain and suffering. It may rea-
sonably be argued that "general dam-
ages" refers more broadly to all damages 
other than those awarded for economic 
losses and that preclusion of "general 
damages" precludes also any award for 
disability as such (including for example, 
disability to play golf), as distinguished 
from an award reimbursing economic 
losses resulting from the disability.4 
[3] Thus, under Section 9(1) and (2), the 
tort-feasor has partial immunity for general 
damages until the threshold provisions are 
met and no personal liability for the pay-
ment of the benefits provided under Section 
6, if he has complied with the security re-
quirements of the act. 
Section 11 must be construed in connec-
tion with the other relevant provisions. 
Section 31-41-11 provides: 
(1) Every insurer authorized to write 
the insurance required by this act shall 
agree as a condition to being allowed to 
continue to write insurance in the State 
of Utah; 
(a) That where its insured is or 
would be legally liable for the personal 
injuries sustained by any person to 
whom benefits required under this act 
have been paid by another insurer, in-
cluding the state insurance fund, it will 
reimburse such other insurer for the 
payment of such benefits, but not in 
excess of the amount of damages so 
recoverable, and 
4. Id. p 392. 
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(b) That the issue of liability for 
such reimbursement and the amount of 
same shall be decided by mandatory, 
binding arbitration between the insur-
ers. 
Section 11 is not a model of clarity. A 
degree of confusion has been generated by 
the subtitle to this section supplied by the 
publisher of the Utah Code Annotated, The 
Allen Smith Company. The subtitle reads: 
"Subrogation rights and arbitration be-
tween insurers." In contrast, the subtitle 
in the session laws, Laws of Utah, 1973, 
Regular Session, Chapter 55, reads: "Condi-
tions insurers to abide by." 
In reference to Section 11, Keeton 
states:5 
The Utah law preserves subrogation-
like rights of reimbursement among no-
fault insurers. That is, after an insurer 
pays no-fault benefits, it is entitled to 
reimbursement from the insurer of a neg-
ligent driver who would have been liable 
in tort to the injured person but for the 
partial tort exemption. These claims for 
reimbursement are declared to be subject 
to mandatory, binding arbitration be-
tween the insurers. This would appear to 
be an undesirable preservation of fault 
based claims among insurers. It may 
happen, however, that the provision will 
fall into disuse in practice. For example, 
two insurers with a large volume of 
claims against each other may agree to 
square accounts periodically on an actuar-
ial basis, or even to forego these reim-
bursement claims against each other alto-
gether, because it wrould be cheaper for 
both to do so. 
The state of Oregon has a provision simi-
lar to Section 11, viz., ORS 743.825. It 
should be emphasized that Oregon has an 
add-on statute with no partial tort exemp-
tion.6 Oregon further requires the injured 
person to include in his claim or legal action 
the benefits furnished by the insurer, ORS 
743.828(3)(b). By a separate statute, there 
is a provision in Oregon for subrogation. 
ORS 743.830 provides: 
6. Id. p. 386. 
5. Id. at pp. 392-393. 
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If a motor vehicle liability insurer has 
furnished personal injury protection ben-
efits 
(1) The insurer is entitled to the pro-
ceeds of any settlement or judgment that 
may result from the exercise of any 
rights of recovery of the injured person 
against any person legally responsible for 
the accident, to the extent of such bene-
fits furnished by the insurer less the in-
surer's share of expenses, costs and attor-
ney fees incurred by the injured person in 
connection with such recovery. 
(2) The injured person shall hold in 
trust for the benefit of the insurer all 
such rights of recovery which he has, but 
only to the extent of such benefits fur-
nished. 
(3) The injured person shall do whatev-
er is proper to secure, and shall do noth-
ing after loss to prejudice, such rights. 
(4) If requested in writing by the in-
surer, the injured person shall take, 
through any representative not in conflict 
in interest wTith him designated by the 
insurer, such action as may be necessary 
or appropriate to recover such benefits 
furnished as damages from such responsi-
ble person, such action to be taken in the 
name of the injured person, but only to 
the extent of the benefits furnished by 
the insurer. In the event of a recovery, 
the insurer shall also be reimbursed out 
of such recovery for the injured person's 
share of expenses, costs and attorney fees 
incurred by the insurer in connection 
with the recovery. 
(5) In calculating respective shares of 
expenses, costs and attorney fees under 
this section, the basis of allocation shall 
be the respective proportions borne to the 
total recovery by: 
(a) Such benefits furnished by the in-
surer; and 
(b) The total recovery less (a). 
(6) The injured person ^hall execute 
and deliver to the insurer such instru-
ments and papers as may be appropriate 
to secure the rights and obligations of the 
insurer and him as established by this 
section. 
7. 16 Couch on Insurance 
(7) Any provisions in a motor vehicle 
liability insurance policy or health insur-
ance policy giving rights to the insurer 
relating to subrogation or the subject 
matter of this section shall be construed 
and applied in accordance with the provi-
sions of this section. 
[4] This latter section would be a redun-
dancy if Section 743.825 of the Oregon code 
provided for subrogation by the no-fault 
insurer to its insured, when such insured 
received a settlement or judgment for per-
sonal injuries. Similarly, Section 11 in the 
Utah No-Fault Insurance Act cannot be 
interpreted as conferring on the no-fault 
insurer a right of subrogation to the funds 
received by its insured for personal injuries. 
Section 11 grants the no-fault insurer a 
limited, equitable right to seek reimburse-
ment in arbitration proceeding against the 
liability insurer. Section 11 cannot be 
deemed as conferring subrogation rights on 
the no-fault insurer, vis-a-vis its insured as 
to his recovery in a settlement or legal 
action. 
[5] The nature and purpose of subroga-
tion should be reviewed. Subrogation is a 
creature of equity, its purpose is to work 
out an equitable adjustment between the 
parties by securing the ultimate discharge 
of a debt by the person who, in equity and 
in good conscience, ought to pay it. Subro-
gation has a dual basis—". when 
the insurer has made payment for the loss 
caused by a third party, it is only equitable 
and just that the insurer should be reim-
bursed for his payment to the insured, be-
cause otherwise either the insured would be 
unjustly enriched by virtue of a recovery 
from both the insurer and the third party, 
or in the absence of such double recovery by 
the insured, the third party would go free 
notwithstanding the fact that he has a legal 
obligation in connection with the damage.7" 
[6] Under the Utah No-Fault Insurance 
Act, the tort-feasor who has the required 
security, is not personally liable to the in-
2d, Sec. 61.18, pp. 248^-249. 
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jured person for payme* oi ^cjction 6 bene-
fits, Section 9(2); therefore, the tort-feasor 
has no personal legal obligation to reim-
burse the injured party's insurer. On the 
other hand, the tort-feasor's liability insur-
er, in fulfilling its duty to respond to the 
claims of the injured party to the limits of 
its policy, stands in the shoes of its insured 
and pays on the basis of its insured's per-
sonal liability to the tort victim; this per-
sonal liability does not include PIP pay-
ments. Thus, the tort victim's recovery 
from the liability insurer cannot be reduced 
by the PIP payments. If the victim's re-
covery be reduced by the amount of the 
PIP payments by granting his no-fault in-
surer a right of subrogation, it is the no-
fault insurer who receives double recovery, 
This is so because the insurer receives a 
premium for the benefits, and then receives 
full reimbursement, while the liability in-
surance available to recompense the victim 
is depleted by payments for which the lia-
bility insurer is not responsible to the vic-
tim. 
In the instant action, Allstate has no 
right of subrogation to the recovery of Ivie, 
and the trial court erred in its ruling. The 
cause is remanded with an order to enter 
judgment in favor of Ivie in the amount of 
$7,394.00, the sum representing Ithe PIP 
payments. However, Allstate is not pre-
cluded from claiming reimbursement from 
Travelers in an arbitration proceeding. 
WILKINS, J., concurs. 
STEWART, Justice (concurring): 
I concur in the opinion of Justice Mau-
ghan and add the following comments in 
explanation of my position. 
The Utah Automobile No-Fault Insur-
ance Act, § 31-41-1, et seq., U.C.A. (1953), 
as amended, is neither clear nor specific 
with respect to the relative rights of a 
no-fault insurer in an insured's recovery 
from a third-party tortfeasor. Accordingly, 
it is our obligation to construe the Act to 
effectuate the purposes set out in § 
31-41-2. That provision, in part, provides: 
The intention of the legislature is hereby 
to possibly stabilize, if not effectuate cer-
tain savings in, the rising costs of auto-
mobile accident insurance and to effectu-
ate a more efficient, equitable method of 
handling the greater bulk of the personal 
injury claims that arise out of automobile 
accidents, these being those not involving 
great amounts of damages. 
Contrary to the view of the dissenting 
opinion in this case, the result reached by a 
majority of the Court will not result in 
double recovery to an injured person. It 
will, on the other hand, result in greater 
efficiency, accuracy and fairness in deter-
mining the relative rights of the interested 
parties. Also, it will have the beneficial 
effect of reducing the possibilities for con-
troversy and litigation between no-fault in-
surers and their insureds. 
Pursuant to the majority opinion, a no-
fault insured in an action against a tort-
feasor may not recover from the tortfeasor 
any sums already paid by the no-fault in-
surer. Thus, double recovery by an insured 
is in fact barred. The no-fault insurer, by 
being subrogated to the rights of the in-
sured as provided by § 31-41-11, has a 
right to collect directly from the tort-
feasor^ insurer (whether or not the insured 
party has filed a tort claim) by way of 
arbitration pursuant to § 31-41-11. If the 
injured party files an action against the 
third-party tortfeasor which results in a 
judgment for the insured, the judgment 
would be given dispositive effect on the 
issue of fault and the relative liabilities of 
the insurance companies in the arbitration 
proceedings,^orJt_js in the arbitration pro-
ceedings that the no-fault insurer is subro-
gated to the rights of the insured. Because 
the insurance company stands in privity 
with its insured, principles of res judicata 
and collateral estoppel dictate as much. In 
cases which do not go to judgment because 
of a settlement, the no-fault insurer and the 
tortfeasor's insurer may be able to use the 
settlement agreement and amount as a 
guide in settling liability for the no-fault 
payments. If no voluntary settlement is 
recorded, the arbitration apparatus may be 
used to settle the dispute. No doubt the 
insurance companies will be able in most 
P9 23 
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cases to settle the accounts between them-
selves without resort to formal proceedings. 
This procedure comports with the language 
and intent of § 31-41-11. 
On the other hand, a construction of the 
Act which subrogates the insurer to the 
rights of the insured in a judicial proceed-
ing would render meaningless the arbitra-
tion provisions of the Act, lead to insupera-
ble practical difficulties in making an equi-
table allocation between the insurance com-
pany and its insured, and increased litiga-
tion and its attendant costs. 
In Transamerica Insurance Co. v. Barnes, 
29 Utah 2d 101, 505 P.2d 783 (1972), this 
Court held that an insurer's claim under a 
right of subrogation to a portion of the 
proceeds from a settlement made by the 
insured with a third-party tortfeasor was a 
matter which had to be proved on a record 
with evidence showing that the item of 
damage sought to be recovered was in fact 
included in the settlement sum. The court 
stated that the insurer must: 
present proof which establishes 
that the damages covered by defendant's 
settlement were the same or cover those 
for which defendant has already received 
indemnity from [insurer]; otherwise, the 
receipt of payment from the tort-feasor 
does not entitle the [insurer] to the re-
turn of the payments made by it. [29 
Utah 2d at 106-07, 505 P.2d at 787.] 
If the no-fault insurer were accorded a 
right of subrogation in amounts recovered 
in its insured's tort action against a third-
party tortfeasor, insuperable problems 
would arise. The most conspicuous problem 
would arise with respect to the settlements 
of an action by an insured against the tort-
feasor and the allocation of the settlement 
among the insured and his no-fault insurer. 
Settlements are almost always compromis-
es, and they are often negotiated on a 
lump-sum basis without particular damage 
items being dealt with individually. Refer-
ence to particular damage items may not be 
made in the course of settlement discus-
sions, and if each particular damage item is 
discussed, the value, if any, accorded a par-
ticular damage item in the ultimate sum 
reached is often unascertainable. The prob-
lem is even more difficult when dealing 
with a general verdict because it is impossi-
ble to determine what damage factors are 
included in a general verdict. Because of 
the failure to segregate and identify dam-
age items, subrogation may not be an effec-
tive remedy to prevent double recovery on 
the one hand, and to insure the victim the 
full value of his lawsuit on the other. 
These difficulties are avoided if the per-
sonal injury protection payments made to 
the insured are not a recoverable damage 
item in an action by the insured against the 
tortfeasor—whether the action results in a 
settlement or a judgment. 
The interpretation of the Act adopted by 
a majority of the Court has the further 
merit of avoiding serious problems with re-
spect to legal representation of the insured 
and the insurance company. If the same 
counsel represents both parties in settle-
ment negotiations, conflicts of interest may 
well arise in determining, for example, 
whether or not to .settle a lawsuit or to 
press for a larger recovery by way of a jury 
verdict and, of course, run the risk of no 
recovery at all. On the other hand, if both 
the insurance company and the insured are 
to be represented by independent counsel in 
pressing the claim against the third-party 
tortfeasor, conflict in many cases is likely. 
In sum, the most effective and least cost-
ly way of dealing with the relative rights of 
the insured and the no-fault insurer in a 
recovery from a third party is to require 
each party to pursue its own remedy. The 
insured may sue for all damages less the 
amount paid by the no-fault insurer. The 
no-fault insurer has a right to protect its 
interests in an arbitration proceeding if 
that be necessary. To prevent double re-
covery, the no-fault amounts are not recov-
erable by the victim either in a settlement 
or in a litigated judgment. This approach 
will have the effect of reducing litigation, 
attorney's fees, and the cost of automobile 
accident insurance. 
HALL, Justice (dissenting): 
There is nothing about this case that war-
rants a departure from long-established 
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pnnciples of subrogation. a iopting a 
contrary view, the majority not only ig-
nores the language of the Utah Automobile 
No-Fault Act l which specifically preserves 
subrogation rights, but also ignores the 
recent unanimous ruling of this Court in 
Jones v. Transamerica Insurance Co.} 
wherein we specifically recognized that the 
Act3 preserved subrogation rights between 
insurers whenever no-fault benefits are 
paid. 
The pure and simple facts of this case are 
wholly supportive of the summary judg-
ment appealed from. Ivie chose to compro-
mise her claim against the tortfeasor by 
accepting the sum of $44,000 in full settle-
ment thereof. Prior to the settlement, 
Travelers duly advised Ivie of its intention 
to include Allstate on its settlement draft 
and thereby satisfy its statutory obligation 
to reimburse Allstate for its advance of 
$7,394 in PIP payments. Indeed, at the 
time of settlement, it issued a separate 
draft for the exact sum of said PIP pay-
ments ($7,394), payable jointly to Ivie and 
Allstate. 
Travelers is not a party to this appeal and 
Ivie makes no further claim against it, con-
ceding that the only matter in dispute is her 
entitlement to the said $7,394. Hence, for 
this Court to award said sum to her and 
then to cavalierly suggest that Travelers is 
obligated to pay over an additional sum of 
$7,394 to Allstate by way of reimbursement, 
constitutes a grave injustice. Such a result 
was not sought, nor even contemplated, by 
the parties, least of all by Travelers, which 
is not present to defend its interests. 
Notwithstanding the assertion of the ma-
jority to the contrary, the net effect of its 
holding is to afford Ivie a double recovery 
of PIP payments at the unbargained for 
expense of Travelers. In addition, it de-
prives Travelers of the benefit of its bar-
gain struck with Ivie and increases its obli-
gation from $44,000 to $51,394, by judicial 
fiat. 
1. U.C.A., 1953, 31-41-1 , et seq. 
2. Utah. 592 P.2d 609 (1979). 
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I have no par t ia l^ LAA>rehension as to 
the application of the new rule of law to 
future cases since its practical, dollars and 
cents effect would appear to be no different 
than if the doctrine of subrogation were 
adhered to. In a judicial proceeding, the 
court will simply no longer make an award 
for damages already compensated by PIP 
payments, and, similarly, in negotiating a 
settlement of a lawsuit, an insurer will no 
doubt "short" his settlement offer by a sum 
adequate to cover its reimbursement obliga-
tion for PIP payments advanced by the 
insurer of the injured party. 
On the other hand, applying the new rule 
of law in the present case causes me con-
siderable concern for it effects a highly 
unjust and harsh result. The majority 
would be better advised to abide by the 
so-called "Sunburst Doctrine"4 and thereby 
make the change in the law prospective 
only. 
CROCKETT, Chief Justice (supplemental 
dissent): 
I join in Justice Hall's dissent and would 
affirm the decision of the trial court. 
The main objective of insurance is to 
provide a fair and honest recoupment of 
losses suffered, and not to provide a basis 
for parlaying the loss into a double recovery 
for all or part of the damages thus suffered. 
The purpose of the No-Fault Insurance 
Act is to effectuate a more efficient method 
of handling minor claims arising from auto-
mobile accidents which do not involve great 
amounts of damages; and to provide a 
means for the prompt payment of certain 
minimal losses without regard to fault and 
thus without litigation, in order to effectu-
ate certain savings in the rising costs of 
automobile accident insurance.1 It should 
be realized that if the double recovery per-
4. Laid down in the case of Great Northern Ry. 
Co. v. Sunburst Oil Co., 287 U.S. 358, 53 S.Ct. 
145, 77 L.Ed. 360, cited in Rubalcava v. Gisse-
man, 14 Utah 2d 344, 384 P.2d 389. 
3. U.C.A., 1953, 31-41-11. 
1. See statements in Sec. 31-41-2. U.C.A.1953. 
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mitted by the main opinion is allowed, it 
could not do other than increase, rather 
than decrease, the total costs of insurance. 
It requires little reflection to see that the 
majority decision results in an injustice to 
defendant Travelers. In treating a similar 
situation in the case of Transamerica Ins. 
Co. v. Barnes,2 this Court stated that "If 
the settlement were intended to include 
plaintiff's prior medical expenses, two 
drafts should have been issued, one to plain-
tiff and defendant jointly and one to de-
fendant alone." 3 That is the exact proce-
dure followed by Travelers in this instance. 
It cannot fairly be questioned that the ne-
gotiations between Mrs. Ivie and Travelers 
were made in awareness that Travelers was 
obligated to reimburse Allstate for the 
$7,394 PIP payments which Mrs. Ivie had 
already received; nor that she agreed to 
accept $44,000 from Travelers to discharge 
its total liability. This is confirmed by two 
facts: first, Travelers' policy limit was $50,-
000; and it would make no sense to agree 
to pay $44,000, plus the obligation to reim-
burse Allstate for the $7,394 PIP payments, 
which would thus exceed Travelers' policy 
limits. Second, by the fact that Travelers 
issued the two separate drafts, one for the 
$7,394 payable to Allstate and Mrs. Ivie and 
the other for $36,606 to Mrs. Ivie, just as 
this Court directed in the Barnes case, su-
pra. 
Under the facts as they appear in this 
case, it is discordant to my ideas of law and 
justice to require Travelers to pay the $44,-
000 to satisfy the claims of Mrs. Ivie and of 
Allstate, then also be required to pay the 
$7,394 to Allstate to reimburse it for that 
portion Allstate had already paid of Mrs. 
Ivie's damages. That plainly and simply 
results in injustice: it increases Travelers' 
obligation by $7,394 more than it agreed to 
pay; and it allows Mrs. Ivie double recovery 
by awarding her that much more than she 
had agreed to accept. 
There would seem to be no problem with 
the proposition espoused in the main opin-
ion if the facts had been different. If the 
2. 29 Utah 2d 101. 505 P.2d 783 (1972). 
parties had negotiated their settlement 
with an understanding that Travelers was 
to reimburse Allstate for the PIP benefits it 
had paid, and that any settlement arrived 
at was in addition thereto, no unfairness or 
injustice would result. But that does not 
appear to be the facts here. If such an 
understanding is to be the condition of ne-
gotiations, it should be so understood by the 
parties, and effective on only a prospective 
basis by applying the "Sunburst Doctrine," 
referred to by Justice Hall. 
HALL, J., also concurs in the supplemen-
tal dissent of CROCKETT, C. J. 
ST. PAUL FIRE AND MARINE INSUR-
ANCE, Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
COMMERCIAL UNION ASSURANCE, 
Defendant and Respondent 
No. 16080. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Feb. 8, 1980. 
Commercial automobile liability policy 
insurer brought declaratory judgment ac-
tion to determine extent of liability in-
curred by it and by comprehensive general 
liability policy insurer arising out of the 
death of employee of construction company 
and each party also sought declaration that 
coverage afforded by policy of other was 
primary coverage. The Third District 
Court, Salt Lake County, G. Hal Taylor, J., 
granted comprehensive policy insurer's mo-
tion for summary judgment and adjudged 
that policy issued by plaintiff provided pri-
mary coverage, and plaintiff appealed. The 
3. Id at 787 p ^ ^Q 
Cite as, Utah, 
rogation, and the insured e. titled to be 
made whole before the insurer is entitled to 
any portion of the recovery from the tort-
feasor. Ivie argued she sustained severe 
injuries and was compelled to settle for a 
sum totally inadequate to compensate her 
for the total damages sustained. According 
to her argument, to prevail Allstate must 
prove it has a greater equity than Ivie, 
which, in effect, would require proof Ivie 
had received double payment for her medi-
cal expenses.1 
Ivie further urged, if Allstate were enti-
tled to its subrogation claim, it should con-
tribute to the costs and attorney's fees in-
curred by Ivie in collecting the claim. Ivie 
cites the principle that in the absence of an 
agreement to the contrary as set forth by 
the terms in a policy of insurance, the in-
sured, who is successful in the recovery of 
funds which include money payable by the 
insured to an insurance company, is entitled 
to deduct attorney fees and other expenses 
reasonably and necessarily incurred in mak-
ing such a recovery from the amount pay-
able to the insurance company.2 
The trial court granted Allstate's motion 
for summary judgment. Specifically, the 
court granted Allstate judgment against 
Ivie and Travelers jointly and severally in 
the sum of $7,394.00. The court declared 
Travelers was bound by the provisions of 
Section 31-41-11, and Ivie was not entitled 
to an attorney's fee from Allstate. 
To resolve the issues between the parties, 
it is essential to construe Section 31-41-11; 
however, this section cannot be construed in 
isolation, but must be correlated with other 
pertinent provisions in Chapter 41 of Title 
31, Utah Automobile No-Fault Insurance 
Act. As an aid to the proper construction 
of this act, reference to an article by Robert 
E. Keeton in the 1973 Utah Law Review is 
beneficial, Compensation Systems and 
Utah's No-Fault Statute, 1973 ULR 383. 
Therein, it is explained that twenty-one 
states have enacted "no-fault" legislation. 
1. Transamerica Insurance Company v. Barnes, 
29 Utah 2d 101, 505 P.2d 783 (1972); Lyon v. 
Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company, 25 
Utah 2d 311, 480 P.2d 739 (1971). 
)6 P.2d 1197 
These laws are of two cypes: first, the 
add-on statutes; and second, the partial 
tort exemption statutes. The add-on stat-
utes merely add to the negligence system of 
reparations with some kind of no-fault ben-
efits to an injured person, without regard to 
fault. All tort claims are preserved under 
these statutes, although some provide for 
subrogation or offset to avoid jiouhie recov-
ery for an jtem of loss. These add-on laws 
are not regarded as true "no-fault" legisla-
tion. 
The true "no-fault" insurance is a type of 
compensation system which couples the 
payment of benefits on a no-fault basis 
with the partial elimination of fault-based 
tort actions for both economic losses and 
pain and suffering. This system generally 
continues to permit fault-based claims for 
pain and suffering in the more serious cases 
and for economic losses above no-fault ben-
efits. A system which has no tort exemp-
tion at all is not a "no-fault" insurance. 
The Utah no-fault statute is a compulsory, 
partial tort exemption law coupling no-
fault insurance benefits, Section 6, with a 
partial elimination t>f tort claims for bodily 
injury. 
Section 2 of the act provides: 
The purpose of this act is to require the 
payment of certain prescribed benefits in 
respect to motor vehicle accidents 
through either insurance or other ap-
proved security, but on the basis of no 
fault, preserving, however, the right of 
an injured person to pursue the custom-
ary tort claims where the most serious 
type of injuries occur 
(1) No person for whom direct bene-
fit coverage is provided for in this act 
shall be allowed to maintain a cause of 
action for general damages arising out 
of personal injuries alleged to have 
been caused by an automobile accident 
except where there has been caused by 
this accident any one or more of the 
following: 
2. Scare Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance 
Company v. Clinton, 267 Or. 653, 518 P.2d 645 
(1974). 
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made whole before the insurer is entitled to 
any portion of the recovery from the tort-
feasor. Ivie argued she sustained severe 
injuries and was compelled to settle for a 
sum totally inadequate to compensate her 
for the total damages sustained. According 
to her argument, to prevail Allstate must 
prove it has a greater equity than Ivie, 
which, in effect, would require proof Ivie 
had received double payment for her medi-
cal expenses.1 
Ivie further urged, if Allstate were enti-
tled to its subrogation claim, it should con-
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cites the principle that in the absence of an 
agreement to the contrary as set forth by 
the terms in a policy of insurance, the in-
sured, who is successful in the recovery of 
funds which include money payable by the 
insured to an insurance company, is entitled 
to deduct attorney fees and other expenses 
reasonably and necessarily incurred in mak-
ing such a recovery from the amount pay-
able to the insurance company.2 
The trial court granted Allstate's motion 
for summary judgment. Specifically, the 
court granted Allstate judgment against 
Ivie and Travelers jointly and severally in 
the sum of $7,394.00. The court declared 
Travelers was bound by the provisions of 
Section 31-41-11, and Ivie was not entitled 
to an attorney's fee from Allstate. 
To resolve the issues between the parties, 
it is essential to construe Section 31-41-11; 
however, this section cannot be construed in 
isolation, but must be correlated with other 
pertinent provisions in Chapter 41 of Title 
31, Utah Automobile No-Fault Insurance 
Act. As an aid to the proper construction 
of this act, reference to an article by Robert 
E. Keeton in the 1973 Utah Law Review is 
beneficial, Compensation Systems and 
Utah's No-Fault Statute, 1973 ULR 383. 
Therein, it is explained that twenty-one 
states have enacted "no-fault" legislation. 
1. Transamerica Insurance Company v. Barnes, 
29 Utah 2d 101, 505 P.2d 783 (1972); Lyon v. 
Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company, 25 
Utah 2d 311, 480 P.2d 739 (1971). 
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These laws are oi vWo types: first, the 
add-on statutes; and second, the partial 
tort exemption statutes. The add-on stat-
utes merely add to the negligence system of 
reparations with some kind of no-fault ben-
efits to an injured person, without regard to 
fault. All tort claims are preserved under 
these statutes, although some provide for 
subrogation or offset to avoid jiauble recov-
ery for an item of loss. These add-on laws 
are not regarded as true "no-fault" legisla-
tion. 
The true "no-fault" insurance is a type of 
compensation system which couples the 
payment of benefits on a no-fault basis 
with the partial elimination of fault-based 
tort actions for both economic losses and 
pain and suffering. This system generally 
continues to permit fault-based claims for 
pain and suffering in the more serious cases 
and for economic losses above no-fault ben-
efits. A system which has no tort exemp-
tion at all is not a "no-fault" insurance. 
The Utah no-fault statute is a compulsory, 
partial tort exemption law coupling no-
fault insurance benefits, Section 6, with a 
partial elimination t>f tort claims for bodily 
injury. 
Section 2 of the act provides: 
The purpose of this act is to require the 
payment of certain prescribed benefits in 
respect to motor vehicle accidents 
through either insurance or other ap-
proved security, but on the basis of no 
fault, preserving, however, the right of 
an injured person to pursue the custom-
ary tort claims where the most serious 
type of injuries occur 
(1) No person for whom direct bene-
fit coverage is provided for in this act 
shall be allowed to maintain a cause of 
action for general damages arising out 
oi personal injuries alleged to have 
been caused by an automobile accident 
except where there has been caused by 
this accident any one or more of the 
following: 
2. Stare Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance 
Company v. Clinton, 267 Or. 653. 518 P.2d 645 
(1974). 
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made whole before the insurer is entitled to 
any portion of the recovery from the tort-
feasor. I vie argued she sustained severe 
injuries and was compelled to settle for a 
sum totally inadequate to compensate her 
for the total damages sustained. According 
to her argument, to prevail Allstate must 
prove it has a greater equity than Ivie, 
which, in effect, would require proof Ivie 
had received double payment for her medi-
cal expenses.1 
Ivie further urged, if Allstate were enti-
tled to its subrogation claim, it should con-
tribute to the costs and attorney's fees in-
curred by Ivie in collecting the claim. Ivie 
cites the principle that in the absence of an 
agreement to the contrary as set forth by 
the terms in a policy of insurance, the in-
sured, who is successful in the recovery of 
funds which include money payable by the 
insured to an insurance company, is entitled 
to deduct attorney fees and other expenses 
reasonably and necessarily incurred in mak-
ing such a recovery from the amount pay-
able to the insurance company.2 
The trial court granted Allstate's motion 
for summary judgment. Specifically, the 
court granted Allstate judgment against 
Ivie and Travelers jointly and severally in 
the sum of $7,394.00. The court declared 
Travelers was bound by the provisions of 
Section 31-41-11, and Ivie was not entitled 
to an attorney's fee from Allstate. 
To resolve the issues between the parties, 
it is essential to construe Section 31-41-11; 
however, this section cannot be construed in 
isolation, but must be correlated with other 
pertinent provisions in Chapter 41 of Title 
31, Utah Automobile No-Fault Insurance 
Act. As an aid to the proper construction 
of this act, reference to an article by Robert 
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payment of benefits on a no-fault basis 
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continues to permit fault-based claims for 
pain and suffering in the more serious cases 
and for economic losses above no-fault ben-
efits. A system which has no tort exemp-
tion at all is not a "no-fault" insurance. 
The Utah no-fault statute is a compulsory, 
partial tort exemption law coupling no-
fault insurance benefits, Section 6, with a 
partial elimination t>f tort claims for bodily 
injury. 
Section 2 of the act provides: 
The purpose of this act is to require the 
payment of certain prescribed benefits in 
respect to motor vehicle accidents 
through either insurance or other ap-
proved security, but on the basis of no 
fault, preserving, however, the right of 
an injured person to pursue the custom-
ary tort claims where the most serious 
type of injuries occur 
(1) No person for whom direct bene-
fit coverage is provided for in this act 
shall be allowed to maintain a cause of 
action for general damages arising out 
of personal injuries alleged to have 
been caused by an automobile accident 
except where there has been caused by 
this accident any one or more of the 
following: 
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the sum of $7,394.00. The court declared 
Travelers was bound by the provisions of 
Section 31-41-11, and Ivie was not entitled 
to an attorney's fee from Allstate. 
To resolve the issues between the parties, 
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these statutes, although some provide for 
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compensation system which couples the 
payment of benefits on a no-fault basis 
with the partial elimination of fault-based 
tort actions for both economic losses and 
pain and suffering. This system generally 
continues to permit fault-based claims for 
pain and suffering in the more serious cases 
and for economic losses above no-fault ben-
efits. A system which has no tort exemp-
tion at all is not a "no-fault" insurance. 
The Utah no-fault statute is a compulsory, 
partial tort exemption law coupling no-
fault insurance benefits, Section 6, with a 
partial elimination t)f tort claims for bodily 
injury. 
Section 2 of the act provides: 
The purpose of this act is to require the 
payment of certain prescribed benefits in 
respect to motor vehicle accidents 
through either insurance or other ap-
proved security, but on the basis of no 
fault, preserving, however, the right of 
an injured person to pursue the custom-
ary tort claims where the most serious 
type of injuries occur 
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BECK v. FARMERS INS. EXCHANGE Utah 795 
Cite as 701 ?2d 795 (Utah 1985) 
sufficient to prove a breach under appropri-
Wayne BECK, Plaintiff and Appellant, ate circumstances. 
v. 
FARMERS INSURANCE EXCHANGE, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
No. 18926. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
June 12, 1985. 
Insured brought action against insurer 
for alleged bad-faith refusal to settle a 
claim for insured motorist benefits. The 
Third District Court, Salt Lake County, 
Philip P. Fishier, J., entered summary judg-
ment for insurer, and insured appealed. 
The Supreme Court, Zimmerman, J., held 
that: (1) in a first-party relationship be-
tween an insurer and its insured, the duties 
and obligations of the parties are contrac-
tual rather than fiduciary in nature and, 
without more, a breach of those implied or 
express duties can give rise only to a cause 
of action in contract, not one in tort, and (2) 
question whether insurer breached its duty 
of good faith in rejecting insured's claim 
for uninsured motorist benefits without ex-
planation and in failing to further investi-
gate matter, such that insured was dam-
aged when it was forced to accept settle-
ment offered by insurer because of finan-
cial pressure caused by delay in resolving 
matter, was question of fact precluding 
summary judgment on contractual theory 
of failure to fulfill implied contractual duty 
to deal in good faith. 
Reversed and remanded. 
1. Insurance <3=>602.1 
The good-faith duty to bargain or set-
tle under an insurance contract is only one 
aspect of the duty of good faith and fair 
dealing implied in all contracts and is a 
duty which upon violation may give rise to 
a claim for breach of contract 
2. Insurance <£=>602.2(1) 
Refusal to bargain or settle under an 
insurance contract may, standing alone, be 
3. Insurance <2=>602.1 
Practical end of providing a strong in-
centive for insurers to fulfill their contrac-
tual obligations to their insureds can be 
accomplished as well through a contract 
cause of action upon a failure to bargain in 
good faith without analytical straining ne-
cessitated by the tort approach and with 
far less potential for unforeseen conse-
quences to the law of contracts. 
4. Insurance e=*602.1 
A tort cause of action does not arise in 
a first-party insurance contract situation by 
reason of a failure to bargain in good faith 
because the relationship between the insur-
er and its insured is fundamentally differ-
ent than in a third-party context. 
5. Insurance <3=»602.1 
In a first-party relationship between an 
insurer and its insured, the duties and obli-
gations of the parties are contractual rath-
er than fiduciary in nature and, without 
more, a breach of those implied or express 
duties can give rise only to a cause of 
action in contract, not one in tort, 
6. Insurance <3=>156(1) 
As parties to a contract, the insured 
and the insurer have parallel obligations to 
perform the contract in good faith, obli-
gations that inhere in every contractual 
relationship. 
7. Insurance <^563 
The implied contractual obligation of 
good-faith performance contemplates, at 
the very least, that the insurer will diligent-
ly investigate these acts to enable it to 
determine whether a claim filed by its in-
sured is valid, will fairly evaluate the claim, 
and will thereafter act promptly and rea-
sonably in rejecting or settling the claim, 
and also requires the insurer to deal with 
laymen as laymen and not as experts in the 
subtleties of law and underwriting and to 
refrain from actions that will injure the 
insured's ability to obtain the benefits of 
the contract. 
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8. Insurance <£=>602.2(1) 
Performance of the implied contractual 
obligation of good faith is the essence of 
Vhat "One msrarer Yias "bargained and paid 
for and, if breached, will render insurer 
liable for damages suffered in consequence 
thereof 
9. Insurance <3=>602.10(1) 
Damages recoverable against an insur-
er for breach of its implied contractual 
obligation of good faith toward insured in-
clude both general damages, those flowing 
naturally from breach, and consequential 
damages, those reasonably within contem-
plation of, or reasonably foreseeable by, 
parties at time contract was made 
10. Insurance <3=602.10(1) 
In an action against an insurer for 
breach of a duty to bargain m good faith, 
given that insured frequently faces cata-
strophic consequences if funds are not 
available within a reasonable period of time 
to cover an insured loss, damages for a loss 
well m excess of policy limits, such as for a 
home or a business, may be foreseeable 
and provable 
11. Damages <s=56.10 
In unusual cases concerned with an 
insurer's breach of a duty to bargain in 
good faith, damages for mental anguish to 
insured might be provable, but foreseeabil-
lty of any such damages will always hmge 
upon nature and language of contract and 
reasonable expectations of parties 
12. Judgment <®=*181(23) 
Question whether insurer breached its 
claim for uninsured motorist benefits with-
out explanation and in failing to further 
investigate matter, such that insured was 
damaged when it was forced to accept set-
tlement offered by insurer because of fi-
nancial pressure caused by delay in resolv-
ing matter, was question of fact precluding 
summary judgment on contractual theory 
of failure to fulfill implied contractual duty 
to deal in good faith 
Robert J Debry, Salt Lake City, for 
plaintiff and appellant 
Don J Hanson, Salt Lake City, for de-
fendant and respondent 
ZIMMERMAN, Justice 
Plaintiff Wayne Beck appeals from a 
summary judgment dismissing his claim 
against Farmers Insurance Exchange, his 
automobile insurance carrier, alleging that 
Farmers had refused m bad faith to settle 
a claim for uninsured motorist benefits 
We hold that on the record before us, Beck 
Stated a claim for relief and a summary 
judgment was inappropriate We reverse 
and remand for further proceedings con-
sistent with this opinion. 
Beck injured his knee in a hit-and-run 
accident on January 16, 1982, when his car 
was struck by a car owned by Ann Kirk-
land Ms Kirkland asserted that her car 
of or responsibility for the accident Beck 
filed a claim with Kirkland's insurer, but 
liability was denied on April 20, 1982. 
At the time of the accident, Beck earned 
automobile insurance with Farmers Un-
der that policy, Beck was provided with 
both no-fault and uninsured motorist insur-
ance benefits On February 23, 1982, while 
his claim against Kirkland was pending, 
Beck filed a claim with Farmers for no-
fault benefits Sometime prior to May 26, 
1982, Farmers paid Beck $5,000 for medical 
expenses (the no-fault policy limit) and 
$1,299 43 for lost wages. 
On June 23, 1982, Beck's counsel filed a 
claim with Farmers for uninsured motorist 
benefits, demanding the policy limit, $20,-
000, for general damages suffered as a 
result of the accident His counsel alleges 
that the brochure documenting Beck's dam-
ages, submitted to Farmers with the June 
23rd settlement offer, established that his 
claim was worth substantially more than 
$20,000 Farmers' adjuster rejected the 
settlement offer without explanation on 
July 1, 1982 
Beck filed this lawsuit one month later, 
on August 2, 1982, alleging three causes of 
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action: first, that by refusing to pay his 
uninsured motorist claim, Farmers had 
breached its contract of insurance with 
him; second, that by acting in bad faith in 
refusing to investigate the claim, bargain 
with Beck, or settle the claim, Farmers had 
breached an implied covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing; and third, that Farmers 
had acted oppressively and maliciously to-
ward Beck with the intention of, or in reck-
less disregard of the likelihood of, causing 
emotional distress. Under the first claim, 
Beck sought damages for breach of con-
tract in the amount of the policy limits; 
under the second, he asked for compensato-
ry damages in excess of the policy limits 
for additional injuries, including mental an-
guish; and under the third, he sought puni-
tive damages of $500,000. 
Sometime in August of 1982, Beck's 
counsel contacted Farmers' counsel and of-
fered to settle the whole matter for $20,-
000. This offer was rejected. Farmers 
filed an answer on September 1, 1982, and 
at the same time, moved to strike the pray-
er for punitive damages on the ground that 
they were unavailable for a breach of con-
tract. Farmers' motion was granted. On 
September 29th, the trial court bifurcated 
the case and agreed to try the claim for 
failure to pay uninsured motorist benefits 
independent of Beck's claim alleging 
breach of an implied covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing. 
Immediately after the trial judge bifur-
cated the case, Beck's counsel expressly 
revoked the previously rejected offer to 
settle the whole matter for $20,000. In-
stead, Beck offered to settle only the fail-
ure to pay the uninsured motorist benefits 
claim for $20,000, reserving the implied 
covenant or "bad faith" claim for separate 
resolution. 
On October 20, 1982, Farmers apparently 
counteroffered. Negotiations proceeded, 
and sometime in late November, the parties 
agreed to settle the uninsured motorist 
claim for $15,000. On December 6, 1982, 
the parties stipulated to dismissal of that 
claim and specifically reserved the bad 
faith claim for later disposition. 
In mid-December, Farmers moved to dis-
miss the reserved bad faith claim on two 
theories. First, Farmers asserted that un-
der Lyon v, Hartford Accident and In-
demnity Co., 25 Utah 2d 311, 480 P.2d 739 
(1971), it "had no duty to bargain with or 
settle plaintiffs uninsured motorist claim 
and, therefore, [could not] be held liable" 
for breach of contract or bad faith. Sec-
ond, Farmers argued that even if it had 
some duty to bargain or to settle the claim, 
the facts set forth in the pleadings on file 
did not establish that it had breached the 
duty. No memoranda or factual affidavits 
supported this motion. 
Farmers' motion was opposed by affida-
vits of Beck, his counsel, and a former 
insurance adjuster who worked for Beck's 
counsel as a paralegal. In his affidavit, 
Beck's counsel recited the dates and terms 
of the various settlement offers and the 
fact that they had been rejected without 
counteroffer. Beck's affidavit stated that 
he had accepted the $15,000 offer only be-
cause of financial pressures caused by the 
substantial expenses he had incurred in the 
ten months since the accident. The parale-
gal's affidavit stated that he had been an 
insurance adjuster for 19 years and that he 
had reviewed the settlement documentation 
submitted to Farmers in June when the 
claim was first filed. He expressed the 
opinion that a reasonable and prudent in-
surance company would have valued the 
claim at between $30,000 and $40,000 and 
attempted to settle the matter within 
weeks after the initial offer. The paralegal 
charged that the "only reason for such a 
substantial delay in settling this claim 
would be to put Mr. Beck in a situation of 
financial need and stress so that he would 
accept the first settlement offer," a tactic 
he characterized as acting in bad faith. 
Farmers filed no rebuttal affidavits, and 
the trial court granted Farmers' motion 
without specifying the basis for its holding. 
Beck asks this Court to overrule Lyon 
and permit an insured to sue for an insur-
er's bad faith refusal to bargain or settle. 
He points out that many states now allow a 
tort action for breach of an insurer's duty 
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to deal fairly and in good faith with its 
insured. Assuming that we abandon Lyon, 
Beck argues that the affidavits submitted 
m oggositioa 6a Farmers' motion for sum-
mary judgment were sufficient to create a 
genuine issue of material fact as to wheth-
er Farmers breached an implied covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing. 
Farmers does not now contend, as it did 
below, that it had no duty to bargain or 
settle. Instead, it argues that under Lyon, 
an insurer cannot be held liable for bad 
faith simply because it refused to bargain 
or to settle a claim; rather, it argues, to 
sustain such a claim a plaintiff must pro-
duce evidence of bad faith wholly apart 
from the "mere failure" to bargain or set-
tle. 
Our ruling in Lyon left an insured with-
out any effective remedy against an insur-
er that refuses to bargain or settle in good 
faith with the insured. An insured who 
has suffered a loss and is pressed financial-
ly is at a marked disadvantage when bar-
gaining with an insurer over payment for 
that loss. Failure to accept a proffered 
settlement, although less than fair, can 
lead to catastrophic consequences for an 
insured who, as a direct consequence of the 
loss, may be peculiarly vulnerable, both 
economically and emotionally. The tempta-
tion for an insurer to delay settlement 
while pressures build on the insured is 
great, especially if the insurer's exposure 
cannot exceed the policy limits. See Law-
ton v. Great Southwest Fire Insurance 
Co., 118 N.H. 607, 392 A.2d 576, 579 (1978); 
Harvey & Wiseman, First Party Bad 
Faith: Common Law Remedies and a 
Proposed Legislative Solution, 72 Ky.LJ. 
141, 146, 167-69 (1983-84) (hereinafter cit-
ed as "First Party Bad Faith"); Note, The 
Availability of Excess Damages for 
Wrongful Refusal to Honor First Party 
1. The Court in Lyon considered only the ques-
tion of whether a claim of bad faith gave rise to 
a tort cause of action; however, to the extent 
that Lyon is philosophically inconsistent with 
our recognition today of a cause of action in 
contract, it is overruled. 
2. We use the term "first-party" to refer to an 
insurance agreement where the insurer agrees 
Insurance Claims—An Emerging Trend, 
45 Fordham L.Rev. 164, 164-67 (Oct. 1976) 
(hereinafter cited as "Availability of Excess 
•Damages"). 
[1, 2] In light of these considerations, 
tye now conclude that an insured should be 
Provided with a remedy. However, we do 
*lot agree with plaintiff that a tort action is 
Appropriate. Instead, we hold that the 
good faith duty to bargain or settle under 
An insurance contract is only one aspect of 
the duty of good faith and fair dealing 
implied in all contracts and that a violation 
of that duty gives rise to a claim for breach 
of contract.1 In addition, we do not adopt 
the limitation suggested by Farmers, but 
hold that the refusal to bargain or settle, 
standing alone, may, under appropriate cir-
cumstances, be sufficient to prove a 
breach. 
We recognize that a majority of states 
Permit an insured to institute a tort action 
Against an insurer who fails to bargain in 
%ood faith in a "first-party" situation,2 
Adopting the approach first announced by 
the California Supreme Court in Gruen-
berg v. Aetna Insurance Co., 9 Cal.3d 566, 
SlO P.2d 1032, 108 Cal.Rptr. 480 (1973). 
See, e.g., Bibeault v. Hanover Insurance 
Co., R.I., 417 A.2d 313 (1980); Craft v. 
Economy Fire & Casualty Co., 572 F.2d 
565 (7th Cir.1978) (applying Indiana law); 
bfFA Mutual Insurance Co. v. Flint, 
^enn., 574 S.W.2d 718 (1978). Apparently, 
these courts have taken this step as a mat-
ter of policy in order to provide what they 
Perceive to be an adequate remedy for an 
kisured wronged by an insurer's recalci-
trance. These courts have reasoned that 
Under contract law principles, an insurer 
tyho improperly refuses to settle a first-
Rarty claim may be liable only for damages 
Measured by the maximum dollar amount 
to pay claims submitted to it by the insured for 
losses suffered by the insured. The present case 
involves such a first-party situation. In con-
trast, a "third-party" situation is one where the 
insurer contracts to defend the insured against 
claims made by third parties against the insured 
and to pay any resulting liability, up to the 
specified dollar limit. 
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such a damage measure provides little or 
no incentive to an insurer to promptly and 
faithfully fulfill its contractual obligations. 
Accordingly, these courts have adopted a 
tort approach in order to allow an insured 
to recover extensive consequential and pu-
nitive damages, which they consider to be 
unavailable in an action based solely on a 
breach of contract. See Availability of 
Excess Damages, supra, at 168-77; First 
Party Bad Faith, supra, at 158. 
[3] We conclude that the tort approach 
adopted by these courts is without a sound 
theoretical foundation and has the potential 
for distorting well-established principles of 
contract law. Moreover, the practical end 
of providing a strong incentive for insurers 
to fulfill their contractual obligations can 
be accomplished as well through a contract 
cause of action, without the analytical 
straining necessitated by the tort approach 
and with far less potential for unforeseen 
consequences to the law of contracts. 
The analytical weaknesses of the tort 
approach are easily seen. In Gruenberg, 
the California court held that an insurer 
has a duty to deal in good faith with its 
insured and that an insured can bring an 
action in tort, rather than contract, for 
breach of that duty because the duty is 
imposed by law and, being nonconsensual, 
does not arise out of the contract Gloss-
ing over any distinctions between first- and 
third-party situations, the court concluded 
that the duty imposed upon the insurer 
when bargaining with its insured in a first-
party situation is merely another aspect of 
the fiduciary duty owed in the third-party 
context. Gruenberg v. Aetna Insurance 
Co., 9 Cal.3d at 573-74, 510 P.2d at 1037, 
108 Cal.Rptr. at 485. 
Although this Court, in Ammerman v. 
Farmer's Insurance Exchange, 19 Utah 2d 
261, 430 P.2d 576 (1967), recognized a tort 
cause of action for breach of an insurer's 
obligation to bargain in a third-party con-
text, we cannot agree with the Gruenberg 
court that the considerations which compel 
the recognition of a tort cause of action in 
a third-party context are present in the 
In Ammerman, we 
stated that because a third-party insurance 
contract obligates the insurer to defend the 
insured, the insurer incurs a fiduciary duty 
to its insured to protect the insured's inter-
ests as zealously as it would its own; con-
sequently, a tort cause of action is recog-
nized to remedy a violation of that duty. 
19 Utah 2d at 265-66, 430 P.2d at 578-79. 
[4] However, in Lyon v. Hartford Acci-
dent and Indeinnity Co., we held that a 
tort cause of action did not arise in a first-
party insurance contract situation because 
the relationship between the insurer and its 
insured is fundamentally different than in 
a third-party context: 
In the [third-party] situation, the insurer 
must act in good faith and be as zealous 
in protecting the interests of the insured 
as it would be in regard to its own. In 
the [first-party] situation, the insured 
and the insurer are, in effect and prac-
tically speaking, adversaries. 
25 Utah 2d at 319, 480 P.2d at 745 (cita-
tions omitted). See also Lawton v. Great 
Southwest Fire Insurance Co., 392 A.2d at 
580-81. 
This distinction is of no small conse-
quence. In a third-party situation, the in-
surer controls the disposition of claims 
against its insured, who relinquishes any 
right to negotiate on his own behalf. 
Craft v. Economy Fire & Casualty Co., 
572 F.2d at 569. An insurer's failure to act 
in good faith exposes its insured to a judg-
ment and personal liability in excess of the 
policy limits. Santilli v. State Farm Life 
Insurance Co., 278 Or. 53, 61-62, 562 P.2d 
965, 969 (1977). In essence, the contract 
itself creates a fiduciary relationship be-
cause of the trust and reliance placed in the 
insurer by its insured. Cf Hal Taylor 
Associates v. UnionAmerica, Inc., Utah, 
657 P.2d 743, 748-49 (1982). The insured is 
wholly dependent upon the insurer to see 
that, in dealing with claims by third par-
ties, the insured's best interests are pro-
tected. In addition, when dealing with 
third parties, the insurer acts as an agent 
for the insured with respect to the disputed 
claim. Wholly apart from the contractual 
800 Utan 701 PACIFIC REPORTER, *u oERIES 
obligations undertaken by the parties, the 
law imposes upon all agents a fiduciary 
obligation to their principals with respect to 
matters faffing wit/uh the scope of tfieir 
agency. Id. at 748; see generally 3 Am. 
Jur.2d Agency § 199 (1962). 
In the first-party situation, on the other 
hand, the reasons for finding a fiduciary 
relationship and imposing a corresponding 
duty are absent No relationship of trust 
and reliance is created by the contract; it 
simply obligates the insurer to pay claims 
submitted by the insured in accordance 
with the contract. Santilli v. State Farm 
Life Insurance Co., 278 Or. at 61-62, 562 
P.2d at 969. Furthermore, none of the 
indicia of agency are present. See general-
ly Duncan v. Andrew County Mutual In-
surance Co., Mo.App., 665 S.W.2d 13, 18-
20 (1984). 
Clearly, then, it is difficult to find a 
theoretically sound basis for analogizing 
the duty owed in a third-party context to 
that owed in a first-party context And 
wholly apart from any theoretical prob-
lems, tailoring the tort analysis to first-par-
ty insurance contract cases has proven dif-
ficult The pragmatic reason for adopting 
the tort approach is that it exposes insurers 
to consequential and punitive damages 
awards in excess of the policy limits. How-
ever, the courts appear to have had difficul-
ty in developing a sound rationale for limit-
ing the tort approach to insurance contract 
cases. This may be because there is no 
sound theoretical difference between a 
first-party insurance contract and any oth-
er contract, at least no difference that justi-
fies permitting punitive damages for the 
breach of one and not the other. In any 
event, the tort approach and the accompa-
3. We recognize that in some cases the acts con-
stituting a breach of contract may also result in 
breaches of duty that are independent of the 
contract and may give rise to causes of action in 
tort. Hal Taylor Assoc, v. UnionAmerica, 657 
P.2d at 750; Lawton v. Great Southwest Fire Ins. 
Co., 392 A.2d at 580. For example, the law of 
this state recognizes a duty to refrain from in-
tentionally causing severe emotional distress to 
others. Samms v. Eccles, 11 Utah 2d 289, 358 
P.2d 344 (1961). Thus, intentional and out-
rageous conduct by an insurer against an in-
sured, coupled with a failure to bargain, could 
nying punitive damages have moved rather 
quickly into areas far afield from insur-
ance. See, e.g., Seaman's Direct Buying 
Service, Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., 36 
Cal.3d 752, 686 P.2d 1158, 1166-67. 206 
Cal.Rptr. 354, 362-63 (1984); Wallis v. Su-
perior Court, 160 Cal.App.3d 1109, 207 
Cal.Rptr. 123, 127-29 (1984); Gates v. Life 
of Montana Insurance Co., Mont, 668 
P.2d 213, 214-16 (1983). 
Furthermore, the courts adopting the 
tort approach have had some difficulty in 
determining what degree of bad faith is 
necessary to sustain a claim. E.g., Ander-
son v. Continental Insurance Co., 85 
Wis.2d 675, 692-94, 271 N.W.2d 368, 376-
77 (1978). From a practical standpoint, the 
state of mind of the insurer is irrelevant; 
even an inadvertent breach of the covenant 
of good faith implied in an insurance con-
tract can substantially harm the insured 
ana7 warrants a remecfy. 
[5,6] We therefore hold that in a first-
party relationship between an insurer and 
its insured, the duties and obligations of 
the parties are contractual rather than fi-
duciary. Without more, a breach of those 
implied or express duties can give rise only 
to a cause of action in contract, not one in 
tort.3 This position has not been widely 
adopted by other courts, although a "re-
spectable body of authority,, is developing. 
See Duncan v. Andrew County Mutual 
Insurance Co., 665 S.W.2d at 18-19, and 
cases cited therein; Lawton v. Great 
Southwest Fire Insurance Co., 118 N.H. 
607, 392 A.2d 576 (1978); Kewin v. Massa-
chusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co., 409 
Mich. 401, 295 N.W.2d 50 (1980); Avail-
conceivably result in tort liability independent 
of (and concurrent with) liability for breach of 
contract. Additionally, the facts that give rise to 
a breach of the duty to bargain in good faith 
could also amount to fraudulent activity, ren-
dering an insurer independently liable for dam-
ages flowing from the fraud. See Wetherbee v. 
United Ins. Co., 265 Cal.App.2d 921, 71 Cal.Rptr. 
764 (1968). Also, under various unfair practices 
acts, there may be statutory requirements that 
give rise to independent causes of action. E.g., 
U.C.A., 1953, §§ 31-27-1 to -24. 
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ability of Excess Damages, supra p. 4, at 
168-71. We further hold that as parties to 
a contract, the insured and the insurer have 
parallel obligations to perform the contract 
in good faith, obligations that inhere in 
every contractual relationship. State 
Automobile & Casualty Underwriters v. 
Salisbury, 27 Utah 2d 229, 232, 494 P.2d 
529, 531 (1972); Leigh Furniture & Car-
pet Co. v. Isom, Utah, 657 P.2d 293, 306 
(1982).4 
[7,8] Few cases define the implied con-
tractual obligation to perform a first-party 
insurance contract in good faith. How-
ever, because the considerations are sim-
ilar, we freely look to the tort cases that 
have described the incidents of the duty of 
good faith in the context of first-party in-
surance contracts. From those cases and 
from our own analysis of the obligations 
undertaken by the parties, we conclude 
that the implied obligation of good faith 
performance contemplates, at the very 
least, that the insurer will diligently inves-
tigate the facts to enable it to determine 
whether a claim is valid, will fairly evaluate 
the claim, and will thereafter act promptly 
and reasonably in rejecting or settling the 
claim. See Anderson v. Continental In-
surance Co., 85 Wis.2d at 692-93, 271 
N.W.2d at 377; Egan v. Mutual of Omaha 
Insurance Co., 24 Cal.3d 809, 818-19, 620 
P.2d 141, 145-46, 169 Cal.Rptr. 691, 695-96 
(1979). The duty of good faith also re-
quires the insurer to "deal with laymen as 
laymen and not as experts in the subtleties 
of law and underwriting" and to refrain 
from actions that will injure the insured's 
ability to obtain the benefits of the con-
tract. MFA Mutual Insurance Co. v. 
Flint, 574 S.W.2d at 720, quoting Mer-
chants Indemnity Corp. v. Eggleston, 37 
N.J. 114, 122, 179 A.2d 505, 509 (1962); 
accord Bowler v. Fidelity & Casualty Co,, 
53 N.J. 313, 327, 250 A.2d 580, 587 (1969). 
These performances are the essence of 
what the insured has bargained and paid 
4. The duty to perform the contract in good faith 
cannot, by definition, be waived by either party 
to the agreement. 
for, and the insurer has the obligation to 
perform them. When an insurer has 
breached this duty, it is liable for damages 
suffered in consequence of that breach. 
In adopting the contract approach, we 
are not ignoring the principal reason for 
the adoption of the tort approach—to pro-
vide damage exposure in excess of the poli-
cy limits and thus remove any incentive for 
breaching the duty of good faith. Despite 
what some courts have suggested, e.g., 
Santilli v. State Farm Insurance Co., 562 
P.2d at 969, and what some commentators 
have asserted, e.g., J. Appleman, Insur-
ance Law & Practice § 8878.15 at 424-26 
(1981), there is no reason to limit damages 
recoverable for breach of a duty to investi-
gate, bargain, and settle claims in good 
faith to the amount specified in the insur-
ance policy.5 Nothing inherent in the con-
tract law approach mandates this narrow 
definition of recoverable damages. Al-
though the policy limits define the amount 
for which the insurer may be held respon-
sible in performing the contract, they do 
not define the amount for which it may be 
liable upon a breach. Lawton v. Great 
Southwest Fire Insurance Co., 392 A.2d at 
579. 
[9] Damages recoverable for breach of 
contract include both general damages, i.e., 
those flowing naturally from the breach, 
and consequential damages, i.e., those rea-
sonably within the contemplation of, or rea-
sonably foreseeable by, the parties at the 
time the contract was made. Pacific Coast 
Title Insurance Co. v. Hartford Accident 
& Indemnity Co., 7 Utah 2d 377, 379, 325 
P.2d 906, 907 (1958), citing Hadley v. Box-
endale, 9 Exch. 341, 156 Eng.Rep. 145 
(1854). We have repeatedly recognized 
that consequential damages for breach of 
contract may reach beyond the bare con-
tract terms. See, e.g., Pacific Coast Title 
Insurance Co. v. Hartford Accident & 
Idemnity, 7 Utah 2d at 379, 325 P.2d at 908 
5. In Ammerman, we suggested in dicta that in 
an action for breach of an insurance policy, the 
damages could not exceed the policy limits. 19 
Utah 2d at 264, 430 P.2d at 578. We expressly 
disavow this dicta. 
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(attorney fees incurred for settling and de-
fending claims were foreseeable result of 
contractor's default); Bevan v. J.H. Con-
struction Co., Utah, 669 P.2d 442, 444 
(1983) (home purchasers entitled to dam-
ages for loss of favorable mortgage inter-
est rate resulting from builder's breach of 
contract). 
[10,11] In an action for breach of a 
duty to bargain in good faith, a broad 
range of recoverable damages is conceiva-
ble, particularly given the unique nature 
and purpose of an insurance contract. An 
insured frequently faces catastrophic con-
sequences if funds are not available within 
a reasonable period of time to cover an 
insured loss; damages for losses well in 
excess of the policy limits, such as for a 
home or a business, may therefore be fore-
seeable and provable. See, e.g., Reichert v. 
General Insurance Co., 59 Cal.Rptr. 724, 
728, 428 P.2d 860, 864 (1967), vacated on 
other grounds, 68 Cal.2d 822, 442 P.2d 377, 
69 Cal.Rptr. 321 (1968) (because bankrupt-
cy was a foreseeable consequence of fire 
insurer's failure to pay, insurer was liable 
for consequential damages flowing from 
bankruptcy). Furthermore, it is axiomatic 
that insurance frequently is purchased not 
only to provide funds in case of loss, but to 
provide peace of mind for the insured or his 
beneficiaries. Therefore, although other 
courts adopting the contract approach have 
been reluctant to allow such an award, 
Lawton v. Great Southwest Fire Insur-
ance Co.f 392 A.2d at 581-82, we find no 
difficulty with the proposition that, in un-
usual cases, damages for mental anguish 
might be provable.6 See Kewin v. Massa-
chusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co., 409 
Mich, at 440-55, 295 N.W.2d at 64-72 (Wil-
liams, J., dissenting); cf. Lambert v. Sine, 
123 Utah 145, 150, 256 P.2d 241, 244 (1953). 
The foreseeability of any such damages 
will always hinge upon the nature and lan-
guage of the contract and the reasonable 
expectations of the parties. J. Calamari & 
6. Clearly, damages will not be available for the 
mere disappointment, frustration, or anxiety 
normally experienced in the process of filing an 
J. Perillo, Contracts § 14-5 at 523-25 (2d 
ed. 1977). 
With the foregoing principles in mind, we 
return to a consideration of the present 
case. The trial court granted summary 
judgment for the insurer in the face of 
affidavits of the insured, his counsel, and a 
paralegal who had been an adjuster for 
many years. In the absence of any respon-
sive affidavits, we take the assertions of 
the affidavits as true and view all unex-
plained facts in a light most favorable to 
Beck. It appears that the insurer was 
served with Beck's claim on June 23, 1982. 
On July 1st, the claim was rejected without 
explanation and without any request for 
additional facts. The insured heard noth-
ing more from the insurer until after Au-
gust 2d, when this suit was filed. The 
affidavits state that the insured accepted 
the settlement offered by the insurer in 
late October because of the financial pres-
sure caused by the delay in resolving the 
matter. The affidavits also offer the opin-
ion of the expert adjuster turned paralegal 
that the delay was in bad faith. 
From January until late June, Beck was 
apparently negotiating with the car own-
er's carrier and not with Farmers, for no 
claim was filed with Fanners until June 
23rd. Therefore, none of the delay be-
tween January and June 23rd can be attrib-
uted to Farmers. The unexplained delay 
thereafter, however, together with a flat 
rejection of plaintiffs offer, provides a fac-
tual basis for this cause of action sufficient 
to withstand summary judgment. Farmers 
had an obligation to diligently investigate 
and evaluate Beck's claim. It rejected the 
claim in one week, and we must infer that 
the insurer did nothing to investigate or 
evaluate the claim during the following 
month. 
[12] Under these circumstances and re-
solving all doubts in Beck's favor, we can-
not say that a jury could not find that 
Farmers breached its duty of good faith in 
rejecting Beck's claim without explanation 
insurance claim and negotiating a settlement 
with an insurer. 
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and in failing to further investigate the Affirmed. 
matter. Therefore, we remand the matter Stewart, J., concurred in result. 
to the trial court for further proceedings. 
HALL, C.J., and STEWART, HOWE and 
DURHAM, J J , concur. 
Claron D. BAILEY, Plaintiff 
and Respondent, 
v. 
DESERET FEDERAL SAVINGS AND 
LOAN ASSOCIATION, Defendant 
and Appellant. 
No. 18961. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
June 19, 1985. 
Assignee of second deed of trust filed 
action requesting that he be awarded ex-
cess sale proceeds over amount due holder 
of first deed of trust The Third District 
Court, Salt Lake County, Homer F. Wilkin-
son, J., found for assignee, and holder of 
first deed of trust appealed. The Supreme 
Court, Durham, J., held that affidavit of 
attorney representing assignee of second 
deed of trust establishing that bankruptcy 
judge dismissed assignee's complaint seek-
ing to stay trustee's sale because of se-
cured claims on debtor's property and be-
cause bankruptcy court had no interest in 
funds, and that bankruptcy judge had earli-
er favorably responded to statement that 
assignee would prefer to go to state court, 
demonstrated that bankruptcy court did 
not make adjudication on merits, and thus, 
bankruptcy court's dismissal was not res 
judicata so as to bar state court action by 
assignee seeking to recover excess sale 
proceeds over amount due holder of first 
deed of trust. 
1. Appeal and Error <3=>204(4) 
In action brought by assignee of sec-
ond deed of trust seeking to be awarded 
excess sale proceeds over amount due hold-
er of first deed of trust, holder of first 
deed of trust, by failing to interpose any 
objection at trial to use of affidavit of 
plaintiffs attorney, waived objection on ba-
sis of allegation that such affidavit was 
hearsay, and could not raise such issue for 
first time on appeal. 
2. Judgment <&=>654 
Finding that court does not have juris-
diction is not the sort of adjudication that 
can serve as basis for res judicata on mer-
its. 
3. Judgment <s=>829(3) 
Affidavit of attorney representing as-
signee of second deed of trust establishing 
that bankruptcy judge dismissed assignee's 
complaint seeking to stay trustee's sale 
because of secured claims on debtor's prop-
erty and because bankruptcy court had no 
interest in funds, and that bankruptcy 
judge had earlier favorably responded to 
statement that assignee would prefer to go 
to state court, demonstrated that bankrupt-
cy court did not make adjudication on mer-
its, and thus, bankruptcy court's dismissal 
was not res judicata so as to bar state 
court action by assignee seeking to recover 
excess sale proceeds over amount due hold-
er of first deed of trust. 
Edward M. Garrett, Joseph E. Hatch, 
Salt Lake City, for defendant and appel-
lant. 
J. Steven Newton, Salt Lake City, for 
plaintiff and respondent. 
DURHAM, Justice: 
The plaintiff, a mechanic's lien holder 
and assignee of a second position trust 
deed, filed a complaint with the federal 
bankruptcy court asking the court to stay a 
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4. Appeal and Error <3=>931(1) 
David Allen BENNION, Donald Dean ln reviewing evidence, Supreme Court 
Bennion, and Dennis Layne views it in light most favorable to trial 
Bennion, Plaintiffs and Appellants, court. 
v, 
Lloyd HANSEN and John J. Van Leeu-
wen, as Trustees of the Grover A. Han-
sen Trust, Defendants and Respon-
dents. 
No, 18925. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
April 5, 1985. 
Grandchildren sued trustees seeking to 
enforce terms of declaration of trust exe-
cuted by their grandfather. The Third Dis-
trict Court, Salt Lake County, Scott Dan-
iels, J., entered judgment in favor of trus-
tees, and grandchildren appealed. The Su-
preme Court, Zimmerman, J., held that: (1) 
trial court did not abuse its discretion by 
denying trial to grandchildren whose only 
excuse for failure to file jury demand on 
time was that deadline for filing notice fell 
on Sunday, and where notice was filed on 
following Tuesday, four days late, and (2) 
trial court's findings had adequate eviden-
tiary support. 
Affirmed. 
1. Jury e=>25(6) 
To avail oneself of right to jury trial, 
one's demand must be timely and in accord-
ance with applicable rule or statute. 
Const. Art. 1, § 10. 
2. Jury <&=>25(6) 
Trial court did not abuse its discretion 
by denying jury trial to plaintiffs whose 
only excuse for failure to file jury demand 
on time was that deadline for filing notice 
fell on Sunday, and where notice was filed 
on following Tuesday, four days late. 
Const. Art. 1, § 10. 
3. Appeal and Error <S=>1010.1(6) 
On appeal, findings of trial court will 
not be disturbed unless there is no substan-
tial record evidence to support them. 
5. Trusts <S=>37V2 
Creation of a trust requires delivery of 
property into the trust. 
t. D: jds <3=>56(2, 3) 
Delivery of deed requires that grantor 
either relinquish physical control of deed or 
have present intent to permanently divest 
himself of title to the property. 
7. Trusts <&=>372(1) 
Party challenging validity of delivery 
bears burden of proof; where grantor re-
tains possession of or the right to recall 
deed, burden shifts to party claiming under 
deed. 
8. Trusts <s=*372(3) 
Ample evidence supported trial court's 
finding that grandchildren who sued trus-
tee seeking to enforce terms of declaration 
of trust as executed by their grandfather 
did not meet their burden of proving that 
their grandfather placed the deed and trust 
declaration in a safety deposit box in 1972 
with intention of relinquishing control over 
both documents, and thus that there had 
been no delivery as required for creation of 
trust, prior to amendment. 
9. Trial ®=>403 
Until a court files its findings of fact, 
no decision has been rendered or final rul-
ing made. 
10. Judges <s=>24 
Any judge is free to change his or her 
mind on the outcome of a case until a 
decision is formally rendered. 
James A. Mcintosh, Salt Lake City, for 
plaintiffs and appellants. 
Craig G. Adamson, Salt Lake City, for 
defendants and respondents. 
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ZIMMERMAN, Justice: 
This is an appeal from a judgment af-
firming the disposition of an estate in ac-
cordance with an amended trust instru-
ment. The appellants seek reversal on 
grounds that the trust instrument, which 
by its terms was irrevocable and unamend-
able, took effect before it was amended 
and, therefore, the amendment should have 
been ignored. We affirm the trial court. 
Plaintiffs Layne, David, and Donald 
Bennion ("the Bennion brothers") sued 
Lloyd Hansen and John Van Leeuwen in 
their capacities as trustees of the Grover 
A. Hansen Trust, seeking to enforce the 
terms of a 1972 declaration of trust exe-
cuted by their grandfather, Grover A. Han-
sen. Under the terms of the 1972 declara-
tion, plaintiffs were to receive approximate-
ly one-third of Mr. Hansen's estate on the 
death of their mother, Mr. Hansen's daugh-
ter. The estate consisted almost entirely 
of a condominium and its furnishings. 
Rather than following the 1972 instru-
ment's provisions, upon the death of the 
Bennion brothers' mother, the trustees dis-
tributed the estate in accordance with the 
terms of a 1974 amendment to the 1972 
declaration of trust. This amendment re-
duced the brothers' share of the estate to 
the lump sum of $4,500 to be shared equal-
ly among them. 
After the brothers' request for a jury 
was denied for untimeliness, the trial court 
heard testimony and held that the 1974 
amendment was effective. It found as a 
matter of fact that Grover Hansen had no 
present intent to create a trust in 1972 and 
had not delivered any property into the 
trust prior to executing the 1974 amend-
ment. It therefore concluded that the ir-
revocable trust was not actually created 
until 1974 and that its terms were those set 
forth in the declaration signed in 1972, as 
1. Rule 4.2, Utah R. Practice, states that a written 
demand for a jury trial "must be filed at least 
ten (10) days prior to trial or at such other time 
as the trial judge may order." (Emphasis add-
ed.) Rule 6, Utah R.Civ.P., in delineating how 
time limits shall be computed, states that the 
modified by the 1974 amendment The 
court granted judgment for the defendants. 
In this Court, the Bennion brothers seek 
reversal, claiming that the trial court erred 
in denying their request for a jury, that the 
1974 amendment was ineffective because in 
1972 there was valid delivery of both the 
declaration of irrevocable trust and a deed 
conveying the condominium into the trust, 
and that the trial court erred when it en-
tered findings and conclusions inconsistent 
with its own earlier oral statements. 
[1] The facts with respect to the broth-
ers' first claim are simple. They filed a 
request for a jury eight days before the 
trial date. Rule 4.2 of the Rules of Prac-
tice in the district courts of this state re-
quires that such a request be made ten 
days before trial. The trustees objected to 
the notice, and the Jaw and motion judge 
sustained the objection. The brothers ar-
gue that this ruling denied them their con-
stitutional right to a jury trial. Their argu-
ment is without merit. The Utah Constitu-
tion, article I, section 10, provides that in 
civil cases the right to a jury trial is 
"waived unless demanded." To avail one-
self of this right, one's demand must be 
timely and in accordance with applicable 
rule or statute. Board of Education v. 
West, 55 Utah 357, 362-63, 186 P. 114, 116 
(1919). Nothing more was required by the 
court below. 
[2] The brothers further contend that, 
under Board of Education, the trial court 
had the discretion to relieve them of their 
default upon a showing of good cause and 
that the court abused its discretion by not 
permitting them a jury. However, there is 
absolutely no factual basis for finding that 
the lower court abused its discretion. The 
only excuse offered for the failure to file 
the demand on time is that the deadline for 
filing the notice fell on a Sunday. The 
notice, however, was filed on the following 
Tuesday, four days late.1 It is hard to 
day of the event from which the designated time 
period runs, here the trial date, is not included 
in the computation. The last day of the period 
is included unless it is a Saturday, a Sunday, or 
a legal holiday. In that case, the time period 
runs "until the end of the next day which is not 
P3 I/I 
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understand how this fact alone would war-
rant our finding that the trial court abused 
its discretion in denying the brothers' re-
quest for a jury. 
With respect to the second point, the 
brothers contend that in 1972 the trust 
declaration and the deed conveying the con-
dominium to the trust were properly deliv-
ered and, therefore, that this property was 
beyond the reach of the 1974 amendment. 
This argument runs directly contrary to the 
trial court's explicit finding of fact that 
although the grantor executed these instru-
ments in 1972, he did not deliver either 
instrument and had no intention of making 
such delivery. The court found that these 
instruments were not delivered and did not 
become effective until 1974 when the 
grantor executed the amendment and then 
had all three instruments simultaneously 
recorded. 
[3,4] On appeal, the findings of the tri-
al court will not be disturbed unless there 
is no substantial record evidence to support 
them. See, e.g., Litho Sales, Inc. v. Cutru-
bus, Utah, 636 P.2d 487, 488 (1981). In 
reviewing the evidence, we view it in the 
light most favorable to the trial court. 
See, e.g., Hardy v. Hendrickson, 27 Utah 
2d 251, 254, 495 P.2d 28, 29 (1972). The 
brothers' counsel has not approached this 
appeal with these standards in mind. His 
brief ignores the trial court's findings and 
invites this Court to reweigh all the evi-
dence on the issue and independently find 
the facts. That is not this Court's role, and 
we firmly decline the brothers' invitation. 
Considering the evidence under the appro-
priate standards, we conclude that the trial 
court's findings have adequate evidentiary 
support and should not be disturbed. 
[5-7] Creation of a trust requires deliv-
ery of property into the trust. Delivery of 
a deed requires that the grantor either 
a Saturday, a Sunday or a legal holiday." (Em-
phasis added.) Reading these two rules togeth-
er, the minimum ten-day period is counted back 
from the day before the trial is scheduled. 
Should the tenth day fall on a Sunday, as here, 
the time period must be counted back to the 
next day that is not a Saturday, a Sunday, or a 
v. HANSEN Utah 7 5 9 
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relinquish physical control of the deed or 
have a present intent to permanently divest 
himself of title to the property. See Wig-
gill v. Cheney, Utah, 597 P.2d 1351, 1352 
(1979); Hanns v. Hanns, 246 Or. 282, 423 
P.2d 499, 507 (1967). The general rule is 
that the party challenging the validity of 
delivery bears the burden of proof. Con-
trolled Receivables, Inc. v. Harman, 17 
Utah 2d 420, 423, 413 P.2d 807, 809 (1966). 
However, where the grantor retains pos-
session of or the right to recall the deed, 
the burden shifts to the party claiming 
under the deed. Hanns v. Hanns, 423 
P.2d at 508. 
[8] In the present case, both parties 
conceded that actual physical delivery of 
the deed to the condominium did not occur. 
The brothers' claim rests on the contention 
that Grover Hansen placed the deed and 
the trust declaration in a safety deposit box 
in 1972 with the intention of relinquishing 
control over both documents. For this 
proposition, the brothers rely on the fact 
that one of the trustees had a key to the 
box. See Agrelius v. Mohesky, 208 Kan. 
790, 494 P.2d 1095 (1972). However, there 
was ample evidence to support the trial 
court's finding that the brothers had not 
carried their burden of proof on this point. 
First, there was conflicting testimony as 
to whether Grover Hansen had put the 
deed in the safety deposit box. Second, 
even if he did put the deed in the box, there 
was evidence that he did not do so with an 
intention to relinquish control over it and to 
effect delivery into the trust. The evidence 
was undisputed that Grover maintained 
control over the deed from 1972 until 1974. 
No one saw either the trust declaration or 
the deed from 1972 until Grover produced 
the documents in 1974 when the amend-
ment was executed and all documents were 
recorded. 
legal holiday. Thus, the jury demand would be 
due on the prior Friday. A Friday filing would 
comply with the demands of both Rule 4.2 and 
Rule 6, while to allow a Monday filing would 
directly contravene the ten-day minimum re-
quired by Rule 4.2. 
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[9,10] The final argument of the broth-
ers is also without merit. At the close of 
trial, after telling the parties he would take 
the matter under advisement and would 
further consider their trial briefs, the judge 
commented on his understanding of the 
evidence and gave some indication of his 
leanings. The brothers complain that the 
findings of fact finally signed by the judge 
do not agree with his post-trial comments. 
Until a court files its findings of fact, no 
decision has been rendered or final ruling 
made. Any judge is free to change his or 
her mind on the outcome of a case until a 
decision is formally rendered. McCollum 
v. Clothier, 121 Utah 311, 320, 241 P.2d 
468, 472 (1952); Chapman v. Jesco, Inc., 98 
N.M. 707, 709, 652 P.2d 257, 259 (1982); 
Johnson v. Whitman, 1 Wash.App. 540, 
541, 463 P.2d 207, 209 (1969). The rule 
suggested by the brothers would mean that 
a judge would have to refrain from ex-
pressing any views he or she might have on 
a matter for fear that those comments 
might be found to control the later disposi-
tion of the case. It would be most unwise 
to adopt any rule that might discourage 
judges from frankly discussing the merits 
of cases before them with attorneys for 
both sides; such discussion is often valu-
able to the court and counsel, both in focus-
ing on the pivotal issues and in clarifying 
points that the court might otherwise have 
misunderstood. 
The decision below is affirmed. Costs to 
respondents. 
HALL, C.J., and STEWART, HOWE and 
DURHAM, JJ., concur. 
Rosemary J. BONWICH, Plaintiff 
and Respondent, 
v. 
Christopher BONWICH, Defendant 
and Appellant. 
Nos. 19592, 19804. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
April 8, 1985. 
In divorce action, the Second District 
Court, Weber County, John F. Wahlquist, 
J., granted custody of child to adoptive 
mother, rather than biological father, and 
father appealed. The Supreme Court, 
Howe, J., held that: (1) presumption favor-
ing natural parent over nonparent was in-
applicable in the case of adoption; (2) 
award of custody of child to adoptive moth-
er was proper where based on best interest 
of child, and absent sexist biases or preju-
dices; and (3) property award was pre-
sumed proper absent any showing of ineq-
uity. 
Affirmed. 
1. Adoption <3=>25 
Judgment of adoption under Florida 
law which created same relationship be-
tween adoptive parent and child that would 
have existed had child been adoptive par-
ent's legitimate blood descendant was enti-
tled to full faith and credit for purposes of 
determining adoptive parent's right to cus-
tody of child in Utah divorce proceeding 
with child's biological father. West's 
F.S.A. § 63.172(l)(c). 
2. Children Out-of-wedlock <®=>12 
Adoption by acknowledgement con-
ferred on illegitimate child civil and social 
status of legitimate child of his natural 
father. U.C.A.1953, 78-30-12. 
3. Adoption <3=>20 
Relationship of adoptive parent and 
child is the same legally as that of natural 
parent and child, with all rights and duties 
( J K O O K b l U i \ v. i ii^jLi * .>o . ^ . ^ 
1Ueas8!7 P.2d 789 (Utah 1991) 
viction. To ask the trial coi o address 
the admissibility question now would be to 
tempt it to reach a post hoc rationalization 
for the admission of this pivotal evidence. 
Such a mode of proceeding holds too much 
potential for abuse. The only fair way to 
proceed is to vacate defendant's conviction 
and remand the matter for retrial. This 
will permit a trial judge to address properly 
the constitutional admissibility question 
and enter appropriate findings and conclu-
sions. We therefore vacate the conviction 
and remand for a new trial. 
We have considered Ramirez's other 
claims and have found them to be without 
merit. 
HALL, C.J., HOWE, Associate C.J., and 
DURHAM, J., concur. 
STEWART, J., dissents; opinion to 
follow. 
KEY NUMBER SYSTEM S> 
S. Larry CROOKSTON, Randi L. Crook-
ston, and Anna W. Drake, Trustee of 
the Estate of Spencer Larry Crookston 
and Randi Lynn Crookston, Plaintiffs 
and Appellees, 
v, 
FIRE INSURANCE EXCHANGE, a 
California corporation, Defendant 
and Appellant. 
No. 880034. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
June 28, 1991. 
Rehearing Denied Aug. 12, 1991. 
Insureds and trustee of insureds' es-
tate brought action against property insur-
er for breach of contract, breach of cove-
nant of good faith and fair dealing, inten-
tional infliction of en "lal distress, 
fraud, and against bank, wnich was loss 
payee, for breach of covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing, breach of fiduciary duty, 
fraud, and intentional infliction of emotion-
al distress. Insurer and bank cross-
claimed against each other, asserting 
rights of contribution. The Third District 
Court, Salt Lake County, J. Dennis Freder-
ick, J., entered judgment for plaintiffs pur-
suant to jury verdict against insurer, 
awarded attorney fees and costs to plain-
tiffs, and granted summary judgment for 
bank on insurer's cross claim. Insurer ap-
pealed. The Supreme Court, Zimmerman, 
J., held that: (1) any error in proceeding to 
consider bank's inadequately noticed mo-
tion for summary judgment was harmless; 
(2) limitations period in policy was inappli-
cable to insureds' tort causes of action; (3) 
evidence was sufficient to support finding 
that insurer had engaged in fraud; (4) trial 
judge reasonably denied new trial on ques-
tion of "soft" compensatory damages; and 
(5) remand was necessary for trial court to 
reconsider whether award of $4 million in 
punitive damages was excessive. 
Affirmed in part; vacated and remand-
ed in part. 
Howe, Associate C.J., filed opinion con-
curring with reservations. 
Stewart, J., filed opinion concurring in 
part and dissenting in part. 
1. Judgment <3=*184 
Violation of notice requirement for 
hearing on motion for summary judgment 
does not divest court of jurisdiction to 
grant summary judgment. Rules Civ. 
Proc, Rule 56(c). 
2. Judgment <3=>189 
Violation of notice requirement for 
hearing on motion for summary judgment 
will avoid grant of motion unless violation 
amounts to harmless error. Rules Civ. 
Proc, Rule 56(c). 
3. Appeal and Error <s=>1026 
Error is "harmful" only if likelihood of 
different outcome is sufficiently high as to 
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undermine Supreme Court's confidence in 
verdict Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 61. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
4. Appeal and Error <S=>1073(1) 
When insufficient notice was given for 
hearing on motion for summary judgment, 
task of Supreme Court on appeal from 
grant of motion was to determine whether 
different outcome on motion could have 
had reasonable probability of affecting out-
come of case. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 56(c). 
5. Appeal and Error ^1073(1) 
Reasonable likelihood did not exist that 
jury would have found that bank, as loss 
payee under policy, would have owed con-
tribution to property insurer with respect 
to insureds' claims for damages arising out 
of insurer's failure to pay claim in full, and 
therefore any error committed by trial 
court in granting summary judgment for 
bank when bank failed to provide sufficient 
notice of hearing to insurer was harmless, 
where jury was instructed that it could 
award to insureds only such damages as 
insurer proximately caused, and jury was 
not told that it could award any damages to 
be paid by insurer for which bank was 
responsible. Rules Civ.Proc, Rules 56(c), 
61; U.C.A.1953, 78-27-39. 
6. Insurance <3=>602.2(1) 
Standard form clauses limiting time 
for insureds to bring action against insurer 
only bar actions on contract, and do not bar 
suits for tortious conduct. 
7. Insurance <3=>602.2(1) 
Provision of property policy stating 
that no suit or action on policy for recovery 
of any claim shall be sustainable unless 
commenced within 12 months after incep-
tion of loss did not bar insureds' tort 
causes of action against insurer. 
8. Insurance <s=>602.1 
Covenant of good faith and fair deal-
ing owed by insurer to insured is implied 
contractual provision, and cause of action 
for its breach sounds in contract. 
9. Appeal and Error <S=>215(1) 
Supreme Court would not exercise dis-
cretionary review, in interest of justice, to 
determine whether jury instruction, to 
which no objection was raised at trial, omit-
ted or misstated elements of fraud in action 
brought by insureds against property in-
surer. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 51. 
10. Appeal and Error <3=>215(1) 
Supreme Court may review instruction-
al errors in interest of justice despite lack 
of trial objection. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 51. 
11. Appeal and Error <3=>215(1) 
Rule allowing Supreme Court to re-
view instructional errors in interest of jus-
tice despite lack of trial objection embodies 
concept of "plain error." Rules Civ.Proc, 
Rule 51. 
12. Appeal and Error <£*977(3) 
New Trial <&>& 
In deciding whether to grant new trial, 
the trial court has some discretion, and 
Supreme Court will reverse only for abuse 
of that discretion. 
13. Judgment <S=>199(1) 
In passing on motion for judgment not-
withstanding the verdict, trial court has no 
latitude and must be correct. 
14. New Trial <s=>72(5) 
Trial court cannot grant new trial if 
there is sufficient evidence to support ver-
dict for other party and judge merely dis-
agrees with judgment of jury; rather, trial 
judge may properly grant new trial when 
he or she can reasonably conclude that 
verdict is clearly against weight of evi-
dence or there is insufficient evidence to 
justify verdict. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 
59(a)(6). 
15. Appeal and Error <3=>933(1), 1005(2) 
Appellate review of trial court's denial 
of either motion for new trial or motion for 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict 
based on claim of insufficiency of evidence 
is governed by standard that Supreme 
Court reverses only if, viewing evidence in 
light most favorable to prevailing party, 
the evidence is insufficient to support ver-
dict. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 59(a)(6). 
F3l\5 
CROOKhTOiN v. 
fee as 817 P2d 789 (Utah 1991) 
16. Appeal and Error <s=>757U, 
To demonstrate that evidence is insuf-
ficient to support jury verdict, the one chal-
lenging verdict must marshal evidence in 
support of verdict and then demonstrate 
that evidence is insufficient when viewed in 
light most favorable to verdict 
17. Appeal and Error <s=»766 
Supreme Court would reject property 
insureds attack on-jury's finding that in-
surer had engaged in fraud, where insurer 
made no attempt to marshal evidence in 
support of jury finding of fraud, but in-
stead only argued selected evidence favor-
able to its position. 
18. Fraud 0=58(2) 
Evidence supported insureds' claims 
that adjustor misrepresented to insureds' 
attorney that property insurer was not yet 
in position to settle claims and that he 
would include insureds in any settlement 
negotiation, and that adjustor made such 
representations knowing that he was pre-
pared to settle with bank, which was loss 
payee, that very day. 
19. Fraud <®=>64(5) 
Jury could have found by clear and 
convincing evidence that insureds relied on 
adjuster's representation that property in-
surer was not yet ready to settle and were 
induced to inaction thereby, with result 
that insurer was able to settle matter with 
bank, which was loss payee, without in-
sureds' participation for unfairly low 
amount. 
20. Appeal and Error <S=>170(2) 
Property insurer waived any right to 
present claims on appeal that award of 
compensatory and punitive damages to in-
sureds violated ban on excessive fines and 
due process provision of State Constitution, 
where insurer did not raise such arguments 
before trial court. Const. Art. 1, §§ 7, 9. 
21. Constitutional Law <s=>303 
Damages <3=>87(1) 
Utah's standards for avoiding punitive 
damages and reviewing punitive damages 
awards are adequate and do not violate due 
process requirements of Federal Constitu-
tion. U.S.C.A. Const.Amends. 5, 14. 
22. New Trial <s=>7 
General rule governing the grant of 
new trial is that trial court must find at 
least one of the seven grounds listed in rule 
to be met. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 59(a). 
23. New Trial <^161(1) 
If court finds that new trial on amount 
of damages award is warranted on grounds 
of either excessive damages or insufficient 
evidence, it may encourage parties to come 
to some mutually agreeable solution rather 
than incur time and expense of new trial. 
Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 59(a)(5, 6). 
24. New Trial ®=>74 
In context of new trial motion attack-
ing amount of jury verdict on grounds of 
excessiveness of damages or insufficiency 
of evidence, trial court has responsibility to 
review amount of award to ensure that 
jury has acted within its proper bounds. 
Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 59(a)(5, 6). 
25. New Trial <s=>74 
Trial judge is free to grant or deny 
motion for new trial if it is reasonable to 
conclude that jury erred. Rules Civ.Proc, 
Rule 59(a). 
26. New Trial <®=>65 
Trial court cannot grant new trial 
merely because it disagrees with jury's 
judgment. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 59(a). 
27. New Trial <®»159 
If trial court determines that new trial 
is warranted and grants motion, it should 
describe basis for its decision in record 
such that appellate court can have benefit 
of those reasons. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 
59(a). 
28. New Trial <s=*72(5), 77(1) 
In passing on motion for new trial on 
amount of damages, trial court should deny 
motion if it cannot reasonably find that 
jury erred; however, if trial court can rea-
sonably conclude that there was insuffi-
cient evidence to justify verdict or it was 
manifestly against weight of evidence, or 
that jury acted with passion or prejudice, it 
may grant motion and order new trial. 
Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 59(a)(5, 6). 
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29. Appeal and Error ^979(5) 
In reviewing trial judge's ultimate de-
cision to grant or deny new trial on amount 
of damages, Supreme Court will reverse 
only if there is no reasonable basis for the 
decision. Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 59(a). 
30. Appeal and Error <s=>1072 
Trial judge's reliance, as preliminary 
matter prior to ultimate determination of 
motion for new trial, on legal principles 
which are erroneous or facts which are 
wholly without record support may consti-
tute grounds for reversal of grant of mo-
tion. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 59(a). 
31. Appeal and Error <s=>979(5) 
Order granting new trial on amount of 
damages will be upheld on appeal, even if 
jury's award appears supported by sub-
stantial evidence on appeal, if trial judge 
could reasonably conclude that jury's 
award was excessive or unsupported by 
evidence. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 59(a)(5, 6). 
32. Damages <s=>32 
"Soft compensatory damages," in oth-
er words, damages for pain and suffering, 
must be awarded with caution. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
33. Appeal and Error <£=>1004.3 
When reviewing jury's award of soft 
compensatory damages, deliberate action 
of trial court in denying motion for new 
trial should prevail in case of doubt. 
34. Damages <S=>130(1) 
Insurance <s=>602.11 
Trial court properly denied new trial 
with respect to jury's award of $492,427 in 
soft compensatory damages to insureds for 
emotional and mental distress and loss of 
financial reputation arising out of insurer's 
failure to pay in full a claim for property 
damage caused by collapse of insureds' 
home while under construction. 
35. New Trial e=>74 
Any motion for new trial on question 
of punitive damages requires that trial 
court engage in two-part inquiry: whether 
punitive damages are appropriate at all, in 
other words, whether evidence is sufficient 
to support lawful jury finding of defen-
dant's requisite mental state; and whether 
amount of punitive damages is excessive or 
inadequate, appearing to have been given 
under influence of passion or prejudice. 
Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 59(a)(5, 6). 
36. Insurance <3=>602.10(1) 
Property insurer acted with mental 
state necessary for imposition of punitive 
damages, where substantial evidence sup-
ported jury's determinations of reckless 
disregard of insureds' rights and intention-
al fraud arising out of insurer's failure to 
pay in full a claim for property damage 
caused by collapse of insureds' home while 
under construction and insurer's misrepre-
sentation that claim was not about to be 
settled when, in fact, insurer was about to 
settle claim with bank, which was the loss 
payee. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 59(a)(5, 6). 
37. New Trial <s=>159 
Trial court may assume that punitive 
damages award is not excessive, and need 
not give any detailed explanation for its 
decision to deny motion for new trial, if 
punitive damages fall within general rule 
that where punitive damages are well be-
low $100,000, punitive damages awards be-
yond three-to-one ratio to actual damages 
will not be upheld, and that where award is 
in excess of $100,000, awards having ratios 
of less than three-to-one may be over-
turned. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 59(a)(5). 
38. Damages <s=»94 
Trial court is not bound to reduce puni-
tive damages award if it does not fall with-
in general rule that where punitive dam-
ages are well below $100,000, awards be-
yond three-to-one ratio to actual damages 
are seldom upheld, and that where award is 
in excess of $100,000, there is some inclina-
tion to overturn awards having ratios of 
less than three-to-one; however, if such 
award is upheld, trial judge must make 
detailed and reasoned articulation of 
grounds for concluding that award is not 
excessive in light of the law and the facts. 
Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 59(a)(5).
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39. New Trial <3=»159 
Trial court should explain its action in 
reducing or enlarging award of punitive 
damages by way of remittitur or additur. 
40. Damages <s=>94 
Factors that may justify remittitur of 
punitive damages award can include fact 
that award exceeded proper ratio to actual 
damages, lack of intent or low degree of 
malice, benign nature of act, fact that sub-
stantial portion of actual damages is 
"soft," thus making ratio analysis suspect, 
or substantial risk of bankrupting defen-
dant 
41. Appeal and Error <3=>1177(8) 
Remand was necessary for trial judge 
to explain reasons for denial of motion for 
new trial with respect to award of $4 mil-
lion in punitive damages against property 
insurer which had failed to pay in full a 
claim for property damage caused by col-
lapse of insureds' home while under con-
struction, given that large proportion of 
$815,826 in compensatory damages was ar-
guably attributable to emotional distress or 
loss of financial reputation, and fact that 
ratio of punitive damages to compensatory 
damages appeared to be much higher than 
in any case in which Supreme Court had 
upheld punitive damage award. Rules Civ. 
Proc, Rule 59(a)(5). 
42. New Trial <3=*74 
Motion for new trial challenging 
amount of punitive damages award is most 
appropriately brought on grounds of exces-
siveness of award. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 
59(a)(5). 
43. New Trial <s=>74 
Motion for new trial challenging award 
of "hard" actual damages is most appropri-
ately brought on grounds of insufficiency 
of evidence. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 59(a)(6). 
44. Appeal and Error <s=>932(2) 
Any challenge to award of punitive 
damages based on its excessiveness that is 
brought before appellate court will be con-
sidered under same standard for reviewing 
trial court decisions on motions for new 
trial; if no new trial motion was filed be-
low, Supreme Court will assume that trial 
court considered such m m sua sponte 
and denied it. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 
59(a)(5), (d). 
45. Jury <s=>37 
Allowing trial court to consider in the 
first instance the propriety of jury's award 
of punitive damages and to reduce or in-
crease that award if it deems appropriate 
does not violate plaintiff's right to trial by 
jury; if plaintiff does not want to accept 
trial court's proposed remittitur, plaintiff 
may elect to retry matter. U.S.C.A. Const. 
Amend. 7. 
L. Rich Humphreys, M. Douglas Bayly, 
Salt Lake City, for plaintiffs and appellees. 
Philip R. Fishier, Stephen J. Trayner, 
Salt Lake City, and Frank A. Roybal, Boun-
tiful, for defendant and appellant. 
ZIMMERMAN, Justice: 
Fire Insurance Exchange ("Fire Insur-
ance") appeals a jury verdict awarding 
Spencer Larry Crookston and Randi Lynn 
Crookston (collectively referred to as "the 
Crookstons") and Anna W. Drake, trustee 
of the Crookstons' estate, compensatory 
damages of $815,826 and punitive damages 
of $4,000,000 on various theories arising 
out of Fire Insurance's failure to pay in 
full a claim for property damage caused by 
the collapse of the Crookstons' home while 
under construction. Fire Insurance also 
appeals the trial court's award of $175,000 
in attorney fees and $11,126 in costs to the 
Crookstons. 
The jury found that Fire Insurance 
breached its contract of insurance, includ-
ing the implied covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing recognized in Beck v. Farmers 
Ins. Exch., 701 P.2d 795 (Utah 1985); inten-
tionally inflicted emotional distress upon 
the Crookstons; committed fraud and mis-
representation in its handling of the Crook-
stons' claims; and was the proximate cause 
of the damages suffered by the Crook-
stons. Fire Insurance argues that myriad 
substantive and procedural errors were 
committed which require reversal of the 
verdict and/or the damage awards. We 
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find no reason to reverse on the issue of 
Fire Insurance's liability. We also uphold 
the trial court's determination that the 
compensatory damages are supported by 
the evidence and well within the discretion 
of the jury. However, we vacate the trial 
court's denial of a motion for a new trial on 
grounds that the punitive damage award 
was excessive and remand for further con-
sideration consistent with this opinion. 
On appeal, we recite the facts in the light 
most favorable to the jury's verdict. E.g., 
State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 117 (Utah 
1989); Von Hake v. Thomas, 705 P.2d 766, 
769 (Utah 1985). Larry and Randi Crook-
ston owned a vacant lot in Davis County, 
Utah, on which they wanted to build an 
"earth" home, i.e., a house constructed par-
tially underground to take advantage of 
the natural heating and cooling effects of 
the earth. In December of 1980, they ap-
proached Rocky Mountain State Bank for a 
construction loan in the amount of $60,000. 
The bank approved the loan with the stipu-
lation that the Crookstons obtain insurance 
naming the bank as the loss payee. The 
Crookstons obtained such a policy from 
Fire Insurance with a maximum coverage 
of $67,000. The policy named the Crook-
stons as the insureds and the bank as the 
loss payee. 
In December of 1981, the home, which 
was 90 percent completed, collapsed. The 
Crookstons filed a claim with Fire Insur-
ance that month, and an adjuster was as-
signed the claim. A few months passed 
during which no progress was made on the 
c)aim. The Crookstons then hired an attor-
ney, Ralph Klemm, to represent them in 
the claim adjustment. Klemm assisted 
Fire Insurance in obtaining bids to have the 
home repaired. By the end of March of 
1982, Fire Insurance had received bids 
from two contractors: one in the amount of 
$50,951, and another in the amount of $49,-
600. In April of 1982, Fire Insurance's 
regional office extended settlement author-
ity in the amount of $49,443. In May of 
1982, the adjuster obtained another bid 
from an architect in the amount of $74,000. 
Later in May, Fire Insurance replaced 
the original adjuster with one more experi-
enced. The new adjuster, Alan Clapperton, 
commissioned an engineer to do an analysis 
limited to structural damage. The engi-
neer was not informed by Clapperton that 
his report would be the basis for a bid to 
reconstruct the house. Clapperton then re-
quested a bid to rebuild the home from an 
inexperienced contractor. Clapperton pro-
vided this contractor with a copy of the 
engineer's analysis, representing that the 
engineer's limited analysis encompassed 
the entire damage to be repaired. On June 
14, 1982, the contractor bid $27,830.60 to 
repair the home. Clapperton immediately 
made an appointment to meet with a bank 
officer on June 16th to discuss settlement. 
On the morning of the 16th, Clapperton 
received a call from Ralph Klemm, the 
Crookstons' attorney, asking about the sta-
tus of any settlement Clapperton toJd 
Klemm that he needed a little more time 
and would be getting back to him soon with 
a settlement proposal. Clapperton said 
nothing about the bid he had received two 
days earlier or of the meeting he had 
scheduled with the bank for later that same 
day. 
At the meeting with the bank, Clapper-
ton did not disclose the fact that three 
other bids, all substantially higher, had 
been obtained, nor did he reveal that the 
$27,830.60 bid was based on an engineer's 
appraisal limited to structural damage 
only. The bank officer agreed to settle for 
slightly more than $32,000, the amount of 
the low bid plus an approximation of the 
interest that had accrued on the Crookston 
loan since the collapse. Knowing full well 
that the $27,830.60 bid was substantially 
lower than any other bid, Clapperton insist-
ed that the bank accept a settlement check 
made out only to the bank, not jointly to 
the bank and the Crookstons, and that the 
bank execute a proof of loss form releasing 
Fire Insurance from any further liability on 
the claim. The settlement was effected 
that same day, and all necessary doc-
uments were signed and exchanged. 
The Crookstons' attorney called the bank 
later on June 16th. At that time, Klemm 
was told that the bank had just settled the 
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claim with Fire Insurance. Klemm immedi- proceedings, requesting t 
ately called Clapperton, who affirmed that 
Fire Insurance had settled all claims under 
the policy with the sole loss payee, the 
bank. Clapperton also stated that the in-
sureds, the Crookstons, did not have to be 
included in the settlement, that nothing 
more was owing, and that he was closing 
his file. 
Klemm called the bank and discussed the 
Crookstons' situation. He learned that the 
bank intended to pursue a deficiency claim 
against the Crookstons for the balance due 
on the $60,000 loan that was not paid by 
the insurance settlement. Because the 
Crookstons lacked the means to pay off the 
loan, the bank threatened foreclosure. In 
order to avoid additional interest, attorney 
fees, and costs, the Crookstons deeded the 
property on which the earth home stood to 
the bank in lieu of foreclosure and then 
declared bankruptcy. 
In February of 1983, the Crookstons filed 
a suit against the bank and Fire Insurance. 
As the pleadings ultimately stood, the 
Crookstons alleged causes of action against 
Fire Insurance for breach of contract, 
breach of the covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing, intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress, and misrepresentation and 
fraud. Against the bank, the Crookstons 
asserted claims for breach of a covenant of 
good faith and fair dealing, breach of fidu-
ciary duty, misrepresentation and fraud, 
and intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress. They sought actual and punitive 
damages against both Fire Insurance and 
the bank. Fire Insurance and the bank 
cross-claimed against each other, asserting 
rights of contribution. 
In January of 1987, Fire Insurance 
moved for summary judgment based on a 
clause in the insurance contract requiring 
that any actions against the company be 
brought within one year of the date of loss. 
Fire Insurance argued that because the 
date of loss was December of 1981, when 
the house collapsed, and the action was 
brought fourteen months later, in February 
of 1983, the action should have been 
barred. The trial court denied the motion. 
Fire Insurance also moved to bifurcate the 
the cause of 
action for breach of contract be separated 
from the remaining causes of action, which 
motion the trial court also denied. 
Five days before trial, on a Thursday 
afternoon, the Crookstons agreed to settle 
with the bank. The afternoon of the next 
day, a stipulation regarding the settlement 
was executed, and the bank served and 
filed a motion for summary judgment, 
seeking its dismissal from the action. This 
motion was granted. 
The case then proceeded to trial against 
Fire Insurance. After a six-day trial, the 
jury awarded $815,826 in compensatory 
damages and $4,000,000 in punitive dam-
ages. Although the jury's award of com-
pensatory damages was not broken down 
further, testimony at trial attributed $323,-
399 of the $815,826 to economic loss, mak-
ing the remaining $492,427 apparently at-
tributable to emotional distress and loss of 
financial reputation. Fire Insurance filed a 
motion for judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict, new trial, or remittitur, which the 
court denied on December 30, 1987. On 
January 11, 1988, the court entered an ad-
ditional judgment against Fire Insurance 
awarding the Crookstons attorney fees of 
$175,000 and expenses of $11,126. Fire 
Insurance then filed this appeal. 
Fire Insurance claims as follows: (i) the 
trial court erred in granting the bank's 
summary judgment motion, which was both 
procedurally and substantively flawed; (ii) 
the trial court erred in refusing to hold the 
action barred by the one-year limitation 
period in the policy; (iii) the jury instruc-
tions regarding fraud were erroneous; (iv) 
the evidence is insufficient to support a 
finding of either intentional infliction of 
emotional distress or fraud; (v) attorney 
fees should not have been awarded; and 
(vi) the compensatory and punitive dam-
ages were excessive under Utah law and 
also violated constitutional notions of due 
process and the prohibition of excessive 
fines. We will address only the dispositive 
issues. 
Initially, we consider the claim that the 
trial court erred in granting the bank sum-
mary judgment on Fire Insurance's cross-
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claim for contribution. As noted earlier, 
after settling with the Crookstons, the 
bank filed a summary judgment motion 
four days prior to trial. In support of the 
motion, the bank made several arguments: 
(i) it should be dismissed from the case 
because it had settled with the Crookstons; 
(ii) it was abandoning any claim for contri-
bution against Fire Insurance; and (iii) 
there was no legal basis upon which Fire 
Insurance could recover against the bank 
on its cross-claim for contribution because 
contribution is not available to one found to 
have committed an intentional tort or a 
breach of contract, the only two theories 
under which the Crookstons were then pro-
ceeding against Fire Insurance, 
The court held a hearing on the summary 
judgment motion on May 26, 1987, the 
Tuesday following the motion's filing and 
the morning of trial, which was four calen-
dar days but only one business day after 
the motion was filed with the court.1 At 
the time of the hearing, Fire Insurance had 
not filed any opposition papers. Fire In-
surance argues that the court was incor-
rect on the law of contribution and that the 
summary judgment motion was procedural-
ly flawed because it was filed late. See 
Utah R.Civ.P. 56(c). We first consider the 
procedural challenge. 
[1,2] Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) 
requires at least ten days' notice before a 
hearing on a motion for summary judg-
ment. Utah R.Civ.P. 56(c). In this case, 
only three days intervened between the 
1. The intervening weekend was the Memorial 
Day weekend. 
2. Recently, the Utah Court of Appeals in Gillmor 
v. Cummings, 806 P.2d 1205 (Utah Ct.App.1991), 
reversed a grant of summary judgment holding 
that the trial court committed error when it 
ruled on the motion six days before the time to 
respond to the moving party's motion to strike 
supporting affidavits had expired. Gillmor, 
however, even if accepted as an accurate state-
ment of Utah law, is inapposite here because no 
harmful error analysis was applied in that case. 
Instead, the court of appeals apparently as-
sumed prejudice consistent with rule 61. It 
then remanded to the trial court because it was 
"unable to determine from the record . . . what 
the court actually considered in granting the 
summary judgment " Id. at 18 n. 3. 
3. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 61 states: 
filing of the motion and the hearing, two of 
which were weekend days and the other, a 
legal holiday. Obviously, a technical viola-
tion of rule 56(c) occurred. Because a rule 
56(c) violation does not divest the court of 
jurisdiction over the motion, see Walker v. 
Rocky Mountain Recreation Corp., 29 
Utah 2d 274, 279, 508 P.2d 538, 541 (1973); 
Western States Thrift & Loan Co. v. 
Blomquist, 29 Utah 2d 58, 61-62, 504 P.2d 
1019, 1021 (1972), it has the power to grant 
summary judgment despite a rule 56(c) vio-
lation. However, such a violation will void 
the grant unless the violation amounts to 
harmless error.2 See Utah R.Civ.P. 61; 
Blomquist, 29 Utah 2d at 62, 504 P.2d at 
1021 (summary judgment upheld where 
time violation did not adversely affect de-
fendant's rights). 
[3,4] The harmless error analysis pro-
ceeds under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 
613 and State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116 (Utah 
1989).4 "Harmless error" is defined in 
Verde as an error that is "sufficiently in-
consequential that we conclude there is no 
reasonable likelihood that the error affect-
ed the outcome of the proceedings." 
Verde, 770 P.2d at 120; accord, e.g., State 
v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 919-20 (Utah 1987) 
(explaining meaning of "reasonable" proba-
bility or likelihood). Put in other words, an 
error is harmful only if the likelihood of a 
different outcome is sufficiently high as to 
undermine our confidence in the verdict. 
Knight, 734 P.2d at 920. Our task, then, is 
[N]o error or defect in any ruling or order or 
in anything done or omitted by the court or 
by any of the parties, is ground for granting a 
new trial or otherwise disturbing a judgment 
or order, unless refusal to take such action 
appears to the court inconsistent with sub-
stantial justice. The court at every stage of 
the proceeding must disregard any error or 
defect in the proceeding which does not affect 
the substantial rights of the parties. 
Utah R.Civ.P. 61. 
4. In Verde, we discussed harmless error in 
depth and attempted to articulate one harmless 
error standard that harmonizes the various 
rules which state the concept in different terms. 
One of the rules we considered in Verde is rule 
61. State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 120-21 (Utah 
1989). 
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to determine whether a different outcome 
on the summary judgment motion would 
have had a reasonable probability of affect-
ing the outcome of the case. 
For purposes of the decision before us, 
the law of contribution is governed by sec-
tion 78-27-39 of the Code. Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-27-39 (1973) (repealed 1986). 
That section provides that a right of contri-
bution among tort-feasors is recognized 
only after one tort-feasor has paid to dis-
charge a liability common to two or more 
tort-feasors "or more than his prorata 
share thereof/' Id.5 Fire Insurance con-
tends that an adequate time to respond 
would have permitted it to persuade the 
trial court that Fire Insurance was entitled 
to contribution from the bank for damages 
caused by a breach of contract or an inten-
tional tort they jointly committed. 
[5] Even if we assume without deciding 
that Fire Insurance is correct, the trial 
court's error would be harmful only if Fire 
Insurance can show that the jury awarded 
damages against it for which there is a 
reasonable probability that Fire Insurance 
could have persuaded the jury that it was 
entitled to contribution from the bant. 
Here, the jury was instructed that it could 
award plaintiffs only such damages as Fire 
Insurance proximately caused.6 The jury 
was not told that it could award plaintiffs 
any damages to be paid by Fire Insurance 
for which the bank was responsible. And 
there is nothing in the record to persuade 
us that the jury violated its instruction and 
awarded any damages against Fire Insur-
ance that were caused by the bank. There 
is not a reasonable likelihood that a jury 
would have found the bank to owe Fire 
Insurance contribution. Therefore, wheth-
er a right of contribution actually existed 
between the bank and Fire Insurance is of 
no consequence, and any error committed 
5. Section 78-27-39 provides: 
(1) The right of contribution shall exist 
among joint tort-feasors, but a joint tort-fea-
sor shall not be entitled to a money judgment 
for contribution until he [or she] has, by pay-
ment, discharged the common liability or 
more than his [or her] prorata share thereof. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-39 (1973) (repealed 
1986). 
by the trial court in proceeding consider 
the inadequately noticed motion for sum-
mary judgment is harmless. 
We next address Fire Insurance's conten-
tion that the Crookstons' claim was barred 
by the clause in the insurance contract 
stating, "No suit or action on this policy for 
the recovery of any claim shall be sustaina-
ble in any court of law or equity . . . unless 
commenced within 12 months next after 
inception of the loss." This lawsuit was 
filed in February of 1983, fourteen months 
after the house collapsed in December of 
1981. We have previously said that con-
tractual limitations on the time in which to 
bring actions on insurance contracts " 'if 
reasonable, are valid, binding and enforce-
able/ " although looked upon with some 
disfavor. Hoeppner v. Utah Farm Bu-
reau Ins. Co., 595 P.2d 863, 865 (Utah 
1979) (quoting Anderson v. State Farm 
Fire & Casualty Co., 583 P.2d 101, 103 
(Utah 1978)); see also Hibdon v. Truck 
Ins. Exch., 657 P.2d 1358, 1359 (Utah 1983); 
Anderson v. Beneficial Fire & Casualty 
Co., 21 Utah 2d 173, 175, 442 P.2d 933, 934 
(1968). However, we have not addressed 
the question of whether such standard 
form clauses operate to limit the time in 
which one may bring an action grounded in 
tort as opposed to breach of contract. 
There is a split of authority on the ques-
tion of whether a limitation provision such 
as that contained in the contract of insur-
ance at issue here applies to bar an insured 
from suing for an insurer's tortious con-
duct Those courts holding the provision 
effective to bar such a suit reason that the 
tortious conduct of the insurer arises out of 
its obligations under the provisions of the 
policy and, therefore, it would be ineq-
uitable not to give effect to the limitation 
clause. See, e.g., Barrow Dev. Co. v. Ful-
6. Instruction No. 37 states in full: 
You are not to award damages for any 
injury or condition from which the plaintiffs 
may have suffered, or may now be suffering, 
unless it has been established by a preponder-
ance of the evidence in the case that such 
injury or condition was proximately caused 
by the conduct of defendant FIRE INSUR-
ANCE EXCHANGE. 
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ton Ins. Co., 418 F.2d 316, 319 (9th Cir. 
1969); Zieba v. Middlesex Mut. Assurance 
Co., 549 F.Supp. 1318, 1323 (D.Conn.1982); 
Modern Carpet Indus., Inc. v. Factory 
Ins. Ass'n, 125 Ga.App. 150, 152, 186 
S.E.2d 586, 587 (1971). 
Those courts holding standard form limi-
tations of the kind found in the Fire Insur-
ance policy not applicable to tortious con-
duct reason that tort causes of action are 
not actions on the insurance contract but 
separate actions arising from the breach of 
a positive legal duty imposed by law. See, 
e.g., Davis v. State Farm Fire & Casualty 
Co., 545 F.Supp. 370, 372 (D.Nev.1982); 
Asher v. Reliance Ins. Co., 308 F.Supp. 
847, 852-53 (N.D.Cal.1970); Murphy v. All-
state Ins. Co., 83 Cal.App.3d 38, 147 Cal. 
Rptr. 565, 571 (1978); Wabash Valley Pro-
tective Union v. James, 8 Ind.App. 449, 35 
N.E. 919, 920 (1893); Hoskins v. Aetna 
Life Ins. Co., 6 Ohio St.3d 272, 279, 452 
N.E.2d 1315, 1320 (1983); Plant v. Illinois 
Employers Ins., 20 Ohio App.3d 236, 237-
38, 485 N.E.2d 773, 775 (1984); Lewis v. 
Farmers Ins. Co., 681 P.2d 67, 69 (Okla. 
1983); Warmka v. Hartland Cicero Mut. 
Ins. Co., 136 Wis.2d 31, 35, 400 N.W.2d 
923, 925 (1987). 
[6] In the context of a contract of insur-
ance, we prefer this latter line of cases. 
By reading the "no suit or action on this 
policy*' language as not covering tort, we 
are simply following the usual rule by 
which we narrowly construe a standard 
form contractual limitation provision that is 
not bargained for and is drafted by the 
insurance company for its own benefit, es-
7. See section 78-12-23 of the Utah Code, which 
confers a six-year limitation on actions pertain-
ing to written instruments. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-12-23 (1987). We note that section 31A-
21-313, which was enacted in 1986, specifies a 
three-year limit within which to bring any "ac-
tion on a written policy or contract of insur-
ance." Utah Code Ann. § 31A-21-313 (1991). 
The section also provides that "no insurance 
policy may . . . limit the time for beginning an 
action on the policy to a time less than autho-
rized by statute." Utah Code Ann. § 31A-21-
313(3)(a) (1991). Although section 31A-21-313 
does not apply to these facts, it does govern 
actions arising after the section's enactment. 
pecially where that provision takes from 
the other party rights conferred by exist-
ing statutes.7 See, e.g., LDS Hosp. v. Cap-
itol Life Ins. Co., 765 P.2d 857, 859 (Utah 
1988); Browning v. Equitable Life Assur-
ance Co., 94 Utah 570, 575, 80 P.2d 348, 
351 (1938); Valley Bank & Trust v. U.S. 
Life Title Ins. Co., 776 P.2d 933, 936 (Utah 
Ct.App.1989); Draughon v. CUNA Mut. 
Ins. Soc, 771 P.2d 1105, 1108-09 (Utah 
Ct.App.1989) (limitation must use clear lan-
guage). 
[7,8] Because we conclude that the 
Crookstons' tort causes of action are not 
barred by the insurance contract's limita-
tions provision, and because we have sus-
tained the trial court's decision to uphold 
the jury's finding of the tort of fraud and 
all damages awarded by the jury can be 
sustained upon the finding of fraud, we 
need not address the question of which of 
the other causes of action asserted by the 
Crookstons may be barred by the contrac-
tual limitation.8 
We next consider Fire Insurance's chal-
lenge to the jury's finding that Fire Insur-
ance committed fraud. Fire Insurance con-
tends that the jury instruction describing 
the fraud cause of action was erroneous. 
It also argues that even if the jury was 
properly instructed, there was insufficient 
evidence to support the finding of fraud. 
We first address Fire Insurance's claim 
that instruction 28 omitted or misstated 
three of the nine elements of fraud re-
quired in Utah. See generally Pace v. 
Parrish, 122 Utah 141, 144-45, 247 P.2d 
273, 274-75 (1952). Fire Insurance con-
8. We note that the covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing is an implied contractual provision, 
and a cause of action for its breach sounds in 
contract. Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 701 P.2d 
795, 798 (Utah 1985). However, we have never 
addressed the question of whether the time for 
bringing an action for such a breach runs from 
the date of the harm caused by the breach of the 
covenant or from the date of the event trigger-
ing the insured's alleged liability on the policy. 
If it runs from the former date, then the con-
tractual limitation would not have barred the 
Crookstons' suit on that claim because the suit 
was filed less than twelve months after the chal-
lenged settlement with the bank. f } Q I 7 
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to instruction 28, as is required by Utah 
Rule of Civil Procedure 51. That rule 
states in pertinent part, "No party may 
assign as error the giving or the failure to 
give an instruction unless he [or she] ob-
jects thereto." Utah R.Civ.P. 51. Fire In-
surance would have us consider the propri-
ety of the instruction anyway, relying on 
another part of rule 51, which states that 
"notwithstanding the foregoing require-
ment, the appellate court, in its discretion 
and in the interests of justice, may review 
the giving of or failure to give an instruc-
tion." Id. 
[9-11] We hold that discretionary re-
view is not appropriate in this case. The 
last clause of rule 51 does permit us to 
review instructional errors in the interests 
of justice. "However, 'it is incumbent 
upon the aggrieved party to present a per-
suasive reason' for exercising that discre-
tion . . . and this requires 'showing special 
circumstances warranting such a review/ " 
Hansen v. Stewart, 761 P.2d 14, 17 (Utah 
1988) (citations omitted). In State v. El-
dredge, 773 P.2d 29, 35^36 (Utah 1989), we 
described the content of the analogous 
"manifest injustice" exception to Utah Rule 
of Criminal Procedure 19(c)'s requirement 
that any instructional errors raised on ap-
peal be first called to the trial court's atten-
tion by proper objection. We held that the 
term "manifest injustice" embodied the 
concepts of "plain error." See Eldredge, 
773 P.2d at 35-36. The last clause of rule 
51 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
embodies the same concept. See State v. 
Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 120-22 (Utah 1989). 
In the present case, Fire Insurance has not 
begun to make the showing required by 
rule 51. Here, there was simple failure of 
9. In citing Hansen v. Stewart, 761 P.2d 14 (Utah 
1988), we note one point in which the lead 
opinion may be misleading. It states that "a 
new trial may be granted whenever there is 
evidence that would have permitted entry of a 
judgment for the losing party." Id. at 17. This 
statement is an accurate statement of the stan-
dard to be applied by an appellate court review-
ing a trial court's grant of a new trial under rule 
59(a)(6). Read as a statement of the standard to 
be applied by a trial court addressing a new 
trial motion, it is inaccurate. A trial court can-
not grant a new trial if there is sufficient evi-
dence to support a verdict for either party and 
the judge merely disagrees with the judgment of 
arrow technical 
objection to an instruction. See Hansen v. 
Stewart, 761 P.2d at 17. Therefore, we 
decline to consider its challenge to the 
fraud instruction. 
[12-15] We next address Fire Insur-
ance's contention that the evidence was 
insufficient to support a finding of fraud 
and that the trial court erred in refusing to 
grant a new trial or judgment notwith-
standing the verdict ("j.n.o.v."). Before we 
consider this contention, we note the stan-
dard of review. In deciding whether to 
grant a new trial, a trial court has some 
discretion, and we reverse only for abuse 
of that discretion. In passing on a motion 
for a j.n.o.v., however, a trial court has no 
latitude and must be correct. Id.9 Appel-
late review of a trial court's denial of 
either motion based on a claim of insuffi-
ciency of the evidence, however, is gov-
erned by one standard because of the dif-
fering degrees of discretion we accord trial 
courts in ruling initially on these motions. 
Id. Under that standard, we reverse only 
if, viewing the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the prevailing party, the evi-
dence is insufficient to support the verdict. 
Hansen, 761 P.2d at 17; King v. Fereday, 
739 P.2d 618, 620-21 (Utah 1987); Price-
Orem Inv. Co. v. Rollins, Brown, & Gun-
nell, Inc., 713 P.2d 55, 57-58 (Utah 1986). 
[16,17] To demonstrate that the evi-
dence is insufficient to support the jury 
verdict, the one challenging the verdict 
must marshal the evidence in support of 
the verdict and then demonstrate that the 
evidence is insufficient when viewed in the 
light most favorable to the verdict. E.g., 
Morgan v. Quailbrook Condominium Co., 
the jury. Mere disagreement is not a sufficient 
basis on which to set aside a verdict and order a 
new trial. King v. Fereday, 739 P.2d 618, 621 
(Utah 1987); Price-Orem Inv. Co. v. Rollins, 
Brown, & Gunnell, Inc., 713 P.2d 55, 57-58 
(Utah 1986); see also C. Wright & A. Miller, 
Federal Practice & Procedure § 2803 (1973). 
Rather, a trial judge may properly grant a new 
trial under rule 59(a)(6) when he or she can 
reasonably conclude that the verdict is clearly 
against the weight of the evidence or that there 
is insufficient evidence to justify the verdict as 
more fully explained in Goddard v. Hickman, 
685 P.2d 530 (Utah 1984); see also Wellman v. 
Noble, 12 Utah 2d 350, 366 P.2d 701 (1961). 
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704 P.2d 573, 577 n. 3 (Utah 1985); Scharf 
v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 
1985). Here, Fire Insurance has made no 
attempt to marshal the evidence in support 
of the jury finding of fraud. In fact, all 
Fire Insurance has done is argue selected 
evidence favorable to its position. That 
does not begin to meet the marshalling 
burden it must carry. We do not sit to 
retry the facts. See Cambelt InVl Corp. v. 
Dalton, 745 P.2d 1239, 1242 (Utah 1987); 
Von Hake v. Thomas, 705 R2d 766, 769 
(Utah 1985). This failure alone is grounds 
to reject Fire Insurance's attack on the 
fraud finding. E.g., Hansen, 761 P.2d at 
17; Ashton v. Ashton, 733 P.2d 147, 150 
(Utah 1987); Hagan v. Hagan, 810 P.2d 
478, 483 (Utah Ct.App.1991). 
Even if we were to review the record 
evidence for support, we would reject Fire 
Insurance's attack. The Crookstons al-
leged seven theories under which fraud 
could be found, and a casual review of the 
record indicates that there is ample evi-
dence on at least one of the Crookstons' 
fraud theories to sustain the verdict. 
We have previously restated the ele-
ments of fraud as follows: 
(1) That a representation was made; 
(2) concerning a presently existing mate-
rial fact; 
(3) which was false; 
(4) which the representor either (a) knew 
to be false, or (b) made recklessly, know-
ing that he [or she] had insufficient 
knowledge upon which to base such rep-
resentation; 
(5) for the purpose of inducing the other 
party to act upon it; 
(6) that the other party, acting reason-
ably and in ignorance of its falsity; 
(7) did in fact rely upon it; 
(8) and was thereby induced to act; 
(9) to his [or her] injury and damage. 
Pace v. Parrish, 122 Utah 141, 144-45, 247 
P.2d 273, 274-75 (1952); see also Mikkel-
son v. Quail Valley Realty, 641 P.2d 124, 
126 (Utah 1982); Kohler v. Garden City, 
10. Article I, section 9 of the Utah Constitution 
provides: 
"Excessive bail shall not be required; excessive 
fines shall not be imposed; nor shall cruel and 
unusual punishments be inflicted. Persons ar-
639 P.2d 162, 166 (Utah 1981); Wright v. 
Westside Nursery, 787 P.2d 508, 512 (Utah 
Ct.App.1990). See generally 37 Am.Jur.2d 
Fraud and Deceit §§ 432-436 (1968). We 
also stated in Pace that the elements of 
fraud must be proven by ''clear and con-
vincing evidence/' Pace, 122 Utah at 143, 
247 P.2d at 274. 
[18] One of the seven theories upon 
which the Crookstons relied was that on 
June 16, 1982, Clapperton misrepresented 
to Klemm that Fire Insurance was not yet 
in a position to settle the claims and that he 
would include the Crookstons in any settle-
ment negotiation. Clapperton made these 
representations knowing that he was pre-
pared to settle with the bank that very day. 
There is ample evidence to support these 
factual claims. 
[19] As for Fire Insurance's challenge 
to the jury's finding that reliance was rea-
sonable and that the alleged misrepresenta-
tion did not damage the Crookstons, the 
record substantiates that the jury could 
have found by clear and convincing evi-
dence that the Crookstons relied on Clap-
perton's representation that the company 
was not ready to settle and were induced to 
inaction thereby, with the result that Fire 
Insurance was able to settle the matter 
with the bank without their participation 
for an unfairly low amount. The inadequa-
cy of the amount paid the bank by Fire 
Insurance set in motion the events that 
ultimately resulted in the Crookstons' 
bankruptcy and the ensuing harm. There-
fore, we find no error in the denial of both 
the j.n.o.v. and the new trial motion on this 
ground. 
[20,21] Fire Insurance's next claim is 
that the award of compensatory and puni-
tive damages violates the ban on excessive 
fines and the due process provision of the 
Utah Constitution. See Utah Const, art. I, 
§ 9; Utah Const, art. I, § 7.10 Fire Insur-
ance did not, however, raise these argu-
ments before the trial court and has there-
fore waived any right to present them on 
rested or imprisoned shall not be treated with 
unnecessary rigor." Utah Const, art. I, § 9. Ar-
ticle I, section 7 provides: "No person shall be 
deprived of life, liberty or property, without due 
process of law." Utah Const, art. f^§d7 I) t 
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Ream vlWitzen, 581 ting punitives from $100,C JO $50,000 and 
compensatories for emotional distress from 
$25,000 to $12,500).12 
appeal.11 See, e.g., 
P.2d 145, 148-49 (Utah 1978); Bullock v. 
Joe Bailey Auction Co., 580 P.2d 225, 228 
(Utah 1978); Edgar v. Wagner, 572 P.2d 
405, 407 (Utah 1977); State Road Comm'n 
v. Larkin, 27 Utah 2d 295, 300, 495 P.2d 
817, 821 (1972). 
Fire Insurance also attacks the jury's 
verdict under rule 59(a)(5) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. That rule pro-
vides that a trial court can grant a new 
trial if the damages awarded are "exces-
sive [in amount] . . . appearing to have 
been given under the influence of passion 
or prejudice." Utah R.Civ.P. 59(a)(5). Fire 
Insurance contends that both the compen-
satory and the punitive damage awards 
meet this test and that the trial court erred 
in denying its motion for a new trial or a 
remittitur. In support of its contention, 
Fire Insurance relies on a number of our 
prior decisions in which we reduced or re-
versed awards of compensatory or punitive 
damages on grounds they were "exces-
sive." See, e.g., First Security Bank of 
Utah v. J.B.J. Feedyards, Inc., 653 P.2d 
591, 598-99 (Utah 1982) (upholding total 
compensatory damages of $36,000 but cut-
11. Regarding the claimed due process viola-
tions, we note that the United States Supreme 
Court recently held that the procedures fol-
lowed under Alabama law in awarding and re-
viewing punitive damage awards were adequate 
and did not violate the federal due process pro-
vision. See Pacific Mutual Ins. Co. v. Haslip, — 
U.S. , 111 S.Ct. 1032, 113 L.Ed.2d 1 (1991); 
see also Browning-Ferns Indus, v. Kelco Dispos-
al, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 281, 109 S.Ct. 2909, 2923, 
106 L.Ed.2d 219, 242 (1989) (Brennan, J., con-
curring); Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. Cren-
shaw, 486 U.S. 71, 88, 108 S.Ct. 1645, 1655-56, 
100 L.Ed.2d 62 (1988) (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring). In Hammond v. City of Gadsden, 493 
So.2d 1374 (Ala. 1986), Alabama implemented a 
procedure requiring a post-trial hearing in cases 
involving punitive damages wherein the judge 
must state on the record the reasons for revising 
or upholding the jury's award See generally D. 
Blan & J. Hart, The Constitutionality of Punitive 
Damages, December 1990 For the Defense 12, 
20. The procedure has now largely been enact-
ed by statute See Ala.Code § 6-11-23 (Supp 
1990). The standards followed bv courts of this 
state in the past for awarding punitive damages, 
and certainly the standards we today adopt for 
review of punitive damage awards, are at least 
as stringent as, if not more stringent than, those 
followed in Alabama 
12. Other cases in which we have reduced or 
vacated and remanded damage awards include 
Fire Insurance correctly points out that 
in the present case, the amount of both 
compensatory and punitive damages 
awarded is far greater than the awards 
reduced m many prior cases and that the 
ratio of punitives to compensatories is high-
er than has been sustained in any of our 
prior cases where large dollar awards were 
made. Essentially, Fire Insurance con-
tends that the results in those cases, when 
considered together, amount to a determi-
nation of what constitutes "excessive" 
damages as a matter of law, damages that 
we have concluded must have been the 
result of passion or prejudice. Fire Insur-
ance asks that even if we sustain the find-
ing of liability for fraud, we make a reduc-
tion in the amount of both compensatory 
and punitive damages. Alternatively, it 
asks that we remand for a new trial on the 
issue of damages. 
In deciding whether Fire Insurance's 
claim has any merit, we have reviewed 
Jensen v Pioneer Dodge Center, Inc., 702 P.2d 98 
(Utah 1985) (upholding compensatories of 
$1,400 but remanding for reduction of punitives 
of $100,000 as grossly disproportionate); Bundy 
v. Century Equip. Co., 692 P.2d 754 (Utah 1984) 
(remanding for reduction a $25,000 punitive 
award as grossly disproportionate to compensa-
tory damages of $2,133 where court found a low 
degree of malice and there were no findings as 
to defendant's wealth); Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 
P.2d 1207 (Utah 1983) (compensatory damages 
of $59,600 upheld but punitive award of $25,000 
reversed for failure to establish defendant's net 
worth), Cruz v. Montoya, 660 P.2d 723 (Utah 
1983) (reducing punitives from $12,000 to 
$6,000 based on lack of findings as to defen-
dant's wealth where compensatories were 
$9,000, $7,500 of which were "soft"), Kesler v. 
Rogers, 542 P.2d 354 (Utah 1975) (reducing pu-
nitives from $10,000 to $5,000); Prince v. Peter-
son, 538 P.2d 1325 (Utah 1975) (reducing puni-
tives already below compensatory damages with 
no explanation); Nance v. Sheet Metal Workers 
Intl Assoc., 12 Utah 2d 233, 364 P 2d 1027 (1961) 
(reversing $40,000 punitives entered by trial 
court where jury had awarded none and where 
there were only nominal compensatory dam-
ages), Wilson v. Oldroyd, 1 Utah 2d 362, 267 
P.2d 759 (1954) (punitives of $25,000 reduced to 
$5,000 where compensatories were $50,000). 
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many of our prior decisions passing on 
claims that damage awards were "exces-
sive." We have also reviewed many of our 
prior cases considering claims that a trial 
court had abused its discretion in granting 
or denying a motion for a new trial. Col-
lectively, this review has left us dissatisfied 
with the state of the case law. There is 
little consistency either in our statements 
of the appropriate standard of review to be 
applied or in the standard we have actually 
applied. Sometimes, we have approached 
such cases as though we were reviewing a 
trial court's review of the verdict,13 while 
at other times, we appear to have directly 
reviewed the verdict, ignoring any interme-
diate actions by the trial court14 
Because the standard-of-review law is 
confused in this area, we must attempt to 
clarify it before considering the merits of 
Fire Insurance's claim. Today, we attempt 
to bring some order to the processes used 
in determining and reviewing damage 
awards. We will address the relative roles 
of the jury, the trial court, and the appel-
late court. We will also address the sub-
stantive standards for determining the law-
fulness of a particular award. Our discus-
sion of the subject will be divided into three 
parts. First, we will address the standard 
of review to be applied by a trial court 
considering a motion that attacks the 
amount of a jury's damage award. Second, 
we will discuss the standard of review to 
be followed by an appellate court reviewing 
a trial court's decisions on a challenge to a 
jury's damage award. Third, we will ex-
plain the substantive standards by which 
the damage award is to be judged. Finally, 
13. Cases in which we seem to defer to the trial 
court include Elkington v. Foust, 618 P.2d 37, 41 
(Utah 1980) (deferring to trial court stating that 
its action on the award lends solidarity); Holda-
way v. Hall, 29 Utah 2d 77, 80, 505 P.2d 295, 296 
(1973) ("[W]e cannot say that the trial judge 
abused his discretion in not further reducing 
the amount of punitive damages."); DeVas v. 
Noble, 13 Utah 2d 133, 140, 369 P.2d 290, 295 
(1962) (action of trial court lends verity to ver-
dict, although court speaks of reviewing jury 
directly); Wellman v. Noble, 12 Utah 2d 350, 
353-54, 366 P.2d 701, 703-04 (1961) (trial court 
upheld if reasonable); Saltas v. Affleck, 99 Utah 
we will apply these standards to the deci-
sion of the trial court here. 
The first part of our clarification effort 
requires an explanation of the standard of 
review to be applied by a trial court in 
ruling on a motion for a new trial attacking 
the amount of the jury's award. Initially, 
we note the procedural posture in which 
claims that a particular damage award is 
excessive generally come before the trial 
court because it is critical to understanding 
the relative roles of jury, trial court, and 
appellate court. After a jury returns a 
damage award in a civil case, the most 
common way for the losing party to chal-
lenge the amount of the award is to move 
for a new trial or remittitur under rule 
59(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Rule 59(a) provides in part: 
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions 
of Rule 61, a new trial may be granted to 
all or any of the parties and on all or part 
of the issues, for any of the following 
causes . . . : 
(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of 
the court, jury or adverse party, or any 
order of the court, or abuse of discretion 
by which either party was prevented 
from having a fair trial. 
(2) Misconduct of the jury 
(3) Accident or surprise, which ordi-
nary prudence could not have guarded 
against. 
(4) Newly discovered evidence 
(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, 
appearing to have been given under the 
influence of passion or prejudice. 
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to jus-
tify the verdict or other decision, or that 
it is against law. 
381, 386-87, 105 P.2d 176, 178 (1941) (trial court 
accorded great latitude). 
14. See, e.g„ Terry v. ZCM.L, 605 P.2d 314, 327-
28 (Utah 1979) (reversing remittitur and rein-
stating original award), rev'd on reh'g, 617 P.2d 
700 (1980); Prince v. Peterson, 538 P.2d at 1329 
(reducing trial court award without explana-
tion); Falkenburg v. Neff, 72 Utah 258, 270, 269 
P. 1008, 1013 (1928) (reducing punitives of 
$5,000 to $1,500 where compensatories were 
$362.50 while stating that court defers to trial 
court in assessing damages except where, as 
here, they are so disproportionate as to be ex-
cessive as a matter of law). 
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(7) Error in law. 
Utah R.Civ.P. 59(a).15 
[22,23] The general rule governing the 
grant of a new trial is that the trial court 
must find at least one of the seven grounds 
listed in rule 59 to be met.16 See Hancock 
v. Planned Dev. Corp., 791 P.2d 183, 185 
(Utah 1990); Tangaro v. Marrero, 13 Utah 
2d 290, 292 n. 2, 373 P.2d 390, 391 n. 2 
(1962); Schindler v. Schindler, 776 P.2d 
84, 89-90 (Utah Ct.App.1989). In the con-
text of a challenge to the amount of an 
award, two of those grounds are pertinent, 
subparts (5)—excessive damages—and 
(6)—insufficient evidence. If the court 
finds that a new trial is warranted on one 
of these grounds as to the amount of the 
15. It should be noted that although many of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure differ only slight-
ly, if at all, from the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, rule 59 is different. The Utah rule 
lists seven exclusive grounds on which a new 
trial may be granted. In contrast, the federal 
rule simply states that a new trial may be grant-
ed "for any of the reasons for which new trials 
have heretofore been granted in actions at law 
in the courts of the United States." Fed.R.Civ.P. 
59(a)(1); cf. Utah R.Civ.P. 59(a). 
In Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Yeatts, 122 
F.2d 350 (4th Cir.1941), the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit provided an 
articulate history of rule 59, tracing it back to 
the 17th century. Quoting from the Pennsylva-
nia Supreme Court, it stated: 
[Ability to grant new trials] is a power to 
examine the whole case on the law and the 
evidence, with a view to securing a result, not 
merely legal, but also not manifestly against 
justice,—a power exercised in pursuance of 
sound judicial discretion, without which the 
jury system would be a capricious and intol-
erable tyranny [I]t was a power the 
courts ought to exercise unflinchingly. 
Id. at 353 (quoting Smith v. Times Publishing 
Co., 178 Pa. 481, 36 A. 296, 298 (1897)). The 
court continued: 
[The jurors] are not, and have never been, 
independent of the court of which they are a 
part, but their verdicts must meet the approv-
al, or at least they must not offend the sense 
of justice, of the presiding judge, who, as the 
late Justice Grier, of the supreme court of the 
United States, was fond of saying, was by 
virtue of his [or her] position "the thirteenth 
juror." 
Id. (citations omitted). The court noted that 
Lord Mansfield had also recognized the necessi-
ty of "a power, somewhere, to grant new trials." 
Id. (quoting Bright v. Enyon, 1 Burrows 390 
(1757)). 
Finally, the court went on to explain the 
uniqueness of the standard of review for new 
789 (Utah 1991) 
award, it may encourage e parties to 
come to some mutually agreeable solution 
rather than incur the time and expense of a 
new trial. The court often does this, in the 
context of a damage award, by proposing a 
remittitur or additur to the jury's award of 
damages. See Utah State Rd. Comm 'n v. 
Johnson, 550 P.2d 216, 217 (Utah 1976); 
Ruf v. Association for World Travel 
Exch., 10 Utah 2d 249, 249, 351 P.2d 623, 
623 (1960); Bourne v. Moore, 11 Utah 184, 
186, 292 P. 1102, 1103 (1930); Geary v. 
Cain, 69 Utah 340, 347, 255 P. 416, 420 
(1927); Eleganti v. Standard Coal Co., 50 
Utah 585, 592, 168 P. 266, 268 (1917). The 
parties may then accept the alteration and 
avoid a new trial or reject the proposal and 
begin anew.17 If the party against whom 
trial motions due to the facts that the trial court, 
in reviewing the jury, must give them some 
deference and that the appellate court must 
defer to the trial judge in further reviewing the 
decision. Unlike directing a verdict, which a 
trial judge may do "only where there is no 
substantial evidence, [a vjerdict may be set 
aside and new trial granted, when the verdict is 
contrary to the clear weight of the evidence, or 
whenever in the exercise of a sound discretion 
the trial judge thinks this action necessary to 
prevent a miscarriage of justice." Id. at 354 
(citations omitted). 
Although the Fourth Circuit's review was re-
lated to the development of the federal rule, 
Utah's rule is based on the same rationale. 
Utah has simply chosen to delineate specific 
exclusive grounds, which the federal courts 
have not done. We accept the Fourth Circuit's 
summary in Aetna Casualty as largely accurate. 
16. Those portions of Utah's rule 59 with which 
we are concerned date back at least to 1888, 
when rule 59's predecessor was part of Utah's 
Code of Civil Procedure. See 1888 Utah Laws 
ch. 8, § 3400. These provisions have remained 
largely unchanged since that time. The statute 
was apparently modeled after a similar Califor-
nia provision enacted in 1851. See 1851 Cal. 
Stat. ch. 5, § 193, at 81 (current version enacted 
in 1872). Utah's original version of the law, 
adopted in 1870, was modeled after this Califor-
nia provision. See 1870 Utah Laws ch. 7, art. 2, 
§ 193. Although the Utah provision changed 
repeatedly until 1888, the 1888 version is sub-
stantially similar to that now found in rule 59 of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. For that 
reason, our review of relevant case law includes 
reference to many Utah decisions that antedate 
the adoption of the Utah Rules of Civil Proce-
dure in 1951. 
17. Federal courts also allow for such a proce-
dure. "A remittitur gives the plaintiff a choice. 
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the motion is brought rejects the proposal, 
the court may then grant a new trial on the 
issue of damages. 
He [or she] can refuse to accept the reduced 
amount of damages and instead proceed to a 
new trial." 11 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal 
Practice and Procedure § 2815 (1973). 
Gunnell, Inc., 713 P.2d 55, 57-58 (Utah 
1986); see Saltas v. Affleck, 99 Utah 381, 
386-87, 105 P.2d 176, 178 (1940).18 
18. But cf. Hansen v. Stewart, 761 P.2d 14, 17 
(Utah 1989) (stating that trial judge may grant 
new trial whenever there is evidence to support 
different verdict). This statement in Hansen is 
clarified in footnote 9 of this opinion. 
p? in 
[24] Under our rule 59, it is well settled 
that, as a general matter, the trial court 
has broad discretion to grant or deny a 
motion for a new trial. Hancock, 791 P.2d 
at 184-85; Christenson v. Jewkes, 761 P.2d 
1375, 1377 (Utah 1988); Haslam v. Paul-
sen, 15 Utah 2d 185, 186, 389 P.2d 736, 736 
(1964); Page v. Utah Home Fire Ins. Co., 
15 Utah 2d 257, 261, 391 P.2d 290, 292-93 
(1964); Law v. Smith, 34 Utah 394, 407, 98 
P. 300, 305 (1908). The precise nature of 
that discretion and what constitutes an 
abuse, however, are not clearly stated in 
many of our individual cases, though per-
haps it may be gleaned from a collective 
reading of them. In the context of a new 
trial motion attacking the amount of a jury 
verdict under subparts (5) and (5) of rule 
59(a), it is the responsibility of the trial 
court to review the amount of the award to 
ensure that the jury has acted within its 
proper bounds. If the verdict does not 
satisfy the requirements of 59(a)(5) or (6), 
the judge must uphold the award. 
[25,26] The reason that any determina-
tion as to whether the jury exceeded its 
proper bounds is best made in the first 
instance by the trial court is that the trial 
judge is present during all aspects of the 
trial and listens to and views all witnesses. 
Therefore, he or she can best determine if 
the jury has acted with "passion or preju-
dice" and whether the award was too small 
or too large in light of the evidence. The 
trial judge is free to grant or deny a motion 
for a new trial if it is reasonable to con-
clude that the jury erred. Wellman v. 
Noble, 12 Utah 2d 350, 366 P.2d 701 (1961). 
On the other hand, the trial court cannot 
grant a new trial merely because it dis-
agrees with the jury's judgment. King v. 
Fereday, 739 P.2d 618, 621 (Utah 1987); 
Price-Orem Inv. Co. v. Rollins, Brown, & 
[27] If the trial court determines that a 
new trial is warranted and grants the mo-
tion, it should describe the basis for its 
decision in the record such that an appel-
late court can have the benefit of those 
reasons. In Saltas v. Affleck, Justice Mof-
fat, speaking for this court, described why 
such a statement of reasons is necessary: 
In order to eliminate speculation as to 
the basis of the exercise of judicial dis-
cretion in granting new trials, the record 
should show the reasons and make it 
clear the court is not invading the prov-
ince of the jury. The trial court should 
indicate wherein there was a plain dis-
regard by the jury of the instructions of 
the court or the evidence or what consti-
tuted bias or prejudice on the part of the 
jury. If no reasons need be given the 
province of the jury may be invaded at 
will. With no indication as to the basis 
for exercise of the power vested in the 
court to grant new trials the appeal tri-
bunal would be left to analyze the matter 
from the evidence, the record, and the 
instructions. It would be required to 
search out possible reasons for agreeing 
or disagreeing with the trial court in the 
exercise of a discretion. The exercise of 
judicial discretion must be based upon 
some facts notwithstanding great lati-
tude is accorded the trial court in such 
matter. 
Saltas, 99 Utah at 386-87, 105 P.2d at 178 
(citation omitted). 
[28] Thus, in passing on a motion for a 
new trial, if the trial court cannot reason-
ably find that the jury erred, it should deny 
the motion. On the other hand, if the trial 
court can reasonably conclude that there 
was insufficient evidence to justify the ver-
dict or it is manifestly against the weight 
of the evidence in violation of rule 59(a)(6) 
or that the jury acted with passion or preju-
^ e as 817 P.2c 
dice contrary to rule 59(a)(5), * nay grant 
the motion and order a new trial. 
[29-31] We next address the standard 
of review by which an appellate court re-
views a trial court decision to grant or deny 
a new trial motion challenging a verdict as 
excessive under rule 59. In reviewing the 
judge's ultimate decision to grant or deny a 
new trial, we will reverse only if there is no 
reasonable basis for the decision.19 See 
Wellman v. Noble, 12 Utah 2d at 353, 366 
P.2d at 703; see also State v. Petersen, 810 
P.2d 421, 426-427 (Utah 1991). For exam-
ple, even if the jury's award appears sup-
ported by substantial evidence on appeal, if 
the trial judge could reasonably conclude 
that the jury had acted in a manner cover-
ed by the grounds stated in rule 59(a)(5) or 
(6), an order granting a new trial will be 
upheld on appeal. Wellman, 12 Utah 2d at 
354, 366 P.2d at 704. Similarly, a trial 
court's decision to deny a new trial will be 
upheld if there is a reasonable basis to 
support that decision.20 
In light of the foregoing, some state-
ments about standards of review in prior 
cases can be read as misleading, though 
not actually incorrect. For example, in 
Bennion v. LeGrand Johnson Construc-
tion Co., 701 P.2d 1078 (Utah 1985), we 
stated that a "reviewing court will defer to 
a jury's damage award unless the award 
indicates that the jury disregarded compe-
tent evidence." Id. at 1084 (citations omit-
ted); see also Batty v. Mitchell, 575 P.2d 
1040, 1043 (Utah 1978). See generally 
Bundy v. Century Equip. Co., 692 P.2d 
754 (Utah 1984); First Security Bank of 
Utah v. J.B.J. Feedyards, Inc., 653 P.2d 
591 (Utah 1982). This statement of the 
standard, though perhaps not an inaccurate 
characterization of the test to be applied by 
19. We note that if, as a preliminary matter prior 
to the ultimate determination of the motion, the 
judge relies on legal principles which are erro-
neous or facts which are wholly without record 
support, this may also constitute grounds for 
reversal. See State v. Petersen, 810 P.2d 421, 
426 (Utah 1991); State v. Ramirez. 817 P.2d 774, 
at 781 n. 3 (Utah 1991). 
20. We note that the trial court's discretion with 
regard to denying a motion for a new trial or a 
remittitur on the issue of punitive damages is 
789 (Utah 1991) 
a trial court faced with a trial motion 
under rule 59, is inaccurate it it purports to 
state the standard of review by which an 
appellate court determines the propriety of 
a trial court's decision to grant or deny a 
new trial. The statement can be read to 
mean that this court reviews the jury's 
action directly, when in reality we review 
the trial court's action for an abuse of 
discretion.21 It is this type of loosely word-
ed standard which has, over time, effective-
ly confused the appellate court's proper 
role in assessing the merits of a rule 59 
motion attacking a jury verdict with that of 
the trial judge. E.g., Bennion, 701 P.2d at 
1083-84; Bundy, 692 P.2d at 758-59; First 
Security, 653 P.2d at 599; Batty, 575 P.2d 
at 1043. 
Having, we hope, clarified the respective 
roles of the trial and appellate courts as 
they pertain to rule 59 attacks on jury 
verdicts, we now consider the merits of 
Fire Insurance's challenge to the amount 
of compensatory and punitive damages 
awarded by the jury. Fire Insurance con-
tends that both compensatory and punitive 
damages are excessive. Because issues of 
law and policy differ as to each type of 
damages, we consider these claims sepa-
rately. 
We first address the compensatory dam-
age award. Fire Insurance relies on First 
Security Bank of Utah v. J.B.J. Feed-
yards, Inc., as support for its claim that 
the compensatory damages are excessive. 
The Crookstons' economic loss amounted to 
approximately $323,399. Fire Insurance 
argues that the remaining $492,427 award-
ed to the two Crookstons, who are no long-
er married, for emotional and mental dis-
tress and loss of financial reputation is 
excessive. Fire Insurance argues that the 
soft compensatory damages in this case are 
further limited by other conditions as explains! 
later in this opinion. See infra notes 24-31 and 
accompanying text. 
21. We note that in Bennion, no new trial motion 
was presented to the trial court and, thus, this 
court was considering the issue de novo. Stt 
Bennion v. LeGrand Constr. Co., 701 P.2d 1078. 
1083-84 (Utah 1985). We use this statement ol 
the standard in Bennion as an example simply 
because of the possibility that it may be mis-
read. 
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analogous to the damages for emotional 
distress in first Security, which were cut 
from $25,000 to $12,500 on appeal. In 
First Security, this court stated that dam-
ages for emotional distress should be 
awarded with caution. Id. at 598; see also 
Gumbs r. Pueblo InVl, Inc., 823 F.2d 768, 
773 (3d Cir.1987). 
In the present case, Judge Frederick con-
sidered the excessiveness of the compensa-
tor}- damages when Fire Insurance moved 
for a new trial or a remittitur. He conclud-
ed not only that the amount awarded was 
justified by both the law and the evidence, 
but that even a higher amount would have 
been appropriate. He made the following 
observations: 
During the course of the ten or so days 
that we tried the case, it was my obser-
vation that indeed we were dealing here 
with conduct which was pernicious, perni-
cious not merely in the sense of the 
defendant's] having taken und[ue] ad-
vantage of the insureds, the Crookstons, 
in treating their claim in a high-handed 
fashion, but pernicious further in the 
sense that clear, unequivocal misrepre-
sentations were made by agents of the 
defendant to the plaintiffs and to their 
counsel, and as if that were not suffi-
cient, pernicious in the form of conduct, 
which, whiie it may not have been geared 
to create emotional harm and suffering 
to the plaintiffs, was, at the very least, in 
reckless disregard of their rights by deal-
ing sub wsa with the bank and there-
after closing the file and advising the 
plaintiffs to file, the claim file would be 
closed. 
In making an ultimate determination of 
the propriety of the award, Judge Freder-
ick stated: 
I have reviewed my notes and I recall the 
evidence in the regard that I am refer-
22. Although Fire Insurance also contends on 
appeal that me court failed to allocate attorney 
fees bervveen the bank and Fire Insurance, that 
argument was not raised below and is therefore 
waived. Set: State v. Anderson, 789 P.2d 27, 29 
(Utah 1«0\ 
Fire Insurance also argues that the award 
here so shxks "one's conscience [as] to clearly 
indicate passion, prejudice, or corruption on the 
part of the ;un." Duffy v. Union Pacific R.R., 
ring to and I am not in the least per-
suaded that the jury in this case over-
stepped their [sic] bounds in awarding 
excessive general damages and punitive 
damages. On the contrary, this case, in 
my judgment, could well have resulted in 
greater damages than were awrarded by 
the jury. 
[32,33] While it is true, as we stated in 
First Security, that soft compensatory 
damages, i.e., for pain and suffering, must 
be awarded with caution, "[w]hen the de-
termination of the jury has been submitted 
to the scrutiny and judgment of the trial 
judge, his [or her] action thereon should be 
regarded as giving further solidarity to the 
judgment" Elkington v. Foust, 618 P.2d 
37, 41 (Utah 1980). Or, as we said in 
Geary v. Cain, 69 Utah at 358, 255 P. at 
423, "[I]n case of doubt, the deliberate ac-
tion of the trial court should prevail. Oth-
erwise this court will sooner or later find 
itself usurping the functions of both the 
jury and the trial court.,, Id. These state-
ments in Elkington and Geary are consist-
ent with our statement of the appropriate 
appellate standard of review today. 
[34] The judge's determination to deny 
a new trial on this issue was reasonable in 
light of the law and the facts. See Doelle 
v. Bradley, 784 P.2d 1176, 1178-*79 (Utah 
1989); In re Estate of Bartell, 776 P.2d 
885, 886 (Utah 1989). In addition, Judge 
Frederick articulated support for the award 
in the record. Although his statements 
could have been more specific, they were 
sufficient to justify his upholding the com-
pensatory damage award. See Saltas, 99 
Utah at 386-87,105 P.2d at 178. We there-
fore uphold the trial court's decision to 
deny a new trial on the question of compen-
satory damages.22 
118 Utah 82, 89, 218 P.2d 1080, 1083 (1950) 
(citations omitted). Therefore, Fire Insurance 
contends that regardless of the trial court's ac-
tion, this court can and should reverse or re-
duce the award as we did in First Security, 653 
P.2d at 598-99; see also Wilson v. Oldroyd, 1 
Utah 2d at 372, 267 P.2d at 764; Duffy, 118 Utah 
at 91-92, 218 P.2d at 1085. We stated in Bundy 
v. Century Equip. Co., 692 P.2d at 760, "It is well 
settled that when an award of punitive damages 
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[35] We next consider th. claim that 1186 (Utah 1983) (citatio. 
utan fcUi 
the punitive damage award was excessive, 
warranting a new trial. The jury awarded 
$4,000,000 in punitive damages, which Fire 
Insurance claims is excessive under rule 
59(a)(5) for the same reasons it argued that 
the compensatory damage award is exces-
sive. Any motion for a new trial on the 
question of punitive damages requires that 
the trial court engage in a two-part in-
quiry: 23 (i) whether punitives are appropri-
ate at all, i.e., whether the evidence is 
sufficient to support a lawful jury finding 
of defendant's requisite mental state, see 
Utah R.Civ.P. 59(a)(6); Elkington v. Foust, 
618 P.2d at 41; Kesler v. Rogers, 542 P.2d 
354, 359-60 (Utah 1975); Prince v. Peter-
son, 538 P.2d 1325, 1329 (Utah 1975), and 
(ii) whether the amount of punitives is ex-
cessive or inadequate, appearing to have 
been given under the influence of passion 
or prejudice. See Utah R.Civ.P. 59(a)(5). 
[36] With regard to the first inquiry 
required of the trial judge, under our case 
law, punitives are allowed only where there 
is " 'wilful and malicious' conduct, . . . or 
. . . conduct which manifests a knowing 
and reckless indifference toward, and dis-
regard of, the rights of others." Behrens 
v. Raleigh Hills Hosp., Inc., 675 P.2d 1179, 
is determined to be excessive or otherwise inap-
propriate, this court may order a new trial on 
the issue of damages or, in the alternative, re-
mission of a portion of the punitive damages by 
the plaintiff." Id. While it is true that this 
court has the power to grant a new trial in an 
appropriate case, we will do so only according 
to the standard v^  e adopt today, i.e., we will not 
substitute our judgment for that of the trial 
judge in making a decision on a motion for a 
new trial. Such a decision will be upheld if 
there is a reasonable basis for it based on the 
law and the facts. This court's statement in 
Duffy applies equally here: 
The verdict here was admittedly liberal. But 
the mere fact that it was more than another 
jury, or more than this court, might have 
given, or even more than the evidence justi-
fied, does not conclusively show that it was 
the result of passion, prejudice, or corruption 
on the part of the jury. 
Duffy, 118 Utah at 89, 218 P.2d at 1083 (citations 
omitted). 
23. The legal elements that must be met to sus-
tain an award of punitive damages are now 
largely controlled by statute, although the stat-
ute does not apply to this case because it is 
omitted); see 
also Rugg v. Tolman, 39 Utah 295, 304, 
117 P. 54, 57 (1911). Here, although Fire 
Insurance's motion for a new trial on dam-
ages did not expressly raise 59(a)(6) 
grounds, the trial court, in passing on the 
new trial motion, did conclude that there 
was substantial record evidence to support 
the jury's determination that Fire Insur-
ance acted with reckless disregard of 
Crookston's rights. We also note that the 
jury properly found intentional fraud. 
Therefore, we hold that the trial court cor-
rectly concluded that Fire Insurance had 
acted with the mental state required for 
punitives. 
As to the second inquiry required— 
whether the amount of the award was ap-
propriate—Judge Frederick articulated the 
same basis for denying a new trial on the 
amount of punitives as he did for denying 
the motion on the amount of compensato-
ries. However, punitives are, by nature, 
not to compensate but to punish and deter 
future egregious conduct and are grounded 
on wholly different policies. Moreover, the 
amount of punitives awarded here exceeds 
the bounds of the general pattern set by 
our prior decisions. Therefore, we vacate 
made applicable only to claims for punitive 
damages arising on or after May 1, 1989. 1989 
Utah Laws ch. 237, § 4. Section 78-18-1 pro-
vides that before any punitive damages can be 
awarded, the finder of fact must be shown "by 
clear and convincing evidence that the acts or 
omissions of the tortfeasor are the result of 
wilful and malicious or intentionally fraudulent 
conduct, or conduct tha: manifests a knowing 
and reckless indifference :oward, and disregard 
of, the rights of others." I*:ah Code Ann. § 78-
18-l(l)(a) (Supp.l990>. Therefore, a judge 
faced with a new trial mccon must ensure that 
the evidence is sufficien: :n this point before 
upholding any award. The*? standards do not 
apply to punitives arising : -: ot the operation of 
a motor vehicle while v:l;ruarily intoxicated. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-15-: 1Kb). 
of a defendant's 
only after the jury 
: an award of puni-
Utah Code Ann. 
50 percent of any 
x $20,000 is remit-
rr payment of attor-
ode Ann. §78-18-
Under the statute, eva< 
wealth would be admiss:^> 
had properly determinec :rj 
tive damages was prober 
§ 78-18-1(2). Addition^ 
punitives awarded in excess 
ted to the state treasurer SJT: 
ney fees and costs. Ui&r C 
1(3). 
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the trial court's ruling on the new trial 
motion and remand for reconsideration. 
We will now give a detailed explanation 
for this portion of our holding. 
As we noted earlier in this opinion, a 
review of our case law on punitive damages 
has left us dissatisfied with articulated 
standards for determining the amount of 
such awards. These standards provide lit-
tle guidance for either a jury fixing the 
punitive damages, a trial court reviewing a 
challenge to the amount of such an award, 
or an appellate court reviewing a trial 
court's grant or denial of a new trial on 
grounds of an inadequate or excessive 
award. We have, however, found that the 
results of our prior cases dealing with chal-
lenges to damages, taken as a whole, pro-
vide patterns that furnish useful guidance 
as to what constitutes an excessive award. 
Based on these patterns, we now craft a 
set of guidelines that retain the advantages 
of flexibility but clearly set parameters be-
yond which awards may not go without 
some expressed justification. This frame-
work should bring some predictability to 
this area of the law and should permit 
courts to more explicitly address the con-
siderations that come into play in fixing the 
amount of punitive damage awards. 
The stated list of factors we have said 
must be considered in assessing the 
amount of punitives to be awarded include 
the following seven: (i) the relative wealth 
of the defendant; (ii) the nature of the 
alleged misconduct; (iii) the facts and cir-
cumstances surrounding such conduct; (iv) 
the effect thereof on the lives of the plain-
tiff and others; (v) the probability of fu-
ture recurrence of the misconduct; (vi) the 
relationship of the parties; and (vii) the 
amount of actual damages awarded. See 
Bundy v. Century Equip. Co., 692 P.2d 
754, 759 (Utah 1984); Von Hake v. Thom-
as, 705 P.2d 766, 771 (Utah 1985). Our 
cases have done little more than list these 
factors. No relative weights have been 
assigned them, and no standards or formu-
las have been established for properly eval-
uating them when making an award or 
when reviewing the propensity of a jury 
award. This makes such an enterprise 
highly problematic for judge and jury. The 
finder of fact has no guidance on how 
much weight to give each factor or even 
how the factors should be assessed. And 
nothing suggests to the jury or the trial 
court that there is any sort of limit or 
ceiling on an award. 
There is nothing uniquely vague about 
the punitive damage standards set out in 
our cases. Many other jurisdictions have 
quite similar lists of factors that are sup-
posed to guide the award of punitives. See 
American College of Trial Lawyers, Report 
on Punitive Damages of the Committee 
on Special Problems in the Administra-
tion of Justice 3-7 (Mar. 3, 1989) [herein-
after "Report on Punitive Damages"] 
(such vague standards are problematic na-
tionwide). And, quite predictably, the bas-
es for awards made in those jurisdictions 
are no more fathomable than ours. The 
problem that results from this lack of guid-
ance to juries and trial courts is exempli-
fied by disparate ratios of punitive to actu-
al damages that appear in separate cases 
involving similar conduct. 
It might be argued that widely disparate 
punitive damage awards by separate juries 
for the same conduct reflects only the 
weakness of the jury system, not the weak-
ness of the list-of-factors standard for mea-
suring punitives. But that explanation 
fails where it is confronted with the fact 
that appellate courts in different jurisdic-
tions applying essentially the same stan-
dard have reached wildly different conclu-
sions as to what ratio of actuals to puni-
tives is legitimate under the pure list-of-
factors approach. Compare Employers 
Mut Casualty Co. v. Tompkins, 490 So.2d 
897 (Miss. 1986) (upholding punitives of 
$400,000 and actuals of $500, a ratio of 800 
to 1) with Prince v. Peterson, 538 P.2d 
1325 (Utah 1975) (reducing punitives from 
$3,000 to $1,000 where actuals were $5,537, 
with no explanation). The Alabama Su-
preme Court has noted the weakness in the 
list of factors used in Alabama, which is 
quite similar to Utah's list: 
[F]or the same conduct, one insurance 
company and its special agent were pun-
ished by a punitive damages award of 
P9 m 
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$21,130.86 . . . and another urance 
company and its special agent were pun-
ished by a punitive damages award of 
$2,490,000.... The instruction given to 
the juries in those two cases were sub-
stantially the same. 
. . . [T]he standard by which the jury is 
to gauge the amount of punitive dam-
ages, if any, that it is to award is incom-
prehensibly vague and unintelligible 
Under such a "standard," one jury can 
award $21,130.86 and another $2,490,000 
for the same "wrong." 
Charter Hosp. of Mobile, Inc. v. Weinberg, 
558 So.2d 909, 916-17 (Ala.1990). 
Many states have recognized the prob-
lems created by giving finders of fact es-
sentially standardless discretion to award 
punitive damages and have legislatively de-
termined that trial courts may not sanction 
punitive damage awards that exceed actual 
damages by a certain ratio. See, e.g., Colo. 
Rev.Stat. § 13-21-102 (1987) (punitives can-
not exceed actual damages); Fla.StatAnn. 
§ 768.73(l)(a) (1989) (punitives cannot ex-
ceed three times actual damages); Okla. 
Stat.Ann. tit. 23, § 9 (West 1987) (punitives 
can only exceed actual damages if clear 
and convincing evidence of fraud, malice, 
oppression, or wanton or reckless disregard 
for other's rights); see also Report on 
Punitive Damages 5 n. 21. 
At least one court has fixed a rough ratio 
ceiling by judicial decision. The United 
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir-
cuit, in considering an award of punitive 
damages in an intentional business tort 
case under Texas law, stated, "A formula 
of punitive damages equal to three times 
compensatory damages is a fairly good 
standard against which to assess whether a 
jury abused its discretion." Miley v. Op-
penheimer & Co., 637 F.2d 318, 331 (5th 
Cir.1981). 
Other states have imposed strict dollar 
ceilings on punitive damage awards. See, 
e.g., Ga.Code Ann. § 51-12-5.1 (Supp.1990) 
($250,000 ceiling except in cases of product 
24. See Von Hake v. Thomas, 705 P.2d 766 (Utah 
1985); Jensen v. Pioneer Dodge Center, Inc., 702 
P.2d 98 (Utah 1985); Synergetics v. Marathon 
Ranching Co., 701 P.2d 1106 (Utah 1985); Bun-
dy v. Century Equip. Co., 692 P.2d 754 (Utah 
789 (Utah 1991) 
liability or intentional tort); *-\Code Ann. 
§ 8.01-38.1 (Supp.1990) ($35^00 ceiling). 
The courts of both Connecticut and Mi-
chigan have judicially imposed bright-line 
limits on punitive damage awards. See, 
e.g., Triangle Sheet Metal Works, Inc. v. 
Silver, 154 Conn. 116, 127, 222 A.2d 220, 
225 (1966) (limiting punitives to compensate 
for expenses of litigation); Kewin v. Mas-
sachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 409 Mich. 
401, 419-21, 295 N.W.2d 50, 55 (1980) (only 
allowing what it termed "punitives" to 
compensate for "soft" or intangible harm). 
The advantages of imposing bright-line 
ceilings on punitive awards are obvious. A 
ceiling provides unmistakable guidance to 
juries, trial courts, and appellate courts. 
However, the absolute ceiling approach is 
too mechanical and could potentially defeat 
the very purpose of punitive damages. See 
generally Phillips, A Comment on Propos-
als for Determining Amounts of Punitive 
Awards, 40 Ala.L.Rev. 1117 (1989); Mallor 
& Roberts, Punitive Damages: Toward a 
Principled Approach, 31 Hastings L.J. 639 
(1980) [hereinafter Mallor & Roberts]. For 
example, strict dollar amount, percentage 
of the defendant's wealth, and ratio ceil-
ings all would allow potential defendants to 
calculate their exposure to liability in ad-
vance, thus diminishing the deterrent ef-
fect of punitive damages. In addition, such 
absolute ceilings do not provide the flexibil-
ity needed to deal adequately with the type 
of case that involves only minimal actual 
damages, but where the conduct of the 
defendant is so flagrant as to justify a 
large punitive award. See generally Mal-
lor & Roberts at 666-67. 
Bearing in mind the weaknesses of re-
liance on a list-of-factors standard alone 
and the weaknesses created by absolute 
ceilings, whether legislatively or judicially 
created, we conclude that when considered 
together, the language and pattern of re-
sults from our prior cases provide a basis 
for finding a middle ground.24 
1984); Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207 (Utah 
1984); Cruz v. Montoya, 660 P.2d 723 (Utah 
1983); Branch v. Western Petroleum, Inc., 657 
P.2d 267 (Utah 1982); Leigh Furniture 6 Carpet 
Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293 (Utah 1982); First 
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Among the seven factors we have re-
peatedly listed that should be considered in 
determining the amount of a punitive dam-
age award is the "amount of actual dam-
ages." E.g., Bundy, 692 P.2d at 759. Al-
though we have not articulated any stan-
dard for determining the importance to be 
assigned this factor, we have said that the 
amount of a punitive damage award gener-
ally must bear a "reasonable and rational" 
relationship to the actual damages.25 Id. 
The punitive damage awards we have char-
acterized as violating this "reasonable and 
rational" relationship rule have been la-
beled "grossly disproportionate" to the ac-
tual damages awarded and have been said 
to be the result of passion or prejudice. 
These awards have been either reduced by 
this court directly or remanded to the trial 
court for further proceedings. See, e.g., 
Jensen v. Pioneer Dodge Center, Inc., 702 
P.2d 98, 101 (Utah 1985). 
Although vague in its articulation, an 
examination of the results of our cases 
shows that in its operation, this "reason-
able and rational" relationship principle has 
produced some fairly predictable results. 
Generally, we have found punitive damage 
awards below $100,000 not to be excessive 
only when the punitives do not exceed actu-
al damages by more than a ratio of approx-
imately 3 to l.26 See, e.g., Von Hake v. 
Thomas, 705 P.2d 766 (Utah 1985); Branch 
v. Western Petroleum, Inc., 657 P.2d 267 
(Utah 1982); Elkington v. Foust, 618 P.2d 
37 (Utah 1980); Powers v. Taylor, 14 Utah 
Security Bank of Utah v. J.B.J. Feedyards, Inc., 
653 P.2d 591 (Utah 1982); Clayton v. Crossroads 
Equip. Co., 655 P.2d 1125 (Utah 1982); Elking-
ton v. Foust, 618 P.2d 37 (Utah 1980); Terry v. 
Z.C.M.L, 605 P.2d 314 (Utah 1979), overruled on 
other grounds, McFarland v. Skaggs Co., 678 
P.2d 298 (Utah 1984); Kesler v. Rogers, 542 P.2d 
354 (Utah 1975); Prince v. Peterson, 538 P.2d 
1325 (Utah 1975); Holdaway v. Hall, 29 Utah 2d 
77, 505 P.2d 295 (1973); Powers v. Taylor, 14 
Utah 2d 152, 379 P.2d 380 (1963); DeVas v. 
Noble, 13 Utah 2d 133, 369 P.2d 290 (1962); 
Nance v. Sheet Metal Workers Intl Assoc, 12 
Utah 2d 233, 364 P.2d 1027 (1961); Holland v. 
Moreton, 10 Utah 2d 390, 353 P.2d 989 (1960); 
Ostertag v. La Mont, 9 Utah 2d 130, 339 P.2d 
1022 (1959); Sadleir v. Knapton, 5 Utah 2d 26, 
296 P.2d 278 (1956); Wilson v. Oldroyd, 1 Utah 
2d 362, 267 P.2d 759 (1954); Evans v. Gaisford, 
122 Utah 156, 247 P.2d 431 (1952). 
2d 152, 379 P.2d 380 (1963); DeVas v. No-
ble, 13 Utah 2d 133, 369 P.2d 290 (1962); 
Evans v. Gaisford, 122 Utah 156, 247 P.2d 
431 (1952). 
Because of the limited number of cases 
considering large awards, it is more diffi-
cult to note a particular pattern once the 
award exceeds approximately $100,000. 
However, it is safe to say that these large 
awards appear to receive more scrutiny 
than the smaller awards and that the ac-
ceptable ratio appears lower. See, e.g., 
Von Hake, 705 P.2d at 772 (Stewart, J., 
concurring and dissenting) (majority opin-
ion upholding $500,000 punitives—1 to 1 
ratio); Synergetics v. Marathon Ranching 
Co., 701 P.2d 1106, 1113 (Utah 1985) (Stew-
art, J., concurring and dissenting) (majority 
upholding $200,000 punitives—lh to 1 ra-
tio). In one such case, when the ratio 
exceeded 2 to 1, we reduced the award on 
grounds of excessiveness. See First Se-
curity Bank, 653 P.2d at 598-99 (reducing 
$100,000 punitives—3 to 1 ratio—to $50,-
000—2 to 1 ratio). 
[37,38] The general rule to be drawn 
from our past cases appears to be that 
where the punitives are well below $100,-
000, punitive damage awards beyond a 3 to 
1 ratio to actual damages have seldom been 
upheld and that where the award is in 
excess of $100,000, we have indicated some 
inclination to overturn awards having ra-
tios of less than 3 to 1. 
25. Although this is only one of the factors iden-
tified by this court to date to be considered in 
determining an appropriate amount of dam-
ages, it is one which is more concretely defina-
ble and which we today further refine to give 
better guidance. We leave for another day the 
possibility of further refining other factors we 
have previously identified, as well as the possi-
bility that additional factors may be developed 
as we consider particular situations presented to 
us in the course of reviewing trial court rulings. 
26. A few cases have upheld punitives above a 3 
to 1 ratio. See Ostertag v. La Mont, 9 Utah 2d 
130, 339 P.2d 1022 (1959) (upholding punitives 
of $860 to actual damages of $140); see also 
Falkenburg v. Neff, 72 Utah 258, 270, 269 P. 
1008, 1013 (1928) (reducing punitives to $1,500 
where actuals were $362.50). 
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In these patterns, we find th guidelines 
emerge for trial courts faced with chal-
lenges to punitive damage awards on the 
grounds of excessiveness under rule 
59(a)(5). If the ratio of punitive to actual 
damages falls within the range that this 
court has consistently upheld, then the trial 
court may assume that the award is not 
excessive. In denying a rule 59(a)(5) mo-
tion for a new trial, the trial court need not 
give any detailed explanation for its deci-
sion if the punitive damage award falls 
within this ratio range. If the award-ex-
ceeds the ratios set_hy our past pattern of 
decision, the trial courtis^iot—bound to 
reduce it. However, if such an award is 
upheld, the trial judge must make a de-
tailed and reasoned articulation of the 
grounds for concluding that the award is 
not excessive in light of the law and the 
facts. The judge's articulation should gen-
erally be couched in terms of one or more 
of the seven factors we earlier listed as 
proper considerations in determining the 
amount of punitive damages, unless some 
other factor seems compelling to the trial 
court. For example, a trial court might 
conclude that an award should stand, de-
spite a ratio that is higher than we have 
generally approved, because the defendant 
displayed an extremely high degree of mal-
ice, e.g., actual intent to harm27 or a high 
degree of likelihood of great harm based on 
the reprehensible nature of the act.28 
In addition to articulating support for the 
amount of the award in terms of the rele-
vant factors, the judge may also want to 
explain why the large ratio of punitives to 
actuals is necessary in the context of the 
particular case in order to further the pur-
poses of punitive damages "by punishing 
and deterring outrageous and malicious 
27. See, e.g., Cox v. Stolworthy, 496 P.2d 682, 690 
(Idaho 1972) (exemplary damages in deceptive 
for-profit business scheme should make the cost 
of such repetitive antisocial conduct uneconom-
ical), overruled in part, Cheney v. Pahs Verdees 
Inv. Corp., 104 Idaho 897, 665 P.2d 661, 667 
(1983). 
28. See, e.g.t Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119 
Cal.App.3d 757, 174 Cal.Rptr. 348, 388 (1981) 
(upholding punitive award of $3.5 million for 
"conscious and callous disregard of public safe-
ty in order to maximize corporate profits"); 
789 (Utah 1991) 
conduct [or conduct wh manifests a 
knowing or reckless indifference toward, 
and disregard of, the rights of others] 
which is not likely to be deterred by other 
means." Synergetics, 701 P.2d at 1112; 
see also Behrens v. Raleigh Hills Hosp., 
675 P.2d at 1186. In sum, the trial judge's 
articulation should explain why the award 
is not excessive despite the fact that it 
exceeds the general pattern of awards up-
held in our prior cases. The purpose of 
this requirement for an articulation of rea-
sons warranting the denial of the rule 
59(a)(5) excessiveness motion is to permit 
more effective and reasoned appellate re-
view of the decision to uphold the award 
and to enable the appellate court to more 
carefully consider the various factors that 
may warrant punitives and the weight to 
be accorded them, while giving adequate 
deference to the advantaged position of the 
trial judge to appraise the witnesses and 
the evidence. Such appellate review will 
presumably lead to more substantive analy-
sis of the punitive damage standards than 
has been heretofore possible. 
[39,40] Should the trial court decide to 
either reduce or enlarge an award of puni-
tive damages by way of remittitur or addi-
tur, it should also explain its action. See 
Saltas v. Affleck, 99 Utah 381, 386-87, 105 
P.2d 176, 178 (Utah 1940) (requiring such 
an explanation when the trial court grants 
a new trial motion). Factors that may jus-
tify a remittitur could include the fact that 
the award exceeded the proper ratio, lack 
of intent or a low degree of malice, the 
benign nature of the act, the fact that a 
substantial portion of the actual damages 
is "soft," thus making the ratio analysis 
suspect,29 or a substantial risk of bankrupt-
Ford Motor Co. v. Havlick, 351 So.2d 1050, 1050 
(Fla.Ct.App.1977) (upholding award of $1,740,-
000 against Ford). 
29. Our past cases, taken together, also establish 
a distinction between "hard" and "soft" actual 
damages when used as a basis in determining 
the appropriate amount of punitive damages. 
Where actual damages are largely "soft," this 
court has been reluctant to uphold punitive 
damage awards of a ratio that might survive 
scrutiny if the actual damages involved were 
"hard." Compare Von Hake v. Thomas, 705 
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ing the defendant. The articulation of 
grounds for a remittitur or an additur 
should serve the same salutary purpose on 
appeal as where a motion for a new trial is 
denied. 
[41] Returning to the present case, and 
applying the standards we articulate today, 
we conclude that we must vacate the denial 
of the motion for a new trial and remand 
the matter for reconsideration by the trial 
court in light of the foregoing discussion. 
At this time, we express no opinion as to 
whether a remittitur should be granted on 
remand. However, if one is again denied, 
the trial judge must explain the reasons for 
denial under the standards set forth above, 
given the large proportion of the compensa-
tory damages arguably attributable to emo-
tional distress or loss of financial reputa-
tion and the fact that the ratio of punitives 
to ccmpensatories here appears to be much 
higher than in any case where we have 
upheld a punitive damage award. 
[42,43] Finally, a review of our cases 
leads us to observe that a motion for a new 
trial challenging the amount of a punitive 
damage award is most appropriately 
brought under rule 59(a)(5), while a motion 
challenging an award of hard actual dam-
ages is more appropriately brought under 
rule 59(a)(6). We note this because in re-
viewing damage awards in the past, this 
court has at times seemed to merge a rule 
59(a)(5) and (6) analysis. See generally 
Bennion v. LeGrand Johnson Constr. Co., 
701 P.2d 1078 (Utah 1985); Wellman v. 
Noble, 12 Utah 2d 350, 366 P.2d 701 (1961); 
Weber Basin Water Conservancy Dist v. 
Skeen, 8 Utah 2d 79, 328 P.2d 730 (1958). 
A challenge to the amount of an award 
of hard compensatory damages, which by 
definition are to compensate the plaintiff 
P.2d 766 (Utah 1985) and Jensen v. Pioneer 
Dodge Center, Inc., 702 P.2d 98 (Utah 1985) and 
Synergetics v. Marathon Ranching Co., Ltd., 701 
P.2d 1106 (Utah 1985) and Bundy v. Century 
Equip. Co., 692 P.2d 754 (Utah 1984) and Leigh 
Furniture & Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293 
(Utah 1982) and Clayton v. Crossroads Equip. 
Co., 655 P.2d 1125 (Utah 1982) (all involving 
"hard" damages) with Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 
P.2d 1207 (Utah 1983) and Cruz v. Montoya, 660 
P.2d 723 (Utah 1983) and Branch v. Western 
Petroleum, Inc., 657 P.2d 267 (Utah 1982) and 
for some concrete loss, is most appropriate-
ly scrutinized within a 59(a)(6) framework 
because subsection (6) claims "[insufficien-
cy of the evidence to justify the verdict or 
other decision, or that it is against the law" 
as ground upon which a new trial may be 
granted. Utah R.Civ.P. 59(a)(6). General-
ly, hard compensatory damages will be ei-
ther supported by the evidence or not. 
While it may be appropriate generally to 
consider hard compensatory damages un-
der subsection (6), the case may be differ-
ent with soft compensatory damages, 
which constitute a majority of the compen-
satory damages awarded in this case. At 
times, those may more properly be ad-
dressed under the "passion or prejudice" 
framework of rule 59(a)(5). 
[44] We note one final problem that 
could result from the standard we artic-
ulate today, which gives considerable defer-
ence to the trial court in passing on mo-
tions for new trials based on a claim of 
damage excessiveness. We do not wish to 
encourage parties who may try to bypass 
the trial court by appealing an excessive 
damage award directly without moving for 
a new trial and thus benefit from a less 
deferential standard on appeal. To avoid 
such an anomalous result, and because of 
the highly subjective nature of appraisal 
required in assessing the excessiveness of 
an award, we hold that any challenge to an 
award based on its excessiveness that is 
brought before an appellate court will be 
considered under the same standard articu-
lated today for reviewing trial court deci-
sions on motions for a new trial. If no new 
trial motion was filed below, we will as-
sume that the trial court considered such a 
motion sua sponte under rule 59(d)30 and 
denied the motion. 
First Security Bank of Utah v. J.B.J. Feedyards, 
Inc., 653 P.2d 591 (Utah 1982) (all involving 
largely "soft" damages). 
30. Rule 59(d) provides that "the court of its own 
violation may order a new trial for any reason 
for which it might have granted a new trial on 
motion of a party." Utah R.Civ.P. 59(d). If no 
motion was filed below and the trial court did 
not grant a motion sua sponte, the effect is the 
same as if the trial court had considered and 
denied the motion. Thus, it is reasC t^fBe fi m 
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[45] The course we take : ,y should 
produce sounder decision making by trial 
and appellate courts. First, we plainly fix 
the primary responsibility of reviewing the 
amount of punitive damage awards on the 
court best equipped to perform such a re-
view—the trial court.31 We make it plain 
that the appellate court's role is to review 
the trial court's new trial ruling rather 
than the jury's verdict directly. Second, 
we give some context to the term "exces-
sive" in rule 59(a)(5) through the imposition 
of an operatively presumptive ceiling, al-
beit a soft one. Finally, through the re-
quirement of an articulation of reasons for 
sustaining or modifying damage awards, 
we establish a mechanism for the further 
development of the law. The express con-
sideration of the norms by which awards 
are determined will promote careful review 
by both trial and appellate courts of the 
policies underlying punitive damages and 
the facts pertinent to a vindication of those 
policies on a case-by-case basis. See Re-
port on Punitive Damages 13-15 (advocat-
ing a flexible formula based on the amount 
of compensatory damages to determine the 
appropriate amount of punitive damages). 
A sounder law of punitive damages should 
result. 
The trial court's order denying the mo-
tion for a new trial on grounds that the 
punitive damage award was excessive is 
vacated, and the motion is remanded to the 
to apply the same standard of review for puni-
tive damage awards whether they are on appeal 
from a trial court's refusal to grant a new trial 
or on direct appeal. We note, however, that we 
so hold with regard to punitives only because of 
the highly subjective nature of punitive damage 
awards. By so interpreting rule 59(d) with re-
gard to punitive damage awards, we do not 
intend to imply that a similar interpretation of 
the rule will be given as it relates to other types 
of damages or to other grounds upon which 
new trials may be granted. 
31. Some may argue that allowing the trial court 
to consider in the first instance the propriety of 
the jury's award of punitives and to reduce or 
increase the award if it deems appropriate vio-
lates the plaintiffs right to trial by jury. We 
certainly are not advocating that the trial court 
substitute wholesale its own judgment for that 
of the jury. See, e.g., Hancock v. Planned Devel-
opment Corp., 791 P.2d 183, 185 (Utah 1990) 
(trial court has no discretion to grant new trial 
8l7P2d—19 
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trial court for further ecus ation in light 
of this opinion. The judgment against Fire 
Insurance is affirmed in all other respects. 
HALL, C.J., and DURHAM, J., concur. 
HOWE, Associate Chief Justice 
(Concurring with Reservations): 
I concur but write to express my reserva-
tion about some statements in the majority 
opinion as to when it is appropriate for the 
trial court to grant a new trial on the 
ground contained in Rule 59(a)(6), which is 
"[insufficiency of the evidence to justify 
the verdict or other decision, or that it is 
against law." I prefer not to express any 
opinion as to the law governing the grant-
ing of a new trial when the motion to grant 
is premised on that ground. This is be-
cause Fire Insurance, in its motion for a 
new trial, in its argument to the trial court 
at the hearing on its motion, and in its brief 
and argument to this court, has relied only 
on Rule 59(a)(5), which allows a new trial to 
be granted when there has been "[exces-
sive or inadequate damages, appearing to 
have been given under the influence of 
passion or prejudice." 
The majority opinion correctly states and 
applies the law governing this ground. We 
need not go further and attempt to restate 
the law governing other grounds for a new 
trial and examine, overrule, and criticize 
absent showing of at least one circumstance in 
rule 59). Rather, we are recognizing that the 
trial judge is in a better position to determine in 
the first instance the appropriateness of the 
award. 
Our holding today in no way results in the 
loss of a plaintiffs right to a jury trial. A trial 
judge, in proposing a remittitur or additur, only 
does so as an alternative to granting a new trial. 
This is true because a trial judge may only remit 
the damages if he or she finds them excessive or 
add to them if he or she finds them inade-
quate—which is one of the grounds for granting 
a new trial. Thus, if a plaintiff does not want to 
accept the proposed remittitur, he or she may 
elect to retry the matter. 
In addition, as we have already pointed out, a 
trial judge may not substitute judgment for the 
jury. Rather, the judge must be able to artic-
ulate a reasonable basis for the inappropriate-
ness of the verdict. Wellman v. Noble, 12 Utah 
2d 350, 366 P.2d 701 (1961); Saltas v. Affleck, 99 
Utah 381, 105 P.2d 176 (1941). 
814 Utah 817 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
our cases arising under those grounds, es-
pecially in brief footnotes. 
I also refrain from expressing any opin-
ion as to whether a motion for a new trial 
which challenges an award of "hard actual 
damages" is more appropriately brought 
under Rule 59(a)(6). In addition, I fail to 
see how an appellant could benefit by de-
clining to move for a new trial but instead 
appealing directly an excessive damage 
award. In fact, there is an obvious disad-
vantage to that strategy. Therefore, I do 
not think we need assume that the trial 
court considered and denied a motion for a 
new trial sua sponte under Rule 59(d). 
STEWART, Justice (Concurring in Part 
and Dissenting in Part): 
I agree with much of what the majority 
states about the standards to be employed 
under Rule 59(a)(5) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, but I have reservations 
about several points in the opinion concern-
ing the trial and appellate standards for 
dealing with motions for new trials, and I 
disagree with the ultimate disposition of 
the punitive damages issue. I concur in all 
other parts of the opinion. 
The sole issue raised on appeal in this 
case with respect to the award of punitive 
damages is that they were "excessive" un-
der Rule 59(a)(5) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Rule 59(a) specifies seven 
grounds for granting a new trial by a trial 
court. Subpart (5) provides that a trial 
court may order a new trial if it finds that 
the jury returned "excessive or inadequate 
damages" that appear "to have been given 
under the influence of passion or preju-
dice." The majority uses that contention 
of error as a springboard to launch into a 
sweeping, and in some instances confusing, 
discussion of the operation of Rule 59(a). 
In parts of the discussion, it appears that 
the majority is defining standards for all of 
Rule 59(a), but in other parts the majority 
seems to address issues that arise only 
under subparts (5) and (6), although the 
latter subpart is not before the Court and 
has not been argued by the parties. 
I think it appropriate to note that al-
though a verdict may be supported by 
some evidence, the trial court may set that 
verdict aside under subpart (6) if the ver-
dict is against the manifest weight of the 
evidence so "that the trial judge 'cannot in 
good conscience permit it to stand/ " God-
dard v. Hickman, 685 P.2d 530, 532 (Utah 
1984) (quoting Holmes v. Nelson, 7 Utah 
2d 435, 441, 326 P.2d 722, 726 (1958) 
(Crockett, J., concurring)). See also 
Brown v. Johnson, 24 Utah 2d 388, 391, 
472 P.2d 942, 944 (1970); Hyland v. St. 
Mark's Hosp.y 19 Utah 2d 134, 137, 427 
P.2d 736, 738 (1967); Efco Distrib., Inc. v. 
Perrin, 17 Utah 2d 375, 380, 412 P.2d 615, 
617-18 (1966); King v. Union Pacific R.R., 
117 Utah 40, 45-49, 212 P.2d 692, 695-96 
(1949); 6A J. Moore & J. Lucas, Moore's 
Federal Practice H 59.08[5] (1991). In 
Goddard v. Hickman, 685 P.2d 530 (Utah 
1984), and Nelson v. Trujillo, 657 P.2d 730 
(Utah 1982), we held that the standard of 
review on appeal of an order granting a 
new trial under Rule 59(a)(6) is that the 
order will be sustained "if the record con-
tains 'substantial competent evidence which 
would support a verdict for the [moving 
party]/ " 657 P.2d at 732 (quoting King v. 
Union Pacific R.R, 117 Utah at 53, 212 
P.2d at 698). 
In dealing with the standard of review 
that an appellate court should utilize in 
reviewing a trial court's grant of a motion 
for a new trial, the majority states that 
Bennion v. LeGrand Johnson Construc-
tion Co., 701 P.2d 1078 (Utah 1985), is a 
case that has contributed to confusion with 
respect to the proper standard because that 
case stated that a "reviewing court will 
defer to a jury's damage award unless the 
award indicates that the jury disregarded 
competent evidence...." 701 P.2d at 1084. 
The majority then asserts that if that state-
ment purports to state the standard of 
review by which an appellate court deter-
mines the propriety of a trial court's deci-
sion to grant or deny a new trial, it is 
incorrect. The majority further states: 
The statement can be read to mean that 
this court reviews the jury's action di-
rectly, when in reality we review the trial 
court's action for an abuse of discretion. 
It is this type of loosely worded standard 
ff/3f 
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which has, over time, e tively con-
fused the appellate court's proper role in 
assessing the merits of a rule 59 motion 
attacking a jury verdict with that of the 
trial judge. 
Maj. op. at 805 (citation omitted). 
The confusion that the majority finds is 
based on its misreading of Bennion. 
There was no issue of the propriety of the 
grant or denial of a new trial motion in 
Bennion.* This Court was simply asked to 
review directly the validity of the award of 
damages. Although Rule 59(a) was argued 
by the appellant in Bennion as if it estab-
lished standards for reversing a verdict on 
appeal, there was no motion for a new trial 
made in the trial court, and the issue be-
fore this Court was the standard for re-
viewing a damage award directly on ap-
peal. In short, the majority's loose analy-
sis is used to argue that it is necessary to 
restate our case law because it is inaccu-
rate. I disagree. 
Indeed, the majority contrives a strange, 
hypothetical procedure to justify an inap-
propriate standard of appellate review of 
punitive damage awards not reviewed by 
the trial court on a motion for a new trial. 
The majority states that in cases in which a 
motion for a new trial is not made and an 
appeal is taken directly from the award of 
punitive damages, an appellate court will 
assume that the trial court sua sponte 
considered and denied a hypothetical mo-
tion. This hypothetical motion and ruling 
is then made the basis for applying the 
same standard of review in direct appellate 
review of an award of punitive damages as 
is applied when a motion for a new trial is 
actually made and denied by the trial court 
and that ruling is then appealed. Such an 
approach is unnecessary and if literally ap-
plied would lead to serious difficulties. Af-
ter assuming the hypothetical motion and a 
ruling by the trial court denying it, an 
appellate court must then, according to the 
majority, determine if the trial court would 
have abused its discretion in denying the 
hypothetical motion. 
1. Although the majority notes this distinction in 
footnote 21, it does not explain how Bennion 
could be misread as to the proper standard of 
Clearly, the proper a )ach is for an 
appellate court to review tne award of pu-
nitive damages straight-out in light of the 
various factors set out in the majority opin-
ion for determining the reasonableness of 
punitive damages. Compare Bennion, 701 
P.2d at 1084, which states that to justify a 
new trial for excessive damages under 
Rule 59(a)(5), the damage award must be 
"clearly excessive on any rational view of 
the evidence." Although that statement 
was not made in the context of a punitive 
damage award, it is an appropriate stan-
dard to be applied in light of the six rele-
vant factors referred to by the majority to 
be considered in determining the validity of 
a punitive damage award. Applying usual 
appellate standards to the review of a puni-
tive damage award is altogether sound. 
There is no reason to devise a fictional 
procedure to justify an unnecessary and 
inappropriate result. Given the difficulties, 
it is important to recognize that the majori-
ty's view is strictly dictum. There was in 
fact a motion for a new trial in this case. 
The majority remands this case to the 
trial court for the trial judge to state his 
reasons for sustaining the award of puni-
tive damages. In explaining the factors 
the trial judge may examine, the majority 
opinion, in my view, unduly emphasizes the 
relationship of the punitive damages to 
compensatory damages. That relationship 
is certainly not determinative, but is only 
one of many factors to be considered. In 
the context of this case, it is significant 
that our prior cases have not dealt with 
punitive damages awarded against a multi-
million dollar corporation. Of greater sig-
nificance than the relationship of the puni-
tive and compensatory damage awards are 
the other factors which have been enumer-
ated in our cases, such as the financial 
resources of the defendant and the likeli-
hood that a defendant will continue its ma-
licious conduct. 
The defendant in this case argues that its 
net income for the year of its misconduct 
was $23,000,000 and that a $4,000,000 puni-
review when considering the denial or grant of 
a motion for a new trial when no such issue was 
before the Court. 
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By excluding misdemeanor convictions 
which carry a maximum possible imprison-
ment of six-months, from the reach of the 
federally protected right, the Court has im-
plicitly qualified the scope of its later cases 
concerning jury size.13 
Since the present conviction falls within 
this category, i. e., a misdemeanor offense 
with maximum possible imprisonment of 
six-months, the defendants have no federal-
ly protected right to a jury trial and, there-
fore, can claim no right to a six-member 
panel.14 Because the defendants were 
granted the full panoply of rights secured 
by state law including "a speedy trial by an 
impartial jury," 15 their convictions must be 
upheld.16 
WILKINS, HALL and STEWART, JJ., 
concur. 
CROCKETT, Chief Justice (concurring in 
result): 
I agree with the affirmance of the con-
victions because the defendants have had 
13. See Ballew v. Georgia, supra note 2, 435 
U.S. at 229f 98 S.Ct. at 1033. ["The right (to a jury trial) attaches in the present case because 
the maximum penalty for violating Sec. 26-
2101, as it existed at the time of the alleged 
offenses, exceeded six-months imprisonment"]; 
see also Burch v. Louisiana, supra note 2, 441 
U.S. at 136, 137, 99 S.Ct. at 1627. ["While 
readily admitting that the line between six 
members and five was not altogether easy to 
justify at least five Members of the Court be-
lieved (in Baldwin) that reducing the jury to 
five persons in nonpetty cases raised sufficient-
ly substantial doubts as to the fairness of the 
proceeding and proper functioning of the jury 
to warrant drawing the line at six.'* (Emphasis 
added)]. 
14. Cf. District of Columbia v. Colts, 282 U.S. 
63, 51 S.Ct. 52, 75 L.Ed. 177 (1930). In Colts 
the Supreme Court concluded a driving infrac-
tion to be of such a nature as to require a jury 
trial. However, in Colts the offense charged 
was not the "slight offense of exceeding the 
twenty-two mile limit of speed, subdivision (a), 
or merely [with] driving recklessly, subdivision 
(b)(1); but [with] the grave offense of having 
driven at the forbidden rate of speed and reck-
lessly, 'so as to endanger property and individ-
uals' " at 72, 51 S.Ct. at 53. The Court distin-
guished this offense from that considered in 
State v. Rodgers, 91 N.J.L. 212 (1917). In en-
dorsing the delineation between petty and seri-
ous traffic violations discussed in Rodgers, the 
Court concluded the reckless driving then un-
their entitlement, assured by Article I, Sec-
tion 12 of our Utah Constitution, of a trial 
by jury under the same prescription for a 
jury as has existed in Article I, Section 10 
since statehood. 
( o I KEY NUMBER SYSTEM^ 
GUARANTY NATIONAL INSURANCE 
COMPANY, Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
Barbara J. MORRIS, Defendant 
and Appellant. 
No. 16207. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
May 12, 1980. 
Insurer brought action against its in-
sured seeking reimbursement for personal 
der consideration to fall within the category 
related historically to public nuisance and not 
public disorders. The present offense, i. e., 
driving under the influence of alcohol, was con-
sidered by the Rodgers Court as falling within 
the latter category and thus distinguishable 
from the infraction involved in Colts; see 
Hamilton v. Walker, 65 N.M. 470, 340 P.2d 407, 
409 (1959); see also District of Columbia v. 
Clawans, supra note 5, 300 U.S. at 625, 57 S.Ct. 
at 662; see also State v. Roth, 154 N.J.Super. 
363, 381 A.2d 406 (1977); State v. Amick, 173 
Neb. 770, 114 N.W.2d 893 (1962). 
15. Article I, Section 12, Utah Constitution, pro-
vides: "In criminal prosecutions the accused 
shall have the right to appear and defend in 
person and by counsel, to demand the nature 
and cause of the accusation against him, to 
have a copy thereof, to testify in his own be-
half, to be confronted by the witnesses against 
him, to have compulsory process to compel the 
attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to 
have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury 
of the county or district in which the offense is 
alleged to have been committed, and the right 
to appeal on all cases. . . . " 
16. We express no opinion concerning second 
offenses of driving under the influence of alco-
hol or the reckless or negligent operation of a 
vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. 
See 41-6-44(d) and (e). 
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injury protection payments paid to her un-
der Utah Automobile No-Fault Insurance 
Act. The Third District Court, Salt Lake 
County, G. Hal Taylor, J., granted insurer's 
motion for summary judgment, and appeal 
was taken. The Supreme Court, Crockett, 
C. J., held that PIP insurer would be liable 
for reasonable amount of attorney fees in-
curred by insured in obtaining settlement 
against third-party tort-feasor to extent 
that insurer benefited from such settlement 
and from insured's willing reimbursement 
of PIP benefits. 
Vacated and remanded. 
Insurance <3=>601.25 
PIP insurer was liable for reasonable 
amount of attorney fees incurred by in-
sured in obtaining settlement against third-
party tort-feasor to extent that insurer ben-
efited from such settlement and from in-
sured's willing reimbursement of PIP bene-
fits. U.C.A.1953, 31-41-1 et seq. 
Kent M. Kasting and Gary E. Atkin of 
Gustin, Adams, Kasting & Liapis, Salt Lake 
City, for defendant and appellant. 
Timothy R. Hanson and David H. Epper-
son, of Hanson, Russon, Hanson & Dunn, 
Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and respon-
dent. 
CROCKETT, Chief Justice: 
Plaintiff Guaranty National Insurance 
Company brought this action against its 
insured, defendant Barbara J. Morris, seek-
ing reimbursement for personal injury pro-
tection (PIP) payments it paid to her under 
the "Utah Automobile No-Fault Insurance 
Act." l 
The stipulated facts are: On December 
16, 1975, Mrs. Morris was involved in an 
automobile accident with a Mr. Rick Chap-
man, whose insurer was State Farm Insur-
ance Company (hereinafter State Farm). 
Pursuant to its policy with the defendant, 
the plaintiff paid no-fault benefits of 
$2,030.21 for her medical expenses and 
$757.40 for her loss of earnings. 
1. Section 31-41-1 
On June 24, 1976, the plaintiff notified 
State Farm of its claim for reimbursement 
of the PIP benefits it had paid. On Novem-
ber 9, 1976, State Farm advised the plain-
tiff that the defendant Morris had retained 
the services of an attorney to pursue her 
claim against Chapman and that the reim-
bursement request could not be dealt with 
until the claim of their insured (Mrs. Mor-
ris) against Chapman had been resolved. A 
few months later, State Farm further ad-
vised the plaintiff that negotiations with 
the defendant were still pending. 
About two years after the accident oc-
curred, the defendant Morris arrived at a 
settlement with State Farm on the claim 
against Chapman for $14,000. The release 
recited that it was "a full and final . 
settlement of any and all claims, . 
[for] injuries and damages aris-
ing out of the aforesaid accident." State 
Farm issued two checks, one which was 
payable jointly to the defendant Morris and 
her attorney, Mr. Kent Kasting, for $11,-
212.39 for all other damages, and the other 
payable jointly to plaintiff herein, Guaranty 
National Insurance, and Mr. Kasting, for 
$2,787.61, expressly stated to be reimburse-
ment for the PIP benefits plaintiff had paid 
to Mrs. Morris. 
On January 6, 1978, Mr. Kasting advised 
the plaintiff that the defendant had settled 
her claim with State Farm. He also ex-
plained that the $14,000 settlement, which 
resulted from his efforts and from which 
plaintiff Guaranty National received its re-
imbursement of $2,787.61, was also subject 
to his one-third contingency attorney's fee. 
Wherefore, Mr. Kasting claimed $928.27 
from plaintiff. The plaintiff refused to pay 
that fee and instituted this suit for reim-
bursement for the entire PIP payment. 
The trial court granted the plaintiffs mo-
tion for summary judgment, stating that 
the plaintiff had 
no obligation to the defendant 
for attorneys' fees or costs with 
respect to the no-fault pay-
ee seq., U.C.A.1953. D Q III? 
GUAr 
ments and benefits paid 
Defendant concedes that the plaintiff is 
entitled to that part of her recovery from 
State Farm which represents the PIP bene-
fits that had been paid to her by the plain-
tiff.2 But the defendant asserts that since 
it was due to the efforts of herself and of 
her attorney that the $14,000 settlement 
was obtained, and from which plaintiff is 
able to obtain reimbursement for its PIP 
payments, the plaintiff should bear its fair 
proportion of the attorney fee thus in-
curred. The plaintiffs rejoinder is that the 
defendant's attorney is claiming a fee for 
services which the plaintiff neither request-
ed, desired nor authorized and, if it is re-
quired to pay those fees when section 31-
41-11, U.C.A.1953, provides for reimburse-
ment between insurers, insurance costs will 
increase rather than decrease, as was in-
tended by the legislature.3 
Recent decisions of this Court have con-
strued the rights of insurers and insureds 
under our No-Fault Act. In Allstate Insur-
ance Co. v. /vie,4 this Court held that a 
no-fault insurer who has paid PIP benefits 
to its insured is not entitled, by way of 
subrogation, to reimbursement of those 
funds from a subsequent recovery by its 
insured against the third-party tortfeasor 
or his insurer. Rather, as was explained in 
that case, any reimbursement claimed by 
the PIP insurer is to be sought in an arbi-
tration proceeding between the insurance 
companies of the respective parties, as pro-
vided in section 31-41-11, U.C.A.1953. The 
gist of the decision was that the PIP pay-
ment would not be considered as part of 
any settlement between the injured party 
and the third-party tortfeasor or his insur-
er. 
Subsequently, in Street v. Farmers Insur-
ance Co.,1 the injured party settled her 
2. In that regard, this case is different from 
Allstate Insurance Co. v. /vie, Utah, 606 P.2d 
1197 (1980) 
3. Section 31-41-2 provides that* " 
The intention of the legislature is hereby to 
possibly stabilize, if not effectuate certain sav-
ings in, the rising costs of automobile accident 
insurance 
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to defendant claim against the third-party tortfeasor for 
$14,000 and from that recovery, similar to 
the instant case, plaintiff Street willingly 
agreed to the reimbursement of her own 
insurer for her PIP benefits, in that in-
stance $4,601.98. However, she claimed 
that there should be deducted therefrom a 
reasonable attorney's fee for the benefit 
resulting to her insurer by reason of the 
settlement that had been obtained. In that 
case, this Court recognized that in appropri-
ate circumstances and where it has had 
notice, a subrogated insurance carrier 
should pay its fair share of an attorney's 
fee and costs which have been incurred in 
protecting its interests.6 We noted in the 
Street case that the trial court had made no 
findings as to whether any benefit had been 
conferred upon the PIP insurer and the case 
was remanded for a determination of that 
fact. 
Consistent with our decision in the Street 
case, the trial court's refusal to require the 
plaintiff to participate in the payment of 
the defendant's attorney's fees on her tort 
claim against Chapman is vacated. This 
case is remanded for further proceedings to 
determine whether, by the defendant's ob-
taining the $14,000 settlement, any benefit 
was conferred upon the plaintiff, and if so, 
the reasonable amount of attorney's fees to 
be allowed to the defendant. Costs to de-
fendant (appellant). 
MAUGHAN, WILKINS, 
STEWART, JJ., concur. 
HALL and 
4. Supra, note 2 
5. Utah, 609 P.2d 1343 (1980). 
6. Id 
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Donald J. JAMISON, Sr., et al., Plaintiffs 
and Respondents, 
v. 
UTAH HOME FIRE INSURANCE COM-
PANY, Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 14523. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Jan. 20, 1977. 
Parents, whose 12-year-old son was in-
volved in collision with pickup truck while 
son was riding bicycle, brought action 
against truck drivers insurer to recover on 
basis of No-Fault Insurance Act. The 
Third District Court, Salt Lake County, 
Stewart M. Hanson, Jr., J., awarded parents 
disability benefits of $12 per day for foss of 
son's household services and awarded par-
ents $475 in attorney fees, and insurer ap-
pealed. The Supreme Court, Crockett, J., 
held that son's household chores were not 
chores for which his family would "reason-
ably have incurred" expenses within mean-
ing of No-Fault Insurance Act provision, 
but that award of attorney fees would not 
be disturbed. 
Reversed in part and affirmed in part. 
Maughan, J., dissented and filed opin-
ion in which Ellett, J., concurred. 
1. Statutes e=>184 
Background and purpose of a statute 
may be looked to for purpose of ascertain-
ing its meaning and proper application in 
particular circumstances. 
2. Insurance ®=* 467.61 
Provisions of No-Fault Insurance Act 
should be construed in conformity with 
principle that purpose of insurance is to 
indemnify for losses or damages suffered, 
as contrasted to gambling for a munificent 
reward if a loss occurs. U.C.A.1953, 31 -
41-1 et seq. 
3. Damages <s=»184 
Generally, an award of damages cannot 
be based on mere possibility or conjecture; 
such an award must be supported by proof 
on which reasonable minds acting fairlj 
thereon could believe that it is more proba-
ble, than not, that damage was actually 
suffered. 
4. Insurance &=> 513.4 
Twelve-year-old boy's household chores, 
which allegedly consisted of taking out the 
garbage, washing dishes, vacuuming carpet, 
helping carry in groceries and washing car 
during summer, were not chores for which 
his family would "reasonably have in-
curred" expenses within meaning of No-
Fault Insurance Act provision which in ef-
fect provides for an allowance of $12 per 
day "in lieu of reimbursement for expenses 
which would have been reasonably incurred 
for services that, but for the injury, the 
injured person would have performed for 
his household and regardless of whether 
any of these expenses are actually in-
curred." U.C.A.1953, 31^1-1 et seq., 31 -
41-6, 31-41-6(l)(b)(ii). 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
5. Insurance <§=»675 
Award of attorney fees of $475 to 
plaintiffs in action in which recovery was 
sought against an insurer on basis of No-
Fault Insurance Act would not be disturbed 
on appeal, in view of fact that exhibit, 
which showed details and time of certain 
payments made by insurer, was not includ-
ed in record on appeal and in light of fact 
that there was evidence as to reasonable-
ness of the attorney fee. U.C.A.1953, 3 1 -
41-1 et seq. 
L. L. Summerhays, of Strong & Hanni, 
Salt Lake City, for defendant-appellant. 
Gaylen S. Young, Jr., Salt Lake City, for 
plaintiffs-respondents. 
CROCKETT, Justice: 
The issue involved herein is plaintiffs* 
asserted right to recover from the defend-
ant insurance company $12 per day for loss 
of household services of their 12-year-old 
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son as coming within the meaning of Sec-
tion 31^1-6(l)(b)(ii), U.C.A.1953, which is 
quoted below. From a determination on 
that issue in favor of the plaintiffs, award-
ing disability benefits at $12 a day for 112 
days, totaling $1,344, and attorney fees to-
taling $475 and costs, the defendant ap-
peals. 
Inasmuch as the recovery sought is based 
on the No-Fault Insurance Act, the exact 
details as to how the accident occurred are 
not material to the issue involved. There is 
no dispute about the fact that while Donald 
was riding his bicycle on Highland Drive 
about 3700 South in Salt Lake County on 
November 19, 1974, he was involved in a 
collision with a pickup truck driven by Boyd 
D. Lemon, who was insured by the defend-
ant, nor that Donald suffered bruises and 
contusions, injuries to his hip and a broken 
nose. He was hospitalized for a week, then 
remained at home until after the Christmas 
holidays when he was permitted to attend 
school, but was not given an outright re-
lease by his doctor until March 11, 1975. 
This totals the 112 days during which plain-
tiff says he was not able to perform the 
household services hereinafter listed. 
The parties reached an agreement and 
the court approved a settlement as to other 
aspects of the case for Donald's injury, 
medical and hospital expenses. But, they 
were unable to agree upon, and therefore 
stipulated to reserve for determination by 
the court, the issue as to plaintiff's rights to 
any further damages as disability benefits 
under the No-Fault Insurance Act, and as 
to attorney's fees. 
The statute of concern here, Section 31 -
41-6(l)(b)(ii), states: 
in lieu of reimbursement for 
expenses which would have been reason-
ably incurred for services that, but for 
the injury, the injured person would have 
performed for his household and regard-
less of whether any of these expenses are 
actually incurred, an allowance of $12 per 
day commencing not later than three 
[OME FIRE INS. CO. Utah 959 
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days after the date of the injury and 
continuing for a maximum of 365 days 
thereafter, . . . . [Emphasis added.] 
[1] The view of this statute advocated 
by the plaintiff is that it mandates an auto-
matic award of $12 per day for injury to 
any member of a household who would have 
performed services of any nature, however 
much or minimal, and whether their value 
is great or small. As it is but natural to 
expect, the defendant takes a differing 
view and argues that the statute is not 
susceptible to any such interpretation. We 
have no hesitancy in agreeing that the in-
terpretation and application of the law 
should be a process of reason, as contrasted 
to a mere reading of tables or schedules, 
nor that when controversies arise it is both 
permissible and desirable to look to the 
background and purpose of a statute to 
ascertain its meaning and proper applica-
tion in particular circumstances. 
Since the advent of the automobile near 
the turn of this century there has been a 
constant and accelerating increase, both in 
the number of automobiles and the speed at 
which they travel, and a corresponding in-
crease in injuries and damages resulting 
from their use. This has resulted in ever 
increasing insurance coverage and insur-
ance costs, including various methods of 
compelling insurance coverage. Conse-
quent to this, due to the controversies and 
litigation over who was at fault in such 
accidents, with the attendant delays, uncer-
tainties and expenses, the concept of No-
Fault Insurance arose. In enacting it, our 
legislature determined as a matter of public 
policy that some specified primary damages 
as to necessary medical, hospital, and loss of 
wages should be paid without undue delay.1 
This objective is plainly stated in Sec. 
31-41-2: 
to effectuate a more effi-
cient, equitable method of handling the 
greater bulk of the personal injury claims 
that arise out of automobile accidents 
1. The No-Fault Insurance Act was enacted in 1973 as Chap. 55 S.L.U.1973, is now in our 
Code as Sec. 31 4 1 - 1 , et seq. 
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Another equally important and desirable 
objective of the act, to be achieved in cor-
relation with the foregoing, is coping with 
the ever increasing costs of the insurance. 
This is also clearly expressed in the lan-
guage of the same section, stating that a 
purpose of the act is to possibly stabilize, if 
not effectuate certain savings in the rising 
costs of automobile accident insurance. 
Consistent with the general purposes just 
stated, Sec. 31-41-7 provides a formula to 
arrive at what the actual losses are; and 
also provides that any benefits shall be re-
duced by other coverages, workmen's com-
pensation or military benefits, which the 
injured person receives. This idea finds 
further support in Section 31-41-8, which 
states that payment of the benefits provid-
ed for in Section 31-41-6 shall be made on 
a monthly basis as expenses are incurred; 
and that benefits are overdue if not paid 
within 35 days after the insurer receives 
"reasonable proof of the fact and amount of 
expenses incurred.'1 
To test the validity of plaintiff's conten-
tions and how they coordinate with the 
above stated objectives and provisions of 
the statutes, such problems as this should 
be considered: assume, e. g., a family where 
there are eight or ten children, each of 
whom does his assigned share of the family 
chores. The family car has a collision and 
all are injured. Does the insurer pay the 
$12 per day X 10 = $120 per day? Or, 
does the rule of reason apply? 
However much we may desire it to be 
otherwise, this fact might as well be accept-
ed as inescapable: that insurance is a busi-
ness, not a philanthropy. There can be no 
free gifts or benefactions. In the long run 
premiums must pay for losses; and there-
fore, increases in premiums must and will 
be correlated to the extent of the coverage. 
2. Farmers Insurance Co. v. U.S.F. & G. Co., 13 
Wash.App. 836, 537 P.2d 839 (1975); Oregon 
Automobile Insurance Co. v. Salzberg, 85 
Wash.2d 372, 535 P.2d 816 (1975). 
3. No bad faith is imputed in this case. 
4. Cumis, Inc. Society v. Republic Nat. Bank, 
480 S.W.2d 762 (Tex.Civ.App.1972); Anderson 
Otherwise, the business cannot continue to 
operate. Someone has to pay the increased 
premiums. That someone is the policyhold-
ers, i. e., the public. Accordingly, a seeming 
generosity in broadening coverage in an 
individual situation, would be no favor to 
policyholders generally, nor to the public. 
The principle which best serves the objec-
tive to be desired is to give both parties the 
benefit of a sensible, even-handed and prac-
tical application of the statute, under the 
assumption that all of its language was 
used advisedly and in harmony with its 
purposes.2 If the Act had intended reim-
bursement for any and all duties performed 
by members of households, it could have 
plainly so stated. But it does not do so. 
Only by keeping the awards within reason, 
and excepting therefrom claims that might 
be unrealistic, fanciful, or perhaps even 
fraudulent,3 can the stated objective, "to 
effectuate . savings in the rising 
costs of automobile accident insurance 
." be accomplished. Otherwise it is 
obvious that necessary increases in premi-
ums would defeat, rather than promote, the 
purposes of the Act. 
[2] When the provisions of the sections 
of the Act as quoted herein are considered 
together in the light of that purpose, partic-
ularly the key statement in Section 31-41-
6, wherein it speaks in terms of reimburse-
ment "for expenses which would have been 
reasonably incurred " it becomes plain that 
the Act, both in its statement of general 
purpose, and its specific provisions, was not 
intended to provide an automatic reward or 
a "windfall," for being involved in an acci-
dent by requiring payment when there was 
no loss actually suffered, nor for any ex-
pense not reasonably to be incurred,4 but 
should be construed in conformity with the 
v. Group Hospitalization, Inc., 203 A.2d 421 
(D.C.Ct.App.1964); Barmeier v. Oregon Physi-
cians Service, 194 Or. 659, 243 P.2d 1053 (Ore. 
1952); Fire Assn. of Philadelphia v. Strayhorn, 
211 S.W. 447 (Texas 1919); Whitney Estate Co. 
v. Northern Assur. Co., 155 Cal. 521, 101 P. 911 
(Cal.1909). 
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lunaamentai principle of insurance law, 
that the purpose of insurance is to indemni-
fy for losses or damages suffered, as con-
trasted to gambling for a munificent re-
ward if a loss occurs.5 
The clause of the statute, "and regardless 
of whether any of these expenses are actu-
ally incurred .," was undoubtedly 
included to eliminate the necessity of proof 
and to prevent an insurance company from 
claiming the benefit of services rendered 
gratuitously by friends or relatives,6 which 
otherwise would have to be paid for. But it 
is still speaking of "expenses which would 
have been reasonably incurred." 
It seems commendable indeed that Don-
ald assumed and discharged considerable 
responsibility in the household. Particular-
ly in view of the fact that he had two older 
sisters, one 13 and one 14, and his parents, 
all of whom were able to help. Donald's 
contributions are summarized, with the 
time for each, thus: 
Took out the garbage daily (five min-
utes); washed dishes two or three times a 
week (fifteen to twenty minutes); vacu-
umed carpet three or four times a week 
(fifteen to twenty minutes); helped mother 
carry in groceries from car each Friday (no 
time given); and washed the car in the 
summer once every week or two (no time 
given). 
In response to a question as to whether 
the sisters and others helped with those 
chores Mrs. Jamison testified: 
Q. And they shared the household duties 
around the house, did they with your son? 
A. A little. My oldest one worked, and 
my other one was mainly out tending. She 
5. U.C.A., Sec. 31-1-7 defines insurance as 4ta 
contract whereby one undertakes to indemnify 
another or pay or allow a specified or as-
certainable amount or benefit upon determina-
ble risk contingencies." 
6. See Robinson v. Hreinson, 17 Utah 2d 261, 
409 P.2d 121 (1965). 
7. The dissent poses questions which are quite 
different from and therefore not involved here. 
But in the interest of avoiding misunderstand-
OME FIRE INS. CO. Utah %\ 
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brought in extra money by going out tend-
ing. 
Q. You say they didn't do the dishes 
along with your son? 
A. A little, yes. They helped around 
the house, but Don did most of the chores 
around the house because the girls were not 
home that much. 
Q. Did the manager of the apartment 
have your walks cleaned for you? 
A. I will say, sometimes. 
Q. Did you ever complain to him about 
not doing it? 
A. Oh, definitely. That's why we 
moved out. We had a lot of complaints 
with him. 
Whatever view may be taken of the fore-
going, for the purpose of dealing with the 
issue presented in this case, we accept the 
validity of the plaintiffs averment that, 
"but for the injury, the insured (Donald) 
would have performed his household duties 
as recited herein." But, in accordance with 
our understanding of the statute as herein-
above discussed, there remains the other 
critical question: Is it reasonable to suppose 
that the plaintiff's family would have hired 
someone else and paid out money to do the 
chores he lists.7 
[3] In this connection, it is also perti-
nent to observe that the general rule is that 
an award of damages cannot properly be 
made on mere possibility or conjecture, 
there must be a firmer foundation. That is, 
any such award must be supported by proof 
upon which reasonable minds acting fairly 
thereon could believe that it is more proba-
ing, we respond: It would seem that in both 
examples there would be reimbursement. In 
the first because they are the type of services 
for which the family would reasonably incur 
expenses: and the second because there would 
be actual expenditures for that type of service. 
Whereas here, we have concluded that the mi-
nor tasks done by Donald were not things for 
which the family would have "reasonably in-
curred" expenses by hiring someone else to 
perform. 
559 P.2d—21 
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ble than not, that damage was actually 
suffered.8 
[4] Upon our consideration of the prob-
lem in the light of what has been said 
herein, it is our opinion that reasonable 
minds would not believe that the chores 
done by Donald were something for which 
the family would "reasonably have in-
curred" expenses, i. e., would have hired 
someone else to do them and thus have 
made a cash outlay. That being so, reim-
bursement for such services is not covered 
by the statute. 
[5] Concerning the award of $475 to the 
plaintiffs as attorney's fees,9 the problem is 
quite different and the record is somewhat 
confused. This is undoubtedly due to the 
fact that concern was focused upon the 
main problem in the case, which we have 
discussed above. There is concededly some 
indication that the matter of attorney's fees 
was tied to that problem. But, there are 
also indications otherwise. In his summa-
tion the trial court included the following: 
The insurance company knew then 
what the nature of the claim was and 
declined to make any payment within 35 
days thereafter. And I suppose the coun-
terargument is we were in litigation. 
But I suppose the answer to that is we 
were in litigation when medical expenses 
were paid, and that took those out of this 
present action. 
So the court finds that the reasonable 
sufficient proof of claim was given at one 
or the other of those dates, and that the 
amounts which the Court has heretofore 
adjudged to be due as benefits under the 
Act were not paid within 35 days. The 
Court finds, therefore, that a reasonable 
attorney's fee is provided for under the 
Act under this circumstance, and further 
finds that the sum of $475 is a reasonable 
attorney's fee under all the circumstanc-
es. This is not taking into account there 
8. As to the degree of certainty required to 
prove loss or damage incurred, see Robinson v. 
Hreinson, footnote 5 above. 
9. Section 31-41-8 provides that benefits under 
the Act are overdue if not paid within 35 days 
after the insurer receives notice and proof and 
were other claims in this lawsuit, and it is 
really difficult to separate out time; and 
looking at what generally, reasonably 
would have been required to pursue just 
this claim, I find that $475 would be a 
reasonable attorney's fee for that 
amount. 
The exhibit showing the details and time 
of other payments made by the defendant 
insurance company was not included in the 
record brought here. In order to overturn 
the judgment, it is the appellant's burden to 
affirmatively show that the trial court was 
in error. In the absence of that record, and 
because there is evidence as to the reasona-
bleness of the attorney's fee, that portion of 
the judgment should remain undisturbed. 
But the award of $12 per day benefit is 
reversed. The parties to bear their own 
costs. (AJI emphasis in this opinion is add-
ed.) 
HENRIOD, C. J., and WILKINS, J., con-
cur. 
NOTE: The majority of the court had 
acted in this case prior to the retirement of 
Chief Justice HENRIOD. Its release was 
delayed pending preparation of the dissent. 
MAUGHAN, Justice (Dissenting). 
We should affirm the trial court. All 
references are to U.C.A.1953, as enacted 
L.1973. 
The majority opinion is premised on the 
assumption that 31-41-6(l)(b)(ii) is ambigu-
ous and that it is essential to apply the 
rules of construction to determine the un-
derlying legislative intention in order to 
construe its provisions. 
The language of the section is clear, pre-
cise, specific and unambiguous and it is the 
duty of this court to interpret as the legisla-
ture has expressed it. 
that in an action to recover those expenses, the 
insurer is required to pay reasonable attorney's 
fees. 
?im 
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(ii) in lieu of reimbursement for ex-
penses which would have been reasonably 
incurred for services that, but for the 
injury, the injured person would have 
performed for his household and regard-
less of whether any of these expenses are 
actually incurred, an allowance of $12 per 
day . . 
The clear meaning of this statute is that 
if the injured person would have performed 
household services, but for the injury, he is 
granted a flat allowance. The injured par-
ty in the instant case, washed dishes, took 
out garbage, vacuumed carpets, assisted his 
mother in carrying groceries, and washed 
the car. The statute provides an allowance 
for this labor, whether any expense was 
actually incurred. The flat rate avoids the 
necessity of proving the reasonable value of 
each service performed. The effect of the 
majority opinion is to engraft a valuation 
requirement in contradiction of the express 
terms of the statute, viz., whether the value 
of the services is sufficient to merit the 
employment of another to perform them. 
Through judicial legerdemain the majority 
opinion has amended the statute to conform 
with the Massachusetts Act, Mass.Genrl. 
Laws, Chapt. 90, Sec. 34A, Amended by 
St.1970, C. 670, Sec. 1, which provides: 
and for payments in fact 
made to others, not members of the in-
jured person's household and reasonably 
incurred in obtaining from those others 
ordinary and necessary services in lieu of 
those that, had he not been injured, the 
injured person would have performed not 
for income but for the benefit of himself 
and/or members of his household 
. . [Emphasis supplied.] 
Since Utah Act, Chapt. 41, Title 31, was 
basically patterned after the Massachusetts 
Act, the determination of the legislature to 
depart from the benefit provisions has 
great significance. The majority has it, to 
be entitled to the statutory benefits, the 
injured party must prove actual damages, 
viz.; he must prove the household services 
were of such a value to his family, that 
through interruption of the performance, 
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the family is compelled to hire someone 
else, and make a cash outlay. 
The phrase "regardless of whether any of 
these expenses are actually incurred" has 
been restricted to those instances where the 
injured person fortuitously locates a good 
Samaritan, who administers to his brother's 
needs gratuitously. If a member of the 
household performs the injured party's 
household duty, no benefit need be paid is 
the underlying philosophy of the majority, 
which, in fact, coincides with the Massachu-
setts statute. In that statute the services 
must be rendered by one who is not a 
member of the injured party's household. 
How would the majority apply its ruling 
to the following fact situation: The mother 
of five young children is injured. Her hus-
band takes his annual vacation and per-
forms the mother's regular household 
duties. As father and husband, he is equal-
ly responsible for the care of his family. 
Should the mother recover the statutory 
allowance? What if the family has three 
healthy teen-age daughters, who suffer 
from a terminal case of laziness? The 
mother is injured, and the family employs 
someone to clean the house and cook the 
meals. Should the statutory allowance be 
denied because the daughters should have 
performed these household services? 
The legislative design of the statute was 
to eliminate any valuation proof, e. g., were 
the household services of minimal or great 
value, and to set a flat rate. The sole issue 
under this statute is whether the party 
would have performed household services, 
but for the injury. If he would have, he is 
entitled to the statutory benefit. 
The selective citations of the Act to but-
tress the peculiar construction of the major-
ity merits attention. 
31-41-2, provides: 
The purpose of this act is to require the 
payment of certain prescribed benefits in 
respect to motor vehicle accidents 
through either insurance or other ap-
proved security but on the basis of no 
fault, preserving, however, the right of 
an injured person to pursue the custom-
ary tort claims where the most serious 
#/y? 
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type of injuries occur. The intention of 
the legislature is hereby to possibly stabi-
lize, if not effectuate certain savings in, 
the rising costs of automobile accident 
insurance and to effectuate a more effi-
cient method of handling the greater bulk 
of the personal injury claims that arise 
out of automobile accidents, these being 
those not involving great amounts of 
damages. This act is not designed to 
have any effect on property damage 
claims. 
The majority opinion states the public 
policy set forth is to provide the payment 
for some specified, primary damages with-
out undue delay. I construe this section as 
declaring that in certain accidents where 
personal injury claims do not involve great 
amounts of damages, the injured party is 
deprived of his common law tort action. In 
substitution thereof certain prescribed ben-
efits will be paid. The Act further states 
the intention of the legislature to stabilize, 
if not effectuate certain savings in, the cost 
of automobile insurance. The flat rate of 
$12 per day in Section 6(l)(b)(ii), in substi-
tution of value, is a specific application of 
this policy. 
The majority further cites Sec. 8 of the 
Act, wherein it is provided in regard to the 
various benefits set forth in Sec. 6, that 
they shall be paid on a monthly basis as 
expenses are incurred and that benefits are 
overdue if not paid within 35 days after the 
insurer receives "reasonable proof of the 
fact and amount of expenses incurred." 
Since these are general provisions in di-
rect conflict with the specific provision of 
Sec. 6(l)(b)(ii) providing "regardless of 
whether any of these expenses are actually 
incurred" the majority's interpretation is 
perplexing. 
The majority expresses the view that to 
grant the benefit in the instant case would 
be a windfall and against public policy, by 
broadening coverage, to the detriment of 
the public through increased insurance 
costs. Basic policy is a legislative determi-
nation. The selection of a flat rate in place 
of an individual valuation is a matter spe-
cifically within the province of the legisla-
ture; it alone may determine the coverage, 
viz., the payment of certain prescribed ben-
efits in lieu of the common law tort action. 
The application of insurance law in this 
matter is inappropriate. This is not an 
insurance act, per se, but a scheme analo-
gous to the Workmen's Compensation Act, 
wherein the legislature has determined that 
common law actions and principles are inad-
equate to deal with the social problem. In 
response to social conditions, the legislature 
has created an entirely new basis to com-
pensate injured persons; the Act should be 
so interpreted without reliance on the con-
cepts of traditional tort law. 
ELLETT, J., concurs in the views ex-
pressed in the dissenting opinion of MAU-
GHAN, J. 
( o | KEYNUMBERSYSTEM> 
Archie Clarence PACE, Plaintiff 
and Respondent, 
v. 
Larry C. PACE et al., Defendants 
and Appellant. 
No. 14542. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Jan. 21, 1977. 
Mortgagee brought foreclosure suit 
against mortgagor and second mortgagee. 
Second mortgagee filed a counterclaim on 
an open account to which the mortgagee 
asserted a defense of accord and satisfac-
tion. The Third District Court, Salt Lake 
County, Marcellus K. Snow, J., rendered 
summary judgment for the mortgagee on 
the counterclaim and second mortgagee ap-
pealed. The Supreme Court, Wilkins, J., 
held that an issue of material fact existed 
as to whether there was payment on the 
JARA ~LLO v. FARMERS INS. GROUP 
Jiteas669P.2dl231 (Utah 1983) 
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marriage are to be preserved with a more 
rigorous and technical set of requirements 
for recovery. Innocent parties must defend 
themselves, and then assert their right to be 
free of such actions by suing in separate 
actions for malicious prosecution or abuse 
of process. Nowhere does the majority 
point to a basis in law or a benefit to 
society to justify such a cost to the parties 
or to our judicial system. 
As the court stated in Henson v. Thomas, 
supra, "The mutual rights and privileges of 
home life grow out of the marital status. 
Such obligations . . . are not legal in nature 
and may not be made the subject of com-
merce and bartered at the counter." Id. 
231 N.C. at 175, 56 S.E.2d at 433. It is time 
that we acknowledge the operation of the 
process spoken of by Justice Holmes where-
by the customs and needs which give rise to 
a rule disappear but the rule remains, justi-
fied by some new policy based on new be-
liefs and customs. Holmes, The Common 
Law 5 (1881). This old "rule" does not have 
a basis in today's beliefs and customs. Its 
existence now testifies only to the persist-
ence of an old form of action in our com-
mon law system and to the understandable 
but regretable human desire for revenge 
and a greenback poultice. This was a judi-
cially instituted cause of action and should 
be judicially extinguished, especially since 
our legislature has never provided a statu-
tory basis for it See Wyman v. Wallace, 
supra. It should not be said of Utah that it 
is a place 
Where juries cast up what a wife is 
worth, 
By laying -s-hate'er sum, in mulct they 
please on 
The lo%~er. who must pay a handsome 
price. 
Because i; is a marketable vice. 
(Byron, Don J^n, Canto I, lxiv.) 
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Jerry R. JARAMILLO, Plaintiff 
and Respondent, 
v. 
FARMERS INSURANCE GROUP, a cor-
poration, and State Farm Insurance Co,, 
a corporation, Defendants and Appel-
lant. 
No. 18019. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Sept. 1, 1983. 
Tort victim brought action to recover 
balance claimed due under terms of settle-
ment agreement reached in compromise of 
personal injury action. The Third District 
Court, Salt Lake County, Jay E. Banks, J., 
entered judgment in favor of tort victim, 
and tort-feasor's insurer appealed. The Su-
preme Court, Hall, C.J., held that settle-
ment agreement, by which tort-feasor's in-
surer agreed to pay tort victim and tort 
victim's insurer for its payment to tort vic-
tim of no-fault benefits, was valid and bind-
ing on tort victim; therefore, tort victim 
was not entitled to amount tort-feasor's 
insurer intended to pay tort victim's insur-
er. 
Reversed and remanded. 
Stewart, J., dissented and filed opinion, 
in which Durham, J., concurred. 
1. Insurance §=^ 579 
Proposition that Automobile No-Fault 
Insurance Act does not confer a no-fault 
insurer right of subrogation to funds re-
ceived by its insured in subsequent action 
against tort-feasor does not preclude liabili-
ty insurer from negotiating settlement with 
tort victim which compromises both its own 
liability and that of its insured. U.C.A. 
1953, 31-41-1 et seq. 
2. Contracts <s=>14 
Unexpressed intentions do not affect 
validity of contract. 
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3. Insurance <§=> 579.3 
Settlement agreement, by which tort-
feasor's insurer agreed to pay both tort 
victim as well as tort victim's insurer for 
latter's payment of no-fault benefits to tort 
victim, was valid and binding on tort vic-
tim, where tort victim and his attorney 
stipulated that it was tort-feasor's insurer's 
intention to compromise liability to both 
tort victim and tort victim's insurer by pay-
ment of sum which was to be disbursed to 
tort victim in full settlement of his claims 
and to tort victim's insurer as reimburse-
ment for its payment of no-fault benefits, 
notwithstanding that express terms of tort 
victim's release recited payment of consid-
eration in total amount paid by tort-feasor's 
insurer; therefore, tort victim was not enti-
tled to amount intended to be paid to its 
insurer as reimbursement for no-fault bene-
fits. 
Frank G. Noel, Salt Lake City, for de-
fendants and appellants. 
L. Charles Evans, Libby, Mont., Daniel 
Barker, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and 
respondent. 
HALL, Chief Justice: 
Plaintiff brought this action to recover a 
balance of $2,694.13 claimed due under the 
terms of a settlement agreement reached in 
compromise of a personal injury action 
against C. Dale Sharp, defendant State 
Farm Insurance Company's insured. On 
the basis of stipulated facts, the trial court 
granted summary judgment in favor of 
plaintiff, and State Farm appeals. 
Plaintiff sustained injuries as the result 
of a collision with a vehicle driven by Sharp. 
He received personal injury protection 
(PIP) benefits in the amount of $2,694.13 
from his own no-fault insurance carrier, 
defendant Farmers Insurance Group. 
Plaintiff dismissed the personal injury ac-
tion against Sharp when he was successful 
in negotiating the subject settlement agree-
ment with State Farm. 
It was stipulated that plaintiff and his 
attorney were aware that it was State 
Farm's intention to compromise the liability 
to both plaintiff and Farmers by payment 
of the sum of $12,000, which was to be 
disbursed as follows: $9,305.87 to plaintiff 
in full settlement of his claims, and 
$2,694.13 to Farmers as reimbursement for 
its payment to plaintiff of PIP benefits. 
That portion of their stipulation which so 
provides reads as follows: 
5. Plaintiff and plaintiff's attorney, at 
the time of the settlement on October 20, 
1980, because of previous discussions and 
negotiations with State Farm representa-
tives, and because of the discussions be-
tween plaintiff's attorney and State 
Farm's representative at the time of set-
tlement, knew or had reason to believe 
and assumed that State Farm intended at 
the time of the settlement that $9,305.87 
would be paid to plaintiff in full settle-
ment of his claims, and that $2,694.13 
would go to Farmers as reimbursement to 
it for its payment to plaintiff of no-fault 
benefits, the total of the two being the 
sum of $12,000.00; and further because 
of said negotiations and discussions, at 
the time of settlement State Farm be-
lieved and assumed that plaintiff also in-
tended the money to be disbursed as de-
scribed above. 
Following the agreement of settlement 
reached on October 20, 1980, two drafts 
were issued and mailed to plaintiff's attor-
ney, one in the amount of $9,305.87, payable 
jointly to plaintiff and his attorney, and the 
other in the amount of $2,694.13, payable 
jointly to plaintiff and Farmers. The letter 
of transmittal, dated October 27, 1980, also 
recited the terms of settlement: 
These drafts are being tendered in full 
in final settlement of all claims in this 
case of both your client and Farmer's [sic] 
Insurance subrogation claim for no-fault 
benefits. 
Plaintiff executed an accompanying re-
lease, which recited as consideration there-
for payment of the sum of $12,000. He 
negotiated the $9,305.87 check. He then 
requested Farmers to endorse the other 
check over to him. Farmers refused and 
plaintiff initially brought this action 
P? ISL. 
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against only Farmers, seeking to recover 
the amount of the check. However, when 
State Farm stopped payment on the check, 
plaintiff joined State Farm as a party de-
fendant. Farmers and State Farm filed 
separate appeals from the judgment in fa-
vor of plaintiff. Farmers has since with-
drawn its appeal and is not a party to this 
proceeding. 
On appeal, State Farm focuses on the 
settlement agreement as evidenced by the 
stipulation of the parties, and contends that 
plaintiff is bound by the terms thereof, and 
thus is not entitled to receive those funds 
which he knew were intended for the reim-
bursement of Farmers. Plaintiffs rejoin-
der is that the ruling of this Court in All-
state Ins. Co. v. Iviel precludes any deduc-
tions of no-fault benefits from the overall 
settlement figure. He further asserts that 
the release he executed recites, without am-
biguity, payment of consideration therefor 
in the amount of $12,000, and that he is 
therefore entitled to receive that amount. 
The crux of this case is not the ruling in 
Me; rather, it is whether the settlement 
agreement that compromised both the lia-
bility of State Farm's insured and that of 
its own statutory obligation2 to reimburse 
Farmers was valid and binding. We con-
clude that it was. 
[1] Me stands for the proposition that 
the Utah Automobile No-Fault Insurance 
Act3 does not confer on a no-fault insurer 
the right of subrogation to funds received 
by its insured in a subsequent action 
against the tortfeasor. There is nothing 
about the holding in that case which pre-
cludes a liability insurer from negotiating a 
settlement with the tort victim which com-
promises both its own liability and that of 
its insured. 
It is also to be observed that Me arose 
out of a different set of facts. In that case, 
the tort victim reached a settlement with 
the liability insurer, but did so without any 
understanding or agreement that the settle-
1. Utah, 606 P.2d 1197(1980). 
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ment figure included funds to be used for 
the reimbursement of the no-fault insurer, 
whereas in the instant case, plaintiff admit-
tedly understood that the $12,000 settle-
ment figure included funds intended for the 
reimbursement of no-fault benefits paid by 
Farmers. 
[2] In light of the stipulation of the 
parties, it is clear that plaintiff outwardly 
accepted State Farm's terms of settlement. 
Any contrary intentions he may have had 
were left unexpressed and were not other-
wise disclosed. It is well established in the 
law that unexpressed intentions do not af-
fect the validity of a contract. The rule of 
law is as was stated in Allen v. Bissinger & 
Co.:* 
The apparent mutual assent of the par-
ties, essential to the formation of a con-
tract, must be gathered by the language 
employed by them, and the law imputes 
to a person an intention corresponding to 
the reasonable meaning of its words and 
acts. It judges of his intentions by his 
outward expressions and excludes all 
questions in regard to his unexpressed 
intention. If his words or acts judged by 
reasonable standard manifests an inten-
tion to agree to the matter in question, 
that agreement is established and it is 
immaterial what may be the real but 
unexpressed state of his mind upon the 
subject. 
[3] Furthermore, plaintiff accepted 
State Farm's tender of the sum of $9,305.87 
and negotiated the check drawn in his favor 
in that amount. It was not until after he 
had done so that he then laid claim to the 
further sum of $2,694.13. 
Plaintiff's remaining contention that the 
express terms of the release he executed 
entitle him to the full amount of the settle-
ment figure also fails. This is so because 
when the release is contrasted with the 
stipulation of the parties, it does not reflect 
their understanding and intentions at the 
time the settlement agreement was 
3. U.C.A., 1953, § 31^*1-1, et seq. 
2. Set forth in U.C.A., 1953, § 31-41-11. 4. 62 Utah 226, 219 P. 539, 541-42 (1923). 
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reached. Therefore, the release is irrele-
vant to the issues presented by this appeal. 
The judgment is reversed and the case is 
remanded for entry of judgment in favor of 
State Farm. No costs awarded. 
OAKS and HOWE, JJ., concur. 
STEWART, Justice (dissenting). 
I respectfully submit that the majority 
fails to give effect to the law stated in 
Allstate Insurance Co. v. Ivie, Utah, 606 
P.2d 1197 (1980), and Allstate Insurance Co. 
v. Anderson, Utah, 608 P.2d 235 (1980), and 
misapplies governing principles of contract 
law in holding that the plaintiff is not enti-
tled to the full settlement proceeds of $12,-
000. 
The release signed by State Farm Insur-
ance Co. and plaintiff states in relevant 
part: 
For the sole consideration of twelve 
thousand and no/100 Dollars, . . . the un-
dersigned [Jerry R. Jaramillo] releases 
and forever discharges Clarence Dale 
Sharp 
The plain meaning of this document is 
that the plaintiff was to receive a full $12,-
000 from State Farm in settlement of his 
claim. The release does not state that 
$2,694.13 of the total was to go to Farmers 
Insurance Group as reimbursement for the 
PIP payments paid by Farmers to the plain-
tiff, or that the PIP payments figured in 
any way in the settlement and the release. 
The release was in full accord with the law 
stated in Allstate Insurance Co. v. Ivie, 
supra; Allstate Insurance Co. v. Anderson, 
supra, and Street v. Fanners Insurance Ex-
change, Utah, 609 P.2d 1343 (1980), that 
remuneration for PIP payments is a matter 
solely between the no-fault insurance com-
pany and the liability insurance carrier in 
an arbitration proceeding between them. 
In Anderson the facts were similar to the 
instant case except that there was no stipu-
lation between the injured person and the 
liability insurance carrier, as in the instant 
case, and the plaintiff in Anderson was the 
no-fault carrier suing its insured, rather 
than the liability carrier suing the insured, 
as in this case. In Anderson the Court 
stated: 
Plaintiff, Allstate Insurance Company, 
brought this action to recover no-fault 
insurance benefits paid to its insured, the 
defendant, following a settlement be-
tween the defendant and the insurance 
carrier of a third-party tortfeasor. 
In January 1976 defendant, a passenger 
in a vehicle insured by Allstate, was in-
jured in an automobile accident. Pursu-
ant to his claim, Allstate paid defendant 
$2,000 in no-fault medical benefits. Sub-
sequently, defendant filed suit against 
the tortfeasor, who was insured by State 
Farm Mutual Insurance Company. De-
fendant entered into a settlement agree-
ment with State Farm. On settlement of 
that suit defendant executed a release, 
and State Farm agreed to pay a settle-
ment amount of $10,000. Two thousand 
dollars of this amount was made payable 
jointly to defendant and Allstate. De-
fendant refused to deliver the draft, and 
Allstate initiated this action. 
The issue is whether Allstate is enti-
tled, because of a right of subrogation, to 
recover the no-fault payments made to its 
insured out of proceeds of a settlement 
with a third-party tortfeasor. 
We hold that Allstate Insurance Co. v. 
Ivie, Utah, 606 P.2d 1197 (1980), is dispos-
itive of this case. 
Thus, we held that the no-fault insurer was 
not entitled to recover from the insured. 
Compare Street v. Farmers Insurance Ex-
change, supra, in which the no-fault reim-
burseable damage categories were broken 
out in the settlement papers. 
The fact that State Farm, the liability 
insurer in this case, is not the no-fault carri-
er as in Ivie and Anderson is of no conse-
quence. Although the right of subrogation 
is not technically at issue in this case, that 
is also of no consequence. Both Ivie and 
Anderson held that the injured person was 
entitled to the total of a lump sum settle-
ment and that PIP payments could not be 
deducted therefrom. In Ivie we stated, 
"[T]he tort victim's recovery . . . cannot be 
reduced by the PIP payments." 606 P.2d at 
JARAy * LO v. FARMERS INS. GROUP 
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expressly provided otherwise, the case is 
different. Christensen v. Farmers Insur-
ance Exchange, Utah, 669 P.2d 1236 (1983). 
Compare Street v. Farmers Insurance Ex-
change, supra. 
The stipulation in the instant case, which 
was entered into for the purpose of dispos-
ing of the matter on summary judgment, 
does not indicate in any way that the par-
ties agreed to modify the simple and clear 
terms of the release. There is nothing in 
either the release or the stipulation indicat-
ing that the parties agreed that the PIP 
payments were to be deducted from the 
total settlement or that the settlement was 
anything more than it purported to be—a 
settlement of the injured party with the 
liability insurance carrier, State Farm. The 
majority states that the settlement agree-
ment is at variance with the stipulated 
facts as to the parties' beliefs regarding 
their intent. That is, I submit, incorrect. 
There is nothing in the stipulation that adds 
to or takes away from the legal effect of 
the release. The relevant portion of the 
stipulation states: 
5. Plaintiff and plaintiffs attorney, at 
the time of the settlement on October 20, 
1980, because of previous discussions and 
negotiations with State Farm representa-
tives, and because of the discussions be-
tween plaintiff's attorney and State 
Farm's representative at the time of set-
tlement, knew or had reason to believe 
and assumed that State Farm intended at 
the time of the settlement that $9,305.87 
would be paid to plaintiff in full settle-
ment of his claims, and that $2,694.13 
would go to Farmers as reimbursement to 
it for its payment to plaintiff of no-fault 
benefits, the total of the two being the 
sum of $12,000.00; and further because 
of said negotiations and discussions, at 
the time of settlement State Farm be-
lieved and assumed that plaintiff also in-
tended the money to be disbursed as de-
scribed above. 
The majority also argues that "[i]n the 
light of the stipulation of the parties, it is 
outwardly accepted 
State Farm's terms of settlement." That 
conclusion does not, I submit, follow. The 
stipulation only states that plaintiff "knew 
or had reason to believe and assumed that 
State Farm intended at the time of settle-
ment" that $2,694.13 of the total settlement 
would go to Farmers as reimbursement for 
the paid-out PIP benefits. The stipulation 
does not state that plaintiff ever agreed to 
that condition. Apparently, State Farm 
was unaware of the effect of the No-Fault 
Act, Allstate v. I vie, supra, Allstate v. An-
derson, supra, and Street v. Farmers Insur-
ance Exchange, supra. In short, State 
Farm was operating under a mistake of 
law, and it was not plaintiff's duty either to 
inform his adversary of the law or to accede 
to its misunderstanding. 
In all events, plaintiff's mere belief or 
assumption of State Farm's intent does not 
constitute assent to that intent. On 
straight contract principles, mere silence, 
without any accompanying outward acts, is 
not ordinarily sufficient to constitute as-
sent. 1 Corbin on Contracts § 72 (1963 ed.). 
See generally Annot, Silence When Offer 
Is Made or Failure to Reject It Is an Ac-
ceptance Which Will Consummate a Bilat-
eral Contract, 77 A.L.R. 1141 (1932). With-
out plaintiff's assent to a modification of 
the release, there was no binding covenant 
to enforce it. See Oberhansly v. Earle, 
Utah, 572 P.2d 1384 (1977); Pingree v. Con-
tinental Group of Utah, Inc., Utah, 558 P.2d 
1317 (1976); Morgan v. Board of State 
Lands, Utah, 549 P.2d 695 (1976); B & R 
Supply Co. v. Bringhurst, 28 Utah 2d 442, 
503 P.2d 1216 (1972). 
The majority also states that "[t]here is 
nothing about the holding in that case 
[Ivie ] that precludes a liability insurer from 
negotiating a settlement with the tort vic-
tim which compromises both its own liabili-
ty and that of its insured." That, I submit, 
is not accurate. By what legal right can a 
stranger compromise another's legal liabili-
ty? Under the Utah No-Fault Act and Ivie 
and its progeny, the obligation to reimburse 
the no-fault insurer is solely that of the 
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liability insurer, and the injured person can 
not compromise that right. 
I see no relevancy in the fact that in Ivie 
there was no "understanding or agreement 
that the settlement figure included funds to 
be used for the reimbursement of the no-
fault insurer . . . , " as the majority states. 
That was true then, it was also true in 
Anderson, and it is just as true in this case. 
There is not a shred of evidence that the 
parties agreed otherwise in this case. The 
stipulation states only what plaintiff sup-
posed defendant intended—which must also 
have been the case in Ivie. It states noth-
ing whatsoever about what plaintiff stated 
he intended. In short, the parties did not 
agree to deduct PIP payments, nor was 
there a mutual mistake of fact. 
That State Farm "believed and assumed 
that plaintiff also intended the money to be 
disbursed [according to this arrangement]" 
certainly does not prove plaintiffs assent. 
Plaintiff's assent to the condition must have 
been physically manifested in words or 
deeds. The supposition by State Farm that 
plaintiff intended to so contract does not 
create any contractual assent by plaintiff. 
See Morgan v. Board of State Lands, supra. 
The cover letter dated October 27, 1980, 
which accompanied the settlement checks, 
adds nothing to State Farm's argument. 
That letter stated: 
These drafts are being tendered in full 
in final settlement of all claims in this 
case of both your client and Farmer's 
Insurance subrogation claim for no-fault 
benefits. 
This statement indicates only that State 
Farm was unaware of the ruling in Ivie and 
erroneously relied upon the prior practice 
which the No-Fault Act displaced. State 
Farm now relies on the prior practice to 
avoid its contractual commitment. 
The majority cites Allen v. Bissinger & 
Co., 62 Utah 226, 219 P. 539 (1923), for the 
proposition that "the law imputes to a per-
son an intention corresponding to the rea-
sonable meaning of his words and acts." 
Id. at 231, 219 P. at 541, quoting 13 C.J. 
Contracts § 49 (1917). In Bissinger, the 
"words and acts" which evidenced the par-
ties' intent were a series of letters between 
the parties. In the present case, the par-
ties' stipulation deals only with the parties' 
beliefs and assumptions, not with what they 
said or did. The only objective evidence of 
their intent is (1) the written release signed 
by plaintiff, and (2) plaintiff's attempt to 
cash both settlement checks. Thus, rather 
than supporting the majority's conclusion 
that the parties intended that Farmers be 
reimbursed, Allen v. Bissinger & Co., supra, 
supports that conclusion that they did not 
so intend. 
In light of the above, Ivie, Anderson, and 
Street control this case. Thus, Farmers has 
no right of subrogation, and plaintiff is 
entitled to the full $12,000 settlement pay-
able to him by State Farm under the settle-
ment agreement. I would therefore affirm 
the trial court. 
DURHAM, J., concurs in the dissenting 
opinion of STEWART, J. 
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Jerry CHRISTENSEN, Plaintiff 
and Appellant, 
v. 
FARMERS INSURANCE EXCHANGE, a 
corporation, aka Fanners Insurance 
Group, Defendant, Third-Party Plaintiff 
and Respondent, 
v. 
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTO INSUR-
ANCE COMPANY, aka State Farm In-
surance, Third-Party Defendant and Re-
spondent. 
No. 18283. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Sept. 1, 1983. 
Appeal was taken from a judgment of 
the Fourth District Court, Utah County, 
P? I5i. 
JON. v. TRANSAMERICA INS. CO. 
Cite as 592 P.2d 609 
Utah 609 
It is now well established that the trial 
court has power to summarily enforce on 
motion a settlement agreement entered 
into by the litigants while the litigation is 
pending before it. Quite obviously, so 
simple and speedy a remedy serves well 
the policy favoring compromise, which in 
turn has made a major contribution to its 
popularity. 
Yet it is apparent that the summary 
procedure for enforcement of unper-
formed settlement contracts is not a pan-
acea for the myriad types of problems 
that may arise. The summary procedure 
is admirably suited to situations where, 
for example, a binding settlement bar-
gain is conceded or shown, and the excuse 
for nonperformance is comparatively un-
substantial. On the other hand, it is ill-
suited to situations presenting complex 
factual issues related either to the forma-
tion or the consummation of the contract, 
which only testimonial exploration in a 
more plenary proceeding is apt to satis-
factorily resolve. [Citations omitted.] 
The case at hand is not one in which 
complex factual issues are presented; here, 
a "binding settlement bargain is conceded 
or shown, and the excuse for nonperform-
ance is comparatively unsubstantial." 
CROCKETT, C. J. 
and STEWART, JJ. 
and WILKINS, HALL 
concur. 
Elmer G. JONES, Plaintiff and 
Appellant, 
v. 
TRANSAMERICA INSURANCE COM-
PANY, a corporation, Defendant 
and Respondent. 
No. 15809. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
March 12, 1979. 
Insured appealed from summary judg-
ment entered by Fourth District Court, 
Utah County, George E. Ballif, J., which 
denied him right to recover certain benefits 
under contract of no-fault insurance issued 
in conformance with Automobile No-Fault 
Insurance Act. The Supreme Court, Hall, 
J., held that: (1) insured, who earned more 
than $150 per week during period for which 
he sought compensation but whose income 
allegedly was 25% less than what it would 
have been had the accident never occurred, 
was not "disabled" for purposes of loss of 
earnings benefits nor for purposes of house-
hold services benefits under the Act, and (2) 
by entering into settlement agreement with 
his tort-feasors, whereunder insured re-
leased him from all personal injury claims 
as well as property damage, insured cut off 
insurer's subrogation rights under the Act, 
notwithstanding attempted "specific exclu-
sion" relating to no-fault benefits; thus, 
insured was foreclosed from seeking addi-
tional benefits from insurer. 
Affirmed. 
1. Insurance <§=>531.4 
Under Automobile No-Fault Insurance 
Act, an injured person will not be permitted 
to recover from an insurance carrier over 
and above what carrier has previously paid 
in benefits once he has successfully recov-
ered from his tort-feasor for personal inju-
ries. U.C.A. 1953, 31 41 1 et seq. 
2. Insurance <£=>531.4 
Automobile No-Fault Insurance Act 
has no application to property damage 
claims. U.C.A. 1953, 31 41 1 et seq. 
3. Insurance @=*531.4 
Term "disability" within meaning of 
Automobile No-Fault Insurance Act means 
an inability to work as contrasted with 
term "physical impairment," which general-
ly refers to loss of bodily function. U.C.A. 
1953, 31-41-1 et seq. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
4. Insurance o=>531.4 
Insured, who earned more than $150 
per week during period for which he sought 
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compensation but whose income allegedly 
was 25% less than what it would have been 
had the accident never occurred, was not 
"disabled" for purposes of loss of earnings 
benefits nor for purposes of household serv-
ices benefits under Automobile No-Fault 
Insurance Act. U.C.A. 1953, 31 41 6(l)(b). 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
5. Insurance c=>601.25 
By entering into settlement agreement 
with his tort-feasors, whereunder insured 
released them from all personal injury 
claims as well as property damage, insured 
cut off insurer's subrogation rights under 
Automobile No-Fault Insurance Act, not-
withstanding attempted "specific exclusion" 
relating to no-fault benefits; thus, insured 
was foreclosed from seeking additional ben-
efits from insurer. U.C.A. 1953, 31 41 1 
et seq. 
6. Insurance <®=* 601.2 
Fact that insured entered into settle-
ment with his tort-feasors whereby he re-
leased them from all claims for personal 
injuries and property damage did not pre-
clude insurer from seeking reimbursement 
from tort-feasor's insurer. U.C.A. 1953, 
31-41-11. 
D. John Mussleman, of Stott, Young & 
Wilson, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and 
appellant. 
Raymond M. Berry, of Snow, Christensen 
& Martineau, Salt Lake City, for defendant 
and respondent. 
HALL, Justice: 
Plaintiff appeals from a summary judg-
ment denying him the right to recover ben-
efits under a contract of "no-fault" insur-
ance issued in conformance with the Utah 
Automobile No-Fault Insurance Act,1 (here-
inafter "Act"). 
On February 13, 1974, plaintiff was in-
volved in an automobile accident in Kane 
1. U.C.A., 1953, 31-41-1 et seq. 
County, Utah, while on a sales trip to Cali-
fornia. He experienced little pain at the 
time of the accident and continued on his 
sales trip. It was not until he returned 
home to Orem, Utah, on February 21, 1974, 
that he consulted one Dr. Jacobs, an ortho-
pedic surgeon. He then absented himself 
from his employment until March 10, 1974, 
when he returned to work and has worked 
continuously since that time. Shortly after 
the accident, plaintiff applied for various 
no-fault benefits under his insurance policy. 
Defendant insurer paid the charges of Dr. 
Jacobs, and other medical expenses totall-
ing $365.63. Defendant also paid plaintiff 
$567.89 in disability benefits for the period 
of February 21 through March 9, 1974. On 
September 5, 1975 (approximately 18 
months later), plaintiff presented an addi-
tional claim to defendant for $2,485.36 rep-
resenting lost earnings from a reduction in 
earning capacity based on a claim that he 
was partially disabled (25 percent) for a 
period of 47 weeks following the injury. 
Shortly thereafter, plaintiff claimed an ad-
ditional $4,380.00 for inability to perform 
household services, the maximum allowable 
under the Act. At the same time as these 
further claims for disability were made 
upon defendant, plaintiff also entered into 
settlement negotiations with his tortfeasors. 
Defendant refused to pay these subsequent 
claims; however, plaintiff entered into a 
settlement agreement with his tortfeasors 
on January 3, 1976. For the consideration 
of $6,000.00, plaintiff released his tort-
feasors of any and all claims he may have 
had against them for personal injury as 
well as property damage. 
On August 3, 1977, plaintiff filed a com-
plaint against defendant for having refused 
to pay the later disability claims, asserting 
that he had a legal right to compensation 
for loss of gross income and reimbursement 
for his inability to perform household serv-
ices.2 He sought punitive damages for de-
fendant's failure to pay. 
After both parties moved for summary 
judgment, the trial court ruled as follows: 
2. U.C.A., 1953, 31-41-6(l)(b). 
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It is the opinion of this Court that the 
intent of the No-Fault Act was to provide 
benefits to those sustaining less serious 
injuries in automobile accidents, but to 
allow those sustaining more serious inju-
ries the right to proceed against the party 
at fault without limitation as to amounts 
recoverable, but that the person would 
not be entitled to both recovery under the 
No-Fault Act and a suit against and re-
covery from the tort feasor. 
[1] On appeal, the parties choose not to 
squarely address the basis of the trial 
court's decision but focus instead on periph-
erally related matters. Basically the court's 
ruling is correct. The whole tenor of the 
Act is that an injured person will not be 
permitted to recover from an insurance car-
rier (over and above what the carrier has 
previously paid in benefits) once he has 
successfully recovered from his tortfeasor 
for personal injuries. Any other interpreta-
tion would be to permit double damage 
recovery. 
[2] The Act mandates 3 that every resi-
dent owner of a registered motor vehicle 
maintain either insurance or other approved 
security thereon.4 It is designed to totally 
eliminate claims for injuries 5 of lesser con-
sequence which fail to meet a basic "thresh-
old" test set forth in the statute6 and pro-
vides for the payment of benefits by one's 
own insurer without regard to fault.7 
No-fault benefits are also available to 
those who sustain greater injuries. This is 
so even though they remain free to pursue 
a tort claim as well.8 However, this does 
not entitle one to a double recovery for a 
single loss since the statute specifically af-
fords subrogation rights and arbitration be-
3. U.C.A., 1953, 31-41-4(1). 
4. U.C.A., 1953, 31-41-2. 
5. The act has absolutely no application to prop-
erty damage claims. See U.C.A., 1953, 31 -41-
2. * 
6. U.C.A., 1953, 31-41-9. 
7. Supra, footnote 4. 
8. Ibid. 
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tween insurers whenever no-fault benefits 
are paid.9 
A fortiori, the legislative intent specifi-
cally expressed in the Act itself to "possibly 
stabilize, if not effectuate certain savings 
in, the rising costs of automobile accident 
insurance and to effectuate a more effi-
cient, equitable method of handling the 
greater bulk of the personal injury claims 
that arise out of automobile accidents"10 
negatives the contention that double recov-
ery is permitted. Double recovery for a 
single item of loss was never contemplated 
by the legislature n and we will not permit 
any type of automatic reward or "windfall" 
to an injured plaintiff.12 
Specific points raised on appeal concern 
the validity of the disability claims plaintiff 
made upon defendant in 1975. Plaintiff 
argues that by wrongfully refusing to pay 
the benefits sought, defendant had tortious-
ly breached the insurance contract, thereby 
giving rise to a claim for punitive damages. 
Defendant counters with two main argu-
ments: 1) that the refusal to pay the dis-
ability benefits was justified in that plain-
tiff was not "disabled"; and 2) that by 
settling with his tortfeasors, plaintiff had 
chosen his remedy and had cut off defend-
ant's subrogation rights as provided by stat-
ute. With these contentions we agree. 
[3,4] The benefits contemplated by the 
Act are phrased in terms of "disability" not 
in terms of "physical impairment." The 
former is generally understood to mean the 
inability to work, whereas the latter refers 
to the loss of bodily function.13 Plaintiff 
concedes that he was able to work during 
the period for which compensation is sought 
10. Supra, footnote 4. 
11. See Compensation Systems and Utah's No-
Fault Statute, Keeton, 1973 Utah Law Review 
383. 
12. Jamison v. Utah Home Fire Ins. Co., Utah, 
559 P.2d 958 (1977). 
13. See 99 CJ.S. Workmen's Compensation 
§ 296. 
9. U.C.A., 1953, 31-41-11. 
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but argues that his income was 25 percent 
less than what it would have been had the 
accident never occurred. The Act limits 
disability benefits for loss of earnings to a 
maximum of $150 per week and plaintiff 
admittedly earned more than $150 per week 
during the entire time for which benefits 
were claimed. He does not, therefore, fall 
within the "disability" coverage. Likewise, 
if not disabled for purposes of loss of earn-
ings benefits, neither is he disabled for pur-
poses of household services benefits. In-
deed, the Act was never intended to give an 
injured plaintiff a windfall or extra income 
as a benefit for having had an accident.14 
[5,6] Notwithstanding the foregoing 
analysis, defendant's second argument is 
dispositive of this appeal. As indicated su-
pra, in 1974 plaintiff received no-fault bene-
fits totalling $933.52.15 In 1976, plaintiff 
accepted $6,000.00 from his tortfeasors as 
additional recovery and released them of 
any further claims for personal injury and 
property damage. Plaintiff asserts that the 
specific exclusion in the release agreement 
preserved any no-fault claims which may be 
made against the tortfeasors. He also 
makes various intimations that the recovery 
from the tortfeasors is not the same as the 
disability sought from the insurance carrier. 
For example, in his brief on appeal, plain-
tiff suggests that the portion of the 
$6,000.00 to be allocated for personal injury 
should be determined by "a court" which 
would then "offset" any insurance claim. 
No such motion or other request for appor-
tionment was ever made. Before the trial 
court, plaintiff urged that he may well be 
prohibited from suing his tortfeasors for his 
injuries, (due to the "threshold" require-
ments discussed supra), and therefore the 
14. Supra, footnote 12. 
15. The trial judge correctly ruled that any 
rights defendant may have for reimbursement 
for this amount from the tortfeasor's insurer 
under U.C.A., 1953, 31-41-11 is unaffected by 
the settlement and by this action. 
16. U.C.A., 1953, 31-41-11 provides as follows: 
Subrogation rights and arbitration between 
insurers.—(1) Every insurer authorized to 
write the insurance required by this act shall 
$6,000.00 must have been tendered as a 
release from only property damage liability. 
We cannot adopt plaintiff's arguments. 
Plaintiff accepted the $6,000.00 from his 
tortfeasors as additional recovery in lieu of 
any further insurance benefits to which he 
might have been entitled. This agreement 
expressly releases plaintiff's claim against 
the tortfeasors for known and unknown 
personal injuries as well as for property 
damage arising from the accident. As indi-
cated supra, defendant insurer is subrogat-
ed to the rights of plaintiff in asserting a 
claim against the tortfeasors' insurers in 
recovering benefits based upon liability.16 
The rights to which the subrogee succeeds 
can be no greater than those of the person 
for whom he is substituted.17 By executing 
the release, plaintiff discharged the tort-
feasors of any and all liability, notwith-
standing the attempted "specific exclusion" 
relating to no-fault benefits. By so doing, 
plaintiff has chosen his recovery and cannot 
now successfully assert a claim against his 
insurer. 
The above discussion being dispositive of 
the issue of the availability of further no-
fault benefits, defendant has not breached 
its contractual obligations with plaintiff to 
give rise to a claim for punitive damages. 
The summary judgment is therefore af-
firmed. Costs to defendant. 
CROCKETT, C. J., and MAUGHAN, 
WILKINS and STEWART, JJ., concur. 
O I KEY NUMBER SYSTEM 
agree as a condition to being allowed to con-
tinue to write insurance in the state of Utah: 
(a) That where its insured is or would be 
held legally liable for the personal injuries 
sustained by any person to whom benefits 
required under this act have been paid by 
another insurer, including the state insurance 
fund, it will reimburse such other insurer for 
the payment of such benefits, but not in ex-
cess of the amount of damages so recovera-
ble, . . . 
17. 73 Am.Jur.2d, Subrogation, Sec. 10&v» / 
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Clark LAUB and Maude E. Laub, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v. 
SOUTH CENTRAL UTAH TELEPHONE 
ASSOCIATION, INC., Defendant 
and Respondent 
Nos. 17925, 17926. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Dec. 29, 1982. 
Appeal was taken from order of the 
Fifth District Court, Washington County, J. 
Harlan Burns, J., which reduced judgment 
obtained by no-fault insureds against third-
party tort-feasor by the amount of previous 
compensation from the no-fault insurer and 
which required no-fault insurer to contrib-
ute to insured's costs and attorney fees. 
The Supreme Court, Stewart, J., held that: 
(1) insurer was not entitled to relief from 
judgment under catchall provision of rule 
relating to relief from judgment, and (2) 
no-fault insured should receive no funds on 
behalf of no-fault insurer, as prayer against 
tort-feasor should not include damages com-
pensated by personal injury protection pay-
ments, and insurer thus has no right of 
subrogation as to funds obtained by the 
insured and is not required to contribute to 
the insured's cost. 
Affirmed in part and reversed in part. 
Hall, C.J., filed an opinion concurring 
in part and dissenting in part. 
1. Judgment <s=»343 
Rule permitting relief from judgment 
because it has been satisfied or discharged 
and should not be given any more prospec-
tive application did not apply where judg-
ment had been satisfied so that it had no 
more prospective application. Rules Civ. 
Proc., Rule 60(b). 
2. Judgment <e=»343 
Where defendant approved judgment 
and paid it in full without objection until 
six months later when it realized that plain-
tiffs were getting a partial double recovery, 
it was not entitled to relief from judgment 
on the basis of "any other reason justifying 
relief from the operation of the judgment." 
Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 60(bX7). 
3. Judgment <s=>386(l) 
Six-month delay in seeking relief from 
judgment, along with prior satisfaction of 
judgment, showed that motion was not 
made within a reasonable time. Rules Civ. 
Proc., Rule 60(bX7). 
4. Judgment <s=>343 
Where subdivision of relief from judg-
ment rule relating to relief from a judg-
ment rendered by mistake or excusable ne-
glect was applicable, catchall provision of 
the rule was not applicable. Rules Civ. 
Proc., Rule 60(b)(l, 7). 
5. Automobiles <§=> 251.11 
Insurance <s=>601.25 
Tort-feasor who has the required secur-
ity under the No Fault Act is liable neither 
to the injured party nor to the no fault 
insurer for reimbursement of personal inju-
ry protection payments. U.C.A.1953, 31-
41-1 et seq. 
6. Insurance <s=»601.25 
Because no-fault insured should receive 
no funds on behalf of the no-fault insurer, 
insurer has no right of subrogation as to 
funds obtained by the insured through ei-
ther settlement with or judgment against 
the tort-feasor; no-fault insurer's only 
right of reimbursement through subroga-
tion is against the liability insurer in an 
arbitration proceeding. 
7. Insurance <s=>601.25 
Because no-fault insurer ideally will 
not receive its reimbursement from no-fault 
insured, practice of the insurer paying to 
the insured a fair share of the costs and 
attorney fees is obsolete. 
8. Insurance <s=>601.25 
If parties allow no-fault insured to re-
cover funds on behalf of the no-fault insur-
pj/y 
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er and the no-fault insurer does in fact 
receive reimbursement from those funds, 
insurer must contribute to the payment of 
costs and attorney fees incurred by the 
insured in obtaining those funds. 
9. Insurance <fc=>601.25 
Where tort-feasor's insurer was mistak-
en in its belief that reimbursement to no-
fault insurer should pass through the in-
sured and where the insureds were mistak-
en in their belief that they could not retain 
the entirety of amounts paid by the tort-
feasor's insurer, but where no-fault insurer 
was not entitled to reimbursement for 
funds held by insured, and received no part 
of it, no-fault insurer was not required to 
contribute to insured's costs and attorney 
fees incurred in obtaining judgment against 
third-party tort-feasor and its insurer. 
Gary W. Pendleton, St. George, for plain-
tiffs and appellants. 
Leroy S. Axland, Salt Lake City, Ray H. 
Ivie, Ray P. Ivie, Provo, for defendant and 
respondent. 
STEWART, Justice: 
Plaintiffs Clark and Maude Laub obtain-
ed a judgment against the tortfeasor's em-
ployer South Central Utah Telephone Asso-
ciation (South Central) for injuries suffered 
in an automobile accident. On a subse-
quent motion by South Central, the trial 
court reduced the judgment by the amount 
of plaintiffs' economic losses previously 
compensated by their no-fault insurer, 
State Farm Mutual Insurance Company. A 
separate action by plaintiffs seeking contri-
bution from State Farm for costs and attor-
ney's fees incurred in the suit against South 
Central was dismissed. Plaintiffs appeal, 
claiming error in the court's modification of 
the final judgment and error in the dismiss-
al of their contribution action. We reverse 
the modification of final judgment and af-
firm the denial of contribution for costs and 
attorney's fees. 
Plaintiffs sustained personal injury and 
property damage in an accident that oc-
curred in Mojave County, Arizona, Septem-
ber 4, 1978. Pursuant to their no-fault 
insurance policy with State Farm, plaintiffs 
received $4,347.71 in personal injury protec-
tion (PIP) benefits from State Farm. Since 
plaintiffs' damages exceeded the threshold 
limitations controlling tort actions against a 
tortfeasor, see U.C.A., 1953, § 31-41-
9(l)(e), they filed suit against the tortfeasor 
and his employer South Central. State 
Farm subsequently filed notice of its claim 
to subrogation for the PIP benefits already 
paid to plaintiffs. 
In December 1980, plaintiffs obtained a 
judgment against South Central that in-
cluded amounts for damages previously 
compensated by the PIP benefits. To satis-
fy the judgment, South Central's liability 
insurer, Employers of Wausau, tendered to 
plaintiffs two checks, one in the amount of 
$4,347.71, payable to plaintiffs, their attor-
ney, and State Farm, and a second check 
for the balance of the judgment in the 
amount of $31,505.39, payable to plaintiffs 
and their attorney. Plaintiffs filed a Satis-
faction of Judgment in January of 1981. 
Wausau apparently intended the check 
for $4,347.71 to be reimbursement to State 
Farm for the PIP benefits previously paid 
by State Farm to plaintiffs. Plaintiffs con-
ceded State Farm's right to reimbursement, 
but withheld the check while filing a sepa-
rate action to establish their right to retain 
a portion of the check as a contribution 
from State Farm for costs and attorney's 
fees incurred in obtaining that check for 
State Farm. 
State Farm, meanwhile, relying on this 
Court's ruling in Allstate Insurance Co. v. 
Ivie, Utah, 606 P.2d 1197 (1980), realized 
that it had no subrogation rights with re-
spect to the judgment obtained by their 
no-fault insured against South Central. 
Therefore, State Farm claimed no right to 
the $4,347.71 check held by plaintiffs and 
denied any liability for plaintiffs' costs or 
attorney's fees. State Farm, rather, pur-
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sued its statutory remedy, see U.C.A., 1953, 
§ 31-41-11, by seeking reimbursement di-
rectly from Wausau in an arbitration pro-
ceeding. On June 10, 1981, the Salt Lake 
Arbitration Committee entered a decision in 
favor of State Farm, requiring Wausau to 
reimburse State Farm for the $4,347.71 paid 
to plaintiffs pursuant to the no-fault cover-
age. 
Because plaintiffs had retained the 
$4,347.71 check intended for State Farm, 
South Central filed, on July 2, 1981, a mo-
tion under rule 60(b), Utah R.Civ.P., to re-
duce the judgment against them by that 
amount and thereby prevent a double re-
covery by plaintiffs and a double payment 
by Wausau. The trial court subsequently 
granted that motion and simultaneously 
dismissed plaintiffs' separate action against 
State Farm for costs and attorney's fees. 
I. Modification of Final Judgment 
Defendant South Central moved to modi-
fy a final judgment that, six months earlier, 
it had approved as to form and content and 
fully satisfied through payment by its lia-
bility insurer. To accomplish this end, 
South Central relies on rule 60(b), alleging 
not fraud, mistake, newly discovered evi-
dence, or that the judgment was void (all 
but the last of which must be raised within 
three months of the judgment), but that the 
judgment should no longer have prospective 
application, and any other reason the Court 
might think of justifying relief. In rele-
vant part the rule reads: 
On motion and upon such terms as are 
just, the court may in the furtherance of 
justice relieve a party or his legal repre-
sentative from a final judgment, order, or 
proceeding for the following reasons: . . . 
(6) the judgment has been satisfied, re-
leased, or discharged, or a prior judgment 
upon which it is based has been reversed 
or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer 
equitable that the judgment should have 
1. In response to Justice Howe's dissent, the 
satisfied judgment clause of subdivision (6) is 
inapplicable because first, South Central does 
not rely on it, and second, the judgment South 
prospective application; or (7) any other 
reason justifying relief from the opera-
tion of the judgment. The motion shall 
be made within a reasonable time . . . . 
This rule brings into conflict competing 
interests in the finality of judgments and 
relief from inequitable judgments. A mo-
tion to modify a final judgment is ad-
dressed to the discretion of the trial court, 
the exercise of which must be based on 
sound legal principles in light of all relevant 
circumstances. The court's determination 
may be reversed only upon a showing that 
this discretion was abused. In addition to 
the concerns that final judgments should 
not be lightly disturbed and that unjust 
judgments should not be allowed to stand, 
other factors the court should consider are 
whether rule 60(b) is being used as a substi-
tute for appeal, whether the movant had a 
fair opportunity to make his objection at 
trial, and whether the motion was made 
within a reasonable time *f**?ijgzrtry "& 
judgment 7 J. Moore & J. Lucas, Moore's 
Federal Practice 160.19 (2d ed. 1982). 
[1] Our consideration of these factors 
and the express language of rule 60(b) com-
pel us to conclude that the trial court 
abused its discretion in reducing the judg-
ment against defendant South Central. 
Subdivision (6) of rule 60(b) does not apply 
to the circumstances of this case. The third 
clause of subdivision (6), particularly relied 
on by South Central, is inapplicable because 
the judgment ceased to have prospective 
application between the parties when it was 
satisfied by South Central. That clause is 
most commonly invoked to terminate in-
junctions.1 
Subdivision (7) is the residuary clause of 
rule 60(b); it embodies three requirements: 
First, that the reason be one other than 
those listed in subdivisions (1) through (6); 
second, that the reason justify relief; and 
third, that the motion be made within a 
Central seeks reduced is not satisfied through 
payment of a different judgment (in arbitra-
tion) by a third party (Wausau). 
LAUB v. SOU! 
reasonable time. The reason 
South Central as justification to reduce the 
judgment is that failure to reduce it will 
result in a partial double recovery for plain-
tiffs and a partial double payment by the 
liability insurer, Wausau. As South Central 
accurately states, prevention of double re-
covery is one of the purposes of the Utah 
Automobile No-Fault Insurance Act. And 
in keeping with that purpose, we recently 
upheld a trial court's reducing the special 
damages of a judgment by the amount of 
damages previously compensated by PIP 
benefits. Dupuis v. Nielson, Utah, 624 R2d 
685 (1981). Dupuis followed naturally from 
our holding in Allstate Insurance Co. v. 
Ivie, Utah, 606 P.2d 1197 (1980), that a 
tortfeasor is not personally liable to the 
injured insured for special damages previ-
ously compensated by PIP benefits from 
the no-fault insurer, and that the injured 
party should therefore not be allowed even 
to plead for those damages. However, if a 
plaintiff does improperly plead for previ-
ously compensated damages and they are 
allowed to be included in the judgment, the 
court should, at the conclusion of the trial, 
either on its own initiative or on motion of 
a party, reduce the judgment by the 
amount of those previously compensated 
damages, and thereby prevent double recov-
ery. 
[2] Assuming that the reason offered by 
South Central to justify relief is a reason 
other than those listed in subdivisions (1) 
through (6), does it justify relief on the 
facts of the instant case? We hold that it 
does not. Dupuis, in which relief was 
granted, is distinguishable from the instant 
case because there the judgment was modi-
fied at the conclusion of trial and before it 
was accepted and satisfied. In the instant 
case the judgment was modified long after 
the time for amending the judgment (pur-
suant to rule 59(e)) or filing an appeal had 
passed and long after South Central had 
approved and satisfied the judgment. 
Clearly, under Ivie, plaintiffs were not enti-
tled to previously compensated damages. 
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offered by When the excessive judgment was ren-
dered, South Central should have moved 
that it be reduced, as was done in Dupuis. 
Instead, South Central approved the judg-
ment and paid it in full without objection, 
until six months later when it finally real-
ized that plaintiffs were getting a partial 
double recovery. 
[3] Furthermore, both the six-month de-
lay and the fact of prior satisfaction show 
that the motion was not made within a 
reasonable time. While we decline plain-
tiffs' invitation to go so far as to say that a 
judgment once knowingly and voluntarily 
satisfied becomes extinguished and is there-
fore never subject to modification, see 
Mitchell v. Lindly, Okl., 351 P.2d 1063 
(1960), we do consider the fact of prior 
satisfaction an important consideration in 
determining whether the motion to modify 
was made within a reasonable time. The 
possibility of prejudice to the nonmoving 
party increases significantly when the judg-
ment has already been paid. 
Federal courts construing the identical 
residuary clause of rule 60(b), Fed.R.Civ.P., 
also deny modification on similar facts. 
E.g., Hughes v. Sanders, 287 F.Supp. 332 
(E.D.Okl.1968). In Hughes the plaintiff 
was injured in an automobile accident, and 
because he was a member of the military, 
the Government paid his medical expenses 
under an agreement that he would reim-
burse the Government out of any recovery 
obtained from the tortfeasor. Analogously, 
then, the Government was in the position of 
a no-fault insurer. Plaintiff subsequently 
obtained a judgment that included the val-
ue of the medical expenses already paid by 
the Government. Thereafter, the Govern-
ment released the needy plaintiff from his 
reimbursement obligation, and as a result, 
defendant moved, prior to satisfaction, that 
the judgment be reduced by the sum of the 
compensated medical expenses pursuant to 
the residuary clause of rule 60(b). The 
court denied the motion, reasoning: 
The power given to the Court by that 
clause, however, "should be very cau-
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tiously and sparingly invoked by the 
Court only in unusual and exceptional 
instances." [Citation omitted.] The 
Court does not believe that this is such a 
case. 
Hughes at 334. That reasoning and result 
are even more applicable in the instant case 
since plaintiffs were under no obligation to 
pay the $4,347.71 check over to their no-
fault insurer and defendant South Central 
made its motion long after satisfaction. 
George Thatcher Corp. v. Bullen, 108 
Utah 562, 162 P.2d 421 (1945), cited by 
South Central in support of its motion to 
modify the judgment, is inapplicable be-
cause it deals with a plaintiff's right to set 
aside a filed Satisfaction of Judgment when 
the judgment has not in fact been satisfied. 
Here we deal not with a motion to set aside 
a Satisfaction of Judgment, but with de-
fendant's motion to reduce a judgment pre-
viously satisfied. 
[4] In summary, then, neither subdivi-
sion (6) nor subdivision (7) of rule 60(b) 
affords South Central relief from the judg-
ment against it. In view of the fact that 
plaintiffs' judgment should never have in-
cluded the previously compensated dam-
ages, defendant South Central's own mis-
take or neglect is the cause of plaintiffs' 
partial double recovery. As discussed 
above, South Central could have prevented 
this undesirable result by timely motion to 
strike the improper portion of the prayer 
for relief or to amend the judgment. This 
failure to act seasonably falls more accu-
rately under subdivision (1) of rule 60(b), 
allowing relief from a judgment rendered 
by "mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or ex-
cusable neglect." However, even if subdivi-
sion (1) had been relied on, relief would still 
be denied for failure to make the motion 
within three months of the judgment. In 
Richards v. Siddoway, 24 Utah 2d 314, 471 
P.2d 143 (1970), we reversed the granting of 
a motion to correct a nonclerical error in a 
judgment pursuant to subdivision (1) of rule 
60(b) because, as here, the motion was made 
too late. The time strictures of rule 60(b) 
are wholesome and necessary, for there 
must be an end to the time when judgments 
can be questioned. See also Ackermann v. 
United States, 340 U.S. 193, 198, 71 S.Ct. 
209, 211, 95 L.Ed. 207 (1950) (denied relief 
under rule 60(b): "There must be an end to 
litigation someday, and free, calculated, de-
liberate choices are not to be relieved 
from."). Furthermore, since subdivision (1) 
is applicable to the instant case, subdivision 
(7) cannot apply and may not be used to 
circumvent the three-month filing period. 
Calder Brothers v. Anderson Signs, Inc., 
Utah, 652 P.2d 922 (1982). See also Pitts v. 
McLachlan, Utah, 567 P.2d 171 (1977). 
II. Attorney's Fees 
Prior to passage of the Utah Automobile 
No-Fault Insurance Act in 1973, standard 
practice was for the insurer to compensate 
the insured for his economic losses and then 
seek reimbursement out of the insured's 
subsequent judgment or settlement. To fa-
cilitate this reimbursement process, the lia-
bility insurer would typically make one 
check payable to both the insured and the 
insurer in the amount of the compensation 
previously paid. Another check would be 
made payable to the insured alone for the 
balance of the judgment. Because the re-
imbursement fund was procured by the in-
sured, the insurer typically contributed a 
fair share of the costs and attorney's fees 
incurred in obtaining the fund. See Trans-
america Insurance Co. v. Barnes, 29 Utah 
2d 101, 505 P.2d 783 (1972). 
[5-8] The No-Fault Act and cases con-
struing it have significantly altered this 
practice. To begin with, a tortfeasor who 
has the required security is liable neither to 
the injured party nor to the no-fault insurer 
for reimbursement of PIP payments; 
therefore, the plaintiff's prayer should not 
include the damages compensated by the 
PIP payments. Since the no-fault insured 
should receive no funds on behalf of the 
no-fault insurer, the insurer has no right of 
subrogation as to funds obtained Jxy the 
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insured through either settlement with or 
judgment against the tortfeasor. The no-
fault insurer's only right of reimbursement 
through subrogation is against the liability 
insurer in an arbitration proceeding. All-
state Insurance Co. v. Ivie, Utah, 606 P.2d 
1197 (1980). Since the no-fault insurer 
ideally will not receive its reimbursement 
from the no-fault insured, the practice of 
the insurer paying to the insured a fair 
share of the costs and attorney's fees is now 
obsolete. However, if, as in Street v. 
Farmers Insurance Exchange, Utah, 609 
P.2d 1343 (1980), and Guaranty National 
Insurance Co. v. Morris, Utah, 611 P.2d 725 
(1980), the parties deviate from the above-
outlined practice and allow the no-fault in-
sured to recover funds on behalf of the 
no-fault insurer and the no-fault insurer 
does in fact receive reimbursement from 
those funds, then the insurer must contrib-
ute to the payment of costs and attorney's 
fees incurred by the insured in obtaining 
those funds. 
[9] The parties in the instant case devi-
ated from proper procedure in that plain-
tiffs were allowed to plead for and recover 
previously compensated damages. Liability 
insurer Wausau was mistaken in its belief 
that reimbursement to State Farm should 
pass through the plaintiffs, and plaintiffs 
were mistaken in their belief that they 
could not retain the whole of it. No-fault 
insurer State Farm was not entitled to the 
reimbursement fund held by plaintiffs, 
made no claim to it, and received no part of 
it. Therefore, State Farm need not contrib-
ute to payment of plaintiffs' costs and at-
torney's fees. Plaintiffs urge that State 
Farm is benefitted indirectly through appli-
cation of collateral estoppel in the arbitra-
tion proceeding as to issues decided at trial 
and should therefore bear some of the costs 
and attorney's fees of trial. However, any 
1. U.C.A., 1953, § 31-41-1, et seq. 
2. Allstate Insurance Co. v. Anderson, Utah, 608 
P.2d 235 (1980). 
such benefit is too remote to require a 
sharing of costs and fees. To require con-
tribution under such circumstances would 
only multiply the disputes and litigation 
and thus yield a result the No-Fault Act 
was designed to eliminate. 
Affirmed in part and reversed in part. 
OAKS and DURHAM, JJ., concur. 
HALL, Chief Justice (concurring and dis-
senting): 
I concur in affirming the denial of attor-
ney fees and costs to plaintiffs. However, I 
dissent from that part of the Court's opin-
ion which reverses the trial court's modifi-
cation of the judgment against South Cen-
tral. 
The very purpose of the Utah Automobile 
No-Fault Insurance Actl is to prevent dou-
ble payment for the same loss and thus to 
avoid increased costs of insurance cover-
age.2 In furtherance of that worthy objec-
tive, the trial court appropriately modified 
the judgment against South Central by the 
specific, identifiable and undisputed amount 
of the PIP benefits received by plaintiffs 
prior to the time they initiated this lawsuit. 
Plaintiffs filed this action prior to this 
Court's decision in Allstate Insurance Com-
pany v. Ivie 3 when it was common practice 
to plead for and recover all damages, in-
cluding those covered by PIP payments pre-
viously received under first party insurance 
benefits. The tortfeasor's liability insurer 
typically made payment in two separate 
checks, one drawn solely in favor of the 
injured party covering general damages, 
and the other drawn jointly in favor of the 
injured party and his no-fault insurer cover-
ing prior PIP payments. This procedure 
afforded the no-fault insurer the right of 
subrogation to recover the PIP payments 
previously advanced to its insured. 
3. Utah, 606 P.2d 1197; Ivie was decided Febru-
ary 7, 1980, after this action was filed, but 
before it was tried and decided on December 
23, 1980. 
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The foregoing procedure was followed in 
the instant case,4 except that plaintiffs re-
tained the PIP check, not for the purpose of 
effecting a double recovery, but to compel 
South Central to contribute toward their 
costs and attorney fees in recovering the 
PIP payments for State Farm. Conse-
quently, as contemplated by Ivie,5 State 
Farm sought and obtained reimbursement 
of the sum of $4,347.71 from Wausau 
through arbitration proceedings. This 
placed Wausau in the unexpected and ineq-
uitable position of having to make a double 
payment of PIP damages. The trial court's 
subsequent modification of the initial judg-
ment, reducing the amount thereof by the 
sum of the PIP payments, constituted an 
appropriate effort on the part of the court 
to rectify its error and to comply with the 
recent Ivie decision. In modifying the 
judgment, the court relied upon the provi-
sions of Rule 60(bX6) and (7),6 which read in 
pertinent part as follows: 
On motion and upon such terms as are 
just, the court may in the furtherance of 
justice relieve a party or his legal repre-
sentative from a final judgment, order, or 
proceeding for the following reasons: . . . 
(6) the judgment has been satisfied, re-
leased, or discharged, or a prior judgment 
upon which it is based has been reversed 
or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer 
equitable that the judgment should have 
prospective application; or (7) any other 
reason justifying relief from the opera-
tion of the judgment. The motion shall 
be made within a reasonable time 
The main opinion concludes that the trial 
court erred in relying on the foregoing rules 
4. In apparent unawareness of the intervening 
decision in Ivie. 
5. In Ivie, the Court interpreted the procedure 
contemplated by the no-fault statute, supra, as 
follows: 
[T]he injured party should plead only for 
those damages for which he has not received 
reparation under his first party insurance 
benefits. 
Ivie at 1200. 
[S]imilarly, section 11 in the Utah No-Fault 
Insurance Act cannot be interpreted as con-
and suggests that the only subsection of 
Rule 60(b) which would have supported a 
motion to modify in this case was subsec-
tion (1) which allows relief from a judg-
ment rendered by "mistake, inadvertence, 
surprise or excusable neglect," and requires 
such a motion be made within three months 
of the date of the judgment. South Cen-
tral's motion to modify was made on June 
30, 1981, more than six months after judg-
ment. Therefore, it would not qualify un-
der subsection (1). However, under the 
unique facts and circumstances of this case, 
the need to modify did not arise within the 
three-month limitation period. In light of 
the fact that this case was tried pursuant to 
the pre-Jv/e procedure, Wausau had no rea-
son to believe that the check it had issued to 
plaintiffs and State Farm jointly would not 
eventually be endorsed to State Farm under 
the customary principles of subrogation. 
The prospect of having to make a double 
payment if the PIP damages did not be-
come a reality until the arbitration decision 
was reached on June 10, 1981, which was 
five months after judgment. Wausau's 
need for relief did not exist prior to the 
arbitration decision, and promptly thereaft-
er (on June 30,1981) South Central brought 
its motion to modify based on Rule 60(bX6) 
and (7). 
The main opinion accurately recites the 
general rule of law that there must be a 
day when a judgment becomes final and 
litigation ceases, and that the filing of a 
satisfaction of judgment usually accom-
plishes that purpose.7 However, a satisfac-
tion of judgment does not conclusively es-
tablish the finality of the matter. Upon 
ferring on the No-Fault insurer a right of 
subrogation to the funds received by its in-
sured for personal injuries. Section 11 
grants the no-fault insurer a limited, equita-
ble right to seek reimbursement in arbitration 
proceeding against the liability insurer. 
Me at 1202. 
6. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
7. Hollingsworth v. Fire Insurance Exchange, 
Utah, 655 P.2d 637 (1982). 
LAUB v. SOU'i JENTRAL 
Cite as, Utah, 
proper motion and adequate reasons, a sat-
isfaction of judgment can be set aside.8 
Equitable principles govern the vacation of 
an entry of satisfaction of judgment just as 
they do a motion to modify a judgment.9 
Although no specific motion to set aside the 
satisfaction of judgment was made in this 
case, it was necessarily set aside pursuant 
to the modification of the judgment and 
upon equitable principles. 
I agree with the further reasoning of the 
main opinion that the possibility of preju-
dice to the nonmoving party increases sig-
nificantly when the judgment has already 
been paid and satisfied, but that reasoning 
has no application to the particular facts of 
this case. What possible prejudice could 
inure to plaintiffs by invalidating the 
$4,347.71 PIP check issued by Wausau, 
which plaintiffs never expected to retain, 
and which has never been negotiated? The 
check is still uncashed, and now that the 
instrument is more than six months old, by 
statute it need not be honored.10 It is 
therefore not only reasonable, but incum-
bent upon this Court to apply principles of 
equity in this matter and sustain the reduc-
tion of judgment against South Central, 
thus fulfilling the objective of the law with-
out causing undue prejudice to any party. 
The judgment of the trial court is sup-
ported by the practice followed in the feder-
al courts. Rule 60(bX5) of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure is identical to Rule 
60(bX6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, and the provision "no longer equitable 
that the judgment should have prospective 
application" has been construed as follows: 
The reference in clause (5) to judgment 
which it is "no longer equitable" to apply 
prospectively invokes equitable principles 
for relief from the prospective operation 
of a judgment which long antedate the 
8. George Thatcher Corporation v. Bullen, 108 
Utah 562, 162 P.2d 421 (1945); Cason v. Glass 
Bottle Blowers Association, 113 Cal.App.2d 
263, 247 P.2d 931 (1952); 47 Am.Jur.2d Judg-
ments § 1032. 
9. George Thatcher Corporation v. Bullent su-
pra, n. 6; see also, Utah C.V. Federal Credit 
Union v. Jenkins, Utah, 528 P.2d 1187 (1974). 
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Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Those 
principles are invariably applied by the 
courts in construing Rule 60(bX5), and 
the leading decisions explicating those 
principles bear exposition. For example, 
it is established that a change in condi-
tions, whether a fact or by subsequently 
enacted statute, may warrant relief from 
a final judgment, but only from the pro-
spective application of that judgment. 
[Emphasis added.] 
14 A.L.R.Fed. 309 § 3(b). 
Justice in this case demands that the 
principles of equity be applied. There has 
been an obvious change in conditions. The 
Ivie decision came down while this case was 
pending in the trial court, changing the 
customary procedure followed in applying 
the no-fault statute. This prompted State 
Farm's otherwise unexpected arbitration 
proceeding against Wausau to recover the 
PIP payments which had already been paid 
jointly to the plaintiffs and State Farm in 
accordance with the trial court's judgment 
Certainly, these were changed circumstanc-
es within the contemplation of the Rule.11 
Furthermore, the judgment still has pro-
spective application. This is so notwith-
standing the fact that the judgment has 
been paid and a satisfaction of judgment 
filed, because the $4,347.71 check represent-
ing the PIP payments previously made by 
Wausau remains unnegotiated. 
In such circumstances, the sage advice of 
Justice Cardozo regarding the application of 
Rule 60(b)(5), supra, has full application: 
A court does not abdicate its power to 
revoke or modify its mandate if satisfied 
that what it has been doing has been 
turned through changing circumstances 
into an instrument of wrong. 
286 U.S. at 114, 52 S.Ct. at 462. 
I would affirm the judgment of the trial 
court in its entirety. 
10. U.C.A., 1953, § 70A-4-404. 
11. See 14 A.L.R.Fed. 309, § 5[a]; see also, 77 
Moore's Federal Practice ^60.26[4]; see also, 
United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 52 
S.Ct. 460, 76 L.Ed. 999 (1932). 
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HOWE, Justice (concurring and dissent-
ing): 
I concur in the opinion of Chief Justice 
Hall with the following observation. Nei-
ther in his opinion nor in the majority opin-
ion is any recognition given to that part of 
Rule 60(bX6) which specifically provides 
that if a judgment has been "satisfied, re-
leased, or discharged", that is a ground 
upon which the court may relieve a party 
from the judgment. Entirely aside from 
the fact that the plaintiffs here had filed a 
written Satisfaction of Judgment in the 
court below, the judgment debtor's insurer, 
Wausau, has paid or is obligated to pay the 
plaintiffs' insurer, State Farm, $4,347.71 on 
a subrogation claim handled through arbi-
tration. This fact clearly provided the 
judgment debtor with grounds to have the 
judgment against it modified to the extent 
of that amount. On somewhat similar 
facts, a judgment was modified because of 
partial satisfaction thereof in Sunderland v. 
City of Philadelphia, 575 F.2d 1089 (3rd 
Cir.1978). There, the plaintiffs obtained a 
judgment against the defendants in the 
amount of $35,000 arising out of a gas 
explosion. After entry of judgment, de-
fendants filed a motion to amend the judg-
ment because one of them had paid $7,500 
to the plaintiffs' insurer on account of the 
latter's subrogation claim against the de-
fendants. The court held that the denial of 
the motion by the district court was an 
abuse of discretion and that the defendants 
were entitled to such relief modifying the 
judgment under Federal Rule 60(bX5), 
which is the same as our Rule 60(bX6). 
O I KEY NUMBER SYSTEM 
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT 
SECURITY and Marian Lynch, 
Defendants. 
No. 17922. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Dec. 30, 1982. 
City employee had worked as real es-
tate acquisition officer. When city depart-
ments were reorganized, employee was re-
fused employment in new position commen-
surate to her former position, and was of-
fered position with different job description 
and lower job classification, and employee 
voluntarily terminated employment with 
city. She subsequently was granted unem-
ployment compensation benefits, and city 
appealed such award. Appeals referee de-
termined that employee's resignation was 
without "good cause," but the Board of 
Review reversed referee, granting employee 
benefits, and city appealed. The Supreme 
Court, Stewart, J., held that: (1) employee 
who quits "voluntarily and without good 
cause" may nevertheless be awarded bene-
fits if Industrial Commission finds that it 
would be contrary to equity and good con-
science to deny them; (2) evidence sup-
ported finding that employee left her em-
ployment not because she failed to receive 
raise but because it appeared inevitable she 
would be demoted; and (3) employee was 
entitled to compensation on basis of "equity 
and good conscience." 
Affirmed. 
1. Social Security and Public Welfare 
<s=»280 
Although Employment Security Act is 
not designed to provide benefits to those 
McBRIDE 
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Bostwick v. Beach, 103 N.Y. 414, 9 IE. 41 
(1886). 
[7] Following the general rule, when 
specific performance is ordered and a plain-
tiff seeks an award of lost rents or profits, 
the vendor who wrongfully withholds con-
veyance of property is entitled to credit for 
actual interest earned on the purchase mon-
ey retained by the purchaser, if any. The 
seller in default may not, however, profit 
from his own wrongdoing and therefore 
will not be awarded any excess of interest 
over rents and profits. Pearce v. Third 
Ave. Improvement Co., 221 Ala. 209, 128 So. 
396 (1930). 
[8] In the present case, defendant's re-
fusal to convey the property was found to 
be "wrongful in that it was in contraven-
tion of the contract but it was not willful or 
malicious so as to entitle plaintiffs to puni-
tive damages." The usual rule of credit for 
purchase money interest against rental val-
ue should therefore be followed in adjusting 
the equities between the parties based upon 
their position had there been a timely con-
veyance. 
[9] Plaintiffs have attempted to cross 
appeal from the award of damages, alleging 
its inadequacy as a matter of law. How-
ever, they have failed to comply with Rules 
74(b) and 75(d), Utah Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, which require a timely filing and ser-
vice of a statement of the points to be 
relied on in a cross appeal. The cross ap-
peal is therefore not properly before this 
Court, and we decline to consider the addi-
tional issues raised by plaintiffs. 
Remanded for further proceedings to de-
termine the amount of plaintiffs' rental-val-
ue losses as offset by interest on the pur-
chase pricp Costs to Respondents. 
CROCKETT, C. J., and WILKINS and 
HALL, J J., concur. 
MAUGHAN, Justice (concurring and dis-
senting): 
With one exception, I concur with the 
judgment of the Court. That exception is 
with the dismissal of the Cross-Appeal for 
failure to comply with Rules 74(b) and 
75(d), U.R.C.P. 
v. JONES Utah 431 
615P.2d431 
Where, as here, the appellant brings up 
the whole record, and specifically makes the 
issue of damages one of his points on ap-
peal, I see no reason why the respondent 
should not be free to cross-appeal on the 
issue of damages. The issue of damages 
comes as no surprise to the appellant. 
Rules 74(b) and 75(d) are designed to 
prevent surprise when the record is selec-
tively brought to the Court, and where the 
Cross-Appellant may wish to select other 
parts of the record, not already argued. 
Michael W. McBRIDE, Plaintiff 
and Respondent, 
Terry Lynne JONES (formerly Terry 
Lynne McBride), Defendant 
and Appellant. 
No. 16650. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
July 15, 1980. 
A wife instituted supplementary pro-
ceedings in divorce action, to modify the 
decree on ground of deception. The Third 
District Court, Salt Lake County, Christine 
Durham, J., granted husband's motion for 
summary dismissal, and the wife appealed. 
The Supreme Court, Crockett, C. J., held 
that: (1) alleged want of any factual basis 
for wife's claim of fraud was not ground 
for entry of summary judgment where 
averments of the parties were in fact in 
diametric disagreement; (2) in case of in-
terfamily feuding, where contentions make 
it appear that there is substantial likelihood 
that proof may show that party to proceed-
ing wherein judgment was entered was so 
cheated, imposed upon or unfairly dealt 
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with that it should shock conscience of the 
court to allow it to stand, court should 
resolve doubts in favor of permitting par-
ties to present their evidence and have is-
sues determined, instead of allowing dis-
tinction between intrinsic and extrinsic 
fraud to be controlling; and (3) in deter-
mining propriety of granting motion for 
summary dismissal, testimony of party or 
witness could be looked at in its entire 
context, and it was not necessary that it be 
measured solely on one statement. 
Cause remanded for trial upon issues in 
dispute. 
1. Judgment <s=>181(20) 
In supplementary proceedings in di-
vorce action to modify decree, alleged want 
of any factual basis for wife's claim of 
fraud was not ground for entry of summary 
judgment where averments of the parties 
were in fact in diametric disagreement. 
Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56(c). 
2. Judgment <s=* 185(2) 
In case of interfamily feuding, where 
contentions make it appear that there is 
substantial likelihood that proof may show 
that party to proceeding wherein judgment 
was entered was so cheated, imposed upon 
or unfairly dealt with that it should shock 
conscience of the court to allow it to stand, 
court should resolve doubts in favor of per-
mitting parties to present their evidence 
and have issues determined, instead of al-
lowing distinction between intrinsic and ex-
trinsic fraud to be controlling. Rules of 
Civil Procedure, Rule 56(c); Const. Art. 1, 
§11. 
3. Judgment <s=>186 
In determining propriety of granting 
motion for summary dismissal, testimony of 
party or witness could be looked at in its 
entire context, and it was not necessary 
that it be measured solely on one statement. 
Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 56(c). 
1. See Rule 56(c) U.R.C.P.; and see In Re Wil-
liams' Estates, 10 Utah 2d 83, 348 P.2d 683. 
2. Rich v. McGovem, Utah, 551 P.2d 1266. See 
also Transamerica Title Ins. Co. v. United Re-
sources, Inc., 24 Utah 2d 346, 471 P.2d 165. 
Joseph L. Henriod, Earl Jay Peck, Ste-
phen L. Henriod of Nielsen, Henriod, 
Gottfredson & Peck, Salt Lake City, for 
defendant and appellant. 
Raymond J. Etcheverry of Parsons, Behle 
& Latimer, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and 
respondent. 
CROCKETT, Chief Justice: 
The defendant, Terry Lynne Jones, insti-
tuted supplementary proceedings in this di-
vorce action to modify the decree. She 
alleges that her former husband, plaintiff 
Michael W. McBride, actively deceived her 
about the value of family property, referred 
to below. On the ground that the rights of 
the parties had been settled in the decree, 
the court granted the plaintiff's motion for 
summary dismissal. Defendant appeals. 
A motion for summary dismissal can 
properly be granted only when even assum-
ing the facts as asserted by the party 
moved against to be true, he could not 
prevail.1 In circumstances where the grant-
ing of such a motion is justified, it serves 
the salutary purpose of eliminating the 
time, trouble and expense of a trial which 
would be to no avail anyway.2 However, 
since the party moved against is denied the 
opportunity of presenting his evidence and 
his contentions, it is and should be the poli-
cy of the courts to act on such motions with 
great caution, to assure that a party whose 
cause might have merit is not deprived of 
the right to access to the courts for the 
enforcement of rights or the redress of 
wrongs.8 
In defense of the summary order, the 
plaintiff asserts two propositions: first, 
that there is no factual basis for the de-
fendant's claim of fraud, and second, that if 
any fraud existed, it was intrinsic fraud and 
not available as a ground for disturbing the 
decree. 
3. Id. Also see Art. 1, Sec. 11 of the Utah Con-
stitution 
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[1] As to (1) above: Defendant's correct 
anc: sufficient rejoinder is that the aver-
ments of the parties are in diametric disa-
greement, wherefore summary dismissal 
could not properly be based on that ground, 
and that the issue would have to be re-
solved on the basis of the credibility of their 
respective evidence thereon. Accordingly, 
if summary disposition is justified, it would 
have to be on plaintiffs second ground. 
We acknowledge awareness and apprecia-
tion of the cases cited and relied upon by 
the plaintiff to the effect that intrinsic 
fraud will not usually be grounds for set-
ting aside a judgment.4 The reasoning is to 
the effect that intrinsic fraud, that is, fraud 
which occurs during and within the pro-
ceedings, so that a party exercising reason-
able diligence could meet and have an adju-
dication thereon, will not justify relief from 
a judgment.5 Whereas, it is held that the 
only type of fraud which will justify grant-
ing relief from a judgment is extrinsic 
fraud, that is, the deception or misrepresen-
tation was outside the proceedings and ef-
fectively prevented the party from meeting 
and having the issue determined.6 
It is not to be doubted that, in appropri-
ate circumstances, there may be merit to 
the just-stated distinction between intrinsic 
and extrinsic fraud, and the allowance of a 
belated collateral attack upon a judgment 
only for the latter. The principal reason 
for this is that there must be some end to 
litigation; and to serve that purpose, the 
findings and judgment on issues previously 
tried or triable should have respect and 
solidarity; and this includes all matters 
4. Haner v. Haner, 13 Utah 2d 299, 373 P.2d 
577; Clissold v. Clissold, 30 Utah 2d 430, 519 
R2d 241; Rice v. Rice, 11 Utah 27, 212 P.2d 
685. 
5. Id. 
6. Clissold v. Clissold, supra, note 4. 
7. See Wheadon v. Pearson, 14 Utah 2d 45, 376 
P.2d 946, and authorities therein cited. 
8. Haner v. Haner, 13 Utah 2d at 300-1, 373 
P.2d at 578. Approaching such a problem in a 
realistic way, this Court has heretofore recog-
nized that to deny a party post-judgment relief 
on the basis of the intrinsic-extrinsic distinction 
v. JONES Utah 4 3 3 
6i5P.2d431 
which could, with reasonable diligence, have 
been presented and resolved in the trial.7 
And ror that reason a judgment should not 
be disturbed except for compelling reasons 
where the interests of justice so demand. 
The other side of that proposition is that 
the courts should not forsake the interests 
of justice; and when it appears that an 
egregious deception or oppression may have 
been practiced, it should neither be con-
doned nor rewarded. Particularly, that this 
should not be done by allowing one to seek 
refuge in niceties of legal terminology. 
[2] Consistent with that principle, 
thougti we remain committed to the desira-
bility of respecting judgments and preserv-
ing their solidarity, we have heretofore rec-
ognized that it is more important to give 
consideration to the degree of the injustice 
that may have resulted than to terminology 
or labels as to the type of fraud alleged.8 
Accordingly, in a case such as this of inter-
family feuding, where the contentions make 
it appear that there is a substantial likeli-
hood that the proof may show that a party 
was so cheated, imposed upon, or unfairly 
dealt with that it should shock the con-
science of the court to allow it to stand, the 
court should resolve doubts in favor of per-
mitting the parties to present their evidence 
and have the issues determined. 
In preface to refocusing attention on the 
controversy here in the light of what has 
just been said, we note that we do not 
presume to judge the credibility of evidence 
nor the outcome of the controversy. But on 
review of the summary dismissal, we a&-
may be too restrictive. In Haner v. Haner, we 
stated: 
It is sometimes said that when a judgment is 
attacked collaterally on the ground that it 
was obtained by fraud or deceit it will be set 
aside only for extrinsic fraud. But we are in 
accord with the Restatement of Judgments 
that this is too limited. [Restatement of 
Judgments, Sec. 118 et seq.] It seems more 
realistic to say that when it appears that the 
processes of justice have been so completely 
thwarted or distorted as to persuade the 
court that in fairness and good conscience 
the judgment should not be permitted to 
stand, relief should be granted. 
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sume the averments of the party ruled 
against to be true. 
Sparing detail not essential to our pur-
pose here, the generality of the defendant's 
allegations of fraud are: that at the time of 
the divorce proceedings the plaintiff repre-
sented to her that their 10 percent interest 
in a partnership known as Alpine Ltd. had 
become worthless in that its assets had been 
transferred to Land & Cattle Funding, Inc., 
owned by the plaintiff; whereas, Alpine 
Ltd. had had 5,000 acres of land near Al-
pine, Utah, which was sold the year after 
the divorce for 7.5 million dollars. From 
this defendant reasons that their 10 percent 
share thereof should have been about $750,-
000 at the time of the divorce. Further, 
that the plaintiff was in an advantaged 
position having knowledge of those facts; 
that defendant had a right to and did rea-
sonably rely on his representation, which 
prevented her from asserting her claim to 
her share of the Alpine Ltd. assets. 
Plaintiff quite understandably points out 
and stresses an answer in defendant's testi-
mony that she did not rely upon the repre-
sentation by him about the value of Land & 
Cattle Funding, Inc.: 
Q. The question is: At the time you 
decided not to take any stock in Land 
& Cattle Funding, did you rely on the 
statement that the corporation had a 
negative net worth? 
A. No, I did not rely on that statement. 
But she also testified: 
Q. You don't know whether you relied 
on that statement or not? 
A. I don't know what you're asking. 
A. I don't know what I relied on. How 
can you take half of something that 
isn't even there any more? 
[3] The fact is that if her testimony is 
analyzed in its total context, it is also sus-
ceptible of being understood as indicating 
that because the plaintiff had represented 
that the property had no value, she did not 
9. That the testimony of a party, or a witness, 
need not be measured solely on one statement, 
but may be looked at in its entire context, see 
DeVas v. Noblef 13 Utah 2d 133, 369 P.2d 290. 
consider it nor representations concerning it 
in connection with the settlement.9 
Plaintiff also argues that his representa-
tion as to the value of marital assets was a 
mere expression of opinion and as such is 
not a representation of fact which would be 
a basis for an action in fraud. It is true 
that in usual commercial transactions, 
statements as to value, subsequently found 
to be false, may be tolerated as expressions 
of opinion or puffery.^ However, this case 
is different. In some husband-wife rela-
tionships, it would not be unreasonable to 
believe that the husband had superior 
knowledge of property which he was han-
dling in the family's interest; and that the 
wife would be justified in reposing confi-
dence in his knowledge and his representa-
tions concerning value. In situations relat-
ing to family welfare, the parties should be 
held to a higher than usual degree of re-
sponsibility in making full and fair disclo-
sure of the facts of which each has special 
knowledge. 
Upon the basis of what has been said 
herein, it is our conclusion that the trial 
court was not justified in granting the mo-
tion for summary dismissal, but should have 
allowed a trial upon the issues in dispute. 
The cause is remanded for that purpose. 
Any award of costs is to abide determina-
tion by the trial court. 
MAUGHAN, WILKINS and STEWART, 
JJ., concur. 
HALL, J., concurs in result. 
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Phillip C. PEPPER, an Arizona 
resident, et al., Plaintiffs and 
Appellants, 
v. 
ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK, N.A., 
et al., Defendants, Counter-claimants, 
and Appellees. 
ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK, N.A., 
et al., Third-Party Plaintiffs, 
v. 
Fred M. ROSENTHAL, et al., 
Third-Party Defendants. 
Nos. 20807, 20958. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Nov. 9, 1990. 
Rehearing Denied in No. 20807 
Nov. 28, 1990. 
Beneficiaries of trust brought action 
against bank as executor of estate and as 
trustee of trust which was sole beneficiary 
of estate. The Third District Court, Salt 
Lake County, Kenneth Rigtrup, J., entered 
summary judgment in favor of bank, and 
beneficiaries appealed. Bank filed protec-
tive, or conditional, cross appeal from sum-
mary judgment dismissing its third-party 
indemnification claim against third-party 
defendant who had managed family busi-
nesses for and on behalf of bank as execu-
tor. The Supreme Court, Stewart, J., held 
that: (1) denial of motion for relief from 
estate closing order did not preclude subse-
quent independent action collaterally at-
tacking order on grounds of fraud and 
misrepresentation; (2) if a trustee fails to 
assert claims of a trust against an executor 
who transfers dissipated assets to the 
trust, those claims are not precluded by 
probate order discharging executor, even 
though trustee and executor are the same 
entity; and (3) estate closing order which 
approved estate's transfer of partnership 
assets to trust, and subsequent sale of 
assets by trust did not have any res judica-
ta effect upon trust beneficiaries' claims 
against trustee for failing to enforce 
trust's claims against estate for executor's 
mismanagement of assets prior to their 
transfer to trust. 
Reversed and remanded. 
Howe, J., concurred in result. 
1. Executors and Administrators G=>508(1, 
2) 
Court order approving a final account-
ing and settlement of an estate is a decree 
that closes the estate and discharges the 
executor; order binds all persons interest-
ed who are given proper notice of the final 
proceeding as to all matters properly the 
subject of the accounting. U.C.A.1953, 75-
3-1001(1). 
2. Judgment <3=>508 
Final judgments and decrees generally 
may be collaterally attacked if obtained by 
fraud. 
3. Executors and Administrators <&=>509(1, 
4) 
Estate closing orders, like other de-
crees, may be assailed in equity and upon 
the same grounds as other judgments. 
4. Executors and Administrators 
<2>513(3) 
Collateral attack on a decree closing an 
estate and approving final accounting may 
be based on fraud or misrepresentation. 
U.C.A.1953, 75-1-106. 
5. Executors and Administrators 
<s>513(3) 
For a collateral attack against an es-
tate closing order on ground of fraud, 
plaintiff must allege that executor was 
guilty of misrepresentation or concealment 
in presenting his account or in obtaining 
approval of the court for the final account-
ing. 
6. Judgment <&»585(1), 588 
For denial of a relief from judgment 
motion to have preclusive effect on a sub-
sequently filed independent action, claim or 
ground actually adjudicated on the motion 
must be the same claim or ground that is 
asserted in the independent action. Rules 
Civ.Proc, Rule 60(b). pCj tf(t 
PEPPER v. ZIONS FJ 
teas 801 P.2d 
7. Executors and Administrators 
<S=>509(10) 
Denial of motion for relief from estate 
closing order did not preclude subsequent 
independent action collaterally attacking 
order on grounds of fraud and misrepre-
sentation, where motion sought to have 
order vacated on procedural ground that 
movants had insufficient time to respond to 
executor's petition at final hearing. Rules 
Civ.Proc, Rule 60(b). 
8. Trusts 0 2 4 3 
Trustee owes duty to beneficiary on 
taking over property from an executor to 
examine the property tendered and see 
whether it is that which he ought to re-
ceive. 
9. Trusts <s=»243 
Successor trustee is liable for breach 
of trust if he neglects to take proper steps 
to compel his predecessor to deliver trust 
property to him. 
10. Trusts e=*243 
Trustee has duty to enforce claims 
against executor as a prior fiduciary upon 
the transfer of the assets of estate to trust-
ee; moreover, trustee's duty is not dimin-
ished or altered because trustee was also 
the executor of the estate that transferred 
assets to trust, even though executor was 
absolved from liability for administration 
of estate by court order. 
11. Executors and Administrators 
@=>513(13) 
Beneficiary's claim for relief against 
trustee for failure to enforce trust's claim 
against executor as a predecessor fiduciary 
is not barred by res judicata doctrines of 
collateral estoppel and issue preclusion 
based on an estate closing order; claim 
against trustee for defaulting on its duty to 
protect trust does not constitute a collat-
eral attack on estate closing order. 
12. Executors and Administrators 
<s=>513(9) 
If trustee fails to assert claims of trust 
against executor who transfers dissipated 
assets to trust, such claims are not preclud-
ed by probate order discharging executor, 
IteT NAT. BANK, N.A. uian 1 4 D 
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even though trustee and ^cutor are the 
same entity. 
13. Trusts ®=>243 
Statute limiting a trustee's liability for 
failure to take steps to redress breach of 
trust or fiduciary duty by predecessor exec-
utor or trustee to those acts of predecessor 
concerning which the trustee had actual 
knowledge or information which would 
have caused reasonable trustee to inquire 
further, could not absolve bank which act-
ed in dual capacity as executor and succes-
sor trustee, and thus was clearly aware of 
any breach of duty it may have committed 
as executor. U.C.A.1953, 75-7-306(6). 
14. Executors and Administrators 
<s=>513(13) 
Estate closing order which approved 
estate's transfer of partnership assets to 
trust, and subsequent sale of assets by 
trust, did not have any res judicata effect 
upon trust beneficiaries' claims against 
trustee for failing to enforce trust's claims 
against estate for executor's mismanage-
ment of assets prior to their transfer to 
trust; grounds alleged in complaint were 
not actually litigated in probate proceeding, 
which was a default proceeding. 
Irving H. Biele, Edward S. Sweeney, J. 
Peter Mulhern, Salt Lake City, for plain-
tiffs and appellants. 
Gary R. Howe, Charles M. Bennett, She-
ryl L. Simpson, Salt Lake City, for defen-
dants, counter-claimants, and appellees. 
Bernard L. Rose, Salt Lake City, for 
third-party defendant. 
STEWART, Justice: 
Phillip C. Pepper and other members of 
the Pepper family ("the Peppers"), the ben-
eficiaries of the Jerome B. Pepper trust, 
filed this action against Zions First Nation-
al Bank as the executor of the Jerome B. 
Pepper estate and as the trustee of the 
Jerome B. Pepper inter vivos trust. The 
trust is the sole beneficiary of the estate, 
and Jerome B. Pepper's wife and children, 
the appellants here, are the beneficiaries of 
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the trust. The Peppers appeal from an 
adverse summary judgment on counts I 
and II of their five-count second amended 
complaint. Count I of the complaint al-
leged that Zions, as the executor of the 
estate, was guilty of fraud, mismanage-
ment, and self-dealing, which caused a dis-
sipation of the assets of the estate. Count 
II of the complaint alleged that Zions, as 
trustee, failed to charge Zions as executor 
with breach of its fiduciary duty as execu-
tor in failing to transfer to the trustee the 
assets of the estate undiminished by Zions' 
alleged unlawful acts as executor. 
Zions filed a protective, or conditional, 
cross-appeal from a summary judgment 
dismissing Zions' third-party indemnifica-
tion claim against Fred M. Rosenthal, who 
had managed the Pepper family businesses 
for and on behalf of Zions as executor. 
The trial court dismissed the above claims 
and certified that there was no just reason 
for delay and entered a final order pursu-
ant to Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
I. FACTS 
On April 15, 1975, Jerome B. Pepper 
executed the Jerome B. Pepper inter vivos 
trust, which named Zions as the trustee, 
for the benefit of his wife and children. 
After he died in 1976, Zions was appointed 
the executor of his estate, and in that ca-
pacity, Zions obtained the probate court's 
approval to continue the ordinary opera-
tions of the Pepper family businesses. 
Zions also obtained court approval to ap-
point Fred M. Rosenthal to manage several 
businesses that Pepper had owned. Rosen-
thal served as general manager of the Pep-
per businesses for the estate from Febru-
ary, 1976, to December, 1980. 
In December, 1978, Pamco, one of the 
estate's businesses, made application to 
Zions Bank to increase its line of credit 
with the bank to obtain additional working 
capital and to pay $250,000 in estate taxes. 
The net worth of the Jerome B. Pepper 
estate at about that time was represented 
to be $2,119,468. The net worth of the 
estate in December, 1979, increased to 
$2,555,248. In February, 1981, the line of 
credit with Zions reached a high of $930,-
000. A few months later, Zions, as execu-
tor, filed a final accounting that showed a 
negative net worth for the estate. 
In July, 1981, Zions filed a petition with 
the probate court for approval of its first 
and final accounting, the only formal ac-
counting Zions filed. Zions also sought an 
order that approved Zions' administration 
of the estate, closed the estate, and dis-
charged Zions. In addition, the petition 
sought judicial approval of Zions' transfer 
of the estate's interest in the Lerner-Pep-
per joint venture, a Pepper estate asset, to 
the Pepper trust for sale to Hugh Neu 
Steel Products, Inc., for $1,000,000 and the 
subsequent use of a portion of those pro-
ceeds to purchase a debt from Kennecott 
Metals for $225,019.36, which was owned 
by Pamco, a Pepper business, and a debt 
from Teledyne National for $24,356.22. No 
mention was made in the petition to the 
probate court of using the proceeds of the 
sale to pay off the security interest that 
Zions, as a commercial bank, had securing 
its line of credit. The Peppers allege, inter 
alia, that defendant Zions, as trustee of the 
Jerome B. Pepper inter vivos trust, had 
represented to the plaintiffs that the sale 
of the interest in the Jerome B. Pepper 
joint venture was to benefit the benefi-
ciaries, when in fact the sale was to protect 
the defendant's commercial line of credit 
which the defendant had increased to ap-
proximately $930,000. 
As executor, Zions mailed to the Pepper 
family members written notice of Zions' 
petition for closure of the estate and for 
court approval of the sale of the Lerner-
Pepper joint venture interest. The notice 
stated that the estate's liabilities exceeded 
its assets. The Peppers did not appear at 
the hearing, and on October 8, 1981, the 
probate court entered a decree that ap-
proved the estate's first and final account-
ing and closed the estate. The closing or-
der approved the executor's transfer of the 
assets to the trustee, the trustee's sale of 
the Lerner-Pepper joint venture interest to 
Hugh Neu Steel Co., and Zions' subsequent 
payment of the debts of Pepper's Allied 
Metals. The final accounting *foog^d/that 
Cite as 801 P.2d 
as of September 22, 1981, ti estate had 
only liabilities and no assets to pass on to 
the Jerome B. Pepper inter vivos trust. 
On July 1, 1982, the Peppers filed a mo-
tion in the probate court to set aside the 
closing order under Rule 60(b)(7) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure on the 
ground that there was excusable neglect in 
failing to appear to oppose the closing or-
der. Before the probate court ruled on 
that motion, the Peppers filed an amended 
complaint in the district court against 
Zions, alleging fraud and misrepresenta-
tion. Thereafter, the probate court denied 
the Peppers' Rule 60(b)(7) motion to vacate 
the closing order on the ground that the 
motion was untimely. The Peppers appeal-
ed the denial of the motion, and this Court 
affirmed. In re Estate of Pepper, 711 P.2d 
261 (Utah 1985). 
Again, the Peppers amended their com-
plaint in the district court, this time alleg-
ing five claims for relief. The first claim 
for relief alleged fraud and misrepresenta-
tion against Zions as executor. The com-
plaint alleges, inter alia: 
The misrepresentations made by the 
Defendant were made with the intent 
that the Plaintiffs rely upon said misrep-
resentations for the purpose of inducing 
the Plaintiffs to acquiesce to the continu-
ance of the operations of the various 
companies in the control of Defendant 
Zions while Personal Representative. 
The misrepresentations made by the 
Defendant were made with the intent 
that the Plaintiffs rely upon such misrep-
resentations with the purpose of continu-
ing non-profitable businesses in order to 
protect the commercial line of credit with 
Defendant Zions Sugarhouse Branch, 
which the Defendant had allowed to in-
crease to as high as $930,000. 
The second claim for relief alleged that 
Zions breached its fiduciary duty in failing 
to object to the entry of the order closing 
the estate. The third and fourth claims 
alleged negligence and breach of fiduciary 
duty by Zions as trustee of the Fannie N. 
Pepper inter vivos trust and the Jerome B. 
Pepper irrevocable trust. The fifth claim 
sought punitive damages for the miscon-
144 (Utah 1990) 
duct alleged in the firs jur claims for 
relief. 
Zions filed a third-party complaint 
against Fred M. Rosenthal and several oth-
er third-party defendants, alleging that if 
Zions were held liable to the Peppers, the 
third-party defendants were liable to in-
demnify Zions for any dissipation of assets 
caused by mismanagement of the business-
es by Rosenthal and the other defendants. 
Zions also specifically alleged misrepresen-
tation and breach of contract against Ro-
senthal and the other third-party defen-
dants. Zions stipulated that it had no claim 
against Rosenthal arising from the Pep-
pers' third, fourth, and fifth claims for 
relief, except to the extent that the fifth 
claim alleged punitive damages based on 
the Peppers' first and second claims for 
relief. 
Zions moved for summary judgment on 
the fraud claim against it as executor un-
der the first claim for relief and on the 
claim against it as trustee for failure to 
object to the executor's final accounting 
under the second claim for relief. Zions 
asserted that both claims were barred by 
res judicata. The trial court granted sum-
mary judgment on both claims. Rosenthal 
also moved for summary judgment against 
Zions on the ground that Zions' claims 
against him derived from the Peppers' first 
and second claims for relief. Zions argued 
that its claims against Rosenthal should be 
dismissed only if Zions' motion for partial 
summary judgment against the Peppers 
were granted. The trial court granted 
summary judgment to Rosenthal indepen-
dent of the court's rulings against the Pep-
pers and for Zions. 
On this appeal, the Peppers argue that 
the trial court erred in ruling that the 
estate closing order was res judicata as to 
(1) the Peppers' fraud claim against Zions 
as executor of the estate, and (2) their 
claim against Zions as trustee for failing to 
object to the entry of the closing order. 
On its cross-appeal, Zions contends that if 
its partial summary judgment against the 
Peppers is reversed, Zions is entitled to 
indemnification from Rosenthal and that 
the summary judgment in favor of Rosen-
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thai and against Zions on the cross-claim 
should be reversed. 
II. FIRST CLAIM FOR 
RELIEF—FRAUD 
Zions asserts, and the trial court held, 
that the estate closing order was res judica-
ta and precluded the Peppers' fraud claim 
against Zions in its capacity as executor. 
[1] A court ordt,i approving a final ac-
counting and settlement of an estate is a 
decree that closes the estate and dis-
charges the executor. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 75-3-1001(1) (1978). The order binds all 
persons interested who are given proper 
notice of the final proceeding as to all 
matters properly the subject of the ac-
counting. In re Rice's Estate, 111 Utah 
428, 440-41, 182 P.2d 111, 117 (1947); ac-
cord Miller v. Walker Bank & Trust Co., 
17 Utah 2d 88, 89-90, 404 P.2d 675, 676 
(1965); In re Raleigh's Estate, 48 Utah 
128, 133-34, 158 P. 705, 707 (1916); 4 J. 
Henderson, Bancroft's Probate Practice, 
§ 1011 (2d ed. 1950). 
[2-4] Final judgments and decrees gen-
erally may be collaterally attacked, how-
ever, if obtained by fraud. St. Pierre v. 
Edmonds, 645 P.2d 615, 618 (Utah 1982). 
Estate closing orders, like other decrees, 
may be assailed in equity and upon the 
same grounds as other judgments. In re 
Raleigh's Estate, 48 Utah at 137, 158 P. at 
709. See also In re Estate of Pepper, 711 
P.2d 261, 262-63 (Utah 1985). This Court 
has held on a number of occasions that a 
collateral attack on a decree closing an 
estate and approving the final accounting 
may be based on fraud or misrepresenta-
tion. Miller, 17 Utah 2d at 89-90, 404 P.2d 
at 676; In re Rice's Estate, 111 Utah at 
440-41, 182 P.2d at 117; In re Raleigh s 
Estate, 48 Utah at 137, 158 P. at 709; Utah 
Code Ann. § 75-1-106 (1978). 
But not every claim of fraud or misrepre-
sentation provides a basis for a collateral 
attack against a judgment or decree. A 
number of older cases state the test to be 
whether the fraud was "extrinsic" or "in-
trinsic" and hold that if extrinsic, the fraud 
is actionable in a collateral atcack, but if 
intrinsic, it is not actionable. The distinc-
tion between extrinsic and intrinsic fraud 
has often turned on a rather formal and 
artificial analysis dependent largely on the 
particular label that is attached to the 
fraud. See St Pierre v. Edmonds, 645 
P.2d at 618-19. Because of widespread 
dissatisfaction with the distinction, we reas-
sessed the law and held in St Pierre that 
the fraud alleged need only affect the basic 
fairness of the adjudication. 
[5] Our trust and estate cases have es-
sentially employed that test, even before 
our ruling in St Pierre, although they 
have sometimes couched the conclusion in 
the old intrinsic-extrinsic language. See, 
for example, In re Rice's Estate, 111 Utah 
at 442, 182 P.2d at 118, in which this Court 
defined extrinsic fraud to mean fraudulent 
acts that prevent the fair submission of a 
case for adjudication. See also Auerbach 
v. Samuels, 10 Utah 2d 152, 155-56, 349 
P.2d 1112, 1114 (1960). Thus, to allege an 
actionable fraud on a collateral attack, a 
plaintiff in a probate case must allege that 
an executor "was guilty of misrepresenta-
tion or concealment in presenting his ac-
count or in obtaining the approval of the 
court." Restatement (Second) of Trusts, 
§ 220, comment a (1959). 
An executor's failure to disclose perti-
nent facts to those who take under a will 
may constitute the kind of fraud that is 
actionable in a collateral attack. Hewitt v. 
Hewitt 17 F.2d 716, 717 (9th Cir.1927), 
stated the general rule that "mere silence" 
of an executor in not disclosing important 
facts to the heirs was the type of fraud 
against which a court generally was power-
less to grant relief, but held that there is 
an exception to that rule: 
"But there is an admitted exception to 
this general rule in cases where, by rea-
son of something done by the successful 
party to a suit, there was m fact no 
adversary trial or decision of the issue in 
the case. Where the unsuccessful party 
has been prevented from exhibiting fully 
his case, by fraud or deception practiced 
on him by his opponent, as by keeping 
him away from court, a false promise of 
a compromise; or where t t e^ fewdani 
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never had knowledge of tl ^uit, being 
kept in ignorance by the acts of the 
plaintiff; or where an attorney fraudu-
lently or without authority assumes to 
represent a party and connives at his 
defeat; or where the attorney regularly 
employed corruptly sells out his client's 
interest to the other side—these, and 
similar cases, which show that there has 
never been a real contest in the trial or 
hearing of the case, are reasons for 
which a new suit may be sustained to set 
aside and annul the former judgment or 
decree, and open the case for a new and 
a fair hearing." 
This case, we think, falls within the 
exception, and not within the general 
rule. Here the appellant was prevented 
from presenting a claim for his portion of 
the estate by the fraudulent conduct of 
the administratrix, and there has been no 
adversary trial or decision of any issue 
as between the parties to the present 
suit. The appellees frankly concede that, 
if the appellant had been prevented from 
making claim to the estate because of 
some fraudulent statement or misrepre-
sentation on the part of the administra-
trix, a court of equity would readily 
grant relief; but it is contended that 
mere silence on her part presents an 
entirely different question. But there 
can be no sound distinction between the 
giving of false information and the fail-
ure to give correct information, where 
the giving of the latter is a matter of 
legal duty. 
17 F.2d at 718 (quoting United States v. 
Throckmorton, 98 U.S. 61, 65-66, 25 L.Ed. 
93 (1878)). Accord, Pickens v. Merriam, 
242 F. 363 (9th Cir.1917); Jose v. Lyman, 
316 Mass. 271, 55 N.E.2d 433 (1944); In re 
Enger's Will, 225 Minn. 229, 30 N.W.2d 
694 (1948); 31 Am.Jur.2d Executors and 
Administrators § 1001 (1989). 
The fraud the Peppers allege against 
Zions as executor is that Zions misrepre-
sented the value of the Pepper estate "in 
the form of quarterly reports prepared by 
Defendants Zions and forwarded to the 
Plaintiffs which showed misleading values 
of the Jerome B. Pepper estate and compa-
nies within the estate" and other informa-
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tion conveyed "directly t ie plaintiff by 
written correspondence and conversations 
which gave misleading information as to 
the value of the estate." The Peppers do 
not claim that Zions misrepresented the 
value of the estate in the final accounting; 
indeed, the Peppers' complaint is based on 
the loss in the value of the estate, as re-
flected in the final accounting. A fair in-
ference from the Peppers' allegations is 
that Zions lulled the Peppers into a false 
sense of security as to the proper manage-
ment and value of the estate, with the 
consequence that they did not act with 
sufficient promptness to object formally to 
the closing order. See Goldberg i\ 
Goldberg, 217 Cal.App.2d 623, 32 Cal.Rptr. 
93 (1963). 
In effect, the Peppers allege that they 
were thus prevented from litigating the 
question whether Zions mismanaged sever-
al of the major assets of the estate, i.e., the 
Lerner-Pepper joint venture interest, the 
businesses of Pamco and Pasco (Pepper 
estate businesses), and managed in such a 
manner as to promote Zions' self-interest 
as a commercial bank by insuring payment 
of Zions' line of credit rather than making 
business decisions solely for the benefit of 
the estate. The second amended complaint 
specifically alleges that the Pepper busi-
nesses obtained working capital, at least in 
part, from the commercial line of credit 
obtained from Zions in the name of Pamco 
which reached approximately $350,000 at 
the time of Pepper's death. The complaint 
further alleges, inter alia, that after Pep-
per's death, Pasco and Pamco, through Ro-
senthal, obtained from Zions an increase in 
the line of credit to $750,000 and that the 
line of credit did not benefit the Lerner-
Pepper joint venture, even though it was 
secured by assignments of Lerner-Pepper 
accounts receivable and inventory. 
[6] Zions contends that the Peppers are 
barred as a matter of law from any remedy 
on the ground that a party who moves to 
vacate a final order pursuant to Rule 60(b) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, as 
the Peppers did, may not thereafter attack 
that same order collaterally in an indepen-
dent action. According to Zions, a party 
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may do one or the other, but not both. 
Zions relies on Mendenhall v. Kingston, 
610 P.2d 1287 (Utah 1980), for the proposi-
tion that if a party to a final judgment 
moves to set aside the judgment under 
Rule 60(b) and is unsuccessful, that party 
may not thereafter collaterally attack the 
judgment in an independent action. Zions 
also argues, alternatively, that the October 
8 closing order bars all the Peppers' claims 
against Zion« as executor because the clos-
ing order has not been vacated. 
As noted, the Peppers moved under Rule 
60(b)(7) to set aside the closing order on the 
ground that because the notice given them 
was insufficient to allow them to appear 
and to effectively challenge the closing or-
der, that order was invalid because it de-
nied them due process. This Court's opin-
ion in In re Estate of Pepper, 711 P.2d 261, 
263 (Utah 1985) sets forth precisely the 
allegation that the Peppers made in the 
hearing on their Rule 60(b) motion: "Appel-
lants assert that because the notice was 
mailed to them, out of state, they did not 
have an adequate opportunity to read the 
233-page petition and prepare for the hear-
ing held twelve days after the mailing. 
They argue that this denial of their due 
process rights necessitates that the order 
be set aside." The Court held that the 
notice was adequate and affirmed the deni-
al of the Rule 60(b) motion. Thus, the 
Peppers' motion to set aside was based 
exclusively on procedural grounds. 
1. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1) through 
(7) provides: 
(b) Mistakes; Inadvertence; excusable ne-
glect; newly discovered evidence; fraud, etc. 
On motion and upon such terms as are just, 
the court may in the furtherance of justice 
relieve a party or his legal representative from 
a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the 
following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, 
surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly dis-
covered evidence which by due diligence 
could not have been discovered in time to 
move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) 
fraud (whether heretofore denominated in-
trinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or oth-
er misconduct of an adverse party; (4) when, 
for any cause, the summons in an action has 
not been personally served upon the defen-
dant as required by Rule 4(e) and the defen-
dant has failed to appear in said action; (5) 
the judgment is void; (6) the judgment has 
Zions misreads Rule 60(b) and our case 
law on res judicata. Rule 60(b) provides 
that a final judgment or decree may be set 
aside on seven grounds, some procedural 
and some substantive.1 The rule expressly 
provides that a court also may entertain 
"an independent action to relieve a party 
from a judgment, order or proceeding or to 
set aside a judgment for fraud upon the 
court. The procedure for obtaining any 
relief from a judgment shall be by motion 
as prescribed in these rules or by an inde-
pendent action." Thus, despite the doc-
trine of res judicata, the rule expressly 
recognizes two different methods for at-
tacking a judgment. 
Rule 60(b) does not, however, specify 
what res judicata effect, if any, the denial 
of a Rule 60(b) motion has on a subsequent 
independent action collaterally attacking 
the same judgment. Mendenhall v. King-
ston, 610 P.2d 1287, 1289, held, on the facts 
of that case, that the denial of a Rule 60(b) 
motion precluded a subsequent independent 
action because of res judicata. Neverthe-
less, it does not follow that every denial of 
a 60(b) motion has a preclusive effect on a 
subsequently filed independent action. 
Rule 60(b) sets forth several grounds for 
setting aside a judgment by motion that 
would not be an adequate ground for an 
independent collateral attack on a judg-
ment. For example, the rule provides that 
a party may be relieved of a judgment for 
"excusable neglect" in failing to appear to 
been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a 
prior judgment upon which it is based has 
been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no 
longer equitable that the judgment should 
have prospective application; or (7) any other 
reason justifying relief from the operation of 
the judgment. The motion shall be made 
within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), 
(2), (3), or (4), not more than 3 months after 
the judgment, order, or proceeding was en-
tered or taken. A motion under this Subdivi-
sion (b) does not affect the finality of a judg-
ment or suspend its operation. This rule does 
not limit the power of a court to entertain an 
independent action to relieve a party from a 
judgment, order or proceeding or to set aside 
a judgment for fraud upon the court. The 
procedure for obtaining any relief from a 
judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in 
these rules or by an independent action. 
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contest the entry of a deic^it judgment. 
That ground, however, would certainly not 
justify a collateral attack. There are also 
other grounds for vacating a judgment un-
der Rule 60(b) that would not sustain an 
independent collateral attack, and the deni-
al of a 60(b) motion on such grounds could 
not, under res judicata law, preclude an 
independent action based on fraud or mis-
representation. Certainly, a denial based 
on one of the mandatory time limitations in 
the rule for filing a motion could not have a 
preclusive effect in a subsequent indepen-
dent action. To be preclusive, the claim or 
ground actually adjudicated on the 60(b) 
motion must be the same claim or ground 
that is asserted in the independent action. 
See, e.g., Penrod v. Nu Creation Creme, 
Inc., 669 P.2d 873 (Utah 1983). To hold 
otherwise could result in a denial of due 
process. To the extent that Mendenhall 
endows the denia; of a Rule 60(b) motion 
with greater preclusive effect than that 
stated above, it is hereby disapproved. 
[7] The Peppers' Rule 60(b) motion 
sought to have the October 8 order vacated 
on the ground that the movants had insuf-
ficient time to respond to Zions' petition at 
the final hearing. The denial of that mo-
tion established that the time allowed met 
constitutional requirements, but that ruling 
does not bar the Peppers' claims for fraud 
and misrepresentation alleged in the 
present independent action against Zions. 
In sum, the trial court erred in conclud-
ing as a matter of law that the Peppers' 
claim based on fraud and misrepresentation 
against Zions as executor was necessarily 
barred by res judicata. On remand, the 
plaintiffs must first establish that they 
were in fact prevented by fraud or misrep-
resentation from litigating the allegations 
of mismanagement and self-dealing. 
III. COUNT II—RES JUDICATA EF-
FECT OF THE CLOSING ORDER ON 
THE ACTION AGAINST THE 
TRUSTEE 
The Peppers also allege that, as trustee, 
Zions violated a duty owed them as benefi-
ciaries by failing to enforce the trust's 
claims against the estate for the executor's 
U M
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mismanagement of its L ets prior to their 
transfer to the trust. The Peppers also 
allege that Zions had a conflict of interest 
because of its self-interest in protecting its 
loan to the Pepper estate businesses and its 
duty to administer the estate and the trust 
for the benefit of the Pepper family mem-
bers as beneficiaries. 
Executors and trustees are charged as 
fiduciaries with one of the highest duties of 
care and loyalty known in the law. Al-
though Zions acted as both executor and 
trustee, the duties of each office remained 
separate and independent from the other 
and did not merge. Thus, Zions as trustee 
had a duty to act with the utmost fidelity 
to protect and preserve the beneficiaries' 
interests, even though Zions had to chal-
lenge its own conduct as executor. 
[8-10] The law is settled that a "trustee 
owes a duty to the beneficiary on taking 
over property from the executor to exam-
ine the property tendered and see whether 
it is that which he ought to receive." G. 
Bogert, Trusts and Trustees, § 583, at 
358-59 (rev'd 2d ed. 1980) (citations omit-
ted). A successor trustee "is liable for 
breach of trust if he neglects to take prop-
er steps to compel his predecessor to deliv-
er the trust property to him." 3 A. Scott & 
W. Fratcher, The Law of Trusts § 223.2, at 
398-99 (4th ed. 1988). A trustee has a duty 
to enforce claims against an executor as a 
prior fiduciary upon the transfer of the 
assets of the estate to the trustee. Re-
statement (Second) of Trusts § 177, com-
ment a (1959) states: 
The trustee is under a duty to the 
beneficiary to take reasonable steps to 
enforce any claim which he holds as a 
trustee against predecessor trustees . . . 
or in the case of a testamentary trust 
against the executors of the estate, to 
compel them to transfer to him as trust-
ee property which they are under a duty 
to transfer, or to redress any breach of 
duty committed by them. 
See also In re First Nat'l Bank of Mans-
field, 37 Ohio St.2d 60, 307 N.E.2d 23 
(1974). 
152 Utah 801 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
A trustee's duty is not diminished or 
altered because the trustee was also the 
executor of the estate that transferred its 
assets to the trust, even though the execu-
tor is absolved from liability for his admin-
istration of the estate by a court order. 
Dickerson v. Camden Trust Co., 1 N.J. 
459, 464, 64 A.2d 214, 218 (1949); In re 
First National Bank of Mansfield, 37 
Ohio St.2d at 66, 307 N.E.2d at 26-27. 
Zions asserts tliat because the estate's 
transfer of the Lerner-Pepper partnership 
assets to the trust and the subsequent sale 
of those assets as trustee was approved in 
the October 8 closing order, the doctrine of 
res judicata now bars the Peppers from 
attacking that order. That argument, how-
ever, fails to meet the thrust of the Pep-
pers' argument. They do not complain of 
the sale as such; rather, they contend that 
the executor mismanaged the estate, that 
the trustee had a duty to charge the execu-
tor with the estate's loss of value occa-
sioned by the executor's mismanagement, 
and that as beneficiaries of the trust they 
have a claim against the trustee for its 
failure to enforce the claim against the 
executor. 
[11] A beneficiary's claim for relief 
against a trustee for failure to enforce a 
trust's claim against a predecessor fiduci-
ary is not barred by res judicata doctrines 
of collateral estoppel and issue preclusion 
based on an estate closing order. A claim 
against a trustee for defaulting on its duty 
to protect the trust does not constitute a 
collateral attack on an estate closing order. 
The Minnesota Supreme Court stated in In 
re Irrevocable Inter Vivos Trust Estab-
lished by R.R. Kemske, 305 N.W.2d 755, 
762 (Minn.1981), "This is not a collateral 
attack on a probate court order. It is a 
claim of breach of a trustee's duty to its 
beneficiaries, not breach of an executor's 
duty to its legatee." 
Zions argues, however, that the estate 
closing order creates a preclusive bar 
against the beneficiaries' claim against 
Zions as trustee because that order adjudi-
cated the lawfulness of the transfer of all 
the estate's assets to the trustee at closing. 
In short, Zions contends that the closing 
order precludes a claim against a trustee 
for failing to receive the proper assets 
from the executor when the trustee and the 
executor are the same person. 
[12] There is some authority to support 
Zions' contention that a probate decree is 
res judicata as to both the executor and a 
successor trustee. Carr v. Bank of Amer-
ica NaVl Trust & Savings Assoc, 11 
Cal.2d 366, 79 P.2d 1096 (1938); In re Liq-
uidation of Canal Bank & Trust Co., 185 
La. 34, 168 So. 485 (1936); Shearman v. 
Cameron, 78 N J.Eq. 532, 80 A. 545 (1911); 
In re Menzie's Estate, 54 Misc. 188, 105 
N.Y.S. 925 (1907). See also In re Chaves1 
Estate, 143 Misc. 868, 257 N.Y.S. 641 
(1932), affd, 239 App.Div. 900, 265 N.Y.S. 
932 (1933). Nevertheless, we believe that 
the better view is that if a trustee fails to 
assert the claims of a trust against an 
executor who transfers dissipated assets to 
the trust, those claims are not precluded by 
a probate order discharging the executor, 
even though the trustee and the executor 
are the same entity. A number of cases 
support that proposition. See, e.g., In re 
Estate of Winston, 99 Ill.App.3d 278, 54 
Ill.Dec. 756, 425 N.E.2d 973 (1981); Bullis 
v. DuPage Trust Co., 72 Ill.App.3d 927, 29 
Ill.Dec. 68, 391 N.E.2d 227 (1979); Liska v. 
First Nat'l Bank in Sioux City, 310 
N.W.2d 531 (Iowa Ct.App.1981); In re Ir-
revocable Inter Vivos Trust Established 
by R.R. Kemske, 305 N.W.2d 755 (Minn. 
1981); In re First Nat'l Bank of Mans-
field, 37 Ohio St.2d 60, 307 N.E.2d 23 
(1974); Smith v. McMahon, 236 Or. 310, 
388 P.2d 280 (1964). 
That proposition follows from the princi-
ple that an entity acting in one capacity is 
not the "same party" for res judicata pur-
poses as the same entity acting in a differ-
ent capacity. 18 C. Wright, A. Miller & E. 
Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure 
§ 4449, at 414 (1981). The Restatement 
(Second) of Judgments § 36(2) (1982) 
states: 
A party appearing in an action in one 
capacity, individual or representative, is 
not thereby bound by or entitled to the 
benefits of the rules of res judicata in a 
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subsequent action in which .ie appears in 
another capacity. 
On its face, that rule applies to an entity 
acting in the dual capacity of trustee and 
executor. 
The principle is illustrated by In re Irrev-
ocable Inter Vivos Trust Established by 
R.R. Kemske, 305 N.W.2d 755 (Minn.1981), 
in which a bank acted as both executor of 
Rudolph Kemske's estate and the trustee 
of a trust which was the legatee of part of 
Kemske's estate. The probate court ap-
proved a final decree of distribution more 
than two years before a suit was filed 
against the bank alleging mismanagement 
of the funds. The Minnesota Supreme 
Court rejected the argument that the pro-
bate court's approval of the executor's fi-
nal accounting conclusively established 
that there was no basis for the trustee to 
have objected to that accounting: 
This is not a collateral attack on a pro-
bate court order. It is a claim of breach 
of a trustee's duty to its beneficiaries, 
not breach of an executor's duty to its 
legatee. 
. . . The fact that a bank serves in a 
dual capacity, and as trustee may have to 
question its own conduct as executor, 
does not alter the trustee's duty to its 
beneficiaries. 
. . . At the hearing on the final ac-
count, the trustee—acting for the trust 
beneficiaries—owed the beneficiaries a 
duty to use reasonable care and diligence 
in examining that accounting and object-
ing thereto if reasonable and prudent to 
do so [I]t was error not to have 
permitted appellants . . . to introduce evi-
dence of the executor's performance as 
bearing on the trustee's duty of care. 
305 N.W.2d at 762-63. 
In re First National Bank of Mansfield, 
37 Ohio St.2d 60, 307 N.E.2d 23 (1974), is 
similar. There, the defendant bank was 
the executor of an estate and trustee of a 
testamentary trust created to receive the 
assets of the estate. The executor over-
paid more than $5,000 in inheritance taxes. 
Five years after the probate court had ap-
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proved a final accounting die trust benefi-
ciary sued the bank in its capacity as trust-
ee for the overpayment. The Supreme 
Court of Ohio held that the failure of the 
beneficiary to "file exceptions to the final 
account of the executor does not preclude 
her from filing exceptions to the [bank's] 
account in its capacity as trustee." 37 
Ohio St.2d at 66, 307 N.E.2d at 27. Fur-
thermore, the court held that the bank, as 
trustee, was under an "unqualified duty" 
to "take action to recover . . . that portion 
of the trust property which had been 
wrongfully disbursed by the bank while 
acting as executor." 37 Ohio St.2d at 66, 
307 N.E.2d at 27. 
Likewise, in In re Estate of Winston, 99 
Ul.App.3d 278, 54 Ill.Dec. 756, 425 N.E.2d 
973 (1981), a decedent's widow served as 
both administratrix of his estate and trust-
ee of a trust which was to receive certain 
assets under his will. More than seven 
years after the court approved the widow's 
final account as administratrix, one of the 
beneficiaries of the trust sued, alleging 
that she had converted assets in her hus-
band's estate that should have been placed 
in the trust. The appellate court rejected 
the argument that the order approving the 
widow's final accounting as administratrix 
barred the suit: 
As trustee, she had a duty to assure that 
any assets rightfully belonging to the 
trust became part of the trust As 
trustee, it was incumbent upon her to 
challenge the final account if she knew 
or should have known that [certain stock 
she retained] constituted part of the resi-
due of [the] estate and thus part of the 
trust. [She] cannot now assert the bind-
ing effect of the order approving the 
final account obtained . . . in her capacity 
as administratrix to escape accountability 
for . . . breach of her fiduciary duty as 
trustee in failing to challenge the final 
account 
99 Ill.App.3d at 287, 54 Ill.Dec. at 763-64, 
425 N.E.2d at 980-81 (citations omitted). 
The policy that underlies the rule we 
adopt gives full effect to the trust principle 
that a "trustee owes a duty to the benefi-
ciary on taking over the property from the 
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executor to examine the property tendered 
and see whether it is that which he ought 
to receive." G. Bogert, Trusts and Trust-
ees, § 583, at 359 (rev'd 2d. ed. 1980). That 
duty should not be diluted on a theory that 
the duties of an executor and trustee are 
merged for res judicata purposes when one 
party acts in both capacities. There is no 
sound reason to diminish the protection the 
law affords beneficiaries who rely on fidu-
ciaries for their protection. 
Furthermore, a straight forward applica-
tion of res judicata principles under stan-
dard law compels the same conclusion. 
The grounds alleged in the complaint here 
were not actually litigated in the probate 
proceeding and therefore cannot collateral-
ly estop the beneficiaries against the trust-
ee. See Penrod v. Nu Creation Creme, 
Inc., 669 P.2d 873 (Utah 1983). 
[13] Zions also contends that Utah Code 
Ann. § 75^7-306(6) (1978) absolves it from 
liability as trustee on the ground that as 
executor, it was solely responsible for the 
loss of value. That section limits a trust-
ee's liability "for failure to take necessary 
steps to compel the redress of any breach 
of trust or fiduciary duty by any predeces-
sor executor, trustee, or other fiduciary" to 
those acts of the predecessor of which the 
trustee has "actual knowledge or informa-
tion which would cause a reasonable trust-
ee to inquire further " 
Because Zions acted in a dual capacity as 
trustee, it clearly was aware of any breach 
of duty it may have committed as executor 
of Pepper's estate. The knowledge that 
Zions had as executor, it also necessarily 
had as trustee. Section 75-7-306(6) does 
not absolve a trustee who has knowledge 
of the unlawful conduct of a predecessor 
executor. The statute avails Zions nothing. 
[14] The October 8, 1981 decree approv-
ing the trust transaction did not, therefore, 
have any res judicata effect upon plaintiffs' 
claim against Zions as trustee. The issue 
of the trustee's liability was not actually 
litigated in an adversarial proceeding, but 
was decided in a default proceeding. It 
follows that plaintiffs' claim against Zions 
as trustee is not precluded. 
The partial summary judgment against 
the Peppers on their claim against Zions as 
trustee is reversed. 
IV. ZIONS' CROSS-APPEAL OF 
THIRD-PARTY CLAIM 
In light of the foregoing, we now consid-
er the propriety of the trial court's summa-
ry judgment in favor of Rosenthal on 
Zions' third-party claims against him. 
Zions' first cause of action against Ro-
senthal asserts that he made material rep-
resentations which were imputed to Zions 
as acts of fraud and misrepresentation and 
that he should be held liable to Zions for 
those acts for which Zions might be found 
liable to the Peppers. 
Zions' second claim for relief alleges that 
Rosenthal was negligent in the perform-
ance of his duties in managing the various 
Pepper companies held by the estate. 
Zions' final cause of action is based on 
breach of contract. It asserts that Rosen-
thal's breach was the proximate cause of 
the diminution of the estate of Jerome B. 
Pepper. Zions has stipulated that it has no 
claims against third parties arising from 
the Peppers' third and fourth causes of 
action. 
Zions seeks indemnification from Rosen-
thal on the theory, apparently, that he was 
primarily liable for whatever injury was 
done to the estate, if any, and that Zions 
was only derivatively liable. The allega-
tions in the Peppers' complaint against 
Zions are far from rifle shot allegations. 
Conceivably, the Peppers might be able to 
prove several different theories, some of 
which might give Zions a third-party claim 
against Rosenthal and some of which 
might not. Under these circumstances, it 
is premature to rule that Zions has no 
claim. We, therefore, reverse the summa-
ry judgment against Zions. We observe, 
however, that Rosenthal may, when the 
case is more clearly outlined, seek an order 
of dismissal or summary judgment. 
Reversed and remanded for further pro-
ceedings. E><h I Oi 
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HALL, C.J, DURHAM, J., and Affirmed in part; 
GARFF, Court of Appeals Judge, concur, manded in part. 
.versed and re-
HOWE, J., concurs in the result. 
ZIMMERMAN, J., having disqualified 
himself, did not participate herein; 
GARFF, Court of Appeals Judge, sat. 
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Deanna FOXLEY, Plaintiff 
and Appellee, 
v. 
William M. FOXLEY, Defendant 
and Appellant. 
No. 890493-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Oct. 12, 1990. 
Rehearing Denied Dec. 3, 1990. 
Former wife sought modification of ali-
mony and child support. The Third District 
Court, Salt Lake County, Richard H. Mof-
fat, J., increased alimony and child support 
in light of husband's increase in income. 
Husband appealed. The Court of Appeals, 
Robert L. Newey, Senior Juvenile Court 
Judge, held that: (1) change in husband's 
income from negligible earnings of unem-
ployed medical student to earnings in ex-
cess of $100,000 per year was substantial 
change of circumstances justifying modifi-
cation of decree; (2) evidence of husband's 
increased income and hardships experi-
enced by wife and children justified amount 
of increase in alimony and child support; 
and (3) newly discovered evidence of 
amounts expended by wife for improve-
ments on home did not have degree of 
probative value sufficient to warrant new 
trial. 
1. Robert L. Newey, Senior Juvenile Court 
Judge, sitting by special appointment pursuant 
1. Divorce <3=>164 
Change in former husband's income 
from negligible earnings of unemployed 
medical student to earnings in excess of 
$100,000 a year was substantial change of 
circumstances justifying modification of di-
vorce decree. 
2. Divorce <S>245(2), 309.6 
Trial court finding that former hus-
band's income had increased from negligi-
ble amount to over $100,000 and that for-
mer wife and children had experienced 
hardships and been on public assistance 
supported increases in child support from 
$150 per child and alimony of $10 per 
month to alimony of $1,350 per month and 
child support of $546 per child. 
3. Divorce <$=>151 
Newly discovered evidence concerning 
former wife's alleged expenditures for im-
provements on home did not have degree of 
probative value sufficient to have probable 
effect on result and, thus, did not warrant 
new trial; amount allegedly expended for 
improvements on home included substantial 
amount representing value of labor wife 
performed herself and did not indicate that 
she and children had additional assets or no 
additional needs. 
4. Divorce <§=>287 
Evidentiary basis for amount of attor-
ney fees awarded to former wife had to be 
established on remand, absent any admissi-
ble evidence in record to substantiate rea-
sonableness of amount awarded and in 
light of husband's objection to lack of evi-
dence. 
Greg S. Ericksen, Bountiful, for defen-
dant and appellant. 
Robert W. Hughes, Salt Lake City, for 
plaintiff and appellee. 
Before GARFF, JACKSON and 
NEWEY,1 JJ. 
to Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-24(10) (Supp.1990). 
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to redeem the property, which she did, the 
second attorney did not effect a redemption 
and the redemption period expired. The 
client's action against this second attorney 
was settled for $4,000 during the trial, and 
is not before us on appeal. 
On this appeal from the granting of sum-
mary judgment to the first attorney, the 
client contends that the record disclosed a 
genuine issue of fact, specifically, whether 
the defendant exercised "due care in per-
forming the duties reasonably to be expect-
ed of an attorney under the circumstances." 
[1] An attorney is required to possess 
the legal knowledge and skills common to 
members of his profession, Young v. Brid-
well, 20 Utah 2d 332, 338, 437 P.2d 686, 690 
(1968), and to represent his client's interests 
with competence and diligence. Dunn v. 
McKay, Burton, McMurray & Thurman, 
Utah, 584 P.2d 894, 896 (1978). 
[2,3] Ordinarily, whether a defendant 
has breached the required standard of care 
is a question of fact for the jury. FMA 
Acceptance Co, v. Leatherby Insurance Co., 
Utah, 594 P.2d 1332 (1979); Jensen v. Do-
len, 12 Utah 2d 404, 367 P.2d 191 (1962). 
Consequently, a motion for summary judg-
ment should be denied where the evidence 
presents a genuine issue of material fact 
wrhich, if resolved in favor of the nonmov-
ing party, would entitle him to judgment as 
a matter of law. Utah R.Civ.P. 56(c); Rus-
sell v. Park City Utah Corp., 29 Utah 2d 
184, 506 P.2d 1274 (1973); University Club 
v. Invesco Holding Corp., 29 Utah 2d 1, 504 
P.2d 29 (1972).1 A genuine issue of fact 
exists where, on the basis of the facts in the 
record, reasonable minds could differ on 
whether defendant's conduct measures up 
to the required standard. Singleton v. Al-
exander, 19 Utah 2d 292, 431 P.2d 126 
(1967); FMA Acceptance Co. v. Leatherby 
Insurance Co., supra. 
1. In contrast, a motion for summary' judgment 
may be granted where the pleadings, deposi-
tions, affidavits, admissions, and answers to 
interrogatories, viewed in the light most favor-
able to the nonmoving party, show that no 
genuine issue of material fact exists and that 
[4] After reviewing the record in this 
case, we conclude that reasonable minds 
could differ on the question of whether the 
attorney's actions in this matter measured 
up to the standard of care required of attor-
neys in their professional duties. We there-
fore reverse the summary judgment and 
remand the case for trial on that issue. 
Costs to appellant. 
HALL, C. J., and STEWART, HOWE and 
DURHAM, JJ., concur. 
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Sandra ST. PIERRE, Plaintiff 
and Appellant, 
v. 
Stanley W. EDMONDS, Defendant 
and Respondent 
No. 17075. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
March 19, 1982. 
Ex-wife brought action alleging that 
ex-husband used harassment, threats of 
bodily harm and physical abuse and intimi-
dation to force her to sign documents wrhich 
resulted in substantially reducing her share 
in property settlement in divorce action and 
in preventing her from contesting allega-
tions in divorce complaint and sought dam-
ages or, alternatively, imposition of con-
structive trust. The Fifth District Court, 
Washington County, J. Harlan Burns, J., 
dismissed amended complaint, and ex-wife 
appealed. The Supreme Court, Stewart, J., 
held that complaint did state claim upon 
which relief could be granted. 
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law. Utah R.Civ.P. 56(c); Bihlmaier 
v. Carson, Utah, 603 P.2d 790 (1979); Living-
ston Industries, Inc. v. Walker Bank & Trust 
Co., Utah, 565 P.2d 1117 (1977). 
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Affirmed in part and reversed and re-
manded in part 
1. Divorce <s=>254(2) 
Although court has continuing jurisdic-
tion over its decree in divorce proceeding 
for alimony, support, and division of proper-
ty, motion to modify decree must be made 
in original action and allege changed cir-
cumstances sufficient to warrant a reopen-
ing. U.C.A.1953, 30^3-5. 
2. Divorce <s=>254(2) 
Where ex-wife's claim was that ex-hus-
band used harassment, threats of bodily 
harm and physical abuse, and intimidation 
to force her to sign documents which result-
ed in substantially reducing her share in 
property settlement in divorce action and in 
preventing her from contesting allegations 
in divorce complaint, ex-wife did not plead 
change of circumstances and therefore was 
not entitled to have divorce decree modi-
fied. U.C.A.1953, 30-3-5. 
3. Judgment <§=>386(1) 
Rule authorizing trial court to relieve 
party from final judgment-laerdecree pro-
cured by fraud if motioTHr^fnade within 
three months after judgment does not limit 
power of court to entertain independent 
common-law action to set aside judgment or 
decree for fraud or duress after three-
month period has expired. Rules Civ.Proc., 
Rule 60(b). 
4. Judgment <&»456(1) 
Doctrine of laches and other equitable 
principles determine time within which in-
dependent common-law action to satisfy 
judgment or decree for fraud or duress 
must be brought. 
5. Judgment <®=>372, 443(1) 
Extrinsic fraud arises from acts pre-
venting fair submission of case for adjudi-
cation and intrinsic fraud refers to matters 
occurring during course of proceedings, 
such as false testimony during trial, which 
may have influenced the judgment. 
6. Judgment <s=»372 
Drawing- distinction between extrinsic 
and intrinsic fraud in deciding whether in-
dependent action for relief from prior judg-
ment lies has little merit and distinction 
should be abandoned in determining when 
independent action may lie to set aside 
judgment or decree on ground that it was 
obtained by fraud, overruling Clissold v. 
Clissold, 30 Utah 2d 430, 519 P.2d 241, to 
extent that it is contrary to holding. 
7. Divorce <s=>165(3) 
Intentional act by party in divorce ac-
tion which prevents opposing party from 
making full defense amounts to fraud upon 
opposing party, as well as upon justice, jus-
tifying court in setting aside decree so 
obtained. 
8. Judgment e=>90, 375 
When fraud or duress are properly 
pleaded, it is not important whether decree 
is entered after litigation or by consent. 
9. Divorce <s=>165(5%) 
Ex-wife's complaint alleging that ex-
husband used harassment, threats of bodily 
harm and physical abuse, and intimidation 
to force her to sign documents which result-
ed in substantially reducing her share in 
property settlement in divorce action and in 
preventing her from contesting allegations 
in divorce complaint and wherein she 
sought damages or, alternatively, imposi-
tion of constructive trust on ex-husband's 
property stated claim upon which relief 
could be granted. 
David Nuffer, St. George, for plaintiff 
and appellant. 
Phillip L. Foremaster, St. George, for de-
fendant and respondent. 
STEWART, Justice: 
Plaintiff appeals the district court's order 
dismissing her amended complaint for fail-
ure to state a claim upon which relief may 
be granted. We reverse and remand for 
further proceedings. 
In reviewing the dismissal of a complaint 
for failure to state a claim, we assume the 
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plaintiff's allegations to be true and con-
strue them and the reasonable inferences 
arising therefrom liberally in determining 
whether a claim for relief has been stated. 
Barrus v. Wilkinson, 16 Utah 2d 204, 398 
P.2d 207 (1965); Heathman v. Hatch, 13 
Utah 2d 266, 372 P.2d 990 (1962). 
On March 23, 1978, a complaint seeking a 
divorce and a division of the marital estate 
was filed. Sandra Edmonds (now St. 
Pierre) was the named plaintiff and Stanley 
W. Edmonds the named defendant. Ed-
monds' attorney drafted the original di-
vorce pleadings naming St. Pierre as the 
complaining party. Edmonds executed and 
filed an acknowledgment of service, consent 
to default, and a waiver of appearance in 
the original action; and both parties en-
tered into a property settlement agreement. 
On April 11, 1978, the court entered a 
default judgment against Edmonds. On 
April 21,1978, another attorney retained by 
Edmonds appeared before the district court 
and moved to withdraw Edmonds' consent 
to the default and filed an answer and 
counterclaim, an acknowledgment, a con-
sent and waiver signed by St. Pierre, and a 
property settlement stipulation executed by 
both parties. The stipulation greatly re-
duced the property awarded St. Pierre. 
Based on these documents, the court grant-
ed the divorce and divided the marital es-
tate according to the terms of the stipula-
tion. 
On January 14, 1980, St. Pierre initiated 
this action. In an amended complaint, she 
alleges that Edmonds used harassment, 
threats of bodily harm and physical abuse, 
and intimidation to force her to sign the 
documents which resulted in substantially 
reducing her share in the property settle-
ment in the divorce action and in prevent-
ing her from contesting the allegations in 
the divorce complaint. By way of relief, 
she seeks damages in the amount of that 
1. In Land v. Land, Utah, 605 P.2d 1248 at 1251 
(1980), we held that a decree for the division of 
property based on a voluntary stipulation may 
be modified only in unusual circumstances not 
present here. The Court stated: 
. . . Accordingly, the law limits the continu-
ing jurisdiction of the court where a property 
portion of the marital estate that she claims 
she should have had, i.e., $150,000, or, alter-
natively, imposition of a constructive trust 
on the defendant's property. She also 
seeks, in the alternative, an order setting 
aside the property division in the decree and 
a new distribution of the marital assets as 
provided in the first property settlement 
agreement. 
In dismissing the complaint, the district 
court stated: 
. . . it appear[ed] to the Court that the 
First Cause of Action represents facts 
which, if substantiated by credible evi-
dence would support intrinsic fraud upon 
the Court in Civil No. 6665, Sandra Ed-
monds v. Stanley W. Edmonds, divorce 
action, and more properly heard under 
30-3-5, subparagraph 1, Utah Code An-
notated, 1953, as amended, in a divorce 
case . . . . 
[1,2] In this action plaintiff alleged 
common law claims which were indepen-
dent claims for relief, in addition to the 
attempt to modify the divorce decree itself. 
Clearly she was not entitled to a modifica-
tion of the divorce decree pursuant to 
§ 30-3-5. Although a court has continuing 
jurisdiction over its decree in a divorce pro-
ceeding for alimony, support, and the divi-
sion of property,1 a motion to modify the 
decree must be made in the original action 
and allege changed circumstances sufficient 
to warrant a reopening. Crofts v. Crofts, 
21 Utah 2d 332, 445 P.2d 701 (1968). The 
plaintiff in this action did not plead a 
change in circumstances and therefore was 
not entitled to have the decree modified. 
Nor could plaintiff obtain relief based on 
Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Proce-
dure because the time had expired for filing 
a motion to set the decree aside. 
[3] Rule 60(b) authorizes the trial court, 
on motion, to relieve a party from a final 
settlement agreement has been incorporated 
into the decree, and the outright abrogation 
of the provisions of such an agreement is 
only to be resorted to with great reluctance 
and for compelling reasons. 
p? MS 
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judgment or a decree procured by fraud, 
whether intrinsic or extrinsic, but only if 
the motion is made within three months 
after the judgment. That rule, with its 
short time limitation, does not, however, 
limit the power of a court to entertain an 
independent common law action to set aside 
a judgment or decree for fraud or duress 
after the three-month period has expired. 
Indeed, Rule 60(b) expressly recognizes and 
preserves the court's historic powers to re-
lieve a party from the operations of an 
unconscionable judgment or order. "It re-
mains clear, as it has from the beginning, 
that Rule 60(b) does not limit the power of 
a court to entertain an independent action." 
7 Moore's Federal Practice, § 60.31 at 502 
(2d ed. 1979). 
The well established and fundamental 
doctrines designed to establish the stability 
of judgments and decrees must yield to the 
overriding principle that in our system of 
justice the essential integrity of the adjudi-
catory process must be preserved. One who 
would destroy that integrity cannot plead 
as a defense that his fraud on the system of 
justice must be protected in the name of 
preserving judgments. Thus, it has long 
been recognized by state amfcfederal courts 
alike that an independent equitable action 
for relief from a prior judgment is available 
in addition to those remedies afforded un-
der Rule 60(b). E.g., Bizzell v. Hemingway, 
548 F.2d 505 (4th Cir. 1977); Kodekey Elec-
tronics Inc. v. Mechanex Corporation, 500 
F.2d 110 (10th Cir. 1974); Anderson v. State 
Department of Highways, Alaska, 584 P.2d 
537 (1978); Perper v. Pima County, 123 
Ariz. 439, 600 P.2d 52 (1979); Dudley v. 
Keller, 33 Colo.App. 320, 521 P.2d 175 
(1974); Compton v. Compton, 101 Idaho 
328, 612 P.2d 1175 (1980); Selway v. Burns, 
150 Mont. 1, 429 P.2d 640 (1967); Dunham 
v. First National Bank in Sioux Falls, 86 
S.D. 727, 201 N.W.2d 227 (1972); Jerkins v. 
McKinney, Tenn., 533 S.W.2d 275 (1976). 
See also 11 Wright and Miller, Federal 
Practice and Procedure, § 2868 (1973); 7 
Moore's Federal Practice, §§ 60.31, 60.36 (2d 
ed. 1979); Moore, Federal Relief from Civil 
Judgments, 55 Yale L.J. 623 (1946). 
[4] Nonetheless, even when there is 
fraud in obtaining a judgment, there must 
be some limit on the bringing of an action 
to set the judgment aside. The time limita-
tion in Rule 60(b), however, does not control 
the filing of an independent action. Rath-
er, the doctrine of laches and other equita-
ble principles determine the time within 
which the action must be brought. E.g., 
Compton v. Compton, supra; Selway v. 
Burns, supra; Dunham v. First National 
Bank in Sioux Falls, supra ; 7 Moore's Fed-
eral Practice, § 60.33 (2d ed. 1979); 11 
Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Pro-
cedure, § 2868 (1973). 
The availability of an independent action 
for setting aside a judgment has been said 
to rest on whether the fraud alleged is 
"intrinsic" or "extrinsic." The distinction 
between extrinsic and intrinsic fraud origi-
nated in United States v. Throckmorton, 98 
U.S. 61, 25 L.Ed. 93 (1878), where the Court 
held that the fraud that was the basis of an 
independent action for relief must be ex-
trinsic rather than intrinsic. However, 
thirteen years later, Marshall v. Holmes, 
141 U.S. 589, 12 S.Ct. 62, 35 L.Ed. 870 
(1891), declared the "settled doctrine" that 
relief from a prior judgment would lie 
whenever it is "against conscience to exe-
cute a judgment" and the party seeking 
relief is without fault. 
[5] Extrinsic fraud arises from acts pre-
venting the fair submission of the case for 
adjudication. Clissold v. Clissold, 30 Utah 
2d 430, 519 P.2d 241 (1974); Auerbach v. 
Samuels, 10 Utah 2d 152, 349 P.2d 1112 
(1960). Intrinsic fraud refers to matters 
occurring during the course of the proceed-
ings, such as false testimony during the 
trial, which may have influenced the judg-
ment. Clissold v. Clissold, supra, Crouch v. 
McGaw, 134 Tex. 633, 138 S.W.2d 94 (1940). 
Needless to say, the line between the two is 
neither straight nor bright. 
We recognize that a number of courts 
continue to adhere to the Throckmorton 
distinction between extrinsic and intrinsic 
fraud. However, a number of other courts 
have abandoned the distinction and recog-
nize an independent claim for relief from 
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fraud. E.g., Bussey v. Bussey, 95 N.H. 349, 
64 A.2d 4 (1949) (divorce case). Boring v. 
0% 138 Wis. 260, 119 N.W. 865 (1909), 
(approved in 22 Harv.L.Rev. 600 (1909)); 
Laun v. Kipp, 155 Wis. 347, 145 N.W. 183 
(1914). Publicker v. Shallcross, 106 F.2d 
949, 952 (3rd Cir. 1939), cert, denied, 308 
U.S. 624, 60 S.Ct. 379, 84 L.Ed. 521 (1940). 
[6] Drawing a distinction between ex-
trinsic and intrinsic fraud in deciding 
whether an independent action for relief 
from a prior judgment lies, has little merit. 
Professors Wright and Miller state that, 
"[s]ince there is 'little real basis for the 
distinction between extrinsic and intrinsic 
fraud/ it would be unfortunate if the an-
cient learning on this point were to be 
resurrected as a limitation on independent 
actions now that it is at last decently buried 
with regards to motions." [Footnotes omit-
ted.] 11 Wright & Miller, § 2861 at 196 
(1931). A survey of the cases supports the 
observation that: 
The perpetuation of this extrinsic-intrin-
sic distinction has led the federal courts 
into a thicket of inconsistency, because 
the distinction is unnecessary, often irra-
tional, and potentially productive of in-
justices not outweighed by the interests 
of finality. [Rule 60(b): Survey and Pro-
posal for General Reform, 60 Cal.L.Rev. 
531, 542 (1972).] 
We agree that the extrinsic-intrinsic dis-
tinction fails to provide a rational basis for 
the harsh legal consequences which flow 
from it. We, therefore, decline to deter-
mine whether the allegations in the com-
plaint constitute the equivalent of extrinsic 
or intrinsic fraud and hold that the distinc-
tion should be abandoned in determining 
when an independent action may lie to set 
aside a judgment or decree on the ground 
that it was obtained by fraud.2 
Plaintiff alleges that her waiver of ap-
pearance and her execution of the second 
settlement agreement resulted directly 
from physical and mental intimidation di-
Relying on the 
alleged acknowledgment, waiver and con-
sent, the district court granted Edmonds a 
default divorce and divided the marital 
property pursuant to the agreement ten-
dered by him. Assuming plaintiff's allega-
tions to be true, as we must at this point, 
she was prevented by defendant's duress 
from presenting her evidence to the trial 
court in the divorce proceeding. 
[7] An intentional act by a party in a 
divorce action which prevents the opposing 
party from making a full defense "amounts 
to fraud upon the opposing party, as well as 
upon justice, justifying a court in setting 
aside the decree so obtained." [Citations 
omitted.] Berg v. Berg, 223 Minn. 173, 175, 
34 N.W.2d 722, 724 (1948). Duress and 
fraud are commonly held sufficient to va-
cate a property settlement in a divorce de-
cree. Cary v. Cary, 257 Ala. 431, 59 So.2d 
659 (1952). "Public interest requires that 
no spouse be defrauded or coerced by the 
other in obtaining a decree of divorce." 
Guzzo v. Guzzo, 269 Wis. 21, 28-29, 68 
N.W.2d 559, 563 (1955). In Anno. 157 
A.L.R. 6, 80 (1945) it is stated: 
Duress as a ground for setting aside a 
default judgment of divorce has been fre-
quently bracketed by the courts with 
fraud. Generally speaking, the courts 
will, as in the case of fraud .. . exercise 
their power and set aside a judgment 
obtained by duress. 
[8] When fraud or duress are properly 
pleaded, it is not important whether the 
decree is entered after litigation or by con-
sent. Civic Western Corporation v. Zila 
Industries, Inc., 66 CaLApp.3d 1, 135 Cal 
Rptr. 915 (1977); Parke v. Parke, 72 Idaho 
435, 242 P.2d 860, 863 (1952). 
[9] The claim in this case is for damages 
and in the alternative for a constructive 
trust to be imposed on the assets awarded 
defendant that had been part of the marital 
estate. In a narrow sense, therefore, the 
claim for relief does not seek to set the 
2. To the extent that Clissold v. Clissold, 30 
Utah 2d 430, 519 P.2d 241 (1974) is contrary to 
this holding, it is overruled. 
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decree aside, although it is clear that the 
action attacks the property distribution 
made under the decree and therefore the 
decree itself. Since, as we have held, a 
claim for relief was stated that could have 
resulted in setting the decree aside, it fol-
lows that the less drastic remedy sought in 
this case does not preclude the action. In 
sum, plaintiff's allegations of duress state a 
claim upon which relief could be granted. 
Affirmed as to the motion to modify and 
reversed in all other respects and remanded 
for further proceedings. Costs to appellant. 
HALL, C. J., and OAKS and HOWE, JJ., 
concur. 
DURHAM, J., does not participate herein. 
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NORTH PARK BANK OF COMMERCE, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
Donald G. NICHOLS ana Joseph H. 
Bottum, Defendants and Appellant. 
No. 17498. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
March 22, 1982. 
Guarantor of loan appealed from a 
judgment of the First District Court, Cache 
County, VeNoy Christopherson, J., holding 
him jointly liable with borrower for the 
balance due on three promissory notes 
signed by borrower. The Supreme Court, 
Hall, C. J., held that guarantor was liable 
for the entire balance owed by borrower to 
lender on three separate loans even though 
guarantor had only guaranteed the first 
loan where the agreement signed by guar-
antor stated that guarantor agreed to guar-
antee payment of all obligations of borrow-
er to lender "now existing or which may 
thereafter arise," and where the agreement 
was to "encompass future accommodations 
and indebtednesses" of borrower, in that 
such language was unambiguous as to guar-
antor's liability with respect to borrower's 
future obligations. 
Affirmed and remanded. 
Guaranty <s=*36(l) 
Guarantor of loan was liable for entire 
balance due by borrower to lender on origi-
nal loan and two subsequent loans where 
guarantor had agreed in agreement to 
guarantee payment when due of any and all 
obligations of borrower to lender "now ex-
isting or which may thereafter arise," and 
where agreement was to "encompass future 
accommodations and indebtednesses" of 
borrower, in that such language was unam-
biguous as to guarantor's liability with re-
spect to borrower's future obligations. 
C. C. Patterson, Ogden, for Bottum. 
Frank M. Wells, Ogden, for Nichols. 
Walter G. Mann, Brigham City, for plain-
tiff and respondent. 
HALL, Chief Justice: 
Defendant Joseph H: Bottum appeals a 
judgment holding him jointly liable with 
defendant Donald G. Nichols for the bal-
ance due on a total of three promissory 
notes signed by Nichols. 
Nichols borrowed $40,000 from plaintiff 
North Park Bank of Commerce on Decem-
ber 15, 1976, executing a promissory note 
and pledging 130,000 shares of Ametek 
stock as collateral. As additional security, 
appellant Bottum signed an agreement 
promising to personally guarantee payment 
of the loan. On January 7, 1977, plaintiff 
loaned Nichols an additional $5,000 without 
obtaining further security. 
Nichols' original promissory note fell due 
on March 15, 1977, and his $5,000 note fell 
due on April 7, 1977. However, as of April 
21, 1977, Nichols had paid only the interest 
on these notes. At that time, Nichols 
signed a new promissory note for the entire 
$45,000 principal. 
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number of cores. The court was justified in 
its action but did not go far enough. We 
feel the court also should have considered 
the parties' course of performance and al-
lowed defendant a reasonable time after 
termination to recover cores from its late 
1974 purchases. Our position is supported 
by the Code, which provides, "[o]n 'termina-
tion' all obligations which are still executo-
ry on both sides are discharged but any 
right based on prior breach or performance 
survives." 70A-2-106(3). Thus, under the 
Code defendant's right to a reasonable time 
to gather cores for turn-in is not destroyed 
by termination of the parties' relationship. 
We conclude, after termination, defend-
ant was entitled to a reasonable time in 
which to recover cores from its late 1974 
purchases. We do not disturb the trial 
court's amended holding allowing defend-
ant to turn in 2,450 cores from purchases in 
1975. We place an important qualification 
on our holding, however. Although defend-
ant is entitled to turn in enough usable 
cores to cover his $4,807.40 debt, defendant 
is not entitled to turn in cores for cash. 
Throughout the course of their dealings the 
parties operated on the basis that credit 
rather than cash would be allowed for core 
turn-ins. It would be unjust for the court 
to restructure their understanding at this 
point. In summary, defendant should be 
allowed a reasonable time to turn in to 
plaintiff, up to 6,410 usable cores. This 
figure includes the 2,450 cores the trial 
court allowed defendant to turn in. Any 
number short of 6,410 not turned in, at the 
close of the reasonable time period, shall be 
paid for in cash. 
Remanded to the trial court for judgment 
in accordance with this opinion. 
CROCKETT, C. J., and WILKINS and 
STEWART, JJ., concur. 
HALL, J., concurs in the result. 
CO | KEY NUMBER SYSTEM] 
Mildred A. STREET, Plaintiff 
and Appellant, 
v. 
The FARMERS INSURANCE EX-
CHANGE, a corporation, and Preferred 
Risk Mutual Insurance Company, a cor-
poration, Defendants and Respondents. 
No. 16109. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
March 28, 1980. 
Insured brought action seeking order 
compelling no-fault automobile insurer to 
endorse and deliver draft issued by automo-
bile liability insurer of tort-feasor, with 
whom insured had entered into settlement 
agreement, to insured, and insured also 
sought award *of attorney fees of one third 
of amount received on behalf of no-fault 
insures. The Third District Court, Salt 
Lake County, Maurice Harding, J., entered 
judgment after granting insurer's motion to 
dismiss, and appeal was taken. The Su-
preme Court, Stewart, J., held that: (1) 
no-fault automobile insurer did not have 
interest in proceeds of settlement, which 
concerned payments for inability to per-
form household services, between its in-
sured and third-party tort-feasor by virtue 
of claimed right of subrogation pursuant to 
Utah Automobile No-Fault Insurance Act, 
and (2) remand was required to determine 
factual issues concerning insured's entitle-
ment to attorney fees. 
Reversed and remanded. 
Hall, J., concurred in part and dissent-
ed in part and filed opinion. 
1. Insurance <s=>601.25 
No-fault automobile insurer did not 
have interest in proceeds of settlement, 
which concerned payments for inability to 
perform household services, between its in-
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sured and third-party tort-feasor by virtue 
of claimed right of subrogation pursuant to 
Utah Automobile No-Fault Insurance Act. 
U.C.A.1953, 31^41-1 et seq., 31-41-
6(lXbXii). 
2. Insurance <*=>601 
General rule that subrogated insurance 
carrier must pay its fair share of attorney 
fees and costs if it has given notice and does 
nothing to assist in prosecution of claim 
applies in situations in which benefit is con-
ferred upon insurer as result of mistake, 
such as when there is in fact no subrogation 
right in the insurer to any of sums obtained 
in settlement. 
3- Appeal and Error <s=> 1177(8) 
In action in which insured sought rea-
sonable attorney fees for benefit conferred 
on no-fault automobile insurer as result of 
settlement of action against third-party 
tort-feasor, remand was required to deter-
mine insured's entitlement to attorney fees 
where no factual findings were made $s to 
whether insurer in fact benefited from in-
sured's recovery to extent that draft was 
allegedly endorsed and delivered to the in-
surer in amount representing reimburse-
ment for medical expenses, lost wages and 
property damage, and as to whether insured 
did so in mistaken belief as to nature of 
subrogation rights provided under no-fault 
insurance statutes. U.C.A.1953, 31-41-1 et 
seq. 
F. Alan Fletcher & Patrick J. Garver, of 
Parsons, Behle & Latimer, Salt Lake City, 
for plaintiff and appellant. 
A. Alma Nelson of Hanson & Garrett, 
Frank N. Karras, Salt Lake City, for de-
fendants and respondents. 
STEWART, Justice: 
The issue in this case is whether a no-
fault insurance carrier has an interest in 
the proceeds of a settlement between its 
insured and a third-party tortfeasor by vir-
tue of a right of subrogation claimed pursu-
ant to the Utah Automobile No-Fault In-
surance Act. See §§ 31-41-1 et seq., Utah 
Code Ann. (1953), as amended. Plaintiff 
also seeks an award of attorney's fees to be 
paid out of any recovery Farmers Insurance 
Exchange may obtain based on a right of 
subrogation. 
The district court dismissed plaintiffs 
complaint to compel her no-fault insurer, 
the defendant Farmers, to endorse a draft 
made out jointly to plaintiff and Farmers 
by Preferred Risk Mutual Insurance Com-
pany. Preferred Risk, the insurer of the 
tortfeasor, tendered the draft in settlement 
of plaintiffs claim. Plaintiff seeks reversal 
of the lower court's dismissal and claims 
that Farmers had no right by way of subro-
gation to share in the settlement amount. 
The plaintiff, Mildred A. Street, was in-
jured in a collision between her automobile 
and one operated by Janet M. Clayton in 
August 1975. Pursuant to the terms of 
Street's no-fault insurance policy with 
Farmers Exchange, Farmers paid Street 
$10,132.47, of which $3,233.10 was for medi-
cal expenses, $1,816.40 for lost wages, 
$702.97 for property damage, and $4,380 for 
inability to perform household services 
(hereafter "loss of services"). 
The payment for loss of services was 
made in accordance with the insurance poli-
cy and as required by § 31-41-£(l)(bXii), 
which provides for payment to be made for 
loss of services at the rate of $12 per day 
"in lieu of reimbursement for expenses 
which would have been reasonably incurred 
for services that, but for the injury, the 
injured person would have performed for 
his household and regardless of whether 
any of these expenses are actually in-
curred." Street did not actually incur ex-
penses for "loss of services," since substi-
tute household services were provided vol-
untarily and without compensation by 
Street's neighbors, friends, and family 
members. 
Street's damages exceeded the threshold 
limitations controlling tort actions against a 
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tortfeasor, soo § 31-41-9, and she filed suit 
against Ms. Clayton seeking general and 
special damages for her injuries. This ac-
tion was concluded by a settlement. Prior 
to settlement of the tort action, Farmers 
placed Street and the tortfeasor's insurer, 
Preferred Risk, on notice of its claim to 
subrogation for the amount Farmers paid 
to Street 
Farmers agreed to discount its subroga-
tion claim by 20% in the event the parties to 
the action entered into a settlement. This 
was based on the comparative negligence 
ratio between plaintiff and tortfeasor which 
plaintiff and Preferred Risk had agreed to. 
It was agreed that plaintiff was 20% negli-
gent and the tortfeasor, 80%. 
The stipulation for dismissal and release 
provided for a total payment of $14,000, 
broken down as follows: 
(1) Special damages of $7,256.14, repre-
senting $3,165.31 for medical expenses, 
$2,480.45 for lost wages, and $610.38 for 
property damages; and (2) General dam-
ages in the amount of $6,743.86. The stipu-
lation between the parties contains the fol-
lowing language: 
Plaintiffs hereby acknowledge such claim 
and agree to pay Farmers Insurance 
Group such amounts, not exceeding the 
above itemization, which may be deter-
mined to be due and owing to Farmers 
Insurance Group pursuant to its subroga-
tion rights. In entering into this stipula-
tion, however, plaintiffs do not concede 
that Farmers Insurance Group's claim of 
subrogation rights for payments made for 
"services" is valid or that plaintiffs have 
an obligation to repay to Farmers Insur-
ance Group any amount paid by it pursu-
ant to the provisions of Section 31-41-
6(lXbXii), [U.C.A.], as set forth in the 
Personal Injury Protection Endorsement 
to plaintiffs' insurance policy. 
Preferred Risk issued three drafts pay-
able as follows: 
1. A draft payable to Jack L. and Mil-
dred A. Street and Farmers Insurance 
Group in the amount of $4,601.98 for medi-
cal expenses, lost wages, and property dam-
age. 
2. A draft payable to Jack L. and Mil-
dred A. Street and Farmers Insurance 
Group in the amount of $3,504 for "loss of 
services." 
3. A draft payable to Jack L. and Mil-
dred A. Street and their attorneys in the 
amount of $5,894.02, representing the bal-
ance of the settlement amount. 
The Streets endorsed and delivered the 
first draft to Farmers. The Streets refused 
to endorse the second draft and claimed 
that Farmers is not entitled to reimburse-
ment for loss of services payments because 
loss of services was not a recoverable dam-
age item. Specifically, they claimed that 
since this item could not have been recov-
ered from the tortfeasor by way of dam-
ages, Farmers had no right of subrogation 
as to it. 
Plaintiff filed suit in district court seek-
ing an order compelling Farmers to endorse 
and deliver the second draft to the plaintiff 
and to restrain Farmers and Preferred Risk 
from arbitrating the reimbursement issue. 
Plaintiff also sought an award of attorney's 
fees of Vi of the amount received on behalf 
of Farmers. 
The trial court granted a motion to dis-
miss the complaint on the ground that a 
no-fault insurance carrier is entitled to re-
imbursement to the extent that the insured 
recovered damages from the tortfeasor or 
its insurance carrier, even though the 
amount recovered did not include the type 
of damages for which the no-fault insurer 
had made direct payments to the no-fault 
insured. Thus, according to the trial court's 
ruling, a no-fault insurer could collect out 
of damages attributable to pain and suffer-
ing sums paid for an entirely different type 
of damage, i. e., loss of services payments to 
the insured. 
[1] Farmers' claim for reimbursement 
in this case cannot be sustained. Allstate 
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Insurance Co. v. Ivie, Utah, 606 P.2d 1197 
(1980), is dispositive. It holds that the Utah 
No-Fault Insurance Act does not contem-
plate the granting of a right of subrogation 
to a no-fault insurer in an action by the 
no-fault insured against a third-party tort-
feasor. The right of subrogation, as ex-
plained in Ivie, is a right to be exercised in 
an arbitration proceeding between insur-
ance companies of the respective parties so 
that double recovery can be avoided, unnec-
essary litigation made less likely, and the 
inherent conflicts between the insured and 
the insurer avoided. 
The plaintiff also contends that she is 
entitled to a reasonable attorney's fee for 
the benefit conferred on Farmers as a re-
sult of a settlement of her action against 
the third-party tortfeasor. The general 
rule is that a subrogated insurance carrier 
must pay its fair share of attorney's fees 
and costs if it has given notice and does 
nothing to assist in the prosecution of the 
claim. Cedarholm v. State Farm Mutual 
Insurance Companies, 81 Idaho 136, 338 
P.2d 93 (1959); State Farm Mutual Auto-
mobile Insurance Co. v. Clinton, 267 Or. 653, 
518 P.2d 645 (1974); Iowa National Mutual 
Insurance Co. v. Huntley, 78 Wyo. 380, 328 
P.2d 569 (1958); 44 Am.Jur.2d Insurance 
§ 1846 (1969); and Annot. 2 A.L.R.3d 1441 
(1965). 
[2] The problem in this case is that 
there was in fact no subrogation right in 
Farmers to any of the sums obtained in 
settlement, as we held in Ivie, supra. How-
ever, if a benefit was conferred on Farmers 
as a result of a mistake, the general rule 
which governs attorney's fees in a proper 
subrogation claim should be extended to the 
instant situation. Had Farmers been com-
pelled to collect from Preferred Risk under 
the rule enunciated in Ivie, supra, it would 
necessarily have incurred expenses. Equity 
and good conscience require that Farmers 
should not have a free ride from plaintiff's 
efforts if such be the case. 
1. Allstate Insurance Co. v. Me, Utah, 606 P.2d 
1197(1980). 
[3] The resolution of plaintiffs claim 
for attorney's fees must depend upon find-
ings of fact to be made by the trial court. 
Since the court dismissed plaintiff's com-
plaint without taking evidence, no factual 
findings were made as to whether Farmers 
in fact benefited from Street's recovery to 
the extent that the Streets allegedly en-
dorsed and delivered a draft to Farmers in 
the amount of $4,601.98, which represented 
reimbursement for medical expenses, lost 
wages, and property damage, and whether 
plaintiff did so in a mistaken belief as to 
the nature of %the subrogation rights provid-
ed by the No-Fault Insurance Statute. If 
such a benefit were conferred upon Farm-
ers by the actions of the plaintiff, plaintiff 
is entitled to a reasonable attorney's fee 
from Farmers to the extent that Farmers 
benefited in the settlement secured by 
plaintiff. 
Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of 
the lower court and remand the case to the 
trial court for further proceedings in accord 
with this opinion. 
CROCKETT, C. J., and MAUGHAN and 
WILKINS, JJ., concur. 
HALL, Justice (concurring and dissent-
ing): 
I agree that Farmers has no right of 
subrogation.1 However, for that very rea-
son (i. e., as a matter of law), it is my 
opinion that plaintiff is not entitled to at-
torneys' fees. Simply stated, I deem it 
wholly inappropriate to compensate plain-
tiff for "protecting" a right of subrogation 
when in fact no such right existed to be 
protected. Farmers' only right to reim-
bursement of PIP payments is through 
mandatory, binding arbitration,2 to which 
plaintiff is barred as a party. 
Furthermore, the judgment having been 
reversed, plaintiff's demand that Farmers 
and Preferred Risk be restrained from arbi-
trating the reimbursement issue would ap-
2. Id., interpreting U.C.A., 1953, 31-41-11. 
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fc^weenTnsurers and that Pontiff should 
E l u d e d from participating in the pro-
c a i n e in any way. At the very least a 
SSual question exists as to whether plam-
S f is entitled to equitable relief as would 
deprive Farmers of its statutory right to 
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Louis L. TIMM, John Neiuwland, and 
Floyd M. Childs, trustees of United Pre-
cision Machine and Engineering Com-
pany Profit Sharing Trust; ABCO In-
surance Agency, Inc., a Utah corpora-
tion; and Joseph L. Henroid, trustee 
for the Annette Jacob Trust, Plaintiffs, 
Appellees, and Counterclaim Defen-
dants, 
v. 
T. LaMar DEWSNUP and Aletha Dewsn-
up; Arrow Investment Co., a limited 
partnership; The Federal Land Bank of 
Berkley; Imperial Land Title Inc., as 
trustee and Eugene L. Carson and 
Elaine Carson as beneficiaries; String-
ham, Masuran, Larsen & Sabin, a pro-
fessional corporation; Mineral Fertiliz-
er Co., Inc.; and Harry V. Kaps, Defen-
dants, Appellants, and Counterclaim-
ants. 
No. 910157. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
April 27, 1993. 
Lenders brought action against bor-
rowers to recover amounts paid on behalf 
of borrowers to preserve equity interest in 
property purchased on contract for deed 
allegedly securing the loan. Borrowers 
counterclaimed to reform trust deed in sev-
eral respects including vacating assign-
ment of contract for deed as security. The 
Fourth District Court, Millard County, Ray 
M. Harding, J., entered summary judgment 
in favor of lenders and later denied borrow-
er's motion to amend counterclaim and to 
reconsider and set aside summary judg-
ment. Borrower appealed. The Supreme 
Court, Howe, Associate C.J., held that: (1) 
summary judgment implicitly adjudicated 
only one issue raised by counterclaim; (2) 
trial court's erroneous belief that counter-
claim was no longer before it warranted 
remand so that court could address merits 
of motion to amend counterclaim; and (3) 
motion to reconsider summary judgment is 
permitted where the summary judgment is 
subject to revision. 
Reversed and remanded. 
1. Judgment <^181(14) 
Summary judgment on lenders' claim 
against borrowers to recover payments by 
lenders to preserve borrowers' equity inter-
est in property purchased by them on con-
tract for deed implicitly ruled against bor-
rowers on their counterclaim for reforma-
tion of trust deed to exclude contract for 
deed as security, but the judgment did not 
adjudicate other issues raised by counter-
claim; lenders made no express reference 
to counterclaim or its issues in their motion 
for summary judgment or notice of hear-
ing. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 56(a, b). 
2. Judgment <s=>181(14) 
Moving party determines scope of mo-
tion for summary judgment, decides issues 
presented to court for adjudication, may 
move for summary judgment on all or less 
than all issues raised by complaint and 
answer, and may move for termination of 
issues raised by counterclaim or cross 
claim. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 56(a, b). 
3. Judgment <3=>178 
Summary judgment procedure is gen-
erally considered drastic remedy requiring 
strict compliance with rule authorizing it. 
Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 56(a, b). 
4. Pleading <S=>236(1) 
Motion to amend pleading is addressed 
to discretion of trial court. Rules Civ. 
Proc, Rules 15, 15(a). 
5. Appeal and Error @=>1178(1) 
Trial court's erroneous belief that 
counterclaim was no longer before it war-
ranted remand so that court could address 
merits of motion to amend counterclaim, 
even though case had been dormant for 
approximately ten years; long delay was 
occasioned by bankruptcy proceedings and 
was largely not fault of either party, and 
one issue on remand involved only interpre-
tation of loan documents unaffected by 
T1MM v. 
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6. Judgment <3=>720 
Collateral estoppel or issue preclusion 
prevents relitigation of issues determined 
in prior action. 
7. Judgment <S=>956(1) 
Party invoking collateral estoppel has 
burden of proof. 
8. Judgment <e=>829(3) 
In dismissing adversary proceeding 
with prejudice, bankruptcy court did not 
determine issue whether trust deed should 
be reconveyed as result of payment of 
notes, and, therefore, dismissal had no col-
lateral estoppel effect on that issue, though 
it was raised in debtors' complaint in bank-
ruptcy court and in trial briefs of both 
parties. 
9. Judgment <s=>186 
Motion to reconsider summary judg-
ment is permitted where the summary 
judgment is subject to revision. Rules Civ. 
Proc, Rule 54(b). 
Michael Z. Hayes, Salt Lake City, for 
plaintiffs. 
Russell A. Cline, Salt Lake City, for 
Dewsnups. 
HOWE, Associate Chief Justice: 
Defendant Aletha Dewsnup appeals the 
trial court's denial of her motions to (1) 
amend her counterclaim, and (2) either re-
consider and set aside a summary judg-
ment entered against her or certify the 
summary judgment as final so that she 
could appeal it Defendant T. LaMar 
Dewsnup, Aletha's husband, died in 1986 
during the pendency of this action. 
FACTS 
In June of 1978, the Dewsnups, farmers 
in Delta, Utah, with the help of two attor-
neys who the Dewsnups assert represented 
them, borrowed $119,000 for a two-year 
period to purchase a motel. The lenders 
were the Annette Jacob Trust, of which one 
of the attorneys was a trustee, the United 
Precision Machine and Engineering Compa-
ny Profit Sharing Trust, and ABCO Insur-
1178 (Utah 1993) 
ance Agency, Inc. As securit4 ,. Dewsn-
ups offered their 160-acre farm, together 
with its water rights. They were required 
to make an interest-only payment on the 
loan on June 1, 1979, and to pay the loan in 
full by June 1, 1980. The attorneys1 firm 
prepared the loan documents that the 
Dewsnups executed, including three prom-
issory notes and a trust deed to secure the 
notes. The Dewsnups later contended that 
they were not aware at that time (1) that 
the trust deed included, in addition to their 
farm, 56.71 acres of land in Oak City, Utah, 
that Aletha Dewsnup had inherited, and (2) 
that one of the papers they signed assigned 
to the lenders the Dewsnups' interest as 
purchasers in a real estate contract. The 
assignment was given as additional securi-
ty for the notes. 
The Dewsnups entered into the real es-
tate contract in 1976 with Arrow Invest-
ment Company to purchase farm land adja-
cent to their farm. The contract provided 
that the $400,000 purchase price would be 
paid in twenty annual installments of $47,-
880.50, due on January 2 each year. The 
contract also stated that should the Dewsn-
ups default on any payment and remain in 
default for five months (until June 2 of the 
same year), they would forfeit any interest 
in the contract and property. 
The Dewsnups failed to timely pay the 
1979 property taxes on the Arrow land and 
failed to make the 1980 annual January 2 
payment on the Arrow contract. On June 
7, 1980, the lenders made the January 2 
payment and paid the past due 1979 proper-
ty taxes. They then demanded that the 
Dewsnups reimburse them for those 
amounts because the assignment of con-
tract required reimbursement for payments 
made by the lenders "under or pursuant 
to" tne purchase contract. The Dewsnups 
refused to reimburse, contending that be-
cause the default terminated the purchase 
contract on June 2, by its own terms, the 
June 7 payments could not have been made 
under and pursuant to the purchase con-
tract. 
Although the Dewsnups had made the 
interest payment on the loan on June 1, 
1979, they were unable to pay the loan in 
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full when it came due a year later. The 
lenders commenced a nonjudicial fore-
closure of the trust deed, and in September 
of 1980, they filed this action against the 
Dewsnups to foreclose the assignment of 
contract because of their failure to pay the 
loan and to reimburse the lenders for the 
1979 property taxes and the 1980 $47,-
880.50 installment on the Arrow contract. 
The Dewsnups engaged a new attorney 
who filed an answer and a counterclaim, 
seeking to (1) reform the trust deed to 
conform with what they asserted were the 
intentions of the parties, i.e., to include 
only the 160-acre farm and the water 
rights, and (2) vacate the assignment of the 
Arrow contract as security for the payment 
of the notes. The counterclaim alleged a 
breach of fiduciary duty on the part of 
their former attorneys, who the Dewsnups 
asserted had also acted on behalf of the 
tenders, in failing to fully advise the 
Dewsnups of the content of the loan docu-
ments. 
In December of 1980, the Dewsnups sold 
the motel, paid the $119,000 loan in full, 
and asked the lenders to reconvey the trust 
deed. The lenders refused unless they 
were reimbursed for the $47,880.50 pay-
ment they made on the Arrow contract and 
the 1979 property taxes in the sum of 
$2,085.71. In March of 1981, the lenders 
moved for summary judgment for those 
amounts plus attorney fees. Neither the 
motion for summary judgment nor the no-
tice of the hearing on the motion mentioned 
the counterclaim. 
The Dewsnups' attorney did not appear 
at the hearing, and the trial court granted 
summary judgment and a decree of fore-
closure against their interest in the con-
tract in favor of the lenders for the 
amounts sought in their motion. The sum-
mary judgment did not refer to the coun-
terclaim by name. The lenders then pur-
sued the foreclosure until April 23, 1981, 
when the Dewsnups filed chapter 11 (busi-
ness reorganization) bankruptcy to fore-
stall the foreclosure. The chapter 11 bank-
1. This issue was appealed to the United States 
Supreme Court. The Court held that 11 U.S.C. 
section 506(d) does not permit a chapter 7 debt-
or to void that part of a lien on real property in 
ruptcy was never completed, and in June of 
1984, the Dewsnups filed chapter 7 (liqui-
dation) bankruptcy, which was pending at 
the time of this appeal. In March of 1986, 
the Dewsnups filed an adversary proceed-
ing in bankruptcy court, primarily to deter-
mine whether they could void the lenders' 
lien in excess of the fair market value 
pursuant to 11 U.S.C. section 506.1 
On January 6, 1991, the chapter 7 bank-
ruptcy trustee abandoned the counterclaim 
the Dewsnups had filed in this action, and 
two weeks later, Mrs. Dewsnup filed (1) a 
motion to amend the counterclaim and (2) a 
motion to reconsider and set aside the sum-
mary judgment or, in the alternative, to 
certify the summary judgment as final pur-
suant to rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, so that she could appeal it. The 
trial court denied both motions, holding 
that it had "implicitly" denied the counter-
claim when it granted summary judgment 
in 1981 and that the summary judgment 
was "a final appealable judgment" at that 
time. Consequently, it would now be im-
proper to certify it for appeal under rule 
54(b). 
ANALYSIS 
Adjudication of Counterclaim 
[1] Mrs. Dewsnup contends that the tri-
al court erred in denying her motion to 
amend her counterclaim. The denial was 
based on the court's determination that the 
counterclaim had been implicitly denied by 
the summary judgment and thus had been 
wholly disposed of and was no longer sub-
ject to amendment She argues that the 
counterclaim and the issues raised therein 
were not before the court at the time the 
summary judgment was granted, that the 
counterclaim was unaffected by the judg-
ment, and that the court should have ad-
dressed on its merits her motion to amend 
the counterclaim. 
Rule 56(a) and (b), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, states that a party seeking to 
excess of its fair market value. Dewsnup v. 
Timm, 502 U.S. , 112 S.Ct. 773, 116 L.Ed.2d 
903 (1992). 
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recover on a claim, countered .*, . . cross-
claim or the party against whom a claim, 
counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted 
may move for summary judgment in his 
favor "upon all or any part thereof/' We 
held in Bennion v. Amoss, 28 Utah 2d 216, 
500 P.2d 512 (1972), that summary judg-
ment on a complaint is not precluded by the 
existence of a counterclaim. Also, cases 
which raise issues of both fact and law may 
lend themselves to summary judgment only 
on issues of law. 
[2] The moving party determines the 
scope of a motion for summary judgment. 
That party decides what issues to present 
to the court for adjudication. He or she 
may move for summary judgment on all or 
less than all of the issues raised by the 
complaint and answer and may also move 
for determination of issues raised by any 
counterclaim or cross-claim if he or she 
deems it appropriate. When the moving 
party has decided what the scope of the 
motion for summary judgment shall be, 
rule 56 contemplates that a written motion 
shall be served on the opposite party set-
ting forth with clarity the relief sought by 
the motion so that the opposite party may 
prepare to defend against it if he or she 
chooses to do so. 
[3] Summary judgment procedure is 
generally considered a drastic remedy, re-
quiring strict compliance with the rule au-
thorizing it. Parmelee v. Chicago Eye 
Shield Co., 157 F.2d 582, 168 A.L.R. 1130 
(8th Cir.1946). In Lazar v. Allen, 347 
So.2d 457 (Fla.DistCt.App.1977), the court 
stressed the importance of "scrupulously 
observing the notice requirements" prior to 
entering summary judgment. The Florida 
Supreme Court has observed: 
If the [requirements of the rules] are 
not fulfilled, both in letter and spirit, the 
summary judgment procedure may be-
come a vehicle of injustice rather than a 
salutary medium of reaching a swift but 
just result on a pure matter of law, as 
intended by the framers of the rules. 
Cleveland Trust Co. v. Foster, 93 So.2d 
112, 114 (Fla.1957). 
In accordance with that policy, the Flori-
da District Court of Appeal in Faussner v. 
DEWSNUP uian H M 
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Wever, 432 So.2d 100 ia.^/ist.Ct.App. 
1983), held that a summary judgment 
awarded to a seller in an action brought by 
a buyer seeking specific performance did 
not mean that the seller was also necessari-
ly entitled to summary judgment on his 
counterclaim against the buyer for reten-
tion of the earnest money. The court held 
that in order to recover on the counter-
claim, the seller had to make a motion for 
summary judgment to that effect and give 
notice as required by the rules of civil 
procedure. In a later decision of the same 
court, Redding v. Powell, 452 So.2d 132 
(Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1984), at issue was wheth-
er a summary judgment for foreclosure of 
a mortgage disposed of a counterclaim for 
an accounting and for a satisfaction of the 
mortgage. The Redding court held that 
"the summary judgment did not dispose of 
appellant's counterclaim because the record 
indicates that neither appellee's motion for 
summary judgment nor the court's order 
specifically mentioned or referred to the 
counterclaim." Id. at 135. 
A review of this court's decisions indi-
cates that we have allowed summary judg-
ments to be granted without strict compli-
ance to the rules only when both parties 
are present and no prejudice is shown. In 
Security Title Co. v. Pay less Builder's 
Supply, 17 Utah 2d 179, 407 P.2d 141 
(1965), we found no error in a summary 
judgment granted at the close of a pretrial 
hearing when both parties were present, 
although the ten-day notice required by the 
rules had not been given. See also Crook-
ston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789 (Utah 
1991); Western States Thrift & Loan Co. 
v. Blomquist, 29 Utah 2d 58, 504 P.2d 1019 
(1972). In contrast, we held in Hein 's Tur-
key Hatcheries, Inc. v. Nephi Processing 
Plant, Inc., 24 Utah 2d 271, 470 P.2d 257 
(1970), that a motion for summary judg-
ment filed on the day of trial was not 
timely. 
Turning to the instant case, the lenders 
contend that although neither the motion 
for summary judgment, the notice of the 
hearing on said motion, nor the summary 
judgment itself made mention or reference 
to the counterclaim by name, the counter-
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claim was implicitly denied when summary 
judgment was granted. This contention re-
quires us to examine what issues were 
raised by the counterclaim and what issues 
were resolved by the summary judgment. 
In their counterclaim, the Dewsnups al-
leged that their attorneys had failed to 
fully advise them that the trust deed they 
executed included property in addition to 
the 160-acre farm and had failed to advise 
them that they were also assigning their 
equity in the Arrow contract as additional 
security for the $119,000 loan. They fur-
ther alleged that they did not learn of these 
facts until two years later, in June of 1980. 
The relief which they sought in their coun-
terclaim was a decree reforming the trust 
deed to include only the 160-acre farm and 
its water rights and vacating the assign-
ment of the Arrow contract. The lenders 
replied to the counterclaim by denying each 
and every allegation. Thereafter, the lend-
ers moved for summary judgment against 
the Dewsnups for the principal sum of $49,-
966.21, plus accrued interest and attorney 
fees. As set forth in the affidavit of one of 
the lenders, the principal sum consisted of 
the $47,880.50 payment that the lenders 
had made on the Arrow contract and the 
$2,085.71 property taxes. The Dewsnups 
would not have owed these two amounts if 
they could have proved as alleged in their 
counterclaim that they did not intend the 
Arrow contract to be part of the security 
for the loan. Therefore, we are led to 
conclude that although the motion for sum-
mary judgment, the notice of hearing on 
the motion, and the summary judgment 
itself made no reference to the counter-
claim by name, the grant of summary judg-
ment implicitly and necessarily constituted 
an adverse ruling on that part of the coun-
terclaim that sought reformation to ex-
clude the Arrow contract as security in the 
loan transaction. See Ford Motor Co. v. 
Transport Indemnity Co., 795 F.2d 538, 
543 (6th Cir.1986) (if district court's ruling 
on one claim necessarily precludes alterna-
tive or mutually exclusive claim, final order 
will arise despite lack of explicit declaration 
by district court). 
However, in accordance with the policy 
that the procedure for summary judgment 
should be strictly observed, we conclude 
that nothing else was implicitly adjudicated 
by the grant of summary judgment. Inas-
much as the lenders, as the moving party, 
made no express reference to the counter-
claim or the issues raised by it in their 
motion or in their notice of hearing, none of 
the other issues raised by the counterclaim 
were implicated by the grant of summary 
judgment. Those issues remain unaffected 
in the trial court. One of those issues is 
whether the parties intended to include the 
Oak City property in the trust deed. 
Mrs. Dewsnup also asserts that the trust 
deed secures only the promissory notes but 
does not secure payment of the summary 
judgment, which was for the 1980 annual 
installment on the Arrow contract and the 
1979 property taxes on the Arrow land. 
We do not reach this question because nei-
ther the merits of the summary judgment 
nor the interpretation of the trust deed is 
before us for review. At this point, there 
is no final judgment subject to appellate 
review. 
Motion to Amend Counterclaim 
[4,5] Having determined that the trial 
court erred in its conclusion that the coun-
terclaim was implicitly wholly disposed of 
and that part of the counterclaim remains 
in the trial court, we now turn to the 
court's denial of Mrs. Dewsnup's motion to 
amend the counterclaim. A motion to 
amend a pleading is addressed to the dis-
cretion of the trial court. Here, the court 
did not exercise its discretion because it 
took the position that the counterclaim was 
no longer before it and subject to amend-
ment. Therefore, it is necessary to remand 
this case to the trial court to address the 
merits of the motion to amend so that the 
court may exercise its discretion with re-
gard to it. 
For the guidance of the trial court, we 
briefly review our case law on amendments 
to pleadings. Rule 15(a), Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, permits amendment with 
leave of the court and states that 'leave 
shall be freely given when justice so re-
quires/' In Cheney v. Rucker, 14 Utah 2d 
205, 211, 381 P.2d 86, 91 (1963), we held 
H JO/ 
TIMM v. 
*851 P.2d 
that rule 15 should be interpi^ceu liberally 
so as to allow parties to have their claims 
fully adjudicated: "[The
 r u ies of civil pro-
cedure] must all be looked to in the light of 
their even more fundamental purpose of 
liberalizing both pleading and procedure to 
the end that the parties are afforded the 
privilege of presenting whatever legitimate 
contentions they have pertaining to their 
dispute." See also Johnson v. Brinker-
hoff, 89 Utah 530, 538-39, 57 P.2d 1132, 
1136 (1936) ("[T]he policy of the law is 
toward liberality in the allowance of 
amendments and to regard them favorably 
in order that the real controversy between 
the parties may be presented, their rights 
determined, and the cause decided/'); Han-
cock v. Luke, 46 Utah 26, 38, 148 P. 452, 
457 (1915) ("Courts should be liberal in 
allowing amendments to the end that cases 
may be fully and fairly presented on their 
merits."). 
This liberal application of rule 15(a), how-
ever, is limited when the opposing party 
does not have adequate opportunity to re-
spond to the amended pleadings. In over-
ruling the trial court's denial of a rule 15 
motion to amend, we held in Lewis v. Moul-
trie, 627 P.2d 94, 98 (Utah 1981), that leave 
to amend should have been granted be-
cause the opposing party had "fair opportu-
nity" to respond to the amended pleading: 
"A prime consideration in determining 
whether an amendment should be permit-
ted is the adequacy of an opportunity for 
the opposing party to meet the newly 
raised matter." This court had previously 
noted: 
Some tempest has been raised about the 
court allowing the plaintiff to make tar-
dy amendments to the pleadings 
The pleadings are never more important 
than the case that is before the court 
There can be no prejudice in this case 
because we'll give ample time for an 
answer This is in harmony with 
what we regard as the correct policy: of 
recognizing the desirability of the plead-
ings setting forth definitely framed is-
sues, but also of permitting amendment 
where the interest of justice so requires, 
and the adverse party is given a fair 
opportunity to meet it. 
3EWSNUP Utah H 8 3 
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Thomas J. Peck & Sons, * at. v. Lee Rock 
Prods., Inc., 30 Utah 2d 187, 193, 515 P.2d 
446, 449-50 (1973) (citations omitted), quot-
ed in Lewis, 627 P.2d at 98. 
Mrs. Dewsnup contends that this court 
has never upheld a trial court's refusal to 
grant leave to amend a pleading before a 
trial date has been set because at that point 
in the litigation, the opposing party will 
always have time to respond to the amend-
ed pleading. She refers to Gillman v. 
Hansen, 26 Utah 2d 165, 486 P.2d 1045 
(1971), in which we found that a trial court 
abused its discretion in refusing to permit 
the defendant to amend its answer and add 
a counterclaim when the case had not been 
set for trial. Conversely, Mrs. Dewsnup 
asserts that we have upheld a trial court's 
refusal to grant leave to amend only when 
the amendment was sought shortly before 
trial or at trial so that the opposing party 
did not have adequate time to respond. 
See Staker v. Huntington Cleveland Irr. 
Co., 664 P.2d 1188, 1190 (Utah 1983) (trial 
court's denial of motion to amend answer 
on day of trial affirmed); Girard v. Apple-
by, 660 P.2d 245 (Utah 1983) (no abuse of 
discretion in trial court's denying motion to 
amend made on first day of trial). 
The lenders assert that they would be 
prejudiced by any amendment coming after 
ten years of dormancy of the case. On 
remand, any defenses or arguments 
against amendment may be presented to 
the trial court. It should be observed that 
the long delay was occasioned by the bank-
ruptcy proceedings and is largely not the 
fault of either party. Also, one of the 
issues which Mrs. Dewsnup seeks to raise 
in the amended counterclaim is whether the 
trust deed secures reimbursement of the 
1980 annual installment and the 1979 prop-
erty taxes which the lenders paid on the 
Arrow contract and for which amounts 
summary judgment was granted. This is-
sue would appear to involve only an inter-
pretation of the loan documents, which 
would be unaffected by the passage of 
time. 
[6,7] The lenders further assert that 
collateral estoppel prevents Mrs. Dewsnup 
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from amending her counterclaim to raise 
the issue of whether the trust deed should 
have been reconveyed after the $119,000 
loan was paid in December 1980. They 
contend that this issue was raised and liti-
gated in an adversary proceeding in the 
bankruptcy court. Collateral estoppel or 
issue preclusion prevents the relitigation of 
issues determined in a prior action. Ma-
lone v. Parker, 826 P.2d 132, 136 (Utah 
1992). In raising the defense of collateral 
estoppel, the lenders have the burden of 
proof. 
The party invoking this doctrine must 
demonstrate the following: (1) the issue 
involved in the subsequent action is iden-
tical to the issue decided in the previous 
action; (2) the issue was decided in a 
final judgment on the merits; (3) the 
issue was competently, fully, and fairly 
litigated in the first action; and (4) the 
party against whom the doctrine is in-
voked must be either a party to the first 
action or in privity with that party. 
Id. 
[8] In reviewing the record, we find 
that the issue of whether the trust deed 
should be reconveyed as a result of the 
payment of the promissory notes was 
raised in the Dewsnups' complaint in the 
bankruptcy court and in the trial briefs of 
both parties. However, the lenders have 
offered no evidence that the bankruptcy 
court ruled on the merits of this issue. 
The memorandum decision and the judg-
ment of dismissal make no reference to the 
issue; they refer only to the 11 U.S.C. 
section 506 bankruptcy issue as to whether 
the Dewsnups are entitled to avoid liens in 
excess of the fair market value of the 
property and then redeem the property. 
Mrs. Dewsnup contends that she tried to 
raise the issue, but the bankruptcy court 
would not consider it. 
Because the party asserting collateral es-
toppel has the burden of proof and there is 
no evidence of the bankruptcy court's de-
termination of the issue, we hold that the 
bankruptcy court did not determine the is-
sue. The lenders drafted the judgment of 
dismissal, which simply states that the 
Dewsnups' adversary proceeding is dis-
missed in its entirety with prejudice, with 
no findings of facts or reference to the 
Dewsnups' claims. Consequently, there 
has been no issue preclusion. In all likeli-
hood, the bankruptcy court thought that 
the summary judgment had determined the 
issue, and the court did not want to go 
behind the state court judgment. See Heis-
er v. Woodruff, 327 U.S. 726, 734, 66 S.Ct. 
853, 857, 90 L.Ed. 970, 976-77 (1946), which 
holds that where a state court judgment 
has been validly rendered, that judgment 
"is now res judicata and may not be fur-
ther litigated in the bankruptcy proceed-
ing." As earlier expressed in this opinion, 
we do not reach the issue on this appeal. 
Motion to Reconsider the Summary 
Judgment or Certify as Final 
under Rule 54(b) 
[9] The trial court denied Mrs. Dewsn-
up's motion to reconsider the summary 
judgment, stating that "no such motion 
exists under the Utah Rules of Civil Proce-
dure." In so ruling, it relied on Peay v. 
Peay} 607 P.2d 841 (Utah 1980). See also 
Drury v. Lunceford, 18 Utah 2d 74, 415 
P.2d 662 (1966) (to the same effect). Those 
cases, however, do not hold that a motion 
to reconsider does not exist in the circum-
stances presented by this case, where a 
final judgment has not been entered. 
Mrs. Dewsnup relies on the provisions of 
rule 54(b) and in the court of appeals' anal-
ysis in Salt Lake City Corp. v. James 
Constructors, 761 P.2d 42 (Utah Ct.App. 
1988), for her contention that a motion to 
reconsider exists and it was error for the 
trial court not to grant the motion. She 
asserts that because the summary judg-
ment did not wholly dispose of the case, the 
judgment is "subject to revision at any 
time before the entry of judgment adjudi-
cating all the claims and the rights and 
liabilities of all the parties." Utah R.Civ.P. 
54(b). Mrs. Dewsnup contends that under 
the analysis in James Constructors, a mo-
tion to reconsider, although not explicitly 
allowed in the Utah Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, may be permitted under rule 54(b). 
The court in James Constructors stated 
that rule 54(b) "does allow for the possibili-
ty of a judge changing his or her^miijd in 
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nearest ancestor must be preferred to 
those claiming through an ancestor more 
remote. 
Utah 783 
Now, the appellants take only through 
their mother. If she could not take, then 
her daughters cannot take. 
At common law illegitimate children 
could not inherit property.4 The common 
law of England is the law of Utah except 
as it has been modified by statute; and 
while the statute permits the illegitimate 
child to inherit from its mother and from 
its father if he acknowledges the child to 
be his, the statute makes no provision for 
inheriting from the brothers and sisters 
who are legitimate children of their father. 
Section 74-4-11, U.CA.1953, seems to 
indicate a legislative intent that an illegiti-
mate cannot inherit from collateral half 
blood relatives on the father's side. It pro-
vides that the property of an illegitimate 
child who dies intestate without leaving 
husband or wife or lawful issue will go to 
his mother or in case of her death to her 
heirs at law. This statute prevents the de-
cedent from participating in the estate of 
his half sister, and it would seem that the 
legislature intended that she (or in case of 
her prior death, her descendants) should 
not be able to share in his estate. 
The appellants, therefore, cannot take 
under Subsection (4), supra, a share of the 
decedent's property through their mother, 
nor can they take under Subsection (6) 
above for the reason that they are not rec-
ognized in law as the "next of kin." The 
term "next of kin" refers to nearest blood 
relatives who would take the personal es-
tate of one who dies intestate 5 and does 
not include bastards.6 Since their mother 
could not inherit any part of the estate of 
the decedent, the appellants likewise are 
precluded from inheriting and, therefore, 
cannot be considered as belonging to the 
class of "next of kin." 
4. 2 Wendell's Blaekstone Commentaries, 
page 286. 
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TRANSAMERICA INSURANCE COMPANY, 
a California corporation, Plaintiff 
and Appellant, 
v. 
Earl R. BARNES, Defendant 
and Respondent. 
No. 12771. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Nov. 17, 1072. 
Automobile liability insurer brought 
action to enforce its claimed right of sub-
rogation to certain funds received by de-
fendant in settlement of his tort action for 
personal injuries against third party. The 
Third District Court, Salt Lake County, 
Stewart M. Hanson, J., rendered summary 
judgment for defendant, and plaintiff ap-
pealed. The Supreme Court, Callister, C. 
J., held that where record was insufficient 
to indicate whether defendant who had 
received medical expense payments from 
insurer, was paid twice for his injuries and 
record was inadequate to establish who had 
greater equity and did not clearly establish 
that tort-feasors or their representatives 
had actual or constructive knowledge of in-
surer's right of subrogation, issues of fact 
were raised, precluding summary judgment 
for defendant. 
Reversed and remanded for trial. 
Tuckett, J., concurred in result. 
Henriod, J., dissented and filed opin-
ion. 
Crockett, J., dissented and filed opin-
ion. 
Insurance <£»606(4) 
Where an automobile liability policy 
did not specify occupant of a vehicle being 
used by an insured as a "person insured," 
defendant, who was such a passenger, who 
had been paid by insurer under medical ex-
pense coverage and against whom insurer 
5. Bullentine Law Dictionary page SON. 
6. 10 C.J.S. Bastards § 24. 
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subsequently brought action to enforce its 
claimed right of subrogation to funds re-
ceived by defendant in settlement of his 
tort action for personal injuries against 
third party, was not an "insured" subject 
to insurer's subrogation rights under policy 
clause providing that insurer shall be sub-
rogated to all insured's rights of recovery. 
(Per Callister, C. J., with one Justice con-
curring and one Justice concurring in the 
result.) 
2. Insurance <§=>606(l) 
Regardless of an express contract pro-
vision, an insurer may be entitled to subro-
gation. (Per Callister, C J., with one Jus-
tice concurring and one Justice concurring 
in the result.) 
3. Subrogation C^l 
Equitable principles apply to subroga-
tion. (Per Callister, C. J., with one Justice 
concurring and one Justice concurring in 
the result.) 
4. Insurance €=>606(l) 
Insured is entitled to be made whole 
before insurer may recover any portion of 
insured's recovery from tort-feasor; if one 
responsible has paid full extent of the loss, 
insured should not claim both sums, and in-
surer may then assert its claim to subroga-
tion. (Per Callister, C. J., with one Justice 
concurring and one Justice concurring in 
the result.) 
5. Subrogation <§=»! 
Subrogation is not a matter of right 
but may be invoked only in those circum-
stances where justice demands its applica-
tion. (Per Callister, C. J., with one Justice 
concurring and one Justice concurring in 
the result.) 
6. Subrogation 0=>l 
Subrogation is not permitted where it 
will work any injustice to others. (Per 
Callister, C. J., with one Justice concurring 
and one Justice concurring in the result.) 
7. Subrogation C=>l 
To entitle one to subrogation, the equi-
ties of one's case must be strong. (Per 
Callister, C. J., with one Justice concurring 
and one Justice concurring in the result.) 
8. Subrogation <5=>\ 
The purpose of subrogation, as a crea-
tion of equity, is to effect an adjustment 
between parties so as to secure ultimately 
the payment or discharge of the debt by a 
person who in good conscience ought to 
pay for it. (Per Callister, C. J., with one 
Justice concurring and one Justice concur-
ring in the result.) 
9. Insurance 0^606(10) 
If third-party tort-feasor's settlement 
with person who had received payment 
from automobile liability insurer for medi-
cal expenses was intended to include the 
prior medical expenses paid for by insurer, 
two drafts should have been issued, one to 
insurer and person receiving benefits joint-
ly and one to that person alone. (Per Cal-
lister, C. J., with one Justice concurring 
and one Justice concurring in the result.) 
10. Insurance <§=>606(I0) 
If settlement by third-party tort-feasor 
with person who had received medical ex-
pense payments from automobile liability 
insurer was made with knowledge, actual 
or constructive, of insurer's subrogation 
right, such settlement and release was a 
fraud on insurer and would not affect in-
surer's right of subrogation as against 
tort-feasor or his insurer. (Per Callister, 
C. J., with one Justice concurring and one 
Justice concurring in the result.) 
11. Judgment C= I^85.3(I2) 
Where record, in automobile liability 
insurer's action to enforce its claimed right 
of subrogation to certain funds received by 
defendant in settlement of his tort action 
for personal injuries against third party, 
was insufficient to indicate whether de-
fendant, who had received medical expense 
payment* from insurer, was paid twice for 
his injuries and record was inadequate to 
establish who had greater equity and did 
not clearly establish that tort-feasors or 
their representatives had actual or con-
structive knowledge of insurer's right of 
subrogation, issues of fact were raised, 
precluding summary judgment for defend-
ant. (Per Callister, C. J., with one Justice 
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concurring and one Justice v .curring in certain funds received b\ 
the result.) 
12. Insurance <S=*606( 10) 
If an insurer has had an opportunity 
to assert its subrogation rights to third-
party tort-feasors who have entered into 
settlement with person against whom sub-
rogation rights are claimed and insured has 
neglected to give notice or enforce its de-
mands, it may be determined under such 
circumstances that insurer's rights in equi-
ty are equal or inferior to those of person 
against whom subrogation is claimed. 
(Per Callister, C. J., with one Justice con-
curring and one Justice concurring in the 
result.) 
13. Equity <S=>54 
Equity will not relieve one who could 
have relieved himself. (Per Callister, C. 
J., with one Justice concurring and one 
Justice concurring in the result.) 
14. Insurance O60I.2 
Insurer, to establish a superior equity 
against person who has received medical 
expense payments from insurer and there-
after recovered against third-party tort-
feasors,'and thus to be entitled to prevail 
in subrogation action, must present proof 
which establishes that damages recovered 
by defendant's settlement were the same or 
cover those for which defendant has al-
ready received indemnity from insurer; 
otherwise, receipt of payment from tort-
feasor does not entitle insurer to return of 
payments made by it. (Per Callister, C. J., 
with one Justice concurring and one Jus-
tice concurring in the result.) 
Allan L. Larson, of Worsley, Snow & 
Christensen, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff 
and appellant. 
William H. Henderson and Mark S. 
Miner, Salt Lake City, for defendant and 
respondent. 
CALLISTER, Chief Justice: 
Plaintiff insurer initiated this action to 
enforce its claimed right of subrogation to 
5C5 P.2d—50 
£fendant in set-
tlement of his tort action for personal in-
juries against third parties. Both parties 
moved for summary judgment based on the 
pleadings, affidavits, admissions and an-
swers to interrogatories; the trial court 
granted judgment to the defendant. Plain-
tiff appeals therefrom and seeks judgment 
rendered in its favor. 
Defendant was a passenger in a motor 
vehicle, owned and operated by one Jen-
son; plaintiff had issued a policy of insur-
ance to Jenson. The vehicle was involved 
in a collision, and defendant sustained per-
sonal injuries. Plaintiff, under its medical 
expense coverage, paid defendant $1,000, 
the maximum benefit under the policy. 
Thereafter, defendant filed an action 
against the alleged tort-feasors, whom he 
claimed by their negligence caused the col-
lision with the vehicle in which he was rid-
ing. Defendant alleged that he had sus-
tained permanent injuries, and sought 
$65,000 general damages and $10,000 spe-
cial damages. Plaintiff notified defend-
ant's attorney of its claimed subrogation 
right; however, plaintiff refused to partic-
ipate in defendant's action or to permit his 
counsel to act on its behalf. Defendant 
has emphasized that the law firm that rep-
resents plaintiff also represented the tort-
feasors, with whom defendant entered into 
a settlement for a lump sum of $7,500. 
Plaintiff claims that it is entitled to reim-
bursement to the extent of $1,000 less a 
reasonable attorney's fee and its propor-
tionate share of the costs from the fund 
recovered by defendant from the tort-fea-
sors. 
Plaintiff predicates its right of subroga-
tion on three alternative theories: one, on 
an express contract as provided in the in-
surance policy issued to Jenson; two, on 
an implied contract as money had and re-
ceived; or third, on a quasi contract for 
unjust enrichment. 
The insurance contract provided that the 
company would pay, "on behalf of the in-
sured," all reasonable medical expenses for 
bodily injury caused by accident and sus-
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taincd by any person while occupying an 
owned automobile while being used by an 
insured. The policy further defined an 
"insured" as a person or organization de-
scribed under "Persons Insured/ ' Under 
the express provisions of the policy, an oc-
cupant of a vehicle being used by an in-
sured was not specified as a "person in-
sured." The subrogation clause of the pol-
icy provided: 
In the event of any payment under 
the Liability or Medical Expense Cover-
age or under Part II of this policy, the 
company shall be subrogated to all the 
insured's rights of recovery therefor 
against any person or organization and 
the insured shall execute and deliver in-
struments and papers and do whatever 
else is necessary to secure such rights. 
The insured shaU do nothing after ]oss 
to prejudice such rights. [Emphasis 
added.] 
[1,2] From the foregoing, defendant 
was not an ' 'insured" under the express 
provisions of the contract; and, therefore, 
it may not be urged that as an insured he 
breached the contractual provisions of the 
subrogation clause. Regardless of an ex-
press contract provision, an insurer may be 
entitled to subrogation. 
Subrogation springs from equity con-
cluding that one having been reimbursed 
for a specific loss should not be entitled 
to a second reimbursement therefor. 
This principle has been accepted in the 
insurance field with respect to property 
damage, and with respect to medical 
costs by an impressive weight of authori-
ty. . . . » 
[3-8J Equitable principles apply to sub-
rogation, and the insured is entitled to be 
made whole before the insurer may recover 
any portion of the recovery from the tort-
1. State Farm Mutual Ins. Co. v. Fanners 
Ins. Ex<-liaii£<\ 22 I'tali 2<1 1X3, 1X4. 450 
I\2<1 45S (1909). 
2. Lyon v. IlartfonI Arc. & In<]<«m. Co.. 25 
Etah 2d 311, 31 \ 4X0 I\2<1 739 (1971). 
3. Beavor County v. Homo Inrieni. Co., XX 
Ctah 1, 3G-37. 52 I\2d 435 (1935). 
feasor. If the one responsible has paid the 
full extent of the loss, the insurer should 
not claim both sums, and the insurer may 
then assert its claim to subrogation.2 Sub-
rogation is not a matter of right but may 
be invoked only in those circumstances 
where justice demands its application, and 
the rights of the one seeking subrogation 
have a greater equity than the one who op-
poses him.3 Subrogation is not permitted 
where it will work any injustice to others. 
To entitle one to subrogation, the equities 
of one's case must be strong, as equity will, 
in general, relieve only those who could 
not have relieved themselves.4 The pur-
pose of subrogation, as a creation of equi-
ty, is to effect an adjustment between par-
ties so as to secure ultimately the payment 
or discharge of a debt by a person who in 
good conscience ought to pay for it.5 
Plaintiff urges that defendant's settle-
ment and release of his entire claim must 
necessarily include all of his medical ex-
penses, and therefore, he has received dou-
ble payment to the extent that plaintiff 
paid under its medical coverage. On the 
other hand, defendant claims that he sus-
tained severe injuries, but he was compelled 
to settle for a sum that inadequately com-
pensated him for the total damages sus-
tained. 
[9,10] The settlement was for a lump 
sum without apportionment as to specific 
items of damage. From the state of the 
instant record, there is insufficient evi-
dence to indicate whether defendant was 
paid twice. When the settlement was 
made, the tort-feasors or their representa-
tives apparently had actual or constructive 
knowledge that some of defendant's medi-
cal expenses had previously been paid by 
plaintiff. Perhaps the negotiated settle-
ment was reduced by this amount, particu-
larly when defendant's counsel had been 
4. Ashton Jonkins Ins. Co. \ . Layton Sugar 
Co., X5 Ctah 333, 337, 39 I\2<1 701 
(1935). 
5. Holmstead v. Abbott C. M. I)i<>sd, Inc.. 
27 Ctah 2d 109, 493 I\2«I 025 (1972). 
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informed that he did not repreb .it plain- tort-feasor does not entitle 
tiff's interest. If the settlement were in-
tended to include plaintiff's prior medical 
expenses, two drafts should have been is-
sued, one to plaintiff and defendant jointly 
and one to defendant, alone. If the settle-
ment were made with knowledge, actual or 
constructive, of plaintiff's subrogation 
right, such settlement and release is a 
fraud on the insurer and will not affect 
the insurer's right of subrogation as 
against the tort-feasor or his insurance 
carrier.6 
plaintiff to 
the return of the payments made by it.7 
This cause is reversed and remanded for 
a trial in accordance with this opinion. 
No costs are awarded. 
ELLETT, J., concurs. 
T U C K E T T , J., concurs in the result. 
[11-14] The present state of the record 
is inadequate to establish who has the 
greater equity. The record does not clear-
ly establish that the tort-feasors or their 
representatives had actual or constructive 
knowledge of plaintiff's right of subroga-
tion. If such fact be established, they may 
not disregard plaintiff's known subrogation 
right in settling the liability. In such a 
case, the tort-feasors in good conscience 
should discharge the liability and plaintiff 
does not have a right in equity superior 
to defendant's. Furthermore, if plaintiff 
had an opportunity to assert its subroga-
tion rights to the tort-feasors and neglected 
to give notice or enforce its demands, the 
trial court may determine under such cir-
cumstances that plaintiff's rights in equity 
are equal or inferior to defendant's, i. e., 
equity will not relieve one who could have 
relieved himself. The plaintiff to establish 
a superior equity and thus to be entitled to 
prevail must present proof which establish-
es that the damages covered by defendant's 
settlement were the same or cover those 
for which the defendant has already re-
ceived indemnity from plaintiff; other-
wise, the receipt of payment from the 
H E N R I O D , Justice (dissenting) : 
I dissent. The main opinion indulges 
generalities as substitutes for the facts in 
subrogation matters relating to insurance 
contracts. 
The policy in this case provided two 
things pertinent to this case: It insured 
Barnes, defendant here, who was no signa-
tory to the insurance contract, but a bene-
ficiary thereof, by the happenstance that 
he was a passenger in the car owned by 
the insured who paid the premium. As 
such beneficiary he obtained no greater 
rights under the policy than did the in-
sured, and under the terms of the policy 
the insurance company, plaintiff here, was 
1) required to pay medical benefits to the 
defendant, as passenger, and 2) was subro-
gated, in equity, which is the case here, to 
any recovery for such benefits made by 
defendant.1 
Defendant, having full knowledge of the 
policy terms, after having been paid the 
maximum medical benefits of $1,000 by the 
plaintiff insurance company, sued for both 
medical and general damages. At this 
point the insurance company, plaintiff 
here, notified Barnes of its equitable right 
of subrogation to recover back what it had 
paid Barnes ($1,000) for the medicals. 
Barnes settled his suit against the tort-fea-
sor for $7,500, giving a full release for all 
16 Coueli On Insurance 2d, § 01:197, i>i>. 
348-350; Davenport v. State Farm Mu-
tual Auto. Ins. Co., 81 Nov. 361, 404 
P.2d 10 (1965) ; Hospital Service Corp. 
of Rhode Island v. Pennsylvania Ins. Co., 
101 R.I. 708, 227 A.2d 105, 112 (1967) ; 
Sentry Ins. Co. v. Stuart , 246 Ark. 6*0, 
439 S.W.2d 797, 799 (1909) ; 0A Apple-
man Ins. Law & Practice, § 4092, p. 240. 
7. 15 Blashfield Automobile Law and Prac-
tice, § 484.0, p. 192. 
!. There was nothing therein requiring the 
company to sue for or assist Barnes in 
recovering anything other than what the 
company had paid under the policy, the 
maximum $1,000. 
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claims, without insisting that the release 
include or exclude the medical payment of 
$1,000 already paid. In equity one is said 
to be required to do equity. If this be so, 
Barnes should have said "I have been paid 
$1,000 on the claim for medical damages 
which I sued you for along with general 
damages, and therefore I cannot give you 
a release for all claims unless you either 
pay an additional $1,000 to the insurance 
company or make out two checks, one to it 
for its equitable subrogation right of reim-
bursement of $1,000, leaving a second 
check to me for $6,500." Barnes having 
failed in equity either to notify the plain-
tiff company of its willingness to accept a 
sum for a "release of all claims," without 
condition or exclusion of the one claim,— 
the medical one,—is not responsive to the 
maxim that "He who seeks equity must do 
equity."2 It is no answer for the main 
opinion to return this case to determine 
what Barnes's understanding with the de-
fendant tort-feasor's insurance carrier was, 
since such circumstances are quite irrele-
vant and inconsistent with any rights 
plaintiff and defendant here may have en-
tertained. Barnes, defendant here, cannot 
adjudge the conditions under which he may 
give a release for all claims, without reser-
vation, without being obligated to abide by 
the only contract that gave him any rights 
for medical payments at all—the insurance 
policy, and the only thing involved here. 
It seems silly for him to say that I am 
bound by the policy under which, though I 
was no signatory thereto, I am not bound, 
if the insurer doesn't intervene and protect 
me in some fantastic claim I made in rny 
complaint, which I admitted in my brief 
that I, "Barnes, fearful of losing suit 
settled it for a lump sum of 
$7,500" To this author, this sounds like a 
first-class shakedown, and as icing on a 
cake that would give a double payment of 
$1,000 medical expense paid by the plain-
tiff insurance company, which latter in eq-
uity should have at least some kind of re-
lief, and which should be the amount paid, 
2. State Farm Mutual v. Farmers Insurance E 
or $1,000 as compared to $7,500 settlement 
which should amount to 100% recovery, in 
my opinion, but at least a proportionate re-
covery from Barnes. This would seem to 
be equity, and there is no equity in sending 
this case back to determine any other equi-
ties between plaintiff and defendant, since 
such equities already were resolved in an 
insurance contract, to the terms of which 
Barnes was but a beneficiary, not a signa-
tory, and to which he was no party as to 
subrogation rights, and in which contract 
he was not entitled to lay down his own 
rules, but to whose terms, if he relies on 
its terms, he must comply,—one of which 
is that certainly he cannot sign a release of 
all claims unless he recognizes the rights 
of the contract under which he has accept-
ed benefits, without reserving rights to the 
insurer in a release. 
CROCKETT, J., dissents and files opin-
ion. 
CROCKETT, Justice (dissenting): 
It is important to bear in mind that, as 
correctly set forth in the main opinion, the 
defendant Barnes was not an "insured" un-
der Jensen's policy with plaintiff Trans-
america. Therefore Barnes and Trans-
america had no contractual relationship 
nor obligations to each other. Defendant 
Barnes simply became a third-party benefi-
ciary of Transamerica's promise to its in-
sured, Jensen, that it would pay up to 
$1000 medical to any occupant of his car 
who was injured. It should be assumed 
that Jensen both desired and paid for this 
protection to his passengers, of which 
Barnes became a beneficiary. Transameri-
ca received the premium for that protec-
tion and should fulfill that obligation and 
should not be permitted to sue and recover 
from the third-party beneficiary (defend-
ant Barnes). Allowing it to take the mon-
ey away from the intended beneficiary to 
reimburse itself results in failure to fulfill 
the promise for which it accepted the pre-
mium, and defeats the purpose for which 
its insured (Jensen) paid his money. 
change, 22 Utah 2d 183, 450 P.2d 458 (1969). 
TRANS AMERICA INSURANCE COMPANY v. BARAlib 
Cite as 503 P.2d 783 
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The conclusion thus stated is affirmed 
by the well known authority, Couch on In-
surance, Sec. 61:172, 2d Ed., wherein it is 
stated: 
It may be required by statute or con-
tract that some person other than the in-
sured shall have the benefit of the insur-
ance procured by the insured. When 
such is the case, the insurer may not as-
sert any claim by zcay of subrogation 
against such person, [this is] on the 
theory that the policy is designed to af-
ford protection to such third person and 
this purpose would obviously be defeated 
if the insurer could sue the third person 
to recover from him the payments made 
by the insurer to the third person. (Ci-
tation) [Emphasis added.] 
It is also significant that Transamerica's 
policy contained numerous and ample pro-
visions for its own protection, including 
rights of subrogation expressly reserved to 
itself, but it did not include the right of 
subrogation against any third-party benefi-
ciary, therefore not against one in the po-
sition of the defendant Barnes. 
Further, assuming without conceding 
that there may be some circumstances 
where such a subrogation would be availa-
ble to this plaintiff, it certainly would be 
obliged at least to make it clearly appear 
that $1000 of the settlement received by 
Barnes in the other suit was for the medi-
cal expense plaintiff had paid. On the ba-
sis of the pleadings, affidavits, admissions 
and answers to interrogatories, the trial 
court could view the facts thus: that inas-
much as the settlement of Barnes (defend-
ant here) in the other case wherein he set-
tled his claim of $65,000 for $7500 was 
indicated as being for his personal in-
juries, and with no segregation nor indica-
tion as to separate medical expense, there 
therefore would exist no reasonable basis 
for a finding that the $1000 medical ex-
pense which had been paid by plaintiff 
Transamerica was repaid in that settle-
ment. 
On the basis of what I have said above I 
think the trial court was justified in con-
cluding that there was no disputed issue of 
fact which if resolved in favor of the 
plaintiff would entitle it to prevail, and 
that accordingly, the summary judgment 
was proper in order to avoid the time, trou-
ble and expense of a trial. 
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And Sec. 78-45- self when he reaches his majority, his par-
ents may be required to provide support 
beyond that time.2 
and their minor children 
2(4) states thereof that 
"Child" means a son or daughter under 
the age of twenty-one years and a son or 
daughter of whatever age who is incapac-
itated from earning a living and without 
sufficient means. [Emphasis added.] 
Upon appropriate hearing and considera-
tion of the matter, the trial court ordered 
the father, plaintiff Leonard, to pay $150 
per month to support his son, Joseph (no 
one questions that he is retarded and incap-
able of self-support), after he became 21. 
On appeal, the father urges: (1) that 
inasmuch as the divorce decree awarded 
support for Joseph until he was 21, that was 
res judicata on that issue; and (2) insuffici-
ency of the evidence to support the decree. 
[1] As to (1), above: The issue present-
ed and decided in the prior proceeding re-
lated to the support of the children during 
their minority. It does not appear that the 
issue, as to the obligation of the plaintiff 
Leonard to support the son Joseph after the 
latter had attained the age of 21, nor of the 
son's right to receive such support, was 
tried or determined therein. Joseph is now 
21, when it would normally be expected 
that he would have become self-supporting. 
But the fact is that he has not, and he is 
without means of support and will become 
an object of charity, or a burden on public 
welfare, unless that responsibility is placed 
upon his parents, including his father, as 
does this adjudication. 
[2] There is a firm foundation for the 
judgment of the trial court in the statute 
quoted above. It expressly fixes responsi-
bility for support of a child "of whatever 
age who is incapacitated from earning a 
living and without sufficient means" upon 
his parents. Correlated to the foregoing 
and in further support of the trial court's 
ruling, this Court has recognized that when 
a child is so limited, either physically or 
mentally, that he is unable to support him-
2. See Dehm v. Dehm, Utah, 545 P.2d 525 
(1976), and authorities therein cited. This prin-
ciple was also stated and reaffirmed in the later 
case of Carlson v. Carlson, Utah, 584 P.2d 864 
(1978). 
[3,4] As to the plaintiff's challenge to 
the sufficiency of evidence: There has been 
no transcript of the evidence brought to 
this Court; and in the absence thereof we 
assume that it supports the findings of the 
trial court.8 However, we make the obser-
vation that, in view of the financial circum-
stances of the parties as shown in our prior 
decision in this case, it does not appear that 
$150 per month to provide for a retarded 
child would be excessive or inequitable. 
Affirmed. Costs to plaintiff. 
MAUGHAN, HALL and WILKINS, JJ., 
and HENRIOD, Retired Justice, concur. 
STEWART, J., having disqualified him-
self, does not participate herein. 
The WESTERN CASUALTY AND 
SURETY COMPANY, Plaintiff 
and Appellant, 
v. 
Ralph MARCHANT, Darve Miller, and 
Sherman Peterson, Defendants and 
Respondents. 
No. 16512. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
July 11, 1980. 
Automobile liability insurer, which 
claimed that injured employee was an em-
ployee of insured and thus excluded under 
3. Watkins v. Simonds, 14 Utah 2d 406, 385 
P.2d 154 (1963). 
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policy, brought declaratory judgment action 
to have its rights determined. The Second 
District Court, Davis County, J. Duffy 
Palmer, J., found that clause excluding cov-
erage was not applicable to employee, and 
insurer appealed. The Supreme Court, 
Crockett, C. J., held that: (1) no reason 
existed to disturb determination that em-
ployee was not employed by insured at time 
of injury, but (2) trial court's recitation "for 
good cause shown" provided no foundation 
for award of attorney fees to insured. 
Affirmed as modified. 
Stewart, J., concurred in result. 
1. Insurance <s=> 155.1 
Master and Servant <s=>l 
When a question arises under insurance 
policy as to whether one person is an em-
ployee of another, it is to be resolved as are 
other questions of fact, considering a num-
ber of factors, none of which is necessarily 
alone controlling; in general, it can be said 
that an employee is one who is hired for 
compensation, for a substantial period of 
time, to perform duties wherein he is sub-
ject to a comparatively high degree of di-
rection and control by the one who hires 
him. 
2. Insurance <s=>467.61(4) 
In determining whether employee was 
a "loaned employee" of the insured and 
therefore fell within automobile liability 
policy clause excluding coverage of in-
sured's own employees, factors to be con-
sidered included for whose benefit work 
was done, who paid employee, and as perti-
nent to issue of control, whether lending 
employer also furnished specialized equip-
ment to be used by employee. 
3. Insurance <s=>155 
If it is shown that a person is an em-
ployee of one employer, burden of proving 
change of employment status is upon party 
contending that such a change has occurred 
for purposes of determining coverage under 
an insurance policy. 
4. Insurance <$=>467.61(4) 
No reason existed to disturb trial 
court's determination that truck-leasing 
business employee was not employed at 
time of his injury by insured, who operated 
similar truck-leasing business and who pur-
suant to arrangement with other business 
asked employee if he would be interested in 
working one or two days on demolition 
project, and thus automobile liability policy 
clause excluding coverage of insured's own 
employees did not protect insurer from pay-
ing employee no-fault personal injury pro-
tection benefits under the policy for injuries 
sustained by employee while working on 
insured's demolition site nor from its obliga-
tion to defend insured in suit brought 
against him by employee. 
5. Costs <s=>173(l) 
Authorization contained in declaratory 
judgment statute to award such "costs as 
may seem equitable and just" covers award 
of attorney fees if they were necessarily 
incurred because of litigation which was not 
resorted to in good faith but was spiteful, 
contentious or obstructive. U.C.A.1953, 78-
33-10. 
6. Insurance <s=>675 
Where there was no finding of fact 
that showed that insurer initiated declara-
tory judgment action to determine its 
rights because of spite or to be obstructive, 
and where no such finding was warranted 
and insurer merely stated its position and 
initiated declaratory judgment action for 
determination of what appeared to be a 
justiciable controversy concerning coverage 
under automobile liability policy, no founda-
tion existed for award of attorney fees to 
insured under declaratory judgment stat-
ute, which provides that court may make 
equitable and just award of costs. U.C.A. 
1953, 78-33-10. 
Roger H. Bullock of Strong & Hanni, Salt 
Lake City, for plaintiff and appellant. 
Craig S. Cook, Salt Lake City, for Mar-
chant and Miller. 
Wendell E. Bennett, Salt Lake City, for 
Peterson. 
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then explained how the demolition job was 
to proceed. At the end of the day, he told 
the men to return the following Monday. 
That morning, since the Yates truck needed 
repairs, Peterson used one of Marchant's 
trucks. After he had returned from the 
dumping site to pick up his second load, 
Peterson noticed that the loading positions 
of the other trucks had changed. He left 
his truck to determine whether there was a 
new loading procedure and, while he was 
talking to one of the other drivers, he was 
hit by a truck being backed up by defend-
ant Darve Miller. 
Peterson subsequently brought two ac-
tions, one against plaintiff Western Casual-
ty to obtain the no-fault benefits, i. e., the 
personal injury protections (PIP) for medi-
cal expenses, loss of income and loss of 
services.2 He also initiated an action for 
general damages against Marchant. When 
the plaintiff was notified of these claims, it 
took the position that Peterson was an em-
ploye of Marchant, and thus excluded under 
its policy, and refused to pay either the PIP 
no-fault benefits or to afford its insured, 
Marchant, a defense in the action against 
him. Controversy arose and the plaintiff 
brought this declaratory judgment action to 
have its rights determined. 
It is upon the basis of the t€ timony and 
the evidence of the parties relating to the 
foregoing that the trial court made its find-
ing that, at the time of the accident, Peter-
son was not the employee of Marchant, but 
was still in the employ of Gary Yates. It 
further found that neither Marchant nor 
Gary Yates carried workman's compensa-
tion coverage and, thus, Peterson was not 
entitled to receive any workman's compen-
sation. 
The insurance policy issued by the plain-
tiff provides liability coverage for bodily 
injury "arising out of the ownership, main-
tenance or use of the automobile" and that 
the plaintiff "shall defend any suit alleging 
CROCKETT, Chief Justice: 
Plaintiff Western Casualty, which issued 
an automobile liability insurance policy to 
defendant Ralph Marchant, appeals from a 
finding that a clause excluding coverage of 
the insured's own employees was not appli-
cable to defendant Sherman Peterson who 
was injured while he was working on de-
fendant Marchant's demolition job site. 
Plaintiffs principal contention is that 
"the only reasonable conclusion from the 
evidence" is that Peterson was working as 
an employee of Marchant, and not of Gary 
Yates, as the trial court found.1 
Defendant Marchant operates a trucking 
business whereby he leases both trucks and 
drivers to other businesses for various pur-
poses. He is also a licensed demolition con-
tractor. In the early fall of 1977, he agreed 
to perform demolition work on a lot in 
Clearfield, Utah. He and Gary Yates, who 
operated a similar truck leasing business, 
had a long standing arrangement whereby 
they sold and hauled fill dirt and topsoil 
from land owned by Marchant. Any mate-
rial sold by Yates would be charged against 
his account, with the understanding that 
when Marchant needed an extra truck or 
driver, he could borrow Yates' equipment 
and/or drivers and Yates' account would bfe 
credited accordingly. 
Pursuant to that arrangement, Marchant 
asked Sherman Peterson, who worked fof 
Yates at the time, if he would be interested 
in working one or two days on the demoli-
tion project in Clearfield. After Peterson 
agreed, Marchant told him that the work 
would begin on Saturday, September 3, 
1977, and that Peterson was to use one of 
Yates' trucks on the job. Marchant also 
talked with Yates, who agreed to the use of 
his truck and driver on the weekend demoli-
tion job. Yates further testified that he 
had paid Peterson in advance for that work. 
On September 3, Peterson and four other 
men reported to Marchant for work, who 
1. We assume that the tnal court believed those 
aspects of the evidence which support the find-
ings and judgment. Tate's lnc v. Little Ameri-
ca Refining Co., Utah, 535 P.2d 1228 (1975); 
Corma v. Cornia, Utah, 546 P2d 890 (1976). 
2. The amounts claimed for those losses were 
$5,031.47, $7,800.00 and $4,800.00, respective-
ly. 
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such bodily injury . . and seeking 
damages which are payable" under the 
terms of the policy. The express language 
of the exclusion relied upon by the plaintiff 
is that the policy does not apply 
to (1) bodily injury to any em-
ployee of the insured arising out of and in 
the course of employment by 
the insured, or (2) any obligation for 
which the insured . may be held 
liable under any workman's compensa-
tion, unemployment compensation or dis-
ability benefits law, or under any similar 
law . . [Emphasis added.] 
[1] When a question arises as to wheth-
er one person is an employee of another, it 
is to be resolved as are other questions of 
fact.3 In doing so, there are a number of 
factors which should be considered, no one 
of which is necessarily alone controlling.4 
In general, it can be said that an employee 
is one who is hired for compensation, for a 
substantial period of time, to perform 
duties wherein he is subject to a compara-
tively high degree of direction and control 
by the one who hires him.5 
[2,3] When, as in the present case, the 
question relates to a person alleged to be a 
"loaned employee," there are additional fac-
tors to be considered: (1) for whose benefit 
the work was done; (2) who paid the em-
ployee; and, as pertinent to the issue of 
control, (3) whether the "lending" employer 
also furnished specialized equipment to be 
used by the employee.6 In focusing the 
foregoing principles upon our problem, 
there is yet another proposition that has 
application here: If it is shown that a per-
3. Truck Insurance Exchange v. Yardley, Utah, 
556 P.2d 494 (1976); Kiefer Concrete, Inc. v. 
Hoffman, Colo., 562 P.2d 745 (1977); Peterick 
v. State, 22 Wash.App. 163, 589 P.2d 250 
(1978). 
4. Harry L. Young & Sons, Inc. v. Ashton, Utah, 
538 P.2d 316 (1975); Storrusten v. Harrison, 
169 Mont. 525, 549 P.2d 464 (1976); Antonini 
v. Hanna Industries, Nev., 573 P.2d 1184 
(1978). 
5. Buhler v. Maddison, 109 Utah 267, 176 P.2d 
118 (1947); Christean v. Ind. Comm., 113 Utah 
451, 196 P.2d 502 (1948); Oberhansly v. Travel-
ers Ins. Co., 5 Utah 2d 15, 295 P.2d 1093 (1956); 
son is an employee of one employer (Gary 
Yates), the burden of proving a change of 
employment status is upon the party (plain-
tiff) contending that such a change has 
occurred.7 
[4] Upon our survey of the evidence in 
the light of the foregoing, we see no reason 
to disturb the trial court's determination 
that Sherman Peterson was employed by 
Gary Yates at the time of his injury, and 
not by defendant Marchant. It therefore 
correctly ruled that the clause in plaintiff's 
policy excluding Marchant's employees does 
not protect plaintiff from paying Peterson 
the PIP no-fault benefits under the policy, 
nor from its obligation to defend Marchant 
in the suit brought against him by Peterson. 
Plaintiff also attacks the trial court's 
granting of defendant Marchant's motion 
for attorneys' fees, alleged to be taxable 
costs. The court's action on that motion 
stated: 
Pursuant to the Motion of defendant 
Marchant and good cause ap-
pearing therefor; IT IS HEREBY OR-
DERED that . . . he is . . . 
awarded . . . $3,500.00 attorney 
fees. 
In support of that order, defendant relies 
on Section 78-33-10, U.C.A., 1953, pertain-
ing to declaratory judgments. It provides 
that the court "may make such award of 
costs as may seem equitable and just." It is 
to be noted that the statute makes no ex-
press mention of attorneys' fees. 
[5] The basic rule which this Court has 
declared and long adhered to is that attor-
Adamson v. Okland Construction Co., 29 Utah 
2d 286, 508 P.2d 805 (1973); Harry L. Young & 
Sons, Inc. v. Ashton, supra, note 4. 
6. Harry L. Young & Sons, Inc. v. Ashton, su-
pra, note 4; Kepa v. Hawaii Welding Co. Ltd., 
56 Haw. 544, 545 P.2d 687 (1976); Storrusten 
v. Harrison, supra, note 4. 
7. Pichler v. Pacific Mechanical Constructors, 1 
Wash.App. 447, 462 P.2d 960 (1969). That the 
insurer has the burden of proof that a loss is 
excluded from coverage, see Standford v. 
American Guaranty Life Ins. Co., 280 Or. 525, 
571 P.2d 909 (1977). 
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neys' fees are not to be allowed unless they 
are provided for by contract or by statute8 
or where they are a legitimate item of 
damages caused by the other party's wrong-
ful act.1 As an extension of the latter 
proposition, we have no doubt that the stat-
utory authorization to award such "costs as 
may seem equitable and just" may include 
an award of attorneys' fees if they were 
necessarily incurred because of litigation 
which was not resorted to in good faith, but 
was merely spiteful, contentious or obstruc-
tive.10 
Utah 427 
Stephan R. ELIASON and Marilyn D. 
Eliason, husband and wife, Plaintiffs, 
Respondents, and Cross-Appellants, 
v. 
Richard C. WATTS and John A. Kerr, 
partners, dba K. W. Development, a 
partnership, and Jan Watts and Barbara 
Kerr, as Individuals, Defendants, Appel-
lants, and Cross-Appellants. 
No. 16402. 
[6] It is true that in granting defend-
ant's motion for attorneys' fees, the trial 
court recited "for good cause shown." But 
that is merely a conclusion, without any 
finding of fact which would bring the plain-
tiffs conduct within the rules just stated 
above. Moreover, no such finding would be 
warranted where the plaintiff merely stat-
ed its position and initiated this action for 
determination of what appears to be a justi-
ciable controversy. It would not comport 
with our ideas of either law or justice to 
prevent any party who entertains bona fide 
questions about his legal obligations from 
seeking adjudication thereon in the courts.11 
There being no foundation for the award 
of attorneys' fees to the defendant,12 that 
portion of the judgment is vacated; and 
with that modification, the judgment of the 
trial court is affirmed. No costs awarded. 
MAUGHAN, WILKINS and HALL, JJ., 
concur. 
STEWART, J., concurs in result. 
( O ^ KEY NUMBER SYSTEMS 
8. Nelson v. Newman, Utah, 583 P.2d 601 
(1978); Biesinger v. Behunin, Utah, 584 P.2d 
801 (1978); Dyson v. Aviation Office of Ameri-
ca, Inc., Utah, 593 P.2d 143 (1979). 
9. 20 Am.Jur.2d, Costs, sec. 72; Espinoza v. 
Safeco Title Ins. Co., Utah, 598 P.2d 346 (1979). 
10. American States Ins. Co. v. Walker, 26 Utah 
2d 161, 486 P.2d 1042 (1971). See statement in 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
July 14, 1980. 
Purchasers sued vendors for specific 
performance of contract to sell realty. The 
First District Court, Cache County, VeNoy 
Christofferson, J., entered judgment grant-
ing specific performance and rental-value 
damages and vendors appealed and pur-
chasers cross-appealed. The Supreme 
Court, Stewart, J., held that: (1) purchas-
ers' tender of cash for amount of purchase 
price of realty was sufficient performance 
on their part and they were entitled to 
specific performance; (2) where vendors' 
refusal to convey realty contravened con-
tract but was not willful or malicious, inter-
est earned on purchase money retained by 
purchasers would be credited against rental 
value in adjusting equities between parties 
based upon their positions had there been a 
timely conveyance; and (3) in absence of 
plaintiffs' timely filing and serving state-
ment of points to be relied on in cross 
appeal, cross appeal was not properly before 
the court. 
Remanded to d*fermine amount of 
plaintiffs' rental-value losses as offset by 
interest on the purchase price. 
Ranch Homes, Inc. v. Greater Park City Corp., 
Utah, 592 P.2d 620 (1979). 
11. Utah Const., Art. 1, sec. 11. 
12. Cf., American States Ins. Co. v. Walker, 
supra, note 10 (where the record indicated that 
an award of attorneys' fees was justified). 
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Dismissal of claim. 
This statute provides no basis on which to 
dismiss a claim. Burns Chiropractic Clinic v. 
Allstate Ins. Co., 851 P.2d 1209 (Utah Ct. App. 
1993). 
Time computation. 
The 52 consecutive week period in Subsection 
(l)(b)(i) runs from the loss of gross income and 
loss of earning capacity, not from the date of the 
accident. Plaintiff who did not begin to suffer 
loss of income and loss of earning capacity until 
six months after an accident and continued to 
suffer that loss for a period exceeding the 
maximum benefit of 52 weeks was improperly 
denied coverage when the trial court only pro-
vided for coverage for 52 weeks following the 
date of the accident. Larsen v. Allstate Ins. Co., 
217 Utah Adv. Rep. 30 (Ct. App. 1993). 
Tort claims. 
—Availability of insurance benefits. 
No-fault benefits are available to those who 
sustain serious injury even though they remain 
free to pursue a tort claim as well; however, the 
injured person is not entitled to a double recov-
ery from the tort-feasor and under no-fault for a 
single loss. Jones v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 592 
P.2d 609 (Utah 1979). 
Where insured brought action against his 
no-fault insurer seeking additional no-fault 
benefits after receiving benefits from the no-
fault insurer and obtaining a judgment against 
a third-party tort-feasor, insured was collater-
ally estopped from recovering additional no-
feult benefits in the form of lost wages but was 
not collaterally estopped from recovering for 
household expenses. Wilde v. Mid-Century Ins. 
Co., 635 P.2d 417 (Utah 1981). 
—Motorist's liability. 
A party having the security required under 
this section is granted partial tort immunity 
and is not personally liable for the benefits 
provided hereunder; he remains liable for cus-
tomary tort claims, such as general damages 
and economic losses not compensated by the 
benefits paid hereunder, if the threshold provi-
sions of § 31A-22-309 are met. Allstate Ins. Co. 
v. Ivie, 606 P.2d 1197 (Utah 1980). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
C J . S . — 60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 113. 
AJL.R. — Validity and construction of "no-
fault" automobile insurance plans, 42 A.L.R.3d 
229. 
Validity of state statute prohibiting health 
providers from the practice of waiving patients' 
-obligation to pay health insurance deductibles 
or copayments, or advertising such practice, 8 
AX.R.5th 855. 
Key Numbers. — Automobiles *=* 43. 
31A-22-308. Persons covered by personal injury protec-
tion. 
The following may receive benefits under personal injury protection cover-
age: 
(1) the named insured, when injured in an accident involving any motor 
vehicle, regardless of whether the accident occurs in this state, the United 
States, its territories or possessions, or Canada, except where the injury is 
the result of the use or operation of the named insured's own motor vehicle 
not actually insured under the policy; 
(2) persons related to the insured by blood, marriage, adoption, or 
guardianship who are residents of the insured's household, including 
those who usually make their home in the same household but temporar-
ily live elsewhere under the circumstances described in Section (1), except 
where the person is injured as a result of the use or operation of his own 
motor vehicle not insured under the policy; and 
(3) any other natural person whose injuries arise out of an automobile 
accident occurring while the person occupies a motor vehicle described in 
the policy with the express or implied consent of the named insured or 
while a pedestrian if he is injured in an accident occurring in Utah 
involving the described motor vehicle. 
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History: C. 1953, 31A-22-308, enacted by 
L. 1985, ch. 242, § 27; 1990, ch. 327, § 9. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amend-
ment, effective April 23, 1990, divided the for-
merly undivided language in Subsection (1) 
into present Subsections (1) and (2); redesig-
nated former Subsection (2) as present Subsec-
tion (3); substituted "when injured in an acci-
dent involving any motor vehicle, regardless of 
whether the accident occurs in this state, the 
United States, its territories or possessions, or 
Canada, except when the injury is a result of 
the use or operation of the named insured's own 
motor vehicle not actually insured under the 
policy" for "and" in Subsection (1) and "under 
the circumstances described in Section (1), ex-
cept where the person is injured as a result of 
the use or operation of his own motor vehicle 
not insured under the policy; and" for "when 
injured in an accident in Utah involving any 
motor vehicle" in Subsection (2); and, in Sub-
section (3), deleted "in Utah" after the first 
instance of "occurring" and inserted "occurring 
in Utah" near the end of the subsection. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Limitation of policy covering driver. 
Motorcycle driven by insured. 
Named-driver exclusionary endorsement. 
Out-of-state incidents. 
Limitation of policy covering driver. 
Passenger in an automobile driven by 
insured's son but owned by another person was 
not entitled to personal injury protection (PIP) 
coverage under a policy covering the driver. 
McCaffery v. Grow, 787 P.2d 901 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990). 
Motorcycle driven by insured. 
The coverages described in § 31A-22-307 
were applicable to an insured killed while rid-
ing a motorcycle involved in an accident in this 
state with a motor vehicle; there is no require-
ment that the insured must be operating or 
occupying the motor vehicle to be subject to 
coverage, but only that he be in an accident 
involving a motor vehicle. Coates v. American 
Economy Ins. Co., 627 P.2d 92 (Utah 1981). 
Named-driver exclusionary endorsement. 
Insurance policies used as security must in-
clude minimum omnibus coverage including 
persons operating the vehicle with the express 
or implied permission of the owner-insurer, and 
include the statutory minimum liability limits; 
a named-driver exclusionary endorsement to 
an insurance policy presented as security is 
void in relation to the statutory minimum level 
of coverage, but is enforceable as to coverage 
provided above the mandatory minimum lim-
its. Allstate Ins. Co. v. United States Fid. & 
Guar. Co., 619 P.2d 329 (Utah 1980) (decided 
before 1985 repeal of Chapter 12 of Title 41). 
Out-of-state incidents. 
In light of language limiting application of 
these provisions to accidents in this state, in-
surance commissioner's regulation making no-
fault insurance coverage applicable to incidents 
occurring outside the state was in error. IML 
Freight, Inc. v. Ottosen, 538 P.2d 296 (Utah 
1975). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
AX.R. — What constitutes "entering" or 
"alighting from" vehicle within meaning of in-
surance policy, or statute mandating insurance 
coverage, 59 A.L.R.4th 149. 
31A-22-309. Limitations, exclusions, and conditions to 
personal injury protection. 
(1) A person who has or is required to have direct benefit coverage under a 
policy which includes personal injury protection may not maintain a cause of 
action for general damages arising out of personal injuries alleged to have been 
caused by an automobile accident, except where the person has sustained one 
or more of the following: 
(a) death; 
(b) dismemberment; 
(c) permanent disability or permanent impairment based upon objec-
tive findings; 
(d) permanent disfigurement; or 
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(e) medical expenses to a person in excess of $3,000. 
(2) (a) Any insurer issuing personal injury protection coverage under this 
part may only exclude from this coverage benefits: 
(i) for any injury sustained by the insured while occupying another 
motor vehicle owned by or furnished for the regular use of the insured 
or a resident family member of the insured and not insured under the 
policy; 
(ii) for any injury sustained by any person while operating the 
insured motor vehicle without the express or implied consent of the 
insured or while not in lawful possession of the insured motor vehicle; 
(iii) to any injured person, if the person's conduct contributed to his 
injury: 
(A) by intentionally causing injury to himself; or 
(B) while committing a felony; 
(iv) for any injury sustained by any person arising out of the use of 
any motor vehicle while located for use as a residence or premises; 
(v) for any injury due to war, whether or not declared, civil war, 
insurrection, rebellion or revolution, or to any act or condition 
incident to any of the foregoing; or 
(vi) for any injury resulting from the radioactive, toxic, explosive, 
or other hazardous properties of nuclear materials, 
(b) The provisions of this subsection do not limit the exclusions which 
may be contained in other types of coverage. 
(3) The benefits payable to any injured person under Section 31A-22-307 are 
reduced by: 
(a) any benefits which that person receives or is entitled to receive as a 
result of an accident covered in this code under any workers'compensation 
or similar statutory plan; and 
(b) any amounts which that person receives or is entitled to receive 
from the United States or any of its agencies because that person is on 
active duty in the military service. 
(4) When a person injured is also an insured party under any other policy, 
including those policies complying with this part, primary coverage is given by 
the policy insuring the motor vehicle in use during the accident. 
(5) (a) Payment of the benefits provided for in Section 31A-22-307 shall be 
made on a monthly basis as expenses are incurred. 
(b) Benefits for any period are overdue if they are not paid within 30 
days after the insurer receives reasonable proof of the fact and amount of 
expenses incurred during the period. If reasonable proof is not supplied as 
to the entire claim, the amount supported by reasonable proof is overdue 
if not paid within 30 days after that proof is received by the insurer. Any 
part or all of the remainder of the claim that is later supported by 
reasonable proof is also overdue if not paid within 30 days after the proof 
is received by the insurer. 
(c) If the insurer fails to pay the expenses when due, these expenses 
shall bear interest at the rate of 1 V2% per month after the due date. 
(d) The person entitled to the benefits may bring an action in contract 
to recover the expenses plus the applicable interest. If the insurer is 
required by the action to pay any overdue benefits and interest, the 
insurer is also required to pay a reasonable attorney's fee to the claimant. 
(6) Every policy providing personal injury protection coverage is subject to 
the following: 
^Q~ HACTS IN SPECIFIC LINES S1A-22-309 
(a) that where the insured under the policy is or would be held legally 
liable for the personal injuries sustained by any person to whom benefits 
required under personal injury protection have been paid by another 
insurer, including the Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah, the insurer of 
the person who would be held legally liable shall reimburse the otjier 
insurer for the payment, but not in excess of the amount of damages 
recoverable; and 
(b) that the issue of liability for that reimbursement and its amount 
shall be decided by mandatory, binding arbitration between the insurers. 
History: C. 1953, 31A-22-309, enacted by 
L. 1985, ch. 242, § 27; 1986, ch. 204, § 160; 
1988 (2nd S.S.), ch. 10, § 10; 1991, ch. 74, 
§ 8; 1992, ch. 230, § 9; 1994, ch. 4, § 1. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amend-
ment, effective April 29, 1991, made minor 
stylistic changes in Subsection (1) and rewrote 
Subsection (2Xa)(i), which read: "for any inju-
ries sustained by the injured while occupying 
another motor vehicle owned by the insured 
ANALYSIS 
Acceptance of monthly payment. 
—Effect on insurer's obligation. 
Accrual of cause of action. 
Attorney's fees. 
—Appeal. 
Claims against federal government. 
Household exclusion clause. 
Personal injury protection requirements. 
Reimbursement. 
—Recovery from insured and his insurer. 
Release given by injured party to tort-feasor. 
Ibrt claims. 
—Liability of insured. 
—Pleading and instructions. 
Workers' compensation. 
Acceptance of monthly payment. 
—Effect on insurer's obligation. 
The acceptance of a monthly payment by an 
insured from a no-fault insurer does not termi-
nate the contractual obligation of the insurer to 
make additional payments for subsequently 
accrued claims. Wilde v. Mid-Century Ins. Co., 
635 P.2d 417 (Utah 1981). 
Accrual of cause of action. 
A cause of action against the state accrues at 
the time of the subject accident rather than 
when the plaintiff satisfies the threshhold re-
quirements under this section. Jepson v. State, 
846 P.2d 485 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
Attorney's fees. 
—Appeal. 
Plaintiff was not required to file a cross-
and not insured under the policy.n 
The 1992 amendment, effective April 27, 
1992, inserted "or is required to have" near the 
beginning of Subsection (1). 
The 1994 amendment, effective May 2, 1994, 
added aor permanent impairment based upon 
objective findings'' to the end of Subsection 
(l)(c); made a stylistic change in Subsection 
(3)(b); and added letter designations in Subsec-
tion (5). 
appeal in order to be entitled to attorney's fees 
incurred on appeal in defending his judgment 
for benefits. Coates v. American Economy Ins. 
Co., 627 P.2d 92 (Utah 1981). 
Claims against federal government. 
Even if the federal government could be char-
acterized as an insurer because it provided 
financial security for its employees in regard to 
vehicle operation claims, it could not be sub-
jected to mandatory arbitration under Subsec-
tion (6), since this would conflict with the 
administrative arrangement established in the 
Federal Tort Claims Act. United States Fid. & 
Guar. Co. v. United States, 728 F. Supp. 651 (D. 
Utah 1989). 
Household exclusion clause. 
A household or family exclusion clause in an 
automobile insurance policy is contrary to pub-
lic policy and to the statutory requirements 
found in the No-Fault Insurance Act as to the 
minimum benefits provided by statute. Farm-
ers Ins. Exch. v. Call, 712 P.2d 231 (Utah 1985). 
If an insurer fails to disclose material exclu-
sions in an automobile insurance policy and the 
purchaser is not informed of them in writing, 
those exclusions are invalid. Without disclo-
sure, the household exclusion clause fails to 
honor the reasonable expectations of the pur-
chaser, rendering the exclusion clause invalid 
as to the entire policy limits. Farmers Ins. 
Exch. v. Call, 712 P.2d 231 (Utah 1985). 
Household or family exclusions are valid in 
this state as to insurance provided by an auto-
mobile policy in excess of the statutorily man-
dated amounts and benefits. State Farm Mut. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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Auto. Ins. Co. v. Mastbaum, 748 P.2d 1042 
(Utah 1987). 
Personal injury protection requirements. 
In order to invoke the provisions of Subsec-
tion (6), the individual who initially pays the 
amounts for which personal injury protection 
benefits are also available must be "another 
insurer."McCaffery v. Grow, 787 P.2d 901 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1990). 
Subsection (6) does not contemplate arbitra-
tion between an uninsured victim's father and 
another's insurance company. McCaffcry v. 
Grow, 787 P.2d 901 (Utah Ct. App. 1990,'. 
Reimbursement. 
—Recovery from insured and his insurer. 
Where passenger collected personal iiyury 
protection benefits from driver's insurer and 
received an additional settlement in an action 
against the driver of the other car, the insurer 
had no right of subrogation to the recovery of 
the passenger, but could claim reimbursement 
from the other driver's insurer in an arbitration 
proceeding. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Ivie, 606 P.2d 
1197 (Utah 1980). 
Release given by injured party to tort-
feasor. 
Injured party who entered into a settlement 
agreement with his tort-feasor, whereby he 
released the tort-feasor from any and all known 
and unknown personal injury as well as prop-
erty damage arising from the auto accident, cut 
off his insurance company's subrogation rights, 
and by so doing was not entitled to further 
benefits from his insurance company under the 
no-fault coverage. Jones v. Transamerica Ins. 
Co., 592 P.2d 609 (Utah 1979), but see Allstate 
Ins. Co. v. Ivie, 606 P.2d 1197 (Utah 1980). 
Tort claims. 
—Liability of insured. 
If a party has the security required under 
§ 31A-22-307, he is granted partial tort immu-
nity and is not personally liable for the benefits 
provided under § 31A-22-307, but he remains 
liable for customary tort claims of general dam-
ages and economic losses not compensated un-
der § 31A-22-307. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Ivie, 606 
P.2d 1197 (Utah 1980). 
—Pleading and instructions. 
When injured party is entitled under thresh-
old provisions of this section to maintain claim 
for personal injuries not compensated by per-
sonal injury protection benefits, the injured 
party should plead only for those damages for 
which he has not received reparation under his 
first party insurance benefits; to present a 
completely factual picture to the jury, the in-
jured party may wish to present evidence of all 
his medical bills or other economic losses; in 
such a case, the court, by appropriate instruc-
tion, could explain to the jury that those eco-
nomic losses have not been included in the 
prayer for damages because the injured party 
has previously received reparation under his 
own no-fault insurance. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Ivie, 
606 R2d 1197 (Utah 1980). 
Workers' compensation. 
A no-fault insurer is permitted by Subsection 
(3)(a) to exclude from coverage provided under 
its insurance policy any liability for usuries 
that are compensable under the workers' com-
pensation statute or a similar statutory plan. 
This provision, however, is irrelevant in a pro-
ceeding before the Industrial Commission in-
volving only the employee and an employer who 
has carried no-fault insurance but not workers' 
compensation insurance. Bevans v. Industrial" 
Comm'n, 790 P.2d 573 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. —Allstate Insurance Co. 
v. Ivie: Reimbursement Between Insurers Un-
der Utah's No-Fault Act, 1981 Utah L. Rev. 379. 
Attorney's Fees in Utah, 1984 Utah L. Rev. 
553. 
Note, The Negligent Infliction of Emotional 
Distress: A New Cause of Action in Utah, 1989 
Utah L. Rev. 571. 
AX.R. — Validity and construction of "no-
fault" automobile insurance plans, 42 A.L.R.3d 
229. 
Injury or death caused by assault as within 
coverage of no-fault motor vehicle insurance, 44 
A.L.R.4th 1010. 
Who is "employed or engaged in the automo-
bile business" within exclusionary clause of 
liability policy, 55 A.L.R.4th 261. 
What constitutes "entering" or "alighting 
from" vehicle within meaning of insurance pol-
icy, or statute mandating insurance coverage, 
59 AL.R.4th 149. 
Validity and construction of automobile in-
surance provision or statute automatically ter-
minating coverage when insured obtains an-
other policy providing similar coverage, 61 
A.L.R.4th 1130. 
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31-41-10. Exclusions from coverage.—Any insurer may exclude benefits: 
(a) (i) For injury sustained by the injured while occupying another 
motor vehicle owned by the insured and not insured under the policy, or 
(ii) for an injury sustained by any person while operating the insured 
motor vehicle without the express or implied consent of the insured or 
while nut in lawful possession of the insured motor vehicle. 
(b) To any injured person, if such person's conduct contributed to 
his injury under any of the following circumstances: 
(i) Causing injury to himself intentionally; or 
(ii) While committing a felony. 
History: L. 1973, ch. 65, § 10. 
31-41-11. Subrogation rights and arbitration between insurers.—(1) 
Every insurer authorized to write the insurance required by this act shall 
agree as a condition to being allowed to continue to write insurance in the 
state of Utah: 
(a) That where its insured is or would be held legally liable for the 
personal injuries sustained by any person to whom benefits required under 
this act have been paid by another insurer, including the state insurance 
fund, it will reimburse such other insurer for the payment of such bene-
fits, but not in excess of the amount of damages so recoverable, and 
(b) That the issue of liability for such reimbursement and the amount 
of same shall be decided by mandatory, binding arbitration between the 
insurers. 
History: L. 1973, ch. 55, § 11. automobile insurance plans, 42 A. L. R. 
3d 229. Compter's Notes. 
Section 11 of Laws 1973, ch. 55, does L a ^ Eeviews. 
not contain a subsection (2). No-Fault Automobile Insurance in Utah 
_
 m —State Constitutional Issues, 1970 Utah 
CoUateral References. L. Rev. 248. 
Insurance<§=>4.1. Compensation Systems and Utah's No-
44 C.J.S. Insurance § 64. Fault Statute, 1973 Utah L. Rev. 383. 
See Am. Jur. 2d, No-Fault Insurance Countrywide Overview of Automobile 
§§ 1-34, when published. No-Fault Insurance, 23 Defense L. J. 443 
Validity and construction of "no-fault" 
(1974). 
31-41-12. Rules and regulations of department.—The department is 
authorized to promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary 
for the purposes of this act. 
History: L. 1973, ch. 55, § 12. Cross-Reference. 
Rules and regulations, authority of 
commissioner, 31-2-3.5. 
31-41-13. Operation of vehicle without security a misdemeanor—Posses-
sion of evidence of security required—Additional penalties—Procedures 
following conviction or arrest for violation.—(1) Any owner of a motor 
vehicle with respect to which a security is required under this act, who 
operates this vehicle or permits it to be operated on a public highway in 
this state without this security being in effect is guilty of a misdemeanor. 
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TITLE II. 
APPEALS FROM JUDGMENTS AND ORDERS OF 
TRIAL COURTS. 
Rule 3. Appeal as of right: how taken. 
(a) Filing appeal from final orders and judgments. An appeal may be 
taken from a district, juvenile, or circuit court to the appellate court with 
jurisdiction over the appeal from all final orders and judgments, except as 
otherwise provided by law, by filing a notice of appeal with the clerk of the 
trial court within the time allowed by Rule 4. Failure of an appellant to take 
any step other than the timely filing of a notice of appeal does not affect the 
validity of the appeal, but is ground only for such action as the appellate court 
deems appropriate, which may include dismissal of the appeal or other sanc-
tions short of dismissal, as well as the award of attorney fees. 
(b) Joint or consolidated appeals. If two or more parties are entitled to 
appeal from a judgment or order and their interests are such as to make 
joinder practicable, they may file a joint notice of appeal or may join in an 
appeal of another party after filing separate timely notices of appeal. Joint 
appeals may proceed as a single appeal with a single appellant. Individual 
appeals may be consolidated by order of the appellate court upon its own 
motion or upon motion of a party, or by stipulation of the parties to the 
separate appeals. 
(c) Designation of parties. The party taking the appeal shall be known as 
the appellant and the adverse party as the appellee. The title of the action or 
proceeding shall not be changed in consequence of the appeal, except where 
otherwise directed by the appellate court. In original proceedings in the appel-
late court, the party making the original application shall be known as the 
petitioner and any other party as the respondent. 
(d) Content of notice of appeal. The notice of appeal shall specify the 
party or parties taking the appeal; shall designate the judgment or order, or 
part thereof, appealed from; shall designate the court from which the appeal is 
taken; and shall designate the court to which the appeal is taken. 
(e) Service of notice of appeal. The party taking the appeal shall give 
notice of the filing of a notice of appeal by serving personally or mailing a copy 
thereof to counsel of record of each party to the judgment or order; or, if the 
party is not represented by counsel, then on the party at the party's last 
known address. 
(f) Filing and docketing fees in civil appeals. At the time of filing any 
notice of separate, joint, or cross appeal in a civil case, the party taking the 
appeal shall pay to the clerk of the trial court such filing fees as are estab-
lished by law, and also the fee for docketing the appeal in the appellate court. 
The clerk of the trial court shall not accept a notice of appeal unless the filing 
and docketing fees are paid. 
(g) Docketing of appeal. Upon the filing of the notice of appeal and pay-
ment of the required fees, the clerk of the trial court shall immediately trans-
mit one copy of the notice of appeal, showing the date of its filing, the docket-
ing fee, and a copy of the bond required by Rule 6 or a certification by the 
clerk that the bond has been filed, to the clerk of the appellate court. Upon 
receipt of the copy of the notice of appeal and the docketing fee, the clerk of 
the appellate court shall enter the appeal upon the docket. An appeal shall be 
docketed under the title given to the action in the trial court, with the appel-
lant identified as such, but if the title does not contain the name of the appel-
lant, such name shall be added to the title. 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.) 
Advisory Committee Note. — e designa-
tion of parties is changed to confo. o the des-
ignation of parties in the federal appellate 
courts. 
The rule is amended to make clear that the 
mere designation of an appeal as a "cross-ap-
peal" does not eliminate liability for payment 
of the filing and docketing fees. But for the 
order of filing, the cross-appellant would have 
been the appellant and so should be required to 
pay the established fees. 
ANALYSIS 
Absence of record. 
Attorney fees. 
Content of notice. 
Denial of intervention. 
Dismissal by trial court. 
Filing fees. 
Filing of notice. 
Final order or judgment. 
Judgment nunc pro tunc. 
Motion to strike. 
New trial. 
Partial judgment. 
Postjudgment orders. 
Purpose of notice. 
Review in equity cases. 
Summary judgment. 
Unsigned minute entry. 
Cited. 
Absence of record. 
There was nothing for the court to review 
where the alleged error was not made part of 
the record. Powers v. Gene's Bldg. Materials, 
Inc., 567 P.2d 174 (Utah 1977). 
Attorney fees. 
Because plaintiff was entitled to attorney 
fees by law, he was entitled to attorney fees 
incurred on appeal in defending his judgment 
without the necessity of having to file a cross 
appeal. Coates v. American Economy Ins. Co., 
627 P.2d 92 (Utah 1981); Wallis v. Thomas, 
632 P.2d 39 (Utah 1981). 
Content of notice. 
Subdivision (d) requires only specification of 
the parties taking the appeal, not of all the 
parties involved. Scudder v. Kennecott Copper 
Corp., 886 P.2d 48 (Utah 1994). 
When appealing from an entire final judg-
ment, it is not necessary to specify each inter-
locutory order of which the appellant seeks re-
view. Scudder v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 886 
P.2d 48 (Utah 1994). 
Denial of intervention. 
Order denying with prejudice an application 
for intervention was appealable. Tracy v. Uni-
versity of Utah Hosp., 619 P.2d 340 (Utah 
1980). 
Dismissal by trial court 
Both an order to dismiss with prejudice, on 
the merits of the issues under Rule 41(b), 
U.R.C.P., and an order of dismissal without 
prejudice under Rule 41(a)(1), U.R.C.P., are 
final abjudications of tho issues and the time 
for appeal under this rule begins to run with 
the entry of the order. Steiner v. State, 27 Utah 
2d 284, 496 P.2d 809 (1972). 
Amendment Notes. — Thf £992 amend-
ment, effective October 1,1992, jrted "and a 
copy of the bond required by Rule 6 or a certifi-
cation by the clerk that the bond has been 
filed" and made minor stylistic changes in Sub-
division (g). 
Cross-References. — Circuit courts, ap-
peals from, § 78-4-11. 
Justice courts, appeals from, § 78-5-120. 
Juvenile courts, appeals from § 78-3a-51. 
Denial of defendant's motion to dismiss was 
not a final judgment subject to appeal. Little v. 
Mitchell, 604 P.2d 918 (Utah 1979). 
Dismissal without prejudice of plaintiffs ac-
tion was appealable where the trial court's rul-
ing went to the legal merits of any cause that 
plaintiff may have framed. Bowles v. State ex 
rel. DOT, 652 P.2d 1345 (Utah 1982). 
Filing fees. 
It is not the clerk's duty to file notice of ap-
peal until he has received the appropriate fil-
ing fee. McLain v. Conrad, 19 Utah 2d 346,431 
P.2d 571 (1967). 
Where the notice of appeal was left at the 
clerk's office prior to the expiration of the time 
for filing but the filing fee was not paid until 
after expiration of the time for filing and the 
clerk did not file the notice until the fee was 
paid, the notice was untimely filed and the 
court lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal. 
McLain v. Conrad, 19 Utah 2d 346, 431 P.2d 
571 (1967). 
Filing of notice. 
Where the deadline for filing an appeal ex-
pired on Saturday, the notice of appeal which 
was filed on the following Monday was within 
the time limit, in view of the provisions of 
§ 17-16-9. Transwestern Gen. Agency v. Mor-
gan, 526 P.2d 1186 (Utah 1974). 
Without notice of appeal being given, the Su-
preme Court is without jurisdiction to hear the 
matter. Yost v. State, 640 P.2d 1044 (Utah 
1981). 
The Supreme Court cannot take jurisdiction 
over an appeal which is not timely brought be-
fore it; and an untimely appeal will be dis-
missed for lack of jurisdiction. Burgers v. 
Maiben, 652 P.2d 1320 (Utah 1982); Bowen v. 
Riverton City, 656 P.2d 434 (Utah 1982); Nel-
son v. Stoker, 669 P.2d 390 (Utah 1983). 
Mailing a notice of appeal to the clerk of the 
court does not constitute a "filing" of the notice 
of appeal under this rule. Isaacson v. Dorius, 
669 P.2d 849 (Utah 1983). 
Final order or judgment 
An oral finding of contempt of court and sen-
tence of 15 days in the county jail, with 10 days 
suspended, was not a final judgment from 
which an appeal could have been taken. 
Hinkins v. Santi, 25 Utah 2d 324, 481 P.2d 53 
(1971). 
In the case of a divorce decree which did not, 
by its terms, become a final judgment until 
three months after it was entered, appeal had 
nonetheless to be taken within one month of 
the decree, which was the last proceeding nee-
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essary before the judgment became final. 
Kessimakis v. Kessimakis, 546 P.2d 888 (Utah 
1976). 
A judgment is final when it ends the contro-
versy between the parties litigant. Salt Lake 
City Corp. v. Layton, 600 P.2d 538 (Utah 
1979). 
Order finding person in contempt was an ap-
pealable order. Salzetti v. Backman, 638 P.2d 
543 (Utah 1981). 
District court orders requiring party to con-
vey property in accordance with divorce decree 
were final orders and thus appealable where 
the effect of such orders was to determine sub-
stantial rights in the property and to terminate 
finally the litigation surrounding it. Cahoon v. 
Cahoon, 641 P.2d 140 (Utah 1982). 
Where the order appealed from was not final 
and was not certified nor eligible for certifica-
tion under Rule 54(b), U.R.C.P., the appeal was 
not properly taken, and the remedy was dis-
missal of the appeal. A.J. Mackay Co. v. 
Okland Constr. Co., 817 P.2d 323 (Utah 1991). 
Judgment nunc pro tunc. 
A judgment nunc pro tunc has no effect on 
the time for appeal from that judgment and 
cannot be used to reduce the time, or defeat the 
right, to take an appeal. Utah State Bldg. fid. 
v. Walsh Plumbing Co., 16 Utah 2d 249, 399 
P.2d 141 (1965). 
Where judgment was entered on April 2 but 
the judgment recited that it was entered nunc 
pro tunc as of February 24, this latter recital 
had no effect upon the time for appeal and ap-
peal could be taken by filing notice within the 
required time from April 2. Utah State Bldg. 
Bd. v. Walsh Plumbing Co., 16 Utah 2d 249, 
399 P.2d 141 (1965). 
Motion to strike. 
Order granting plaintiffs motion to strike 
defendant's pleadings is not a final order or 
judgment, and is not appealable. Nielsen v. 
Nielsen, 529 P.2d 803 (Utah 1974). 
Where defendant petitioned court for modifi-
cation of a divorce decree and alternatively 
alledged in the petition that the decree should 
be vacated and set aside, the granting of defen-
dant's motion for modification fully satisfied 
his claim and his alternative claim became 
moot, so that the court's granting of a motion 
to strike the motion to vacate and set aside was 
meaningless and no appeal would lie there-
from. Peay v. Peay, 607 P.2d 841 (Utah 1980). 
New trial. 
An order granting a new trial is not a final 
judgment; it only sets aside the verdict and 
places the parties in the same position as if 
there had been no previous trial. Haslam v. 
Paulsen, 15 Utah 2d 185, 389 P.2d 736 (1964). 
Order denying a motion for a new trial was 
not appealable. Habbeshaw v. Habbeshaw, 17 
Utah 2d 295, 409 P.2d 972 (1966). 
Partial judgment. 
Where the real issue before the court was 
whether mountain ground belonged to dece-
dent's estate or to bis widow and the decree 
decided the issue against the widow, the fact 
that the court retained, jurisdiction to adjudi-
cate further matters did not leave open for re-
property, and the decree entered was final and 
appealable and became conclusive in the ab-
sence of a timely appeal. In re Voorhees' Es-
tate, 12 Utah 2d 361, 366 P.2d 977 (1961). 
Where plaintiffs complaint contained eight 
causes of action, court's judgment on merits as 
to one cause with reservation of jurisdiction 
and judgement as to other causes was not a 
final judgment from which an appeal could be 
taken. J.B.& R.E. Walker, Inc. v. Thayn, 17 
Utah 2d 120, 405 P.2d 342 (1965). 
Where court granted one defendant's motion 
to dismiss with prejudice and entered default 
judgment in favor of that defendant on his 
counterclaim, but action against other defen-
dants and one defendant's counterclaim re-
mained alive, court's order was not final and 
an appeal from it would be dismissed. Kennedy 
v. New Era Indus., Inc., 600 P.2d 534 (Utah 
1979). 
A judgment that disposes of fewer than all of 
the causes of action alleged in the plaintiffs 
complaint is not a final judgment from which 
an appeal may be taken. Salt Lake City Corp. 
v. Layton, 600 P.2d 538 (Utah 1979). 
A partial summary judgment is not gener-
ally a final judgment and hence it is not ap-
pealable under the limitations prescribed by 
this rule. South Shores Concession, Inc. v. 
State, 600 P.2d 550 (Utah 1979). 
District court order setting aside certain pro-
visions in a default decree of divorce and pro-
viding for a further hearing on the matter was 
not a final ruling from which an appeal could 
be taken. Pearson v. Pearson, 641 P.2d 103 
(Utah 1982). 
Postjudgment orders. 
An order vacating a judgment is not a final 
order from which an appeal can be taken pur-
suant to this rule. Van Wagenen v. Walker, 
597 P.2d 1327 (Utah 1979). 
The final judgment rule does not preclude 
review of postjudgment orders; such orders 
were independently subject to the test of final-
ity, according to their own substance and ef-
fect. Cahoon v. Cahoon, 641 P.2d 140 (Utah 
1982). 
Purpose of notice. 
The object of a notice of appeal is to advise 
the opposite party that an appeal has been 
taken from a specific judgment in a particular 
case. Nunley v. Stan Katz Real Estate, Inc., 15 
Utah 2d 126, 388 P.2d 798 (1964). 
Review in equity cases. 
In the appeal of an equity case, the Supreme 
Court may weigh the facts as well as review 
the law, but will reverse on the facts only when 
the evidence clearly preponderates against the 
findings of the trial court. Crimmins v. 
Simonds, 636 P.2d 478 (Utah 1981). 
In reviewing trial court's findings of fact in 
equity cases, the Supreme Court would give 
due deference to the trial court's decision and 
reverse only when the evidence clearly prepon-
derated against the trial court's findings. 
Jensen v. Brown, 639 P.2d 150 (Utah 1981). 
Summary judgment £7d? J J / 
Order setting aside summary jungran^mj* 
son might appeal as matter of rigbl Jensen v. an entry of judgment, nor wasjf a final judg-
Nielsen, 22 Utah 2d 23, 447 P.2 6^ (1968). ment for purposes of appeal. ' on v. Man-
Order denying a motion for summary judg- ning, 645 P.2d 655 (Utah 198*,, Utah State 
ment was not a final order and was not appeal- Tax Comm'n v. Erekson, 714 P.2d 1151 (Utah 
able. Denison v. Crown Toyota Motors, Inc., 1986); Sather v. Gross, 727 P.2d 212 (Utah 
571 P.2d 1359 (Utah 1977). 1986); Ahlstrom v. Anderson, 728 P.2d 979 
A summary judgment in favor of one defen- (Utah 1986). 
dant alone is not a final judgment where the An unsigned minute entry does not consti-
action against the remaining defendant re- tute a final order for purposes of appeal. State 
mains alive. Neider v. State DOT, 665 P.2d v. Crowley, 737 P.2d 198 (Utah 1987). 
1306 (Utah 1983).
 C i t e d ^ H u s t o n v Lewis> 8 1 8 p 2d 531 
Unsigned minute entry. (Utah 1991); Boggs v. Boggs, 824 P.2d 478 
An unsigned minute entry did not constitute (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
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A.L.R. — Appealability of order suspending 
imposition or execution of sentence, 51 
A.L.R.4th 939. 
Rule 4. Appeal as of right: when taken. 
(a) Appeal from final judgment and order. In a case in which an appeal 
is permitted as a matter of right from the trial court to the appellate court, the 
notice of appeal required by Rule 3 shall be filed with the clerk of the trial 
court within 30 days after the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed 
from. However, when a judgment or order is entered in a statutory forcible 
entry or unlawful detainer action, the notice of appeal required by Rule 3 
shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court within 10 days after the date of 
entry of the judgment or order appealed from. 
(b) Motions post judgment or order. If a timely motion under the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure is filed in the trial court by any party (1) for judg-
ment under Rule 50(b); (2) under Rule 52(b) to amend or make additional 
findings of fact, whether or not an alteration of the judgment would be re-
quired if the motion is granted; (3) under Rule 59 to alter or amend the 
judgment; or (4) under Rule 59 for a new trial, the time for appeal for all 
parties shall run from the entry of the order denying a new trial or granting 
or denying any other such motion. Similarly, if a timely motion under the 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure is filed in the trial court by any party (1) 
under Rule 24 for a new trial; or (2) under Rule 26 for an order, after judg-
ment, affecting the substantial rights of a defendant, the time for appeal for 
all parties shall run from the entry of the order denying a new trial or grant-
ing or denying any other such motion. A notice of appeal filed before the 
disposition of any of the above motions shall have no effect. A new notice of 
appeal must be filed within the prescribed time measured from the entry of 
the order of the trial court disposing of the motion as provided above. 
(c) Filing prior to entry of judgment or order. Except as provided in 
paragraph (b) of this rule, a notice of appeal filed after the announcement of a 
decision, judgment, or order but before the entry of the judgment or order of 
the trial court shall be treated as filed after such entry and on the day thereof. 
(d) Additional or cross-appeal. If a timely notice of appeal is filed by a 
party, any other party may file a notice of appeal within 14 days after the date 
on which the first notice of appeal was filed, or within the time otherwise 
prescribed by paragraph (a) of this rule, whichever period last expires. 
(e) Extension of time to appeal. The trial court, upon a showing of excus-
able neglect or good cause, may extend the time for filing a notice of appeal 
upon motion filed not later than 30 days after the expiration of the time 
prescribed by paragraph (a) of this rule. A motion filed before expiration of the 
prescribed time may be ex parte unless the trial court otherwise requires. 
Notice of a motion filed after expiration of the prescribed time shall be given 
to the other parties in accordance with the rules of practice of the trial court 
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No extension shall exceed 30 days past the prescribed time or 10 days from the 
date of entry of the order granting the motion, whichever occurs later. 
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Timeliness of notice. 
—Date of notice. 
Cited. 
Administrative actions. 
Subdivision (c) does not apply to petitions for 
review of administrative actions. Maverik 
Country Stores, Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 860 
P.2d 944 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). 
Attorney fees. 
No cross-appeal is necessary where plaintiffs 
merely sought attorney's fees incurred in de-
fending their judgment on appeal. Wallis v. 
Thomas, 632 P.2d 39 (Utah 1981). 
Cross-appeal. 
Subdivision (d) requires that a notice of 
cross-appeal be timely filed. Absent a cross-ap-
peal, a respondent may not attack the judg-
ment of the court below. Henretty v. Manti 
City Corp., 791 P.2d 506 (Utah 1990) (decided 
under former R. Utah S. Ct. 4). 
Extension of time to appeal 
Neither Rule 6(b), U.R.C.P., granting the 
court power to extend a time limit where a fail-
ure to act in time is due to excusable neglect 
generally, nor Rule 60(b)(1), U.R.C.P., autho-
rizing the court to relieve from final judgment 
for inadvertence or excusable neglect, applies 
where a notice of appeal has not been timely 
filed. Holbrook v. Hodson, 24 Utah 2d 120, 466 
P.2d 843 (1970). 
A party could not extend the time for filing 
an appeal simply by filing a "Motion for Recon-
sideration of Order Striking Petition and Mo-
tion for Relief from Final Judgment." Peay v. 
Peay, 607 P.2d 841 (Utah 1980). 
When the question of "excusable neglect" 
arises in a jurisdictional context, as opposed to 
a nonjurisdictional context, the standard con-
templated thereby is a strict one; it is not 
meant to cover the usual excuse that the law-
yer is too busy, but is to cover emergency situa-
tions only. Prowswood, Inc. v. Mountain Fuel 
Supply Co., 676 P.2d 952 (Utah 1984). 
The time for filing an appeal is jurisdictional 
and ordinarily cannot be enlarged. State v. 
Montoya, 825 P.2d 676 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
Proper remedy of defendant whose cross-ap-
peal was not timely filed under Subdivision (d), 
upon having the notice returned, was to file a 
motion to extend time with the district court 
sion, on appeal. Glezos v. Frontier Inv., 896 
P.2d 1230 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). 
—Amendment or modification of judg-
ment 
If an amendment or modification does not 
change the substance or character of a judg-
ment, it does not enlarge the time for appeal. 
Nielson v. Gurley, 888 P.2d 130 (Utah Ct. App. 
1994). 
Filing of notice. 
The mailing of a notice of appeal was not 
equivalent to a filing of notice of appeal. 
Isaacson v. Dorius, 669 P.2d 849 (Utah 1983). 
Filing with county clerk. 
Filing with the county clerk was not a timely 
filing with the juvenile court, where there was 
no indication when the clerk transmitted a 
copy of the notice of appeal to the juvenile 
court, and the original was returned to appel-
lant's counsel. State, In re M.S., 781 P.2d 1287 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
Final order or judgment 
Where the tried court signed two different 
judgments but neither party served his pre-
pared judgment on the other party before sub-
mitting it to the court, the filing of either judg-
ment would be erroneous, and an appeal taken 
from either is premature because the judg-
ments are not properly "final." Larsen v. 
Larsen, 674 P.2d 116 (Utah 1983). 
Juvenile court's order for temporary confine-
ment in a youth facility for observation and 
assessment prior to a final disposition was not 
a final order, for purposes of appeal, because it 
did not finally dispose of all issues, including 
the rights of the juvenile and/or his mother's 
rights as parental custodian. State, In re 
T.D.C., 748 P.2d 201 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, de-
nied, 765 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1988). 
An unsigned minute entry is not a final 
judgment for purposes of appeal. A judgment, 
tolled by a timely post-judgment motion, starts 
to run on the date when the trial court enters 
its first signed order denying the motion. 
Gallardo v. Bolinder, 800 P.2d 816 (Utah 
1990). 
A signed minute entry ordering defendant's 
counsel to prepare an order showing that plain-
tiffs post-judgment motions filed pursuant to 
Rules 52(b) and 59, U.R.C.P., were denied was 
not a final appealable order. Swenson Assocs. 
Architects v. State, 254 Utah Adv. Rep. 9 
(Utah 1994). 
Post-judgment motions. 
Where a post-judgment motion was timely 
filed under Rule 59(a)(6), U.R.C.P., to upset the 
judgment, and notices of appeal from the judg-
ment were filed after the motion was made, but 
before the disposition of the motion, the motion 
rendered the notices of appeal ineffective, and 
notice of appeal had to be filed within the re-
quired time from the date of 
disposed of the motion. U-M Ir 
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an arbitrator's award runs froin^the order 
denying appellant's timely motior^^ alter or 
amend that judgment under Rule WPiJ.R.C.P. 
Robinson & Wells v. Warren, 669 P.2d 844 
(Utah 1983). 
The Supreme Court may not consider an ap-
peal from the dismissal of a complaint for 
unpaid overtime compensation until the trial 
court has had an opportunity to review the or-
der in question by ruling on all pending post-
judgment motions. Bailey v. Sound Lab, Inc., 
694 P.2d 1043 (Utah 1984). 
A notice of appeal filed before the disposition 
of a proper post-judgment motion is ineffective 
to confer jurisdiction upon the Supreme Court. 
Transamerica Cash Reserve, Inc. v. Hafen, 723 
P.2d 425 (Utah 1986); DeBry v. Fidelity Natl 
Title Ins. Co., 828 P.2d 520 (Utah Ct. App. 
1992), cert denied, 857 P.2d 948 (Utah 1993). 
Filing a post-judgment motion of a type 
listed in this rule suspends the finality of the 
judgment, and a notice of appeal filed prior to 
disposition of such a motion by entry of a 
signed order is not effective to confer jurisdic-
tion on an appellate court. Anderson v. 
Schwendiman, 764 P.2d 999 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988). 
Filing of an "exception to order and motion 
for reconsideration" of summary judgment 
tolled the thirty-day time period within which 
to file a notice of appeal, notwithstanding the 
incorrect title placed upon the pleading, since 
the judge ruled on the motion as if it were a 
motion for a new trial. Watkiss & Campbell v. 
Foa & Son, 808 P.2d 1061 (Utah 1991). 
Where a motion to set aside a judgment was 
not timely served and was subsequently with-
drawn, and thus the court neither granted nor 
denied the motion and did not enter an order, 
the motion did not trigger a new thirty-day 
appeal time under Subdivision (b). Nielson v. 
Gurley, 888 P.2d 130 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
When a party files a post-judgment motion 
pursuant to either Rule 52(b) or Rule 59, 
U.R.C.P., a notice of appeal must be filed after 
the order disposing of the motion is entered in 
order to vest jurisdiction in an appellate court. 
Swenson Assocs. Architects v. State, 889 P.2d 
415 (Utah 1994). 
Premature notice. 
A notice of appeal filtd after a ruling on a 
motion to alter or amend a judgment has been 
announced, but before the entry of an order 
disposing of the motion, is premature and does 
not confer jurisdiction on the court Anderson 
v. Schwendiman, 764 P.2d 999 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988). 
Reconsideration of order. 
The Court of Appeals declined to reconsider 
and overrule its prior denial of the state's re-
quest to dismiss an appeal as untimely. State 
v. Yates, 765 P.2d 251 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
Timeliness of notice. 
Notice of appeal filed within the required pe-
riod from date of entry of order of contempt was 
filed timely and Supreme Court had jurisdic-
tion to hear appeal concerning the contempt 
order. Burgers v. Maiben, 652 P.2d 1320 (Utah 
1982). 
An untimely motion for a new trial had no 
effect on the running of the time for filing a 
notice of appeal. Burgers v. Ms*-^, 652 P.2d 
1320 (Utah 1982). 
Case was temporarily remanded to the juve-
nile court in order to allow that court to make 
a determination whether an order extending 
the time for appeal should be entered by the 
juvenile court under this rule, when it was not 
apparent whether the notice of appeal was ei-
ther timely filed or deemed timely filed by the 
juvenile court. State In re M.S., 781 P.2d 1287 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
Where plaintiff, one day after the voluntary 
withdrawal of its motion for directed verdict, 
filed a notice of appeal and also moved for an 
extension of time in which to file a notice of 
appeal, the notice of appeal was timely filed, 
irrespective of whether the order granting ad-
ditional time for filing had a nunc pro tunc 
effect. Guardian State Bank v. Stangl, 778 
P.2d 1 (Utah 1989). 
Notice of appeal placed in the prison mail by 
an incarcerated criminal defendant within the 
30-day period set forth in this rule was not 
timely, where the notice was filed in the dis-
trict court more than 30 days after entry of the 
judgment being appealed. State v. Palmer, 777 
P.2d 521 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
By using the disjunctive "or," Subdivision (c) 
clearly allows the notice of appeal to be filed 
after the announcement of either a decision, a 
judgment, or an order. "Decision" is broadly 
defined to cover final judgments, interlocutory 
orders, or "the first step leading to a judg-
ment," and includes a trial court's determina-
tion of guilt. City of St. George v. Smith, 814 
P.2d 1154 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), overruled on 
other grounds, City of St. George v. Smith, 828 
P.2d 504 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
Appellant's notice of appeal, which was filed 
after the announcement of the decision of guilt 
but before sentencing, was timely filed under 
Subdivision (c). City of St. George v. Smith, 
814 P.2d 1154 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), overruled 
on other grounds, City of St. George v. Smith, 
828 P.2d 504 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
Motion filed within ten days of an entry of 
judgment, objecting to trial court's award of 
pre-judgment interest to plaintiff, was a mo-
tion to alter or amend the judgment under 
UUCP. 59(e). Filing of notice of appeal within 
30 days of the order disposing of that motion 
was timely. Brunetti v. Mascaro, 854 P.2d 555 
(Utah Ct App. 1993). 
When the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdic-
tion to consider defendant's cross-appeal be-
cause it was not timely filed, the lack of juris-
diction was not waived by plaintiffs failure to 
move for dismissal within ten days after defen-
dant filed its docketing statement under 
R.App.P. 10(a). Rule 10(a) is permissive, not 
mandatory, and a lack of subject matter juris-
diction cannot be waived. Glezos v. Frontier 
Inv., 896 P.2d 1230 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). 
-—Date of notice. 
In determining whether a notice of appeal is 
timely filed and establishes jurisdiction in an 
appellate court, the appellate court is bound by 
the filing date on the notice of appeal transmit-
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ted to it by the trial court. State in re M.S., 781 view, 824 P.2d 1199 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); DLB 
P.2d 1287 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). Collection Trust v. Harris, 893 P.2d 593 (Utah 
Cited in Neerings v. Utah State Bar, 817 Ct. App. 1995). 
P.2d 320 (Utah 1991); Wiggins v. Board of Re-
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A.L.R. — When will premature notice of ap-
peal be retroactively validated in federal civil 
case, 76 A.L.R. Fed. 199. 
Rule 5* Discretionary appeals from interlocutory orders. 
(a) Petition for permission to appeal. An appeal from an interlocutory 
order may be sought by any party by filing a petition for permission to appeal 
from the interlocutory order with the clerk of the appellate court with jurisdic-
tion over the case within 20 days after the entry of the order of the trial court, 
with proof of service on all other parties to the action. A timely appeal from an 
order certified under Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, that the 
appellate court determines is not final may, in the discretion of the appellate 
court, be considered by the appellate court as a petition for permission to 
appeal an interlocutory order. The appellate court may direct the appellant to 
file a petition that conforms to the requirements of paragraph (c) of this rule. 
(b) Fees and copies of petition. For a petition presented to the Supreme 
Court, the petitioner shall file with the Clerk of the Supreme Court an origi-
nal and five copies of the petition, together with the fee required by statute. 
For a petition presented to the Court of Appeals, the petitioner shall file with 
the Clerk of the Court of Appeals an original and four copies of the petition, 
together with the fee required by statute. The petitioner shall serve the peti-
tion on the opposing party and notice of the filing of the petition on the trial 
court. If an order is issued authorizing the appeal, the clerk of the appellate 
court shall immediately give notice of the order by mail to the respective 
parties and shall transmit a certified copy of the order, together with a copy of 
the petition and filing fee, to the trial court where the petition and order shall 
be filed in lieu of a notice of appeal. 
(c) Content of petition. 
(1) The petition shall contain: 
(A) A concise statement of facts material to a consideration of the 
issue presented and the order sought to be reviewed; 
(B) The issue presented expressed in the terms and circfamstances 
of the case but without unnecessary detail, and a demonstration that 
the issue was preserved in the trial court. Petitioner must state the 
applicable standard of appellate review and cite supporting author-
ity; 
(C) A statement of the reasons why an immediate interlocutory 
appeal should be permitted, including a concise analysis of the stat-
utes, rules or cases believed to be determinative of the issue stated; 
and 
(D) A statement of the reason why the appeal may materially ad-
vance the termination of the litigation. 
(2) If the appeal is subject to assignment by the Supreme Court to the 
Court of Appeals, the phrase "Subject to assignment to the Court of Ap-
peals" shall appear immediately under the title of the document, i.e. 
Petition for Permission to Appeal. Appellant may then set forth in the 
petition a concise statement why the Supreme Court should decide the 
case in light of the relevant factors listed in Rule 9(c)(7). 
(3) The petitioner shall attach a copy of the order of the trial court from 
which an appeal is sought and any related findings of fact and conclusions 
of law and opinion.
 ft 
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Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order. 
(a) Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other 
parts of the record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may 
be corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative or on the motion of 
any party and after such notice, if any, as the court orders. During the pen-
dency of an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected before the appeal is 
docketed in the appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is pending 
may be so corrected with leave of the appellate court. 
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evi-
dence; fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may 
in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a 
final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence 
which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a 
new trial under Rule 59(b); v3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrin-
sic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; 
(4) when, for any cause, the summons in an action has not been personally 
served upon the defendant as required by Rule 4(e) and the defendant has 
failed to appear in said action; (5) the judgment is void; (6) the judgment has 
been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is 
based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that 
the judgment should have prospective application; or (7) any other reason 
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made 
within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), (3), or (4), not more than 3 
months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A 
motion under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or 
suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the power of a court to enter-
tain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order or pro-
ceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The procedure for 
obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these 
rules or by an independent action. 
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"Any other reason justifying relief." 
—Default judgment. 
—Impossibility of compliance with order. 
—Incompetent counsel. 
—Lack of due process. 
—Merits of case. 
—Mistake or inadvertence. 
—Mutual mistake. 
—Real party in interest. 
—Refund of fine after dismissal. 
Appeals. 
Clerical mistakes. 
—Computation of damages. 
—Correction after appeal. 
—Date of judgment. 
Void judgment. 
—Estate record. 
—Inherent power of courts. 
—Intent of court and parties. 
—Judicial error distinguished. 
—Order prepared by counsel. 
••-* J _ ^ . « — ^r ~,viir ferial mnt inn . 
Form of motion. 
Fraud. 
—Burden of proof. 
—Divorce action. 
Independent action. 
—Constitutionality of taxes. 
—Divorce decree. 
—Fraud or duress. 
—Motion distinguished. 
Invalid summons. 
—Amendment without notice. 
Inequity of prospective application. 
Jurisdiction. 
Mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable 
neglect. 
—Default judgment. 
Illness. 
Inconvenience. 
Meritorious. 
Merits of claim. 
Negligence of attorney. 
No claim for relief. 
—Delayed motion for new tEl^ S* 1 1 Q 
&& special IU&Q^I 
cions of a judicial officer, and thus should not 
(X xJVTERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 27 Am. Jur. 2d Equity testimony heard by predecessor, 70 A.L.R.3d 
§§ 226, 228; 66 Am. Jur. 2d References §§ 1 et 1079. 
seq., 30 et seq. Referee's failure to file report within time 
C.J.S. — 30A C.J.S. Equity §§ 515, 520, 521 specified by statute, court order, or stipulation 
to 528, 532, 533, 535, 537, 539 et seq. as terminating reference, 71 A.L.R.4th 889. 
A.L.R. — Bankruptcy, right of creditor who What are "exceptional conditions" justifying 
has not filed timely petition for review of ref- reference under Rule of Civil Procedure 53(b), 
eree's order to participate in appeal secured by 1 A.L.R. Fed. 922. 
another creditor, 22 A.L.R.3d 914. Key Numbers. — Equity •=» 393 to 395, 401, 
Power of successor or substituted master or 404 to 406; Reference «=> 3 et seq., 35 to 77, 99 
referee to render decision or enter judgment on et seq. 
PART VII. 
JUDGMENT. 
Rule 54. Judgments; costs. 
(a) Definition; form. "Judgment" as used in these rules includes a decree 
and any order from which an appeal lies. A judgment need not contain a 
recital of pleadings, the report of a master, or the record of prior proceedings. 
(b) Judgment upon multiple claims and/or involving multiple parties. 
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a 
claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, and/or when multiple 
parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to 
one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon an express 
determination by the court that there is no just reason for delay and upon an 
express direction for the entry of judgment. In the absence of such determina-
tion and direction, any order or other form of decision, however designated, 
which adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of 
fewer than all the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the 
claims or parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject to revision 
at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the 
rights and liabilities of all the parties. 
(c) Demand for judgment. 
(1) Generally. Except as to a party against whom a judgment is en-
tered by default, every final judgment shall grant the relief to which the 
party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has not 
demanded such relief in his pleadings. It may be given for or against one 
or more of several claimants; and it may, when the justice of the case 
requires it, determine the ultimate rights of the parties on each side as 
between or among themselves. 
(2) Judgment by default. A judgment by default shall not be different 
in kind from, or exceed in amount, that specifically prayed for in the 
demand for judgment. 
(d) Costs. 
(1) To whom awarded. Except when express provision therefor is 
made either in a statute of this state or in these rules, costs shall be 
allowed as of course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise 
directs; provided, however, where an appeal or other proceeding for re-
view is taken, costs of the action, other than costs in connection with such 
appeal or other proceeding for review, shall abide the final determination 
of the cause. Costs against the state of Utah, its officers and agencies 
shall be imposed only to the extent permitted by law. 
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where defendant was not denied a fair opportu-
nity to meet the change in theory of recovery. 
PLC Landscape Constr. v. Piccadilly Fish 'n 
Chips, Inc., 28 Utah 2d 350, 502 P.2d 562 
(1972). 
Complaint for foreclosure of a lien was defec-
tive because of the nature of relief sought even 
though it did not demand judgment for per-
sonal liability on contract and judgment was 
granted for such personal liability, since this 
rule provides that a judgment shall grant the 
relief to which a party is entitled even though 
it is not demanded. Motivated Mgt. Int'l v. 
Finney, 604 P.2d 467 (Utah 1979). 
In a dispute over the appropriation of assets 
and goodwill of a business corporation, it was 
error for trial court to liquidate assets of the 
corporation where the issues upon which such 
action rested were neither pleaded nor raised 
by parties, nor tried. Combe v. Warren's Fam-
ily Drive-Inns, Inc., 680 P.2d 733 (Utah 1984). 
Judgment in favor of nonparty. 
Subdivision (c)(1) is consistent with the gen-
eral principle that a trial court may not render 
judgment in favor of a nonparty. Courts can 
generally make a legally binding abjudication 
only between the parties actually joined in the 
action. Hiltsley v. Ryder, 738 P.2d 1024 (Utah 
1987). 
Subdivision (c)(1) cannot dispense entirely 
with the necessity that a claimant make some 
claim in the lawsuit against the defendant. 
Butler v. Wilkinson, 740 P.2d 1244 (Utah 
1987). 
A court may not grant relief to a nonparty. 
Butler v. Wilkinson, 740 P.2d 1244 (Utah 
1987). 
Judgment creditors who participated as par-
ties in a lien case could not recover in a sepa-
rate fraudulent conveyance case, where they 
had not moved to intervene and were never 
parties in the separate case. Butler v. Wilkin-
son, 740 P.2d 1244 (Utah 1987). 
Motion to reconsider. 
Although a motion to reconsider is not ex-
pressly available under the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, Subdivision (b) does allow by impli-
cation for the possibility of a judge's changing 
his or her mind in cases involving multiple 
parties or multiple claims. Salt Lake City 
Corp. v. James Constructors, Inc., 761 P.2d 42 
(Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
When summary judgment had been granted 
on some issues but a final judgment in the case 
had not been entered, the summary judgment 
was "subject to revision" under Subdivision (b); 
a motion to reconsider was a reasonable means 
of requesting such a revision and was therefore 
permitted. Timm v. Dewsnup, 851 P.2d 1178 
(Utah 1993). 
The law of the case doctrine did not preclude 
the trial court from revisiting a prior ruling on 
a summary judgment motion. Trembly v. Mrs. 
Fields Cookies, 252 Utah Adv. Rep. 23 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1994). 
Tf uroa uri+Viin fV»o f r i o l nnnrf 'f l rl i a f ro f irm tn 
of factual similarities. Trembly v. Mrs. Fields 
Cookies, 252 Utah Adv. Rep. 23 (Utah Ct. App. 
1994). 
Pleading in the alternative. 
In action by architect against owners for 
value of his services, the alternate remedies of 
an action on the contract or in quasi contract 
under the theory of quantum meruit could be 
pleaded in alternative form and inserted by 
amendment late in the proceedings. Parrish v. 
Tahtaras, 7 Utah 2d 87, 318 P.2d 642 (1957). 
Presumption of finality. 
Subdivision (b) allows courts to reacjjust 
prior rulings in complex cases as subsequent 
developments in the case might require, unless 
those rulings disposed of entire claims or par-
ties and those rulings were specifically certi-
fied as final. The "law of the case" doctrine 
nonetheless promotes a measure of predictabil-
ity in such cases by creating a kind of presump-
tion that the court's prior rulings, even if not 
certified as final, were correct and should 
stand. Salt Lake City Corp. v. James Construc-
tors, Inc., 761 P.2d 42 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
Real party in interest 
Where surety's pleadings in action on bond 
stated that it deemed plaintiffs partial assign-
ment of right of action on bond as a breach of 
contract releasing its liability, plaintiff had 
sufficient notice and surety was entitled to 
show that plaintiff was not real party in inter-
est as a result of the assignment even though 
this specific defense was not pleaded. Pruden-
tial Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Hartford Acci-
dent & Indem. Co., 7 Utah 2d 366, 325 P.2d 
899 (1958). 
Relief not demanded in pleadings. 
Where plaintiffs prayer for relief does not 
include punitive damages but he adduces the 
necessary requirements for such damages at 
trial, he can claim punitive damages under 
Subdivision (c) without a formal amendment to 
the pleadings. Behrens v. Raleigh Hills Hosp., 
675 P.2d 1179 (Utah 1983). 
Every final judgment shall grant the relief to 
which the party in whose favor it is rendered is 
entitled, even if the party has not demanded 
such relief in his pleadings. However, although 
Subdivision (c)(1) permits relief on grounds not 
pleaded, that rule does not go so far as to au-
thorize the granting of relief on issues neither 
raised nor tried. Combe v. Warren's Family 
Drive-Inns, Inc., 680 P.2d 733 (Utah 1984); 
Farr v. Brinkerhoff, 829 P.2d 117 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1992). 
Every final judgment shall grant the relief to 
which the party is entitled, even if the party 
has not demanded such relief in his pleadings. 
Mabey v. Kay Peterson Constr. Co., 682 P.2d 
287 (Utah 1984). 
In consonance with Subdivision (c)(1), it 
would have been proper for the court to have 
reformed the contract if a mutual mistake of 
fact had been established by clear and convinc-
ing evidence even though the J9W ofnngiuJd 
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1 SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH; AUGUST 24, 1995; A.M. SESSION 
2 THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Wall. You have done a 
3 good job representing yourself and I'm assuming that 
4 Mrs. Wall is content with the arguments that have been 
5 presented. 
6 You have nothing more to add? 
7 And Mr. Duffin, in his defense, has taken a 
8 position which there's a legal argument about. Because of 
9 the status of the Jones v. Transamerica case, the 
10 different interpretation that you all are making as to the 
11 impact of State v. Ivie — I mean of Allstate v. Ivie, and 
12 of the Anderson matter, which you have referenced, there 
13 is in my opinion, a bona fide dispute which gave raise to 
14 the filing of this. 
15 It is not as clear as you would urge me to find. 
16 And I think that that is exemplified by the difficulty I'm 
17 having in enunciating my reasoning in this matter. But 
18 regardless of which, as to the cross motions for summary 
19 judgment, plaintiffs' motion for judgment on the pleadings 
20 or summary judgment is denied. 
21 Defendant's motion for summary — and it's denied 
22 based upon Allstate v. Ivie, and my interpretation that 
23 that is an instance which is a very close factual basis 
24 for this matter here. And that the concept which 
25 Mr. Duffin has admitted been changed from Jones v. 
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1 Transamerica is the one in which I'm having some 
2 difficulty with. 
3 But I'm holding that the PIP payments are 
4 separate and distinct and different from the general 
5 settlement of the $16,000. But I'm further holding that 
6 Bear River has the ongoing obligation to pay the PIP 
7 payments in this matter pursuant to the contract, and 
8 binding arbitration, regardless of what position Hawkeye 
9 will take in this matter. 
10 Whether or not that has been settled, because of 
11 the blanket release that has been executed by Mr. and 
12 Mrs. Wall, that binding arbitration will proceed as to 
13 Hawkeye and Bear River regarding the PIP payments, which I 
14 have now determined that are due and owing to Mr. and 
15 Mrs. Wall. So with that, I don't know the status of the 
16 counterclaims in this matter. 
17 Now, Mr. Duffin, can you help me out? 
18 MR. DUFFIN: I think it disposes of them all as 
19 far as you have made a finding that it is a justifiable 
20 debatable question in good faith. So that being the case, 
21 the only issue is we are required to continue on making 
22 the payments. That disposes of the case. 
23 THE COURT: And I'm assuming this may go up on 
24 appeal because it is an issue in which there has been 
25 contest, and if it does go up on appeal, Mr. and 
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1 Mrs. Wall, I urge you very strongly that you get counsel 
2 to help you on the appeal procedures. 
3 You have admitted yourself that you haven't 
4 followed or known of all the procedures in District Court, 
5 and Appellate Court is different, again. And I don't 
6 want, possibly good arguments that you may have, lost on 
7 procedural basis and I would — and if I — like I said, 
8 if this matter is appealed, which it very well may be, 
9 then you ought to seek counsel. You ought to get an 
10 attorney to help you out on the appeals. 
11 But, my ruling is as indicated: That plaintiffs' 
12 motion for judgment on the pleadings or summary judgment 
13 is denied. Defendant's motion for summary judgment, based 
14 upon my interpretation of Ivie is — and it's progeny is 
15 affirmed — I mean, is granted. 
16 I am going to dismiss — and I'm further going to 
17 make the observation that as to plaintiffs' motion to 
18 dismiss the counterclaim, I'm finding that the 
19 counterclaim, while it may speak generally in terms of 
20 bona fide — that's really what you are arguing about — I 
21 find it improper that you allege communication fraud, a 
22 criminal matter, and specific reference to the criminal 
23 statute in a counterclaim of a civil matter. 
24 If you wish to allege fraud, then there's a 
25 statute — then there's the common law pleading that you 
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1 can rely upon. But you will not be able to incorporate a 
2 criminal statute and ask for criminal sanctions in a civil 
3 matter. 
4 In that regard, I'm dismissing all of your 
5 counterclaim, but it is not really necessary because I 
6 have ruled in your favor on a motion for summary judgment. 
7 If you wish to pursue a bad faith allegation, I 
8 have already made my observation that there was a bona 
9 fide issue that needed to be handled in a declaratory 
10 manner, which Mr. Duffin has done, but if you wish to 
11 pursue that, that's entirely up to you. I would think it 
12 is not worth it. At this time you have one on your point 
13 that PIP payments are there but that's entirely up to you. 
14 So do you understand the ruling, Mr. and 
15 Mrs. Wall? 
16 MR. WALL: Yes, sir. 
17 THE COURT: All right. And then I'm going to 
18 make it your obligation to prepare an order consistent 
19 with my ruling, granting your motion for summary judgment 
20 and denying plaintiffs' motion. 
21 MR. DUFFIN: I would be glad to prepare it, your 
22 Honor. 
23 THE COURT: If you would, that would help me out. 
24 MR. DUFFIN: I think that would be a better 
25 position, because then I can prepare it in a form that — 
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1 and I will make the following findings: That based upon 
2 Ivie, blank, the defendant, is under a duty to continue 
3 making the payments. 
4 No, 2. I would make a further finding that the 
5 issue is debatable. It was brought in good faith and bona 
6 fide and, therefore, based upon that, with that finding 
7 then, any issue as to counterclaims and so on are 
8 automatically dismissed. 
9 THE COURT: Make the further finding that I am 
10 also dismissing the counterclaim on the court's own motion 
11 sue sponte, due to the fact of intermixing of a criminal 
12 violation of communication fraud in a civil action. 
13 MR. DUFFIN: Okay. I will do that. I will 
14 prepare that. 
15 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 
16 So Mr. Duffin will prepare it. He will submit it 
17 to you for your approval prior to submitting to the court 
18 for my signature. Upon the signature and entry of the 
19 order, I don't know what Bear River wants to do; if they 
20 take it up, they take it up. They have 30 days in which 
21 to appeal. So that's entirely up to them to decide what 
22 they are going to do. I don't know what position 
23 Mr. Duffin and his clients are going to take. 
24 All right. Any questions? 
25 MR. WALL: No, not right now, sir. 
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1 THE COURT: Thank you. 
2 Mr. Duffin, let me return to you your courtesy 
3 copies. 
4 (Proceedings concluded.) 
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1 REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE 
2 STATE OF UTAH ) 
: SS. 
3 County of Salt Lake ) 
4 I, Nora S. Worthen, do certify that I am a 
5 Certified Shorthand Reporter and Official Court Reporter 
6 in and for the State of Utah; that as such reporter, I 
7 reported the occasion of the proceedings of the 
8 above-entitled matter at the aforesaid time and place. 
9 That the proceeding was reported by me in stenotype using 
10 computer-aided transcription consisting of pages 3 through 
11 8 inclusive. That the same constitutes a true and correct 
12 transcription of the bench ruling of said proceedings. 
13 That I am not of kin or otherwise associated with 
14 any of the parties herein or their counsel, and that I am 
15 not interested in the events thereof. 
16 WITNESS my hand at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 
17 15th day of September, 1995. 
18 
19 
20 ^ 
21 s'yZ'U't- J> /I'/zJ M —^ 
Noira S. Worthen, RPR 
22 Utah License No. 22-106373-7801 
23 
24 
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THOMAS A. DUFFIN (927) of 
JENSEN, DUFFIN, CARMAN, DIBB & JACKSON 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
311 South State, Suite 380 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-6600 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, IN AND 
FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
BEAR RIVER MUTUAL 
INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MIKE JACOBSEN and UTAH VALLEY 
COMMUNITY COLLEGE, a body politic 
of the State of Utah, 
Defendants. 
AMENDED 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO FILE 
AN AMENDED COMPLAINT 
Civil No. 920905486PD 
Judge Glen Iwacaki 
Pursuant to Rule 4-501(1) of the Judicial Council Rules of Judicial 
Administration, Plaintiff files its Memorandum in Support of its Motion to file an 
Amended Complaint. Defendant's Motion is based on the following facts and 
argument: 
1. Defendant Utah Valley Community College, is a subdivision or 
agency of the State of Utah, created by the Legislature of the State of Utah under the 
provisions of the Utah State Constitution, Article XI, Section 1. 
00058/^^/ 
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2. This suit is brought pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, 1953, Title 
63, Chapter 30, Sections 1 through 38. 
3. Jurisdiction is also conferred upon the above-entitled Court 
pursuant to the provisions of the Utah State Constitution, Article I, Section 7, (Due 
Process), no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process 
of law. 
4. That on the 7th day of August, 1991, the Plaintiff, within the one-
year period, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, §63-30-11 and 12, petitioned the 
State of Utah for relief. Said petition was denied. 
5. The Plaintiff has previously filed an undertaking required by Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953, as amended §63-30-19. 
6. That at all times herein the Plaintiff was an insurance company 
duly organized and existing under the laws of the state of Utah and authorized to 
engage in the insurance business who issued a policy of insurance to Larry J. Remm, 
providing for personal injury protection coverage, Policy No. C127191. 
7. That at all times herein the Defendant, Utah Valley Community 
College, was a body politic of the State of Utah, or an agency of the State of Utah. 
8. That at all times herein, Mike Jacobsen, was a resident of Utah 
County, State of Utah, and was an agent of Utah Valley Community College and that 
the State of Utah and was driving a vehicle during the performance of his duties 
00059
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within the scope of his employment and under color of authority of Utah Valley 
Community College and the State of Utah. 
9- That at ail times herein, on January 4, 1991
 # Larry J. Remm was 
the owner of a 1978 Chevrolet automobile, which was being driven by himself and 
insured with Bear River Mutual Insurance Company with personal injury protection 
benefits, 
10. The event out of which this cause of action arose took place and 
occurred on February 15, 1991, at approximately 1:00 p.m. at 4500 South and 320 
West, Salt Lake County, Utah, when Defendant's Agent negligently ran his vehicle 
into the vehicle owned and driven by Larry J. Remm, causing personal injuries in the 
sum of $2,257.00. 
11. That at the time and place mentioned herein the defendant, by and 
through its agent, employee, Mike Jacobsen, in the course of his employment and in 
the performance of his duties, Larry J. Remm was operating his automobile in a 
northbound direction exiting 1-15 and turned West onto 4500 South when Mike 
Jacobsen struck the right rear of the Remm automobile. 
12. In the original Complaint the scribe inadvertently placed Salt Lake 
County as the body politic on whom notice was given and the date of March 29, 
1991, as the date of service, rather than the 7th day of August, 1991. This was in 
error and Plaintiff should be allowed to amend its Complaint to correct the error. 
-4-
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1, 
THAT PLAINTIFF. PURSUANT TO RULE 15(a) SHOULD BE FREELY 
ALLOWED TO AMEND ITS COMPLAINT. 
Rule 15(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides as follows: 
" A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of course at any time 
before a responsive pleading is served or, if the pleading is one to which 
no responsive pleading is permitted and the action has not been placed 
upon the trial calendar, he may so amend it at any time within 20 days 
after it is served. Otherwise a party may amend his pleading only by 
leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall 
be freely given when justice so requires. . . . " 
The said action of the Court in allowing Plaintiff to amend its Complaint 
will not prejudice, or cause undue delay in the trial of the matter or in bringing the 
matter to trial. 
The case of Gillman v. Hansen, 486 P.2d 1045 (UT 1971), states: 
"Ordinarily the allowance of an amendment by leave of court is a matter 
which lies within the sound discretion of the trial court. This discretion, 
however, is to be exercised in the furtherance of justice and must not be 
exercised so as to defeat justice. The rule in this state has always been 
to allow amendments freely where justice requires, and especially is this 
true before trial. 
The case of Hancock v. Luke gives the light on the question here before 
us. There, no objections were made to the pleadings until the case was 
called for trial, when the plaintiff moved for judgment on the pleadings. 
The defendant's motion to amend was denied. In reversing that ruling 
this court said: 
'We can see no reason whatever why the defendants in 
this case should be denied the right of amendment when 
the exercise of that right is a matter of daily occurrence in 
our courts of justice. True, motions for judgment on the pirn 
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pleadings may be rare, but that is no reason why the right 
of amendment should be denied when timely proposed, as 
in the case at bar. Nor can we conceive how any one can 
in any way in advance that in this case at least a partial 
defense may not be set forth by a proper amendment to the 
answer. Nor can we see how it can successfully be 
contended that the emotion for leave to amend was not 
timely made, or that prejudice or undue delay will result if 
a l lowed/" 
The case of Gillman v. Hansen, supra, states that the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure "shall be liberally construed to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive 
determination of every action" and unless substantial abuse and prejudice can be 
demonstrated, it is judicial error to deny the Plaintiff the right to amend its Complaint. 
POINT 11. 
THE PLAINTIFF TIMELY FILED ITS NOTICE AND ITS COMPLAINT IN THE 
ABOVE-ENTITLED MATTER AND THE COURT HAS JURISDICTION. 
The accident occurred on February 15, 1991. On the 7th day of August, 
1991, Exhibit A, notice was sent to the State of Utah, through its agent, Risk 
Management. No answer was received from Risk Management and, therefore, the 
time for commencing an action, as more fully set forth in Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, as amended §63-30-14, provides that if no answer to a claim is received, the 
denial takes place 90 days thereafter. 
Therefore, the notice being sent on August 7, 1991, the denial took 
effect as of November 7, 1991. 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended §63-30-15 provides that the 
action must be commenced within one year after the denial. Therefore, the time to 
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commence the action would be one year from November 7, 1991, or November 7, 
1992. The action was in fact commenced on October , 1992, and was timely. 
Therefore, notice was properly sent, and the action was commenced properly within 
one year after denial. 
POINT III. 
NO NOTICE IS NECESSARY PURSUANT TO THE GOVERNMENT ACT 
ON PERSONAL INJURY PROTECTION AND BENEFIT CLAIMS. 
In 1985 the Utah Legislature passed Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as 
amended §31A-22-307 known as the Personal Injury Protection Coverages and 
Benefits statute. The abbreviation for this statute is called "PIP." 
Under PIP the driver of an automobile who is injured in an accident is paid 
medical and loss of wage benefits by his own insurance carrier. Then the 
reimbursement between the insurance carriers is provided for by mandatory arbitration 
as more fully set forth in AHstate v. I vie. 606 P.2d 1197. The jyje case makes it 
unequivocally clear that the personal injury protection benefits do not become part of 
the plaintiff's (claimant's) negligence claim against the tort feasor. They are distinct 
and separate and they have nothing to do with the tort feasor's or claimant's cause 
of action. 
The statute, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended §31 A-22-309{5) 
provides as follows: 
(5) Payment of the benefits provided for in Section 31A-22-307 shall 
be made on a monthly basis as expenses are incurred. Benefits for any 
period are overdue if they are not paid within 30 days after the insurer 
receives reasonable proof of the fact and amount of expenses i n c u r r e ^ * ' 
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during the period. If reasonable proof is not supplied as to the entire 
claim, the amount supported by reasonable proof is overdue if not paid 
within 30 days after that proof is received by the insurer. If the insurer 
fails to pay the expenses when due, these expenses shall bear interest 
at the rate of 1 !4% per month after the due date. The person entitled 
to the benefits may bring an action in contract to recover the expenses 
plus the applicable interest. If the insurer is required by the action to pay 
any overdue benefits and interest, the insurer is also required to pay a 
reasonable attorney's fee to the claimant. 
As can be plainly seen, the insured contractually has a claim against his 
insurance company for the payment of these benefits. Then the reimbursement is 
covered by statute pursuant to arbitration. 
The whole basis of the entire concept of the Personal Injury Protection 
statute is contractual and statutory in nature. 
This very matter was decided in the U.S. District Court in the matter of 
United States Fidelity & Guaranty v. United States of America, 728 F.Supp. 651 
{D.Utah 1989), in which the Federal District Court stated on page 655: 
w
. . . The inter-company claim for reimbursement of PIP benefits is a 
statutory and contractual remedy not based on personal tort liability. 
The Utah Supreme Court in Allstate v. Ivie, 606 P.2d 1197, 1202-03 
(1980) denied a subrogation claim for recovery of PIP benefits . . . " 
Therefore, this remedy is entirely statutory. American States Insurance 
Company v. Utah Transit Authority, 699 P.2d 1210 (Utah 1985) points out: 
" . . . It correctly points out that UTA is made subject to the 
requirements of the No-Fault Act in section 31-41-4(3) and that 
subsections 31-41-5(1 )(a) and (b) require owners of motor vehicles to 
carry liability insurance that meets the qualifications imposed by the 
Safety Responsibility Act, Allstate Insurance Co. v. USF&G, Utah, 619 
P.2d 329 (1980), or to be self-insured." 
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Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended §60-30-5 provides: 
"Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived as to any 
contractual obligation. Actions arising out of contractual rights or 
obligations shall not be subject to the requirements of Section 63-30-11, 
63-30-12, 63-30-13, 63-30-14, 63-30-15 or 63-30-19." 
Defendant plainly has not read the statute. The basis for these claims 
as more fully set forth in the Federal District Court of United States Fidelity & 
Guaranty v. United States of America, supra, is contractual and statutory. Therefore, 
no notice is required. 
POINT IV. 
THAT PROPER NOTICE WAS SENT TO THE STATE OF UTAH. 
The notice requirement was sent to the Division of Risk Management for 
the State of Utah, 355 West North Temple, Suite 330, Salt Lake City, Utah, as 
pursuant to the Affidavit of Thomas A. Duffin, attached hereto, all claims from the 
Salt Lake Community College are referred to the State of Utah, Division of Risk 
Management. There was certainly substantial compliance with the statute. 
The case of Stahl v. Utah Transit Authority, 618 P.2d 480 (Utah 1980) 
stated: 
"Moreover, there was substantial compliance with the 30-day notice 
provision and defendant was in no way prejudiced by plaintiff's failure 
to comply with the formality of filing a claim. 
A statute is, of course, to be construed in light of its intended purpose. 
Child v. City of Spanish Fork, Utah, 538 P.2d 184 (1975). It is 
necessary to consider the policy of the notice requirement so that in any 
particular case the facts can be evaluated to determine if the intent of 
the statute has been accomplished by substantial compliance with the 
statutory directive. Smith v. State,Ala. 364 So.2d 1 (1978). This county 
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has previously stated that the primary purpose of a notice of claim 
requirement is to afford the responsible public authorities an opportunity 
to pursue a proper and timely investigation of the merits of a claim and 
to arrive at a timely settlement, if appropriate, thereby avoiding the 
expenditure of puDlic revenue for costly and unnecessary litigation. 
Sears v. Southworth, Utah 563 P.2d 192 (1977); Gallegos v. Midvale 
City, 27 Utah 2d 27, 492 P.2d 1335 (1972). 
We view plaintiff's contention that the notice given to the insurance 
adjuster in this case constituted compliance with the statute in light of 
these policy considerations. First, we note that §63-30-14 of the 
Governmental Immunity Act equates the authority of the insurance 
carrier with that of the governmental entity concerning the notice to 
claimant of the approval of denial of a claim for injury. Thus the 
insurance agent is authorized by law to handle the approval or denial of 
plaintiffs claim, representing the interests of the government. Rice v. 
Granite School District, 23 Utah 2d 22, 456 P.2d 159 (1969)." 
There has been substantial compliance in any event because the Division 
of Risk Management handles all claims for the State of Utah and, therefore, the 
provisions of the statute have been correctly complied with. 
CONCLUSION 
This Plaintiff, Bear River Mutual Insurance Company, requests the above-
entitled Court to allow the amended Complaint to be filed and the Motion to Dismiss 
be denied. 
Dated this/—^ day of April, 1993. 
JENSEN, DUFFIN, CARMAN, DIBB & JACKSON 
I Cc^TIFYTHATTHIS IS A TRI 
OF, ORIGINAL DOCUMEI 
INTHL H^IRO DISTRICT C 
LAKEC NTY.8TATEOF 
s ^ 
DEPL 
DATE: 
homas A. Duffin 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
P3L2V4 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
J certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing Memorandum in Support 
of its Motion to File Amended Complaint to the following parties by placing a true 
copy thereof in an envelope addressed to: 
Jan Graham 
Attorney General 
Barbara E. Ochoa 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Defendants 
236 Si „e Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
postage prepaid, this / 3 d a y of April, 1993. 
ofAmem 
W>& 0 
.BE IT REMEMBERED That John Wall and Nanc%- Wall 
Address 1269 West California, Salt Lake City, Utah 84104 
(hereinafter referred to as tne Claimant s ) for and in consideration of the sum of S i x t e e n Thousanc and no/ 100s 
Dollars ($ 1 6 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 ) 
the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, do we hereby REMISE, RELEASE A N D FOREVER DISCHARGE 
David Waters d /b /a D & L Construct ion and Lana Waters 
(Insert Here Full Name of Person*, Corporations or Partnersntps To Be R I I M M O ) 
agents and servants and all other persons, firms, and corporations whomsoever of and from any and all actions, Their 
(His, Her, Their, its) 
claims, and demands whatsoever which claimant's now have or may have, whether known or unknown, developed or un-
(Has, Hd^e) 
developed, on account of or sri.-ing out of the accident, casualty u. evsni which happened or. c* 7+-V. dav of 
August .<n>_22_-
As a further consideration for said Sum Claimant s warrant that no promise or agreement not herein exoressed has 
been made to Claimant s ; that in executing this Release Claimant _s are not relying upon any statement or representation 
i u . Are) 
made by the party or parties hereby released or said party's or paaies' agents, servants or physicians concerning the nature, 
extent, or duration of the injuries and/or damages, or concerning any other thing or matter, but are relying solely upon 
(U, Are) 
t h e i r own judgment; that the above mentioned sum is received by Claimants 
(His, ner. Their, its) — 
in full settlement and satisfaction 
of all the aforesaid claims and demands whatsoever; that Claimants are legally competent to execute this Release; and that be-
lts. Are) 
fore signing and sealing this Release, Claimant
 g h*vp fully informed rhpmgpl VPC of its contents and meaning 
(Has, Have) (Himsett, HerseH, Tftemseives) 
and have executed it with full knowledge thereof. It is further understood and agreed that the payment of said amount is 
not to be construed as an admission of liability, but is a compromise of a disputed claim. 
HAVE READ THE FQREBOIN& RELEASE AND FUU.T UNDERSTAND JT>'^. 
Signed, sealed and delivered this 
at , *3^G ^taL~s-
b.rb dayof -7/IOJCL^:^ 
*^&ZJLA- *^f C^^^^-^^yf 
w2£. 
In the presence of X 
Witness: 
Witness: 
Witness: 
ntf**zJL/ j.uJt' 
(Claimants sign be.'ow) 
C 381A 7/71 K 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
MAMHtWJ. WHITE 
247 Hawthorne Dr. 
Layton. UT 84041 
My GooimHWon Ewp»K 
December 13th. 1997 
STATE OF UTAH 
(Seal) 
(Seal) 
(OVfcR) 
_ (Seal) 
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an action in tort by either a provider of direct benefits under section 10-4-706 
or by a person who has been injured or damaged as a result of an automobile 
accident against an alleged tortfeasor where such alleged tortfeasor was 
either: 
(a) Using or operating a motor vehicle not required to be covered under 
the provisions of this part 7, unless coverage equivalent to that required 
under section 10-4-706 was, at the time of occurrence of the alleged tortious 
conduct, actually provided for the benefit of persons for whom benefits are 
provided under section 10-4-707; or 
(b) Using or operating a motor vehicle which, although required to be 
covered under the provisions of this part 7, was not, at the time of the occur-
rence of the alleged tortious conduct, actually covered under the provisions 
ofthispart7;or 
(c) Deliberately and intentionally committing a tort; or 
(d) Subject as a manufacturer, distributor, supplier, or repairman to a 
tort action arising out of product liability or product defect. 
Source: L. 73: p. 341, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 13-25-15. L. 92: IP(1) amended, 
p. 1787, § 10, effective May 14. 
Am. Jur.2d. See 7 Am. Jur.2d, Automobile claim for the purposes of excusing plaintiff 
Insurance, § 349. from meeting the threshold requirements of 
Although plaintiff alleged willfull and § 10-4-714. Pulliam v. Dreiling, 839 P.2d 521 
wanton conduct by the defendant to support a (Colo. App. 1992). 
claim for punitive damages, this allegation did Applied in Cingoranelli v. St. Paul Fire & 
not transform plaintiffs negligence claim Marine Ins. Co., 658 P.2d 863 (Colo. 1983). 
against the defendant into an intentional tort 
10-4-716. Self-insurers. (1) Any person in whose name more than twenty-
five motor vehicles are registered may qualify as a self-insurer by obtaining 
a certificate of self-insurance issued by the director. 
(2) The director may, in his discretion, upon the application of such 
person, issue a certificate of self-insurance when he is satisfied that such 
person is possessed and will continue to be possessed of ability to pay direct 
benefits as required under section 10-4-706 and to pay any and all judgments 
which may be obtained against such person. Upon not less than five days' 
notice and a hearing pursuant to such notice, the director may, upon reason-
able grounds, cancel a certificate of self-insurance. Failure to pay any benefits 
under section 10-4-706 or failure to pay any judgment within thirty days 
after such judgment shall have become final shall constitute a reasonable 
ground for the cancellation of a certificate of self-insurance. 
Source: L. 73: p. 342, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 13-25-16. L. 92: (2) amended, 
p. 1787, § 11, effective May 14. 
Provisions of act with regard to self-insurers bodily injury arising from the vehicle's 
do not limit obligation that every owner of a permissive use. Barnes v. Whitt, 852 P.2d 
motor vehicle provide liability coverage for 1322 (Colo. App. 1993). 
10-4-717. Intercompany arbitration. (1) Every insurer licensed to write 
motor vehicle insurance in this state shall be deemed to have agreed, as 
a condition to maintaining such license after January 1, 1974: 
nvz 
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(a) That, where its insured is or would be held legally liable under the 
provisions of section 10-4-713 (2) for the benefits paid by another insurer, 
described in section 10-4-706, it will reimburse such other insurer to the 
extent of such benefits but not in excess of the amount of damages so recover-
able for the type of loss covered by such benefits and only to the extent 
of the alleged tort-feasor's insurance coverage in excess of reasonable com-
pensation paid to the injured person for such person's injury or damage by 
the alleged tort-feasor's insurer; and 
(b) That the issue of liability for such reimbursement and the amount 
thereof shall be decided by mandatory, binding intercompany arbitration 
procedures approved by the commissioner. If either insurer in such an arbi-
tration proceeding also has provided coverage to the same policyholder for 
collision or upset arising out of the same occurrence, such insurer shall also 
submit the issue of recovery of any payments thereunder to the same manda-
tory and binding arbitration as provided in this section. 
(2) The commissioner shall also approve procedures for arbitration of 
the issue of liability for and reimbursement of benefits paid under additional 
or supplementary coverages written pursuant to section 10-4-710, which 
procedures shall be applicable to disputes between insurers agreeing to join 
in such procedures. Such agreements shall be renewable annually and shall 
apply to motor vehicle accidents occurring during the calendar year. 
(3) Notwithstanding any statute of limitations to the contrary, any 
demand for initial arbitration proceedings shall be brought within one year 
of the first payment of any of the benefits described in section 10-4-706 
by the insurer claiming for reimbursement. Arbitration proceedings need not 
await final payment of benefits, and the award, if any, shall include provision 
for reimbursement of subsequent benefits. Proceedings may be reopened to 
challenge the propriety of payments subsequently made, but no question of 
fact decided by a prior award shall be reconsidered in any such subsequent 
hearing. 
(4) Nothing in this section shall be construed to allow an insurer to claim 
and receive reimbursement, whether by arbitration, subrogation, litigation, 
intracompany setoff, or any other means, from the liability insurance of the 
tort-feasor in such a manner as to reduce the amount of liability insurance 
available to reasonably compensate an injured victim having a claim or cause 
of action under section 10-4-714. 
Source: L. 73: p. 342, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 13-25-17. L, 79: p. 389, §2. 
L. 80: p. 466, § 1. L, 92: (l)(a) and (3) amended, p. 1788, § 12, effective 
May 14. 
Am. Jur.2d. See 7 Am. Jur.2d, Automobile 
Insurance, § 347. 
Insured entitled to full tort recovery except 
where the result is double recovery. The general 
assembly intended to allow an insured full tort 
recovery undiminished by the subrogation 
and arbitration right of his insurer, except in 
those cases where such a policy would result in 
double recovery to the insured. Marquez v. 
Prudential Property & Cas. Ins. Co., 620 P.2d 
29 (Colo. 1980). 
Subrogation and arbitration not concurrent 
alternatives. Reading § 10-4-713 (1) and this 
section together, it is clear that they were not 
intended to provide concurrent, alternative 
recovery rights to an insurer through subroga-
tion or arbitration. Marquez v. Prudential 
Property & Cas. Ins. Co., 620 P.2d 29 (Colo. 
1980). 
Section applies to actions by or between 
insurance companies and has no applicability 
where the injured party brings an action on her 
own behalf against the tort-feasor. 
?! L53 
10-4-718 Insurance 338 
Hickenbottom v. Schmidt, 626 P.2d 726 
(Colo. App. 1981). 
When direct action for reimbursement avail-
able. Where an insurer licensed to do business 
in Colorado has made personal injury protec-
tion payments and seeks reimbursement from 
another insurer licensed in Colorado, the sole 
and mandatory remedy for recovery of per-
sonal injury protection expenditures is arbi-
tration, as provided by this section. Direct 
action for reimbursement under § 10-4-713 is 
available only where one of the parties is not 
an insurer licensed to do business in Colorado. 
Baumgart v. Kentucky Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. 
Co., 199 Colo. 330,607 P.2d 1002(1980). 
Section applicable. Because defendant taxi-
cab company maintained a certificate of self-
insurance and qualified as a self-insurer under 
§ 10-4-716, once a claim for legal liability 
under § 10-4-713 (2) becomes established, the 
This section constitutes declaration of policy 
that insurance payments can be paid in quar-
terly installments. Golting v. Hartford Acci-
Insurers failure to notify insureds clearly and 
unequivocally of its cancellation of coverage 
constituted a course of conduct which led 
insureds, as ordinary laypersons, reasonably 
to believe that by properly endorsing and 
issue of reimbursement shall be addressed by 
arbitration. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. v. 
Cabs, Inc., 751 P.2d61 (Colo. 1988). 
When this section is read with § 10-4-713, 
mandatory arbitration for determination of 
liability for direct benefits is clearly not 
required where two vehicles in accident were 
both private. Shelter Gen. Ins. v. Progressive 
Cas., 796 P.2d 18 (Colo. App. 1990). 
Unlicensed motor vehicle insurers are not 
subject to the mandatory arbitration provisions 
of this section. Sakala v. Safeco Ins. Co. of 
America, 833 P.2d 879 (Colo. App. 1992). 
Uninsured private motor vehicle owner is not 
subject to mandatory arbitration under this 
section because only licensed insurers are sub-
ject to such mandatory arbitration. Sakala v. 
Safeco Ins. Co., 833 P.2d 879 (Colo. App. 
1992). 
dent & Indem. Co., 43 Colo. App. 337, 603 
P.2d 972 (1979). 
returning their premium payment their per-
sonal injury coverage would remain in effect 
or be reinstated. Leland v. Travelers Indem. 
Co. of Illinois, 712 P.2d 1060 (Colo. App. 
1985). 
10-4-718. Quarterly premium payments. The commissioner shall issue 
rules and regulations establishing quarterly, semiannual, and annual pre-
mium payments for persons who are required to purchase insurance under 
this part 7. 
Source: L. 73: p. 342, § 1. CR.S. 1963: § 13-25-18. 
10-4-719. Prohibited reasons for nonrenewal or refusal to write a policy 
of automobile insurance applicable to this part 7. (1) No insurer authorized 
to transact or transacting business in this state shall refuse to write or refuse 
to renew a policy of insurance affording the coverages required by operation 
of sections 10-4-706 and 10-4-707 solely because of the age, color, sex, 
national origin, residence, marital status, or lawful occupation, including the 
military service, of anyone who is, or seeks to become insured, or solely 
because another insurer has canceled a policy or refused to write or renew 
such policy. The commissioner shall administer and enforce the provisions 
of this subsection (1). 
(2) Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit any insurance 
company authorized to transact or transacting business in this state from 
issuing policies of insurance affording the coverages required by operation 
of sections 10-4-706 and 10-4-707 solely to a specialty market authorized 
by the commissioner. 
Source: L. 73: p. 343, § 1. C.R.S. 1963: § 13-25-19. 
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